THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


IN  MEMORY  OF 

PROFESSOR 
EUGENE  I.  McCORMAC 


ANDREW  JOHNSON 

MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE 


BY 

CLIFTON  R.  HALL,  PH.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  IN  HISTORY  AND 
POLITICS    IN    PRINCETON     UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON:  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1916 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

DAVIS 


Copyright  1916,  by 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Published  October,  1916 


PREFACE 

This  book,  as  its  title  implies,  is  an  attempt  to  trace  the  per 
sonality  of  Andrew  Johnson  through  the  years  1862-1865,  when 
the  burden  of  military  government  and  reconstruction  in 
Tennessee  rested  principally  upon  his  shoulders.  With  this 
purpose  in  mind,  I  have  refrained  from  going  into  several  temp 
ting  by-paths  of  the  subject.  The  military  administration  in 
West  Tennessee,  for  example,  for  which  not  Johnson,  but  the 
generals  of  the  regular  army  stationed  at  Memphis  were  primarily 
responsible,  has  been  scarcely  touched  upon ;  so,  too,  the  working 
of  the  Federal  trade  regulations  in  Tennessee,  a  subject  on  which 
a  separate  monograph  might  be  written.  Nor  have  I  carried 
my  account  beyond  the  spring  of  1865,  when  Johnson  left 
Tennessee  for  Washington.  The  subsequent  details  of  recon 
struction  in  the  state  may  be  found  in  J.  W.  Fertig's  "The 
Secession  and  Reconstruction  of  Tennessee,"  which  also  treats 
of  the  period  of  the  war,  but  which  was  written  before  the 
Johnson  papers  in  the  Library  of  Congress  were  available  for 
study. 

As  is  apparent  from  the  footnotes,  I  have  based  my  account 
largely  upon  the  Johnson  papers,  the  Official  Records  of  the 
Union  and  Confederate  Armies,  and  the  contemporary  news 
papers.  Of  these  last,  the  Nashville  Union  is  a  source  of  the 
highest  importance.  It  is,  of  course,  polemical  and  violently 
partisan,  but  it  contains  a  surprising  amount  of  detailed  news  of 
any  local  occurrence  of  interest  and  notices  and  discusses 
all  references  to  Tennessee  affairs  which  it  discovers  in  ex 
changes  .;  and  its  assertions  can  usually  be  checked  from  other 
sources.  I  have  made  little  use  of  Brownlow's  Knoxville  Whig, 
a  file  of  which  is  in  the  Yale  University  library,  or  of  "Parson 
Brownlow's  Book,"  for  the  obvious  reason  that,  in  this  period 
of  his  career,  the  choleric  parson  was  consciously  blinking  facts 
and  coining  political  capital  out  of  superlatives, 

I  am  conscious  of  my  failure  adequately  to  present  the  Con- 


iv  PREFACE 

federate  side  of  many  controverted  points.  There  is  a  most 
regrettable  dearth  of  material  for  this  purpose,  even  the  anti- 
administration  newspapers  of  Memphis,  such  as  the  Argus  and  the 
Avalanche  existing,  unless  I  am  mistaken,  only  in  files  so  broken 
as  to  be  practically  of  no  value  to  the  historian.  Fortunately,  for 
an  investigation  directed  to  Johnson's  own  career,  this  kind  of 
material  is  not  essential. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  add,  in  explanation  of  my 
method  of  treating  my  subject,  that  I  have  desired  to  show 
how  the  lessons  learned  by  Johnson  in  reconstructing  his  own 
state  constituted  a  training  for  the  work  to  which  he  was  so 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  called  in  a  national  capacity.  It 
will  be  seen,  I  think,  that  his  attitude,  as  president,  toward  the 
problems  of  reconstruction,  was,  in  most  respects,  a  natural 
consequence  of  his  experience  as  military  governor  of  Tennessee. 

I  am  happy  to  express  my  gratitude  to  Professor  Robert  M. 
McElroy  and  Professor  William  Starr  Myers  of  Princeton 
for  their  kindly  interest  and  assistance  in  my  work,  and  to 
Dr.  Gaillard  Hunt,  of  the  Library  of  Congress,  for  many 
courtesies  shown  me. 

CLIFTON  R.  HALL. 

Princton,  N.  J. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER         I.     SECESSION   i 

CHAPTER       II.     ANDREW  JOHNSON  20 

CHAPTER      III.     INAUGURATION   OF   MILITARY   GOV 
ERNMENT    32 

CHAPTER      IV.     THE  DEFENSE  OF  NASHVILLE  ....   50 
CHAPTER        V.     REPRESSION  UNDER  ROSECRANS..   71 

CHAPTER      VI.     MILITARY     AND     POLITICAL     RE 
VERSES  1863  87 

CHAPTER    VII.     PROGRESS  OF  REORGANIZATION,  .no 

CHAPTER  VIII.     THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGN  OF 

1864    139 

CHAPTER      IX.     REORGANIZATION      ACCOM 
PLISHED  157 

CHAPTER        X.     A  GOVERNOR-OF-ALL-WORK 176 

CHAPTER      XL     CONCLUSION  ..210 


CHAPTER   I 

SECESSION 

The  early  mutterings  of  the  secession  storm  awakened  but 
little  response  in  Tennessee.  The  state  was  a  stronghold  of 
the  conservative  Whig  party,  devoted  from  its  inception  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  Union  as  the  summum  bonum  of  the 
national  life,  for  the  preservation  of  which  slavery  and  every 
other  minor  issue  must  compromise  or  give  way.  While  the 
Democrats  had  carried  every  gubernatorial  election  since  1853, 
they  had  invariably  been  compelled  to  struggle  desperately  for 
victory  over  the  Whigs,  and  this  at  a  time  when  the  power  of 
that  party  was  crumbling  to  pieces  in  other  parts  of  the  country.1 
The  border  states,  with  vital  interests  and  intimate  associations 
both  North  and  South,  had  contributed  many  redoubtable  Whig 
champions,  and  the  political  leader  of  Tennessee  in  1860  was 
the  Whig,  John  Bell,  to  whom,  as  the  exponent  of  "the  Con 
stitution,  the  Union,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws,"  his 
state  had  given  a  plurality  of  4,565  votes  over  Breckenridge  in 
the  presidential  election  of  that  year.2  Allied  with  the  same 
party  were  Thomas  A.  R.  Nelson,  Horace  Maynard,  William 
G.  Brownlow,  W.  B.  Campbell  and  Robert  L.  Caruthers,  whose 
careers  make  up  so  large  a  part  of  Tennessee  history  during  the 
war. 

Tennessee's  loyalty,  however — as  circumstances  were  to  prove 
and  as  keen  observers  appreciated  even  in  1860 — was  subject 
to  conditions.  Socially  and  economically  she  was,  except  in 
her  eastern  district,  identified  with  the  South.  The  inhabitants 
of  the  slopes  of  her  great  middle  division  and  the  alluvial 
plains  of  the  west  were  largely  engaged  in  growing  and  shipping 
cotton.  The  plantation  system  and  slavery  were  in  full  opera- 

1  Miller's  Manual  of  Tennessee,  p.  170. 

2  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1861,  p.  676.     "The   full  Whig  strength  went  to 
Bell  and  Everett,  and  the  majority  of  the  democratic  votes  to  Brecken 
ridge,  while  Douglas  was  supported  iby  about  10,000  conservative  Demo 
crats." — Caldwell,   Studies  in   the   Constitutional  History   of   Tennessee, 
p.  266.     There  was  no  Lincoln  ticket  in  the  state. 


2  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

tion.  These  were  her  most  precious  interests.  As  a  border 
state,  situated  between  North  and  South  and  deriving  profit 
and  advantage  from  both,  she  perceived  in  the  Union  her  best 
prospects  for  prosperity;  and  had  the  Union  been  peaceably 
dissolved  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  interfere  with  her  "peculiar 
institutions"  and  her  channels  of  communication  with  the  slave 
states,  it  is  possible — though,  indeed,  not  probable — that  her  con 
servative  antecedents  might  have  combined  with  considerations 
of  her  own  advantage  to  hold  her  true  to  her  old  allegiance. 
The  attitude  of  acquiescence  by  most  of  her  leaders,  her  news 
papers  and  the  great  majority  of  her  citizens  in  the  election  of 
Lincoln  showed  at  least  that  they  had  no  sympathy  with  any 
project  to  disrupt  the  Union  before  the  infringement  of  Southern 
rights  by  overt  acts  of  the  Federal  government3 

The  belligerent  pro-slavery  minority,  however,  were  for  im 
mediate  action,  and  the  initiation  of  secession  by  the  legislatures 
of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  aroused  popular  excitement 
and  encouraged  them  in  this  course.  Their  guiding  spirit  was 
the  governor,  Isham  G.  Harris,  who,  in  constant  communication 
with  the  secession  leaders  in  the  other  states  and  alert  for 
the  auspicious  moment  to  perfect  his  designs,  waited  only  for 
assurance  of  decisive  action  by  his  neighbors  to  convene  the 
legislature  in  secret  session  on  the  /th  of  January,  1861  "to 
consider  the  present  condition  of  the  country."  In  his  message, 
he  advised  that  the  question  of  calling  a  convention  be  sub 
mitted  forthwith  to  the  people;  but  suggested,  as  the  safest 
and  wisest  procedure,  that  amendments  to  the  Federal  Con 
stitution,  designed  permanently  to  tie  the  hands  of  the  Northern 
majority — such  as  the  restoration  of  a  compromise  line  and  its 
extension  to  the  Pacific,  modifications  of  the  fugitive-slave 
law  as  concessions  to  Northern  sentiment,  and  a  provision  against 
the  repeal  of  these  measures  except  by  the  unanimous  consent 
of  the  slave-holding  states — be  insisted  on.  Harris'  opinion  of 
the  actual  worth  of  his  own  pacific  proposals  was  shown  in 
the  observation :  "Before  your  adjournment,  in  all  human  prob 
ability,  the  only  practical  question  for  the  state  to  determine 

'Memphis  Bulletin,  Nov.  12,  1860;  Nashville  Banner,  Nov.  13,  1860, 
etc. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  3 

will  be  whether  or  not  she  will  unite  her  fortunes  with  a  North-- 
ern  or  Southern  Confederacy ;  upon  which  question,  when  pre 
sented,  I  am  certain  there  can  be  little  or  no  division  in  senti 
ment,  identified  as  we  are  in  every  respect  with  the  South."4 

Immediately  upon  this  message,  as  if  part  of  a  prearranged 
plan,  followed  the  news  of  the  secession  of  Mississippi,  Florida, 
Alabama  and  Georgia  and  the  repulse  of  the  Star  of  the  West 
in  Charleston  harbor.  The  state  seethed  with  excitement. 
Secession  meetings  were  held  everywhere  and  the  legislature, 
strongly  pro-Southern  in  sympathy  from  the  beginning,  hastened 
to  provide  (January  19)  for  a  popular  vote  on  the  question 
of  assembling  a  convention  "to  adopt  such  measures  for  vindicat 
ing  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  and  the  protection  of  its  in 
stitutions  as  shall  appear  to  them  to  be  demanded,"  with  high 
hopes  of  stampeding  Tennessee  for  their  views.  With  the 
wise  intent  of  avoiding  the  appearance  of  precipitation  or 
illegality,  it  was  declared  that  no  action  of  the  convention 
favoring  secession  should  be  valid  until  submitted  to  the  people 
and  carried  by  a  vote  equal  to  the  majority  vote  in  the  guber 
natorial  election  of  1859.  At  the  same  time,  the  people  were  to 
choose  delegates  to  attend  the  convention,  in  case  one  should 
be  held.5 

The  legislature  then  proceeded  to  adopt  significant  resolu 
tions — asking  the  president  of  the  United  States  and  the  au 
thorities  of  the  Southern  states  to  "reciprocally  communicate 
assurances"  of  their  peaceable  designs,  regretting  the  action  of 
the  New  York  legislature  in  tendering  men  and  money  for  the 
coercion  of  sovereign  states,  and  directing  the  governors  to  in 
form  the  executive  of  New  York  "that  it  is  the  opinion  of  this 
General  Assembly  that  whenever  the  authorities  of  that  state 
shall  send  armed  forces  to  the  South  for  the  purpose  indicated 
.  .  .  the  people  of  Tennessee,  uniting  with  their  brethren  of 
the  South,  will,  as  one  man,  resist  such  invasion  of  the  soil  of 

*  Senate  Journal  3jd  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  ist  exixra  session,  1861, 
pp.  6  seq. ;  Caldwell,  "Studies  in  the  Constitutional  History  of  Tennessee," 
pp.  268  seq. 

5  Acts,  3$d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  ist  extra  session,  1861,  p.  15. 


4  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

the  South  at  any  hazard  and  to  the  last  extremity."6  That  in 
these  resolutions  the  legislators  exactly  expressed  the  sentiments 
of  the  vast  majority  of  their  constituents  there  is  no  reason 
to  doubt.  Like  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  though  more 
ardently,  they  clung  to  the  old  Union  with  which  their  affections 
and  interests  were  so  closely  identified;  but  they  believed  firmly 
in  state  sovereignty  and  the  constitutional  exemption  of  their 
"rights"  from  invasion  by  the  Federal  government,  and,  perceiving 
that  their  institutions  and  those  of  the  Southern  states  were 
the  same,  they  looked  upon  any  forcible  assault  upon  "Southern 
liberties"  as  directed  also  against  their  own.  An  appeal  to 
arms  would  undermine  the  neutral  ground  on  which  they  hoped 
to  stand  and,  forced  to  take  sides,  they  could  not  hesitate.  The 
prayers  of  all  Union-lovers  were  for  the  success  of  the  peace 
convention  about  to  meet  in  Washington. 

In  these  sentiments  the  people  of  East  Tennessee  had  no 
share.  This  region  had  been  settled  largely  by  Scotch-Irish 
from  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  Geographically  it  consists 
of  mountains  and  narrow  valleys,  affording,  for  the  most  part, 
profitable  returns  in  grain  and  live  stock  to  industrious,  provident 
white  inhabitants,  but  utterly  unsuited  to  a  system  of  slave  labor.7 
The  farms  were  small  and  the  man  of  wealth  was  the  distinct 
exception — conditions  contributing  to  the  development  of  a 
rough,  vigorous  and  aggressive  democracy,  of  which  Andrew 
Johnson,  the  tailor-politican  was  the  type  and  leader.  In  the 
cities,  notably  Knoxville,  was  a  small,  hut  powerful  coterie 
of  conservative  professional  men,  Whigs,  like  T.  A.  R.  Nelson 
and  Maynard.  To  such  men  the  perpetuation  of  slavery  was 
of  little  moment,  and  the  extension  of  it  of  no  moment  at  all. 
Their  Union  predilections  encountered  no  contrary  impulse.  To 
the  argument  that  the  freeing  of  the  slaves  would  humiliate  the 
white  laborer  and  bring  him  into  competition  with  the  black, 
they  replied  that  it  would  also  destroy  the  unjust  ascendency 
of  the  rich  aristocratic  proprietor,  created  by  the  slave  system, 

6  House  Journal,  33<1  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  1st  extra  session,  1861, 
pp.  66,  76,  et  passim. 

7  The  ratio  of  slaves  to  whites  was  about  one  to  twelve.    Census  of  1860, 
quoted  by  Fertig,  The  Secession  and  Reconstruction  of  Tennessee,  p.  28. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  5 

which  cheapened  the  value  of  labor  and  closed  the  avenues  of 
industry,  and  would  throw  all  men,,  white  and  black,  into  a 
fair  competition,  in  which  the  ambitious  Scotchman,  born  and 
bred  to  intelligent  self-dependence,  had  no  reason  to  fear  the 
result. 

Thus,  with  a  powerful  leaven  of  loyalty  to  the  Union — uncon 
ditional  on  the  part  of  the  East  Tennesseeans ;  sustained,  in  the 
case  of  the  Whigs  of  Middle  and  West  Tennessee,  by  the  hope 
that  the  use  of  force  might  be  averted  and  Tennessee  become 
the  mediator  to  reconcile  the  contending  sections  and  save  the 
Union — the  people  voted,  on  the  9th  of  February,  on  the  proposi 
tion  submitted  to  them  by  the  legislature.  The  peace  conference 
was  still  in  session.  The  result  was  57,798  in  favor  of  a  con 
vention;  69,675  against  it.  East  Tennessee  voted  five  to  one 
in  the  negative;  Middle  Tennessee  followed  suit  by  a  majority 
of  1,382;  West  Tennessee  gave  a  15,118  majority  for  the 
affirmative.  The  vote  for  Union  delegates  to  the  convention 
was  88,803 ;  f°r  disunion  delegates,  24,749.®  Thus  the  people 
declared  that  they  did  not  wish  even  to  discuss  the  question  of 
secession.  Tennessee  was  still  emphatically  loyal  and  the  South 
ern  cause  had  sustained  a  severe  reverse. 

"The  election  of  February  was  a  division  along  party  lines. 
Its  result  was  simply  an  indication  that  the  Whig  party  of 
Tennessee  was  still  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  secession."9  All 
this  was  changed  by  the  outbreak  of  actual  hostilities  in  April. 
Enough  has  been  said  to  indicate  that  coercion  was  the  rock  on 
which  the  Union  party  in  Tennessee  would  split.  Secession 
at  once  became  popular  and  irrisistible.  To  President  Lincoln's 
call  for  troops,  Governor  Harris  replied  (April  18)  :  "Tennessee 
will  not  furnish  a  single  man  for  coercion,  but  fifty  thousand, 
if  necessary,  for  the  defence  of  our  rights  and  those  of  our 
Southern  brothers."10 

Still  the  Whig  leaders,  whose  political  religion  was  love  and 
service  of  the  Union,  could  not  bring  themselves  to  believe  that 
the  noble  structure  for  which  Clay  and  Webster  had  labored  so 

8  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1861,  p.  677. 

9  Neal,  Disunion  and  Restoration  in  Tennessee,  p.  14. 
ia  Goodspeed,  History  of  Tennessee,  pp.  513-519. 


6  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

passionately  was  tumbling  to  pieces  before  their  eyes,  while 
they  stood  powerless  to  prevent  the  ruin.  On  the  very  day 
when  Governor  Harris  sent  his  defiant  reply  to  the  president, 
Neil  S.  Brown,  Russell  Houston,  E.  H.  Ewing,  John  Bell,  R.  J. 
Meigs  and  other  prominent  Whigs  appealed  to  the  Tennesseeans 
in  an  impassioned  address,  "The  agitation  of  the  slavery  ques 
tion,  combined  with  party  spirit  and  sectional  animosity,"  they 
said,  "has  at  length  produced  the  legitimate  fruit."  They  de 
nounced  and  deplored  the  coercive  policy  of  the  president  "as 
calculated  to  dissolve  the  Union  forever  and  to  dissolve  it  in 
the  blood  of  our  fellow-citizens,"  and  approved  the  governor's 
refusal  to  contribute  to  that  end,  but,  they  continued,  they  did 
not  think  it  Tennessee's  duty,  "considering  her  position  in  the 
Union,  and  in  view  of  the  great  question  of  the  peace  of  our 
distracted  country,  to  take  sides  against  the  government."  To 
do  so  would  be  to  "terminate  her  grand  mission  of  peace-maker 
between  the  states  of  the  South  and  the  general  government. 
Nay,  more;  the  almost  inevitable  result  would  be  the  transfer 
of  the  war  within  her  own  borders — the  defeat  of  all  hopes  of 
reconciliation,  and  the  deluging  of  the  state  with  the  blood  of 
her  own  people."  (This  was  to  speak  with  the  oracular  tongue 
of  fate.)  "The  present  duty  of  Tennessee  is  to  maintain  a 
position  of  independence — taking  sides  with  the  Union  and  the 
peace  of  the  country  against  all  assailants,  whether  from  the 
North  or  South.  Her  position  should  be  to  maintain  the  sanctity 
of  her  soil  from  the  hostile  tread  of  any  party.  .  .  .  But  should 
a  purpose  be  developed  by  the  government  of  overrunning  and 
subjugating  our  brethren  of  the  seceded  states,  we  say  un 
equivocally,  that  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  state  to  resist  at  all 
hazards,  at  any  cost,  and  by  arms,  any  such  purpose  or  attempt." 
Therefore  let  the  authorities  of  the  state  proceed  at  once  to 
arm  her  for  all  emergencies,  but  "in  the  meantime  let  her, 
as  speedily  as  she  can,  hold  a  conference  with  her  sister  slave- 
holding  states  yet  in  the  Union,  for  the  purpose  of  devising 
plans  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  the  land.  .  .  .  The 
border  slave  states  may  prevent  this  civil  war;  and  why  shall 
they  not  do  it?"11 

u  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  i,  p.  71 ;   Greeley,  American  Conflict, 
vol.  i,  p.  481. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  7 

In  all  this  there  is  nothing  new.  It  is  the  last  despairing, 
hopeless  struggle  of  the  Whigs  to  maintain  their  old  position  of 
peace,  compromise  and  Union.  Hardly  had  they  spoken  when 
the  tide  of  secession  swept  them  irresistibly  with  it  into  the 
disaster  they  so  clearly  foresaw.  Four  days  later,  Bell  declared 
for  the  South,  and  most  of  his  friends  followed  his  lead.  Except 
in  East  Tennessee,  the  Union  sympathizers  were  frightened  into 
silence.  By  the  24th  of  April,  Gideon  J.  Pillow  could  write 
from  Nashville  to  L.  P.  Walker,  the  Confederate  secretary  of 
war:  "We  are  now  united  in  Middle  and  West  Tennessee,  and 
we  think  East  Tennessee  will  soon  be  so,  or  nearly  so.  Ethe- 
ridge  attempted  to  make  a  speech  at  Paris  yesterday,  but  was 
prevented  by  the  people  after  a  short  conflict  with  pistols, 
in  which  four  were  wounded  and  one  killed.  Johnson  has  at 
last  returned  to  East  Tennessee,  and  had  his  nose  pulled  on  the 
way;  was  hissed  and  hooted  at  all  along  on  his  route.  .  .  .  His 
power  is  gone,  and  henceforth  there  will  be  nothing  left  but  the 
stench  of  the  traitor."12 

Fort  Sumter  and  President  Lincoln  had  restored  the  prestige 
of  Governor  Harris,  and  he  hastened  to  utilize  it.  The  legis 
lature,  in  full  sympathy  with  him,  reassembled  at  his  call  on  the 
25th  of  April  and  went  into  secret  session,  the  members  being 
pledged  to  reveal  nothing  that  transpired  during  their  delibera 
tions.  Harris'  message  asserted  that  the  president  had  "wantonly 
inaugurated  an  internecine  war  between  the  people  of  the  slave 
and  non-slave-holding  states,"  urged  the  passage  of  ordinances 
of  secession  and  union  with  the  Confederacy  "in  such  manner 
as  shall  involve  the  highest  exercise  of  sovereign  authority  by 
the  people  of  the  state,"  and,  to  that  end,  asked  that  opportunity 
be  given  for  "a  fair  and  full  expression  of  the  popular  will  on 
each  of  these  propositions  separately."13  His  motives  in  thus 

12  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies,  series  i,  voL 
lii,   part   ii,    p.   69.      (This   publication    will   hereafter   be    referred   to    as 

"O.  R."). 

13  Acts,    33d    Tenn.    General    Assembly,    2d    extra    session,    1861,    p.    I. 
"Under  existing  circumstances  I  can  see  no  propriety  in  encumbering  the 
people  of  the  state  with  the  election  of  delegates,  to  do  that  which  is  in 
our  power  to  enable  them  to  do  directly  for  themselves.    The  most  direct 
as   well  as  the  highest  act  of   sovereignty,   according  to  our  theory,   is 


8  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

apparently  clogging  the  wheels  of  the  secession  chariot  for  the 
sake  of  popular  sovereignty  and  strict  legality  were,  however, 
perhaps  not  as  disinterested  as  they  appeared  on  their  face.  "The 
object  of  the  governor  in  recommending  separate  ordinances," 
wrote  Henry  W.  Hilliard,  the  Confederate  agent  on  the  ground, 
to  Secretary  Toombs,  "is  to  secure  beyond  all  possibility  of 
doubt  the  speedy  secession  of  Tennessee  from  the  government 
of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The  first  proposition  will  be  ratified 
by  an  overwhelming  popular  vote.  As  to  the  second,  which 
provides  for  the  admission  of  Tennessee  as  a  member  of  the 
Confederate  States,  there  will  be  decided  opposition,  for  many 
desire  to  establish  a  middle  confederacy,  formed  of  the  border 
states,  as  they  are  termed.  You  will  readily  comprehend  that 
personal  considerations  influence  opinion  to  some  extent  in  re 
gard  to  this  measure.  ...  A  great  change  has  taken  place  in 
public  sentiment  here  within  a  few  days,  and  the  feeling  in 
favor  of  our  government  rises  into  enthusiasm.  ...  By  exist 
ing  laws  the  governor  has  no  authority  to  send  troops  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  state,  but  the  legislature  will  authorize  him 
to  order  them  to  any  point,  and  in  anticipation  of  this,  or  under 
the  pressure  of  affairs,  Governor  Harris  is  now  sending  troops 
into  Virginia.  .  .  .  Our  Constitution  is  highly  approved,  and 
the  conduct  of  our  government  inspires  respect  and  admiration."14 
Governor  Harris  had  further  recommended  that  the  state  be 
placed  at  once  upon  a  war  footing.15  In  response,  the  assembly 
authorized  him  (April  26)  to  order  the  immediate  organization 
of  all  the  regiments  and  companies  tendered  to  him.16  On  the 
6th  of  May,  it  placed  in  his  hands  the  raising,  organization,  and 
equipment  of  55,000  volunteers,  the  charge  of  the  troops  and 
the  direction  of  the  defence  of  the  state,  and  gave  him,  with  the 

that  by  which  the  people  vote,  not  merely  for  men,  but  for  measures  sub 
mitted  for  their  approval  or  rejection.  Since  it  is  only  the  voice  of  the 
people  that  is  to  be  heard,  there  is  no  reason  why  they  may  not  be  readily 
and  effectively  express  themselves  upon  an  ordinance  framed  and  sub 
mitted  to  them  by  the  legislature  as  if  submitted  by  a  convention." 

"  O.    R.,   series   i,   vol.   Hi,  part  ii,   p.   76. 

15  Senate  Journal,  33d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  2d  extra  session,  1861, 
p.  ii. 

"Ibid,  p   17. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  9 

concurrence  of  the  military  and  financial  board,  the  control  of 
the  military  fund  and  the  authority  to  make  contracts  for  military 
purposes.17 

Meanwhile,  the  Confederate  commissioner,  Milliard,  had 
been  in  conference  with  Harris  and  was  introduced  by  him  to 
the  legislature,  which  he  addressed,  by  invitation,  on  the  3Oth 
of  April,  urging  the  prompt  union  of  Tennessee  with  the 
Southern  republic.18  A  joint  resolution  of  the  ist  of  May  au 
thorized  the  governor  to  appoint  three  commissioners  to  enter 
into  a  military  league  with  the  Montgomery  government.  This 
league,  consummated  on  the  7th,  looked  to  "a  speedy  admission 
into  the  Confederacy"  and  placed  the  military  force  of  the 
state  under  the  coritrol  and  direction  of  President  Davis.19 
The  legislature  ratified  it  the  same  day  and  invited  the  Con 
federacy  to  make  Nashville  its  capital.20 

Not  until,  by  these  remarkable  proceedings,  the  Southern 
sympathizers  had  delivered  the  state  bound  into  the  hands 
of  the  Confederacy  and  destroyed  all  possibility  of  a  free  ex 
pression  of  the  popular  will,  did  they  seek  to  throw  the  cloak 
of  legality  over  their  acts  by  introducing  the  fiat  of  the  "ultimate 
sovereign."  By  an  act  passed  on  the  6th  of  May,  embodying 
the  recommendations  of  Harris'  message,  the  people  were  called 
to  vote,  on  the  8th  of  June,  on  two  distinct  ordinances :  ( I )  a 
declaration  of  independence  and  separation  from  the  Federal 
Union;  (2)  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of  the  provisional 
government  of  the  Confederacy.21 

"The  spirit  of  secession  appears  to  have  reached  its  culminat 
ing  point  in  Tennessee,"  said  the  Louisville  Journal  of  May 
13.  "Certainly  the  fell  spirit  has,  as  yet,  reached  no  higher 
point  of  outrageous  tyranny.  The  whole  of  the  late  proceed 
ings  in  Tennessee  has  been  as  gross  an  outrage  as  ever  was 
perpetrated  by  the  worst  tyrant  of  all  the  earth.  The  whole 
secession  movement,  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  of  that 

17  Acts,  33d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  2d  extra  session,  1861,  p.  21. 

18  Senate  Journal,  33d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  2d  extra,  session,  1861, 
p.  30. 

19  Acts,  33d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  2d  extra  session,  1861  p.  19. 
"Ibid. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  13. 


io  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

state,  has  been  lawless,  violent  and  tumultuous.  The  pretense 
of  submitting  the  ordinance  of  secession  to  the  vote  of  the 
people  of  the  state,  after  placing  her  military  power  and  re 
sources  at  the  disposal  and  under  the  command  of  the  Con 
federate  States  without  any  authority  from  the  people,  is  as 
bitter  and  insolent  a  mockery  of  popular  rights  as  the  human 
mind  could  invent." 

Allowing  for  undue  violence  of  language,  this  is  a  statement 
of  fact.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  election  was  bound  to 
be  a  farce.  Before  the  8th  of  June,  Governor  Harris  had 
raised  most  of  the  troops  authorized  by  the  legislature  and  the 
state  was  full  of  soldiers.  The  sentiment  of  the  people  was 
now  overwhelmingly  for  the  Confederacy  and,  between  soldiers 
and  sentiment,  he  was  a  brave  Union  man  who  ventured  to 
speak  his  mind  at  the  polls.  That  the  state  would  have  gone 
heavily  for  the  South  under  the  fairest  possible  system  of  election 
is  certain;  that  a  fair  election  would  have  increased  the  Union 
vote  seems  equally  so.  But  a  mere  victory  would  not  content 
the  secessionists ;  for  moral  effect,  they  required  the  nearest 
possible  approach  to  unanimity. 

Tennessee  declared  its  independence  by  a  majority  of  over 
61,000  in  a  total  vote  of  nearly  156,000,  and  its  desire  to  join 
the  Confederacy  by  a  majority  of  60,000.  Middle  Tennessee 
was  for  the  South,  58,000  to  8,000;  West  Tennessee,  29,000 
to  6,000.  East  Tennessee  clung  defiantly  to  its  loyalty,  33,000 
to  14,500.  The  military  camps,  comprising  over  6,000  soldiers, 
went  unanimously  for  separation  and  the  Confederacy.  Nearly 
20,000  more  votes  were  cast  than  at  previous  elections,  which 
gave  some  color  to  charges  of  corruption  and  illegal  voting 
by  Confederate  soldiers  from  other  states.  Governor  Harris 
thereupon  (June  24)  proclaimed  the  state  out  of  the  Union 
and  a  part  of  the  Confederacy.22 

These  proceedings,  from  first  to  last,  were  palpably  irregular, 
and,  by  any  construction,  all  except  the  secession  by  vote  of 
the  people  were  unconstitutional.  It  was  sought  to  justify 

23  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  ii,  do'C.  37.  McPherson,  Political 
History  of  the  United  States  during  the  Great  Rebellion,  p.  5,  For  the 
vote,  see  Nashville  Dispatch,  Jan.  n,  1865. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  n 

this  final  act  under  the  pronouncement  in  the  preamble  of  the 
state  constitution  "that  all  power  is  inherent  in  the  people,  and 
all  free  governments  are  founded  on  their  authority,  and  in 
stituted  for  their  peace,  safety,  and  happiness,"  that  "for  the 
advancement  of  those  ends  they  have  at  all  times,  an  inalienable 
and  indefeasible  right  to  alter,  reform,  or  abolish  the  govern 
ment  in  such  manner  as  they  may  think  proper,"  and  "that 
government  being  instituted  for  the  common  benefit,  the  doc 
trine  of  non-resistance  against  arbitrary  power  and  oppression 
is  absurd,  slavish,  and  destructive  of  the  good  and  happiness  of 
mankind."23  That  is,  the  action  of  the  people  must  be  validated, 
if  at  all,  by  an  appeal  to  the  reserved,  extra-constitutional 
rights  inhering  in  sovereignty.  The  constitution  provided  for 
its  amendment  by  a  slow  process  requiring  at  least  two  years, 
which,  granting  the  existence  of  "arbitrary  power  and  oppres 
sion,"  might  imperil  the  "peace,  safety  and  happiness"  of  the 
people,  for  the  advancement  of  which  the  government  could 
at  any  time  be  altered  or  abolished ;  if  so,  irregular  measures 
were  defensible.  These  reflections  will  be  of  value  when  we 
come  to  consider  the  reconstruction  of  1865. 

But,  although  it  be  conceded  that  the  "sovereign  people" 
had  the  right  to  decide  their  destiny  by  any  means  they  chose 
to  adopt,  the  military  ordinance  and  the  league  with  the  Con 
federacy,  put  through  before  the  sovereign  had  spoken,  are 
indefensible  from  any  legal  standpoint,  and  throw  suspicion 
upon  the  final  vote  itself.  The  governor  and  legislature,  holding 
office  under  the  state  constitution  of  1834,  had  taken  oath  to 
support  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  were  obliged 
to  do  so  until  their  state  constitution  was  altered.24  If  the 
people,  by  the  exercise  of  the  "reserve"  of  sovereignty,  could 
release  them,  they  were  bound  at  least  until  some  sovereign 
act  transpired.  The  practical  effect  of  their  proceedings  was 
to  precipitate  revolution.  The  terms  temporary  league  and 
loan  of  military  forces  to  the  Confederacy  were  but  blinds 
behind  which  they  deliberately  violated  strict  moral  and  con 
stitutional  obligations. 

23  Tennessee  State  Constitution  of  1834.    Art,  i,  sec.  i-n,  Miller's  Man 
ual  of  Tennessee,  p.  81. 
34  Ibid.,  art  x.  sec.  i. 


12  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

From  the  beginning,  the  loyal  people  of  East  Tennessee  fully 
comprehended  the  significance  of  the  transactions  at  the  capital, 
and  viewed  the  course  of  events  with  apprehension  and  dismay. 
The  illegal  ordinances  of  early  May  confirmed  their  worst  fears, 
and  their  leaders,  Whig  and  Democrat,  united  in  a  call  to  a 
convention  at  Knoxville  on  the  3Oth  of  that  month.25  This 
assembly,  designated  by  the  Memphis  Appeal  as  "the  little  batch 
of  disaffected  traitors  who  hover  around  the  noxious  atmosphere 
of  Andrew  Johnson's  home/'  adopted  resolutions  condemning 
the  doctrine  of  secession,  declaring  the  ordinances  of  the  legis 
lature  to  be  acts  of  usurpation,  urging  the  policy  of  Kentucky  as 
the  true  policy  for  Tennessee  and  all  the  border  states,  and 
appealing  to  the  people,  "while  it  is  yet  in  their  power,  to 
come  up  in  the  majesty  of  their  strength  and  restore  Tennessee 
to  her  true  position."26  Following  the  election  of  June  8, 
in  which  East  Tennessee  stood  staunchly  by  the  Union,  the 
convention  reassembled  at  Greenville  (June  17-20)  at  the  call 
of  its  president  and  promulgated  the  following  striking  declara 
tion: 

"So  far  as  we  can  learn,  the  election  held  in  this  state  on 
the  eighth  day  of  the  present  month  was  free,  with  few  ex 
ceptions,  in  no  part  of  the  state  other  than  East  Tennessee. 
In  the  large  parts  of  Middle  and  West  Tennessee  no  speeches 
or  discussions  in  favor  of  the  Union  were  permitted.  Union 
papers  were  not  allowed  to  circulate.  Measures  were  taken 
in  some  parts  of  West  Tennessee,  in  defiance  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  laws,  which  allow  folded  tickets  to  have  the  ballot 
numbered  in  such  manner  as  to  mark  and  expose  the  Union 
votes.  .  .  .  Disunionists  in  many  places  had  charge  of  the 
polls,  and  Union  men,  when  voting,  were  denounced  as  Lincoln- 
ites  and  abolitionists.  The  unanimity  of  the  votes  in  many 
large  counties  where  but  a  few  weeks  ago  the  Union  sentiment 
was  so  strong  proves  beyond  doubt  that  Union  men  were  over 
awed  by  the  tyranny  of  the  military  power,  and  the  still  greater 
tyranny  of  a  corrupt  and  subsidized  press.  .  .  .  For  these  and 
other  causes  we  do  not  regard  the  result  of  the  election  as 

*O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  lii,  part  i,  p.   148. 
"  Ibid. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  13 

expressive  of  the  will  of  a  majority  of  the  freemen  of  Tennessee. 
.  .  .  But  if  this  view  is  erroneous,  we  have  the  same,  and  as 
we  think  a  much  better  right  to  remain  in  the  government  of 
the  United  States  than  the  other  divisions  of  Tennessee  have 
to  secede  from  it.  We  prefer  to  remain  attached  to  the  gov 
ernment  of  our  fathers.  .  .  .  We  believe  there  is  no  cause  for 
rebellion  or  secession  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  Tennessee." 
Wishing,  therefore,  "to  avert  a  conflict  with  our  brethren  in 
other  parts  of  the  state,  and  desiring  that  every  constitutional 
means  shall  be  resorted  to  for  the  preservation  of  peace,"  the 
convention  appointed  a  committee  to  ask  the  consent  of  the 
general  assembly  that  the  counties  of  East  Tennessee  and  those 
of  Middle  Tennessee  so  desiring  might  form  a  separate  state.27 
This  was  "peaceable  secession"  in  a  new  aspect.  The  conven 
tion  then  adjourned,  subject  to  the  call  of  its  president  whenever 
another  meeting  should  be  deemed  desirable.  Two  years  were 
to  elapse  before  it  reassembled. 

A  petition  embodying  these  resolutions  was  presented  to  the 
general  assembly  on  the  2Oth  of  June  and  referred  to  a  joint 
committee,  but  no  action  was  ever  taken  on  it.  Its  only  result 
was  to  mark  the  section  for  the  immediate  attention  of  the  Con 
federacy.  The  people  of  East  Tennessee  were  not  blind  to  the 
danger  of  the  course  they  were  pursuing,  but  their  courage  re 
mained  unshaken.  The  first  Thursday  in  August  was  the  regular 
date  for  the  choice  of  representatives  to  the  Federal  Congress, 
and  Governor  Harris,  by  proclamation,  ordered  that  the  election 
take  place  as  usual,  the  delegates  chosen  to  sit  in  the  Congress 
of  the  Confederacy.  In  each  of  the  four  districts  of  East  Ten 
nessee,  the  Confederate  nominees  were  opposed  by  Unionists, 
and  all  of  the  latter  (Thomas  A.  R.  Nelson,  Horace  Maynard, 
Andrew  J.  Clements,  and  George  W.  Bridges)  were  elected  at  the 
polls.  The  vote  for  Nelson  and  Maynard  was  so  overwhelming 
that  their  opponents  were  compelled  to  acknowledge  defeat.  The 
other  two  beaten  candidates  were  seated.  Bridges  and  Nelson 
were  arrested  by  Confederate  troops  on  their  way  to  Washington, 
Bridges  finally  escaping  from  prison  and  being  admitted 
to  the  House  near  the  close  of  the  session.  Nelson  consented 

"Ibid.,  p.  168. 


14  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

to  take  an  oath  of  neutrality,  which  bound  him  to  inaction  during 
the  war.28 

The  attention  of  statesmen  and  military  men  both  North  and 
South  was  now  directed  to  East  Tennessee.  The  district  was  of 
great  strategic  importance.  Its  occupation  meant  the  control  of 
the  railroad  communication  between  the  Mississippi  valley  and 
eastern  Virginia.  Politically  it  afforded  a  prop  to  the  Union 
sentiment  in  western  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  As  early 
as  May,  the  leading  East  Tennesseeans  in  Washington,  Senator 
Andrew  Johnson  and  Representative  Horace  Maynard,  were  be 
sieging  the  president  for  prompt  aid  for  the  Union  cause,  and 
some  arms  and  supplies  were  sent,29  but  the  action  of  the  Con 
federates  was  more  effective.  In  August,  General  Felix  K. 
Zollicoffer,  himself  an  East  Tennesseean,  was  designated  to  re 
claim  the  district  for  the  Confederacy,  and  promptly  overran  it. 

Then  followed  a  reign  of  terror  which,  making  all  allowance 
for  exaggeration  and  hysteria  in  the  contemporary  reports,  fully 
entitles  the  East  Tennessee  loyalists  to  the  name  of  martyrs.  Much 
that  has  been  written  of  Confederate  brutality  and  outrages  is 
doubtless  false.  Accounts  like  Brownlow's  have  been  con 
troverted  by  Southern  writers.  The  Richmond  Enquirer  after 
wards  asserted  that  the  policy  of  the  Confederate  government 
towards  the  district  had  been  "generous  to  weakness."  "The 
Union  men  of  East  Tennessee,"  it  affirmed,  "never  have  been 
subjected  to  restraint,  punishment,  or  violence,  on  account  of 
their  being  Union  men.  .  .  .  No  Union  man  who  has  not 
acted  treason  to  the  Confederate  States,  who  has  not  in  some 
form,  been  in  open,  factious  rebellion  against  its  laws  and 
authority,  has  been  subjected  to  the  slightest  inconvenience 
on  account  of  his  sentiments."30  This  may  be  approximately 
true;  still,  it  is  certain  that  the  Confederates  were  determined, 
by  fair  means  or  foul,  to  control  the  district.  The  Enquirer 

^Fertig,  The  Secession  and  Reconstruction  of  Tennessee,  p.  31,  cites 
Report  of  contested  election  cases,  pp.  466  et  seq.  and  Congressional  Globe, 
Feb.  23,  1863. 

"•General  Beauregard  wrote  to  President  Davis  (June  27)  that 
Johnson  had  sent  10,000  muskets  from  Washington  to  East  Tennessee. 
O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  lii  part  ii,  p.  115. 

*  Quoted  by  Nashville  Union,  Aug.   10,  1862. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  15 

called  it  "the  keystone  of  the  Southern  arch/'  Not  only  did 
its  passes  afford  avenues  for  the  manoeuvres  of  armies  and  its 
principal  railroad  a  great  artery  of  communication  and  supply; 
it  was  also  an  apparently  inexhaustible  storehouse  of  salt  and 
bacon,  those  scarce  and  precious  necessaries  of  the  soldier's  life. 
During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war,  it  became  a  great  com 
missariat  of  the  Southern  army.  Its  tremendous  value  justified 
almost  any  measure  calculated  to  secure  it.  When  the  con 
ciliatory  policy  of  Zollicoffer  failed,  more  stringent  methods 
were  adopted.  Many  of  the  troops  employed  for  the  purpose 
of  subjugation  were  themselves  Tennesseeans,  their  bitterness 
intensified  by  the  political  struggle  within  the  state,  and  keenly 
realizing  that,  unless  the  South  prevailed,  they  had  to  expect 
the  penalty  of  treason  at  the  hands  of  vindictive  local  enemies. 
As  the  war  progressed,  East  Tennessee  became  one  of  its  battle 
grounds.  Union  and  Confederate  armies  marched  and  counter 
marched  across  it,  leaving  inevitable  destruction  in  their  wake. 
The  Confederates,  insisting  that  Tennessee  had  lawfully  exer 
cised  her  right  of  secession  and  that  all  her  citizens  were  bound 
thereby,  their  Union  convictions  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding, 
put  their  conscription  law  in  full  operation  in  the  state  and 
gave  the  people  the  option  of  submitting  to  it  or  meeting  the 
fate  of  traitors.  Many  were  torn  from  their  homes  for  un 
willing  service  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy.  When  such  an 
alternative  confronted  the  Union  man  who  might  otherwise 
have  been  disposed  to  consider  his  security  before  his  patriotism 
(and  it  was  alleged  that  the  conscription  searched  out  with 
especial  care  those  whose  fidelity  to  the  Confederacy  was  open 
to  suspicion),  acquiescence  in  Southern  domination  could  bring 
but  cold  comfort.31 

Meanwhile  the  crops  were  confiscated  and  sent  south,  and  as 
was  natural,  the  friends  of  the  Union  were  the  first  to  be 
stripped  and  left  without  hope  of  remuneration.  Detached  bands 
of  horsemen,  whom  the  regular  Confederate  commanders  had 
no  means  of  controlling,  labored  for  their  cause  in  their  own 

31  For  detailed  accounts  of  East  Tennessee  before  and  during  the 
war,  see  Parson  Brownloirfs  Book;  O.  P.  Temple,  East  Tennessee  in  the 
Civil  War;  Humes,  The  Loyal  Mountaineers  of  Tennessee. 


16  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

way,  burning  barns  and  houses,  destroying  stores,  driving  off 
cattle,  and  spreading  terror  among  the  inhabitants.  Hosts  of 
refugees  fled  for  safety  to  Camp  Dick  Robinson  and  other  Fed 
eral  military  posts  in  Kentucky  or  further  north,  leaving  their 
property  in  the  hands  of  their  foes.  The  Confederate  com 
mander  of  the  post  at  Knoxville  himself  declared:  "Marauding 
bands  of  armed  men  go  through  the  country,  representing 
themselves  to  be  the  authorized  agents  of  the  state  or  Con 
federate  Government;  they  'impress'  into  'service'  horses  and 
men;  they  plunder  the  helpless,  and  especially  the  quondam 
supporters  of  Johnson,  Maynard,  and  Brownlow;  they  force 
men  to  enlist  by  the  representation  that  otherwise  they  will 
be  incarcerated  at  Tuscaloosa;  they  force  the  people  to  feed 
and  care  for  themselves  and  horses  without  compensation."32 

The  people  of  East  Tennessee  did  not  tamely  submit  to  the 
domination  of  a  superior  military  force.  They  would  not  be 
lieve  that  the  government  for  which  they  had  struggled  and 
suffered  would  desert  them  in  their  time  of  need.  A  Southern 
sympathizer  wrote  (November  12)  to  Jefferson  Davis:  they 
"look  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Federal  authority  with 
as  much  confidence  as  the  Jews  look  for  the  coming  of  the 
Messiah,  and  I  feel  quite  sure  when  I  assert  that  no  event 
or  circumstance  can  change  or  modify  their  hope."33  While 
their  leaders  implored  the  president  for  aid,  they  formed  secret 
military  organizations,  whose  activity  aroused  the  apprehension 
of  Zollicoffer,  but  which,  for  lack  of  arms,  were  of  little  value. 
Many  took  to  "bushwhacking,"  shooting  Confederates  from 
ambush  and  destroying  their  property — tactics  which  did  the 
Unionists  more  harm  than  good,  for  they  maddened  the  Con 
federates  and  provoked  them  to  savage  retaliation.  More  effec 
tive  was  the  burning  of  railroad  bridges.  This  began  in 
November  and  seriously  impeded  the  operations  of  the  Con 
federate  forces.  Secretary  Benjamin  ordered  the  execution 
of  convicted  bridge-burners,  after  summary  trial  by  drum-head 
court-martial,  "on  the  spot  in  the  vicinity  of  the  burned  bridges," 
and  the  imprisonment  at  Tuscaloosa  of  all  other  active  Union 

32  Nicolay  &  Hay,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  v,  ch.  4. 
*  Goodspeed,  History  of  Tennessee,  p.  486. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  17 

sympathizers,  and  directed  that  in  no  case  should  a  man  once  in 
arms  against  the  government  be  released  on  any  pledge  or  oath 
of  allegiance.34  The  military  authorities  sought  by  mingled 
craft  and  violence  to  secure  the  leaders  of  the  resistance  and 
crush  it  in  the  bud.  Brownlow  was  lured  from  his  hiding- 
place  in  the  mountains  by  the  promise  of  a  pass  into  Kentucky, 
and  promptly  arrested  and  imprisoned.35 

Meanwhile  the  Federal  government  was  moving  with  dis 
astrous  slowness.  In  October,  the  president  had  pressed  on 
the  war  department  the  advantage  of  occupying  a  point  on  the 
railroad  near  Cumberland  Gap,  the  outlet  into  Virginia  and  Ken 
tucky.  He  was  supported  by  the  emphatic  opinion  of  General 
Thomas  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson.  When  General  McClellan 
became  commander-in-chief  in  November,  he  assigned  his  per 
sonal  friend,  General  Buell,  to  the  command  in  Kentucky 
and  urged  him  to  advance  promptly  into  East  Tennessee,  cut 
the  Confederate  communications,  and  succor  the  Union  sym 
pathizers  there.  Johnson  and  Maynard  telegraphed  Buell:  "Our 
people  are  oppressed  and  pursued  as  beasts  of  the  forest;  the 
government  must  come  to  their  relief/'36  The  general  replied: 
''I  assure  you  I  recognize  no  more  imperative  duty,  and  crave 
no  higher  honor,  than  that  of  rescuing  our  loyal  friends  in 
Tennessee;"37  but  he  failed  to  suit  the  action  to  the  word.  The 
fact  was  that  he  had  set  his  heart  upon  striking  directly  at  the 
centre  of  the  Confederate  power  at  Nashville.  With  this  end 
in  view,  he  remained  inactive,  maturing  his  own  plans,  and  meet 
ing  the  importunities  of  Lincoln  and  McClellan  with  evasive 
replies,  until  the  Confederate  domination  of  East  Tennessee 
was  complete  and  only  a  laborious  campaign  could  dislodge 
them.  Finally  a  peremptory  telegram  from  Lincoln  (January 
4)  forced  him  to  confess  that  he  had  not  acted  in  sympathy 
with  his  superiors  and  that  his  opportunity  had  been  lost.  His 
report  met  with  a  sharp  reproof  from  McClellan  and  an  ex 
pression  of  acute  disappointment  and  distress  from  Lincoln, 

34  Ibid.,  pp.  483-490. 

35  Ibid.,  p.  490. 

88  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  vii,  p.  480. 
37  Ibid.,  p.  483- 


i8  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

who  was  keenly  alive  to  the  political  value  of  East  Tennessee 
to  the  Union,  while  Buell  viewed  the  situation  exclusively  from 
a  military  standpoint.38 

The  devoted  district  had  yet  almost  two  years  of  extremest 
suffering  to  undergo  before  its  deliverance.  Brownlow  and 
Oliver  P.  Temple  have  related  in  detail  the  pathetic  history  of 
those  terrible  times.  Neither  Lincoln  at  Washington  nor  John 
son  at  Nashville,  in  agony  over  the  fate  of  his  friends  and 
neighbors,  to  whose  confidence  and  support  he  owed  everything, 
could  provide  the  needed  aid.  On  the  8th  of  April,  1862,  Presi 
dent  Davis  placed  East  Tennessee  under  martial  law.39  On  the 
23d,  Colonel  Churchwell,  the  Confederate  provost-marshal  at 
Knoxville,  warned  all  who  had  fled  to  the  enemy  to  return  within 
thirty  days.  Those  who  did  so  were  offered  amnesty  and  pro 
tection;  those  who  failed  to  comply  would  have  their  families 
sent  to  Kentucky  or  beyond  the  Confederate  lines  at  their  own 
expense.  "The  women  and  children  must  be  taken  care  of 
by  husbands  and  fathers,  either  in  East  Tennessee  or  in  the 
Lincoln  government/'40  On  the  24th,  Johnson's  invalid  wife, 
with  her  family,  was  ordered  to  pass  beyond  the  Confederate 
states  line  within  thirty-six  hours.  Though  this  order  was  not 
fully  enforced  at  once,  she  was  driven  from  her  house  and,  after 
distressing  experiences,  sent  North  in  September  at  her  own 
request.41  The  families  of  Brownlow  and  Maynard  were  sim 
ilarly  served.  Their  property  was  confiscated. 

While  East  Tennessee  was  firmly  in  the  grip  of  the  Con 
federacy,  the  situation  in  the  central  and  western  parts  of  the 

"I  present,  in  general,  the  administration  view.  The  wisdom  of  Buell's 
plan  is  still  a  moot  point.  Writers  have  contended  that  his  design  to 
strike  the  enemy's  main  force  was  better  calculated  than  that  of  Lincoln  and 
McClellan  both  to  further  the  campaign  and  to  free  East  Tennessee. 
Whatever  the  merits  of  the  case,  the  lack  of  candor  in  Buell's  dispatches 
put  him  in  bad  odor  with  the  administration. 

39  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  iv,  p.  502. 

*°McPherson,  Political  History  of  the  United  States  during  the  Great 
Rebellion,  p.  121. 

"Johnson,  Papers,  vol.  xviii,  4104  a,  4104  d,  4104  e.  This  collection  of 
manuscripts  is  in  the  Library  of  Congress  at  Washington.  It  will  here 
after  be  referred  to  as  "J.  P.". 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  19 

state  was  transformed  by  the  victories  of  Grant.  The  fall  of 
Fort  Henry  (February  6)  and  Fort  Donelson  (February  16) 
turned  the  Confederate  line  of  defence  extending  from  these 
strongholds  to  Bowling  Green  in  Kentucky.  The  army  of 
General  Johnston  at  once  abandoned  Bowling  Green  and  fell 
back  through  Nashville,  followed  by  things  of  panic-stricken 
secessionists.  Buell,  pressing  on  in  pursuit,  reached  the  capital 
on  the  25th.  The  state  government  fled  to  Memphis  and,  on 
the  2Oth  of  March,  adjourned  sine  die.  Governor  Harris  took 
refuge  in  Mississippi.  On  the  22d  of  February,  Grant  pro 
claimed  martial  law  in  West  Tennessee.  No  courts  were  to 
be  held  under  state  authority.  All  cases  coming  within  reach 
of  the  military  arm  were  to  be  adjudicated  by  the  authorities 
established  by  the  government  of  the  United  States.  Whenever 
a  sufficient  number  of  citizens  returned  to  their  allegiance  to 
maintain  law  and  order,  the  military  restriction  would  be 
removed.42 

On  the  3d  of  March,  President  Lincoln  appointed  Andrew 
Johnson  military  governor  of  Tennessee,  with  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers. 

"Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  p.  763. 


CHAPTER    II 

ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Andrew  Johnson,1  to  whose  discretion  the  president  confided 
a  task  appalling  in  its  difficulties,  demanding  in  the  highest  de 
gree,  keen  instinct,  fine  discrimination,  and  sound  judgment, 
was  a  remarkable  personality,  a  character  calculated  to  inspire 
admiration,  hatred,  enthusiasm,  contempt,  but  never  indifference. 
The  record  of  his  life  is  the  history  of  the  victory  of  an  in 
domitable  will  over  countless  obstacles.  Born  in  1808,  the 
son  of  a  "poor  white"  of  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  and  raised 
in  miserable  poverty,  he  received  not  even  the  most  ordinary 
education,  and,  at  the  age  of  ten,  was  apprenticed  to  a  tailor  of 
Greenville,  Tennessee,  to  aid  in  the  support  of  his  widowed 
mother.  Realizing  his  ignorance  and  fired  with  the  most  ardent 
desire  to  improve  his  condition,  he  employed  the  hours  after 
his  day's  work  was  done  in  learning  to  read,  and,  after  his 
marriage  in  1827,  his  wife  helped  him  to  acquire  the  arts  of 
writing  and  arithmetic.  His  greatest  assets  were  a  brilliant, 
incisive  mind  and  an  insatiable  ambition;  these  proved  decisive 
of  his  career.  Breadth  of  view  he  never  attained. 

Conscious  of  his  superior  ability,  and  impeded  at  every  turn, 
in  his  efforts  to  secure  the  preferments  he  felt  his  worth  de 
manded,  by  lack  of  wealth  and  social  standing,  the  monopolies 
of  the  plantation-owning,  slave-holding  aristocrats  in  his  state, 
he  early  developed  an  intense  bitterness  against  the  artificial 
distinctions  of  society.  Far  from  diminishing,  this  feeling  grew 
upon  him  with  years,  poisoned  his  whole  life,  and  impaired  his 
character.  At  the  outset  it  made  him  the  champion  of  oppressed 
democracy  and  tempted  him  to  employ  the  devices  of  the 
demagogue.  To  such  a  man  East  Tennessee  offered  a  fertile 

1John  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Service  of  Andrew  Johnson  (New 
York,  1866)  is  the  best  biography  for  Johnson's  early  years,  although  an 
unscholarly,  adulatory,  and  often  indiscriminatingly  partisan  work.  Pro 
fessor  St.  George  L.  Sioussat  is  at  work  upon  a  life  of  Johnson  which 
is  expected  to  appear  shortly. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  21 

field.  The  tailor's  shop  became  a  meeting-place  for  the  poor 
laborers  of  the  town.  There  their  grievances  were  discussed, 
and  among  them  Johnson  was  first  in  ability  and  influence.  He 
urged  upon  them  the  importance  of  asserting  their  right  to  a 
voice  in  the  town  councils,  from  which  their  interests  had  long 
received  scant  consideration,  and,  as  their  avowed  representa 
tive,  he  made  his  political  debut  as  alderman  of  Greenville  in 
1828.  In  1830  he  was  chosen  mayor.  His  aggressive  labors 
for  his  constituents  and  his  vicious,  fearless  attacks  upon  the 
aristocracy  soon  made  him  the  idol  of  the  democracy  of  East 
Tennessee.  In  1835  he  was  sent  to  the  state  House  of  Repre 
sentatives.  His  opposition  to  a  popular  scheme  of  internal  im 
provements,  as  designed  to  get  fraudulent  profits  for  capitalists 
at  the  expense  of  the  state,  brought  about  his  defeat  at  the 
next  election;  but  the  results  bore  out  his  predictions  and  he 
was  returned  in  1839.  Henceforth  his  career  was  a  succession 
of  triumphs.  State  senator  in  1841,  East  Tennessee  sent  him 
in  1843  to  represent  her  in  the  national  House,  where  he  re 
mained  uninterruptedly  for  ten  years.  In  1853  he  lost  his 
seat,  owing  to  the  "gerrymandering"  of  the  state  under  Whig 
auspices,  which  placed  him  in  a  strong  Whig  district.  With 
characteristically  irrepressible  fighting  spirit,  he  promptly  present 
ed  himself  as  candidate  for  governor  in  opposition  to  the  brilliant 
and  popular  Gustavus  A.  Henry,  "the  eagle  orator,"  whom  he  be 
lieved  to  be  the  chief  agent  in  his  discomfiture,  and  defeated  him 
in  an  exciting  campaign.  In  1855  he  was  re-ekcted  over  Meredith 
P.  Gentry,  a  Know-Nothing  Whig.  In  both  these  campaigns  the 
rival  candidates  appeared  in  joint  debate  throughout  the  state. 
Contemporary  evidence  records  that,  while  Henry  and  Gentry 
scrupulously  observed  the  amenities  of  debate  and  refused  to  be 
badgered  into  compromising  their  reputation  as  dignified  states 
men,  Johnson's  speeches  were  tissues  of  misstatement,  misrepre 
sentation,  and  insulting  personalities,  directed  to  the  passions  and 
unreasoning  impulses  of  the  ignorant  voter.  Assaults  upon  aris 
tocrats  combined  with  vaunting  of  his  own  low  origin  and  the 
dignity  of  manual  labor. 

Johnson  was  now  the  undisputed  Democratic  leader  of  the 
state.    As  such,  he  entered  the  national  Senate  at  the  expiration 


22  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

of  his  gubernatorial  term  in  1857,  and  remained  there,  an  in 
creasingly  isolated  and  significant  figure,  until  1862. 

The  political  course  of  Johnson  in  these  early  years  of  his  public 
service  concerns  us  here  only  as  it  throws  light  upon  his  relation 
to  the  great  events  of  1860  and  1861.  Through  every  public  act 
of  his  runs  one  consistent,  unifying  thread  of  purpose — the  ad 
vancement  of  the  power,  prosperity  and  liberty  of  the  masses  at 
the  expense  of  intrenched  privilege.  The  slave-holding  aristocracy 
he  hated  with  a  bitter,  enduring  hatred  born  of  envy  and  ambition. 
."If  Johnson  were  a  snake,"  said  his  rival,  the  well-born  Isham 
G.  Harris,  "he  would  lie  in  the  grass  to  bite  the  heels  of  rich  men's 
children/'2  The  very  thought  of  an  aristocrat  caused  him  to  emit 
venom  and  lash  about  him  with  fury.  He  repeatedly  declared 
that  the  aristocrats  were  an  association  of  secret  conspirators, 
seeking  to  subvert  the  government  and  the  Constitution  in  the  in 
terest  of  their  class.  "What  do  you  mean  by  the  laboring  classes  ?" 
asked  Jefferson  Davis  in  the  Senate.  "Those  who  earn  their  bread 
by  the  sweat  of  their  face,  and  not  by  fatiguing  their  ingenuity," 
Johnson  replied.3 

Though  himself  a  slaveholder,  he  early  demonstrated  his  con 
sistency  by  extending  his  principle  to  embrace  the  eventual  eman 
cipation  of  the  negro  bondman.  In  a  speech  in  1845  on  the 
proposed  annexation  of  Texas,  he  favored  that  measure  as  calcu 
lated  to  improve  the  present  condition  of  the  slaves  and,  in  the 
end,  perhaps,  to  be  "the  gateway  out  of  which  the  sable  sons  of 
Africa  are  to  pass  from  bondage  to  freedom,  where  they  can 
become  merged  in  a  population  congenial  with  themselves,  who 
know  and  feel  no  distinction  in  consequence  of  the  various  hues 
of  skin  or  crosses  of  blood."4  He  denounced  a  high  tariff  policy 
as  redounding  to  the  advantage  of  the  few  at  the  expense  of  the 
many,  and  opposed  national  control  of  internal  improvements  not 
in  their  character  national,  as  weakening  the  authority  and  self- 
reliance  of  the  states.  The  measure  most  intimately  associated 
with  his  name  as  senator  was  the  Homestead  bill — to  grant  to 

3  Harriot  S.  Turner,  Recollections  of  Andrew  Johnson.,  Harper's  Maga 
zine,  vol.  1 20,  p.  170. 

"Frank  Moore,  Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  xii. 

*  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Service  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  32. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  23 

every  laborer  making  application  for  himself  and  family  a  home 
stead  of  1 60  acres  out  of  the  public  domain,  on  condition  of  occu 
pation  and  cultivation  within  a  specified  time — a  project  calculated 
to  increase  the  dignity  and  resources  of  labor,  the  chief  asset  of 
the  state.  You  transplant  the  laborer,  he  said,  "from  a  position 
where  he  is  making  hardly  anything,  and  consequently  buying  but 
little,"  and  "by  bringing  his  labor  in  contact  with  the  productive 
soil,  you  increase  his  ability  to  buy  a  great  deal."  The  treasury  is 
benefited  through  his  demand  for  imports  and  the  government  is 
strengthened  by  giving  him  a  stake  in  its  welfare  and  stability.5 
Johnson's  ardor  for  the  bill  was  not  diminished  by  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  Southern  senators  opposed  it  as  a  menace  to  Southern 
institutions,  and  when,  after  several  defeats,  it  was  carried  through 
Congress  in  1860,  only  to  fall  before  Buchanan's  veto,  the  presi 
dent's  subserviency  to  Southern  interests  was  assigned  as  the 
motive  of  his  action. 

We  come  now  to  Johnson's  pronouncements  on  the  status  of 
slavery  in  the  Union,  the  right  of  secession,  and  the  right  of  the 
Federal  government  to  coerce  a  recalcitrant  state — the  burning 
questions  of  the  period  immediately  preceding  the  war.6 

As  regards  slavery,  while  Johnson  hoped  for  the  eventual 
disappearance  of  the  institution,  as  at  variance  with  his  favorite 
principles  of  democracy  and  equality  of  opportunity  for  all  men, 
he  recognized  that,  in  fact,  it  was  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  life 
of  the  nation  that,  in  justice  to  vested  rights  lawfully  acquired 
and  for  the  sake  of  social  stability,  it  ought  not  to  be  molested, 
so  long  as  it,  in  turn,  remained  in  strict  subordination  to  and 
in  harmony  with  the  government.7  The  government,  the  best 
and  freest  on  earth,  the  one  great  stronghold  of  democracy,  the 
hope  of  the  humble  and  downtrodden  of  all  the  world,  became 
the  object  of  his  most  passionate  attachment,  its  preservation,  with 

5  Ibid.,  p.  53- 

'Moore,   Speeches   of  Andrew  Johnson,   passim. 

7  In  1842,  Johnson  introduced  in  the  Tennessee  legislature  a  resolution 
"that  the  basis  to  be  observed  in  laying  the  state  off  into  congressional 
districts  shall  be  the  voting  population,  without  any  regard  to  the  three- 
fifths  of  the  negro  population."  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Services  of 
Andrew  Johnson,  p.  140. 


24  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

power  and  vitality  unimpaired,  the  principal  article  of  his  politi 
cal  creed,  moulding  decisively  his  opinions  on  all  other  questions 
of  state.  His  every  speech  and  every  action  as  a  public  man 
reiterated  the  slogan  of  Andrew  Jackson,  the  idol  of  his  boyhood 
and  the  inspiration  of  his  whole  career :  "Our  Union !  it  must  be 
preserved !"  Of  its  overthrow  he  could  not  conceive. 

Bred  in  the  school  of  states'-rights  democracy,  Johnson  nat 
urally  took  the  position  that  the  Federal  government  could  not 
coerce  a  state.  But  even  more  strongly  did  he  maintain  that  the 
government  was  a  compact  for  eternity,  and  no  temporary  alli 
ance,  revocable  at  the  will  of  any  party  to  it.  Release  from  its 
obligations  could  come  only  by  consent  of  all  the  states,  or  by  the 
violent,  extra-constitutional  means  of  revolution,  morally  justi 
fiable  only  after  "a  long  train  of  abuses,"  for  which  no  remedy 
through  constitutional  means  appeared.  Thus  denouncing  the 
so-called  right  of  secession,  he  undermined  also  his  own  anti- 
coercion  doctrine  by  asserting  that,  while  the  government  cannot 
coerce  a  state,  it  is  under  a  constitutional  obligation  to  guar 
antee  to  every  state  a  republican  form  of  government,  and, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  Constitution,  the  state  consists  of 
loyal  citizens,  be  they  one  or  many;  that,  in  the  enforcement  of 
this  guarantee,  the  government  may  coerce  a  disloyal  majority 
ay  individuals  in  revolt  against  the  true  citizens  of  the  state. 

It  is  apparent  that  Johnson's  convictions,  as  above  outlined, 
would  incline  him,  in  the  theoretical  controversies  over  slavery 
between  1853  and  1860,  to  adopt  the  popular-sovereignty  doc 
trine  of  Douglas.  This,  indeed,  was  his  preference,  and  Douglas 
afterwards  expressed  his  regret  that  Johnson  had  not  come 
strongly  to  the  support  of  himself  and  Crittenden  early  in  1860, 
in  their  struggle  against  sectionalism  and  the  extremists  North 
and  South.8  His  hesitation  at  this  time  is  probably  explained 
by  the  fact  that  the  safety  of  the  Union  demanded  the  preservation 
of  the  Democratic  party  as  a  national  organization.  The  Southern 
leaders  had  broken  irrevocably  with  Douglas,  and  the  triumph 
of  himself  or  his  policy  in  the  party  was  certain  to  split  it  along 
sectional  lines.  Could  it  be  held  together  and  carry  the  Novem 
ber  election,  civil  war  would  be  averted,  or,  at  worst,  indefinitely 

8  S.  S.  Cox,  Three  Decades  of  Federal  Legislation,  p.  71. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  25 

postponed.  With  this  great  end  so  close  to  his  heart,  Johnson 
supported  Breckenridge  at  the  Charleston  convention  and  labored 
for  his  election. 

The  vote  of  the  people  on  the  6th  of  November,  1860,  destroyed 
Johnson's  hopes.  The  South  declared  that  the  Republican  success 
committed  the  government  to  a  policy  of  sectionalism  fatal  to  the 
vital  institutions  for  the  preservation  of  which  they  had  entered 
the  Union;  they  were,  therefore,  released  from  their  compact. 
The  secession  of  South  Carolina  was  followed  by  that  of  the 
other  cotton  states.  President  Lincoln  asserted  the  determination 
of  the  government  to  perform  its  constitutional  functions  in  the 
rebellious  states,  and  they  prepared  to  resist  invasion  of  their 
sovereignty  by  force. 

In  this  juncture,  Senator  Johnson  at  once  elected  the  only 
course  consistent  with  the  habits  and  convictions  of  a  lifetime. 
With  him  the  preservation  of  the  Union  overshadowed  every 
other  consideration,  human  or  divine.  While  it  seemed  to  him 
that  this  end  would  be  best  subserved  by  the  triumph  of  the 
Southern  Democracy,  he  gave  it  his  earnest  support.  Now  his 
beloved  Union  was  crashing  down  about  his  ears,  and  the  South 
ern  Democracy  had,  in  his  view,  assumed  the  role  of  destroyer. 
Without  hesitation,  and  with  all  the  ardor  and  fury  of  a  desperate 
champion  in  a  sacred  cause,  he  tore  off  the  colors  which  had 
now  become  to  him  the  badge  of  treason  and  struck  with  all  his 
might  for  the  cause  he  would  gladly  have  died  to  save.  This 
explanation  of  his  so-called  "change  of  front"  is  so  obvious  and 
convincing  as  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  casting  about  for  subtle 
reasons  for  his  action.9 

As  late  as  the  I3th  of  December,  1860,  Johnson  made  a  last 
hopeless  effort  for  peace  by  introducing  in  the  Senate  a  proposal 
for  amending  the  Constitution  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent  the 
permanent  monopoly  of  the  Federal  executive  and  judiciary  by 
any  section.  Beginning  with  1864,  the  president  was  to  be 
chosen  alternately  from  a  slave-holding  and  a  free  state ;  senators 
were  to  be  elected  by  popular  vote ;  all  Federal  courts  were  to  be 

'Oliver  P.  Temple  (Notable  Men  of  Tennessee  from  1833  to  1875} 
expresses  his  opinion  that  Johnson  was  actuated  chiefly  by  selfish  political 
motives. 


26  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

composed  of  judges,  one-third  of  whom  should  be  elected  every 
fourth  year  for  a  twelve  year  term,  and  all  vacancies  must  be 
filled  half  from  the  free  and  half  from  the  slave  states.  Slavery 
was  to  be  permitted  south  and  prohibited  north  of  a  fixed  line. 
In  his  speech  supporting  these  amendments,  he  said:  "I  think 
that  this  battle  ought  to  be  fought  not  outside  but  inside  of  the 
Union,  and  upon  the  battlements  of  the  Constitution  itself.  .  .  . 
Those  who  have  violated  the  Constitution  either  in  the  passage 
of  what  are  denominated  personal-liberty  bills,  or  by  their  refusal 
to  execute  the  fugitive-slave  law  .  .  .  must  go  out,  and  not  we. 
If  we  violate  the  Constitution  by  going  out  ourselves,  I  do  not 
think  we  can  go  before  the  country  with  the  same  force  of  posi 
tion  that  we  shall  if  we  stand  inside  of  the  Constitution,  de 
manding  a  compliance  with  its  provisions  and  its  guarantees ;  or, 
if  need  be,  as  I  think  it  is,  demanding  additional  securities.  We 
should  make  that  demand  inside  of  the  Constitution,  and  in  the 
manner  and  mode  pointed  out  by  the  instrument  itself.  Then 
we  keep  ourselves  in  the  right;  we  put  our  adversary  in  the 
wrong;  and  though  it  may  take  a  little  longer,  we  take  the  right 
means  to  accomplish  an  end  that  is  right  in  itself.  ...  If  the 
states  have  the  right  to  secede  at  will  and  pleasure,  for  real  or 
imaginary  evils  or  oppressions  .  .  .  this  government  is  at  an  end ; 
it  is  not  stronger  than  a  rope  of  sand ;  its  own  weight  will  crumble 
it  to  pieces,  and  it  cannot  exist"10 

Johnson  was  the  only  senator  from  a  seceding  state  to  retain 
his  seat  after  his  state  withdrew  from  the  Union.  This  fact  alone 
thrust  him  at  once  into  national  prominence.  Moreover,  he  pos 
sessed  by  nature  the  ideal  equipment  for  a  popular  champion  in 
such  a  crisis.  His  almost  fanatical  love  of  the  Union  and  his  hor 
ror  of  its  destroyers,  combined  witih  a  life-long  hatred  of  the  aris 
tocratic  Southern  leaders  and  of  the  social  and  economic  system 
upon  which  they  proposed  to  build  their  government  to  goad  him 
almost  to  frenzy.  Unbridled  in  speech,  indomitable  in  spirit,  relent 
less  in  purpose,  denouncing  his  enemies  as  animated  by  the  basest, 
most  despicable  of  motives,  and  threatening  them  with  the  direst 
penalties  of  treason,  he  embodied  the  unrestrained  passions  of  the 

10  Congressional  Globe,  36th  Congress,  2d  session,  p.  82  et  seq. ;  Moore, 
Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  80. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE          27 

hour.  From  the  platform  in  Tennessee  and  neighboring  states 
and  from  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  he  heaped  maledictions  upon 
the  Confederacy  and  sounded  a  stirring  call  to  save  the  Union. 
He  was  utterly  without  fear.  The  crowd  groaned  and  hissed 
him  as  he  passed  through  Lynchburg.  At  Liberty  he  drove  back 
at  the  point  of  his  pistol  a  mob  that  attacked  his  car.  He  was 
hanged  and  shot  in  effigy  at  Knoxville,  Nashville,  and  Memphis. 

Two  of  Johnson's  fiery  speeches  for  the  Union  in  the  Senate 
made  especially  strong  impressions  upon  his  contemporaries.  One 
was  delivered  on  the  2d  of  March,  1861,  in  the  heat  of  the  famous 
debate  on  the  right  of  secession,  in  which  he  broke  lances  with 
Davis,  Benjamin,  and  Lane  of  Oregon.  It  enunciates  no  new 
doctrines,  but  is  notable  for  the  violence  of  its  language,  the 
bitterness  of  its  personalities,  and  its  extraordinary  success  in  the 
very  purpose  for  which  it  was  contrived — to  sway  the  crowded 
galleries  to  demonstrations  of  approval  of  the  speaker's  words. 
The  episode  was,  says  Temple,  the  most  remarkable  and  the  most 
intensely  dramatic  that  ever  occurred  in  the  Senate.  Several 
times,  as  the  orator  arraigned  the  "rebels"  and  "traitors,"  the 
applause  became  so  loud  that  the  president  threatened  to  clear 
the  galleries,  and,  at  the  climacteric  outburst :  "I  would  have  them 
arrested ;  and,  if  convicted,  within  the  meaning  and  scope  of  the 
Constitution,  by  the  eternal  God,  I  would  execute  them:  Sir, 
treason  must  be  punished ;  its  enormity  and  the  extent  and  depth 
of  the  offence  must  be  made  known!"11  the  spectators  stood 
upon  their  seats,  swung  their  hats  in  the  air,  and  cheered  wildly. 

A  far  more  creditable  and  justly  meritorious  effort  followed  the 
introduction  into  the  Senate  by  Johnson  (July  27)  of  Crittenden's 
famous  resolution,  "that  this  war  is  not  prosecuted  upon  our 
part  in  any  spirit  of  oppression,  nor  for  the  purpose  of  conquest 
or  subjugation,  nor  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  or  inter 
fering  with  the  rights  or  established  institutions  of  these  states, 
but  to  defend  and  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution 
and  all  laws  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  and  to  preserve  the 
Union,  with  all  the  dignity,  equality,  and  rights  of  the  several 

11  Congressional  Globe,  36th  Congress,  2d  session,  p.  1354 ;  Moore, 
Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  204;  O.  P.  Temple,  Notable  Men  of 
Tennessee,  p.  397. 


28  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

states  unimpaired."  The  resolution,  said  the  senator,  truly  exr 
pressed  the  sentiment  of  every  lover  of  the  Union.  "The  problem 
now  being  solved  before  the  nations  of  the  earth  and  before  the 
people  of  the  United  States  is  ...  whether  we  can  succeed  .  .  . 
in  establishing  the  great  fact  that  we  have  a  government  with 
sufficient  strength  to  maintain  its  existence  against  whatever  com 
bination  may  be  presented  in  opposition  to  it.  ...  Traitors  and 
rebels  are  standing  with  arms  in  their  hands,  and  it  is  said  that 
we  must  go  forward  and  compromise  with  them.  They  are  in 
the  wrong ;  they  are  making  war  upon  the  government ;  they  are 
trying  to  upturn  and  destroy  our  free  institutions.  .  .  .  All  the 
compromise  I  have  to  make  is  the  compromise  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States."  The  secessionists  aim  to  establish  an  aris 
tocracy,  according  to  the  South  Carolina  idea,  based  on  property — 
slave  property — and  to  devote  their  government  to  the  interests 
of  slavery.  It  has  been  said  that  the  president  of  the  United  States 
is  violating  the  Constitution  by  his  so-called  war  measures.  "Are 
not  violations  of  the  Constitution  necessary  for  its  protection  and 
vindication  more  tolerable  than  violations  of  that  sacred  instru 
ment  aimed  at  the  overthrow  and  destruction  of  the  government? 
...  I  say  it  is  the  paramount  duty  of  this  government  to  protect 
those  states,  or  the  loyal  citizens  of  those  states,  in  the  enjoyment 
of  a  republican  form  of  government." 

Then,  lifted  out  of  himself  by  the  sublimity  of  the  cause  for 
which  he  was  pleading,  the  speaker  rose  to  heights  of  oratory  that 
thrilled  the  hearers  to  whom  he  now  revealed  the  essence  of 
nobility  in  his  strange  and  discordant  nature.  "I  say,  let  the 
battle  go  on — it  is  Freedom's  cause — until  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
....  shall  again  be  unfurled  upon  every  cross-road  and  from 
every  house-top  throughout  the  Confederacy,  North  and  South. 
Let  the  Union  be  reinstated ;  let  the  law  be  enforced ;  Jet  the 
Constitution  be  supreme.  .  .  .  There  will  be  an  uprising.  Do  not 
talk  about  Republicans  now;  do  not  talk  about  Democrats  now; 
do  not  talk  about  Whigs  or  Americans  now;  talk  about  your 
country  and  the  Constitution  and  the  Union.  Save  that ;  pre 
serve  the  integrity  of  the  government;  once  more  place  it 
erect  among  the  nations  of  the  earth;  and  then,  if  we  want  to 
divide  about  questions  that  may  arise  in  our  midst,  we  have  a 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  29 

government  to  divide  in.  ...  Let  the  energies  of  the  government 
be  redoubled,  and  let  it  go  on  with  the  war,  .  .  .  not  a  war  upon 
sections,  not  a  war  upon  peculiar  institutions  anywhere ;  but  let  the 
Constitution  and  the  Union  be  inscribed  on  our  banners,  and  the 
supremacy  and  enforcement  of  the  laws  be  its  watchword.  Then 
it  can,  it  will,  go  on  triumphantly.  We  must  succeed.  This  gov 
ernment  must  not,  cannot  fail.  Though  your  flag  may  have  trailed 
in  the  dust ;  though  a  retrograde  movement  may  have  been  made ; 
though  the  banner  of  our  country  may  have  been  sullied,  let  it  still 
be  borne  onward;  and  if,  for  the  prosecution  of  this  war  in 
behalf  of  the  government  and  the  Constitution,  it  is  necessary  to 
cleanse  and  purify  that  banner,  I  say  let  it  be  baptized  in  fire 
from  the  sun  and  bathed  in  a  nation's  blood!  The  nation  must 
be  redeemed;  it  must  be  triumphant.  The  Constitution — which 
is  based  upon  principles  immutable  and  upon  which  rest  the 
rights  of  man  and  the  hopes  and  expectations  of  those  who  love 
freedom  throughout  the  civilized  world — must  be  maintained."12 

This  speech — particularly  the  emphatic  assertion  that  the  war 
was  waged  for  the  Constitution  and  the  Union,  and  not  against 
any  section  or  institution — made  a  profound  impression  and  helped 
secure  supporters  for  the  Union  where  friends  were  then  most 
needed,  in  the  doubtful  border  states.  Only  the  conviction  that 
high  principles,  not  sectional  prejudices,  were  the  issues  at  stake, 
could  prevail  on  them  to  endure  the  suffering  and  devastation 
which  the  next  three  years  were  to  bring  to  them;  and  to 
drive  this  conviction  home,  no  other  man  in  public  life  was  so 
advantageously  posted  as  Johnson.  Alexander  H.  Stephens  fully 
understood  the  importance  of  Johnson's  service  to  the  Union  cause. 
"This  speech,"  he  writes,  "was  one  of  the  most  notable,  as  it  cer 
tainly  was  one  of  the  most  effective  ever  delivered  by  any  man 
on  any  occasion.  I  know  of  no  instance  in  history  when  one 
speech  effected  such  results,  immediate  and  remote,  as  this  one 
did.  The  resolution  referred  to  and  this  speech  especially,  gave 
the  war  a  vigor  and  real  life  it  had  not  before,  and  never  would 

12  Congressional  Globe,  37th  Congress,  1st  session,  pp.  288-297;  Moore, 
Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  pp.  329  et  seq. ;  Moore,  Rebellion  Record, 
vol.  i,  p.  415;  E.  G.  Scott,  Reconstruction  during  the  Civil  War,  p.  245; 
Nicholay  and  Hay,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  iv,  p.  379. 


30  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

have  had  without  them,  on  the  Northern  side.  .  .  .  This  speech, 
throughout,  was  characterized  by  extraordinary  fervor  and  elo 
quence,  and,  in  my  judgment,  did  more  to  strengthen  and  arouse 
the  war  passions  of  the  people  at  the  North  than  everything  else 
combined/'  It  "had  a  special  power  and  influence  springing  from 
the  very  source  from  which  it  emanated.  The  author  stood  soli 
tary  and  alone — isolated  from  every  public  man  throughout  the 
Southern  states,  and  from  nearly  every  public  man  throughout 
the  Northern  states  attached  to  the  same  political  party  to  which 
he  belonged,  upon  the  questions  involved."13 

In  December,  1861,  Johnson  became  one  of  the  seven  members 
of  the  famous  Joint  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  appointed  after  the  disaster  of  Ball's  Bluff,  which  served 
as  the  legislative  whip  and  spur  to  the  executive  and  the  army. 
It  assumed  to  speak  for  the  loyal  people  and  made  its  judgments 
feared  by  the  most  powerful  officials.  Prejudice  and  hasty  con 
clusions  could  often  be  charged  to  it,  but  its  zeal  won  it  support 
in  and  out  of  Congress  and  brought  it  a  prestige  of  which  it  was 
fully  conscious  and  which  it  exploited  to  the  utmost. 

The  qualities  of  loyalty,  fearlessness,  aggressiveness,  self-reli 
ance,  willingness  to  accept  responsibilities,  and  resource  in  carry 
ing  out  his  plans,  together  with  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
political  factors,  public  men,  and  peculiar  conditions  in  his  state, 
designated  Johnson  as  preeminently  the  man  to  take  the  initiative 
in  reconstructing  Tennessee.1*  True  to  his  reputation,  he  did  not 

13  War  between  the  States,  vol.  ii,  pp.  458-462. 

34  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  contended  that  the  choice  of  Johnson 
practically  foredoomed  the  government's  experiment  in  Tennessee  to 
failure.  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Thomas  A.  Scott  wrote  from 
Nashville  to  Stanton  (March  4,  1862) :  "The  public  here  have  long 
known  Mr.  Johnson  as  a  decided  out  and  out  Union  man,  and  one 
politically  opposed  to  everything  concerning  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
which,  so  far  as  Mr.  Johnson  is  concerned,  is  all  right  and  proper,  but 
it  will  prevent  him  from  bringing  back  into  the  ranks  people  who  have 
taken  active  part  against  him,  and  many  would  fear  that  he  would 
choose  to  be  somewhat  vindictive  and  thus  persecute  them — knowing  well 
that  they  in  days  past  did  sadly  persecute  him.  His  appointment  would  at 
onc«  be  used  by  the  rebels  as  the  means  of  organizing  their  party  against 
anything  he  might  attempt,  and  would  undoubtedly  prevent  many  men 
(thro'  false  pride)  from  joining  the  Union  cause.  Mr.  Johnson  has,  in 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  31 

hesitate  to  leave  the  comfort  and  security  of  Washington  at  the 
president's  call  and  go  to  a  post  of  danger  and  difficulty,  where, 
for  the  next  three  years,  the  war  clouds  lowered  around  him,  but 
parted  at  length  to  reveal  him  unshaken  and  triumphant,  the  leader 
of  his  party  before  the  country. 

times  past,  controlled  a  large  share  of  the  masses  of  Tennessee,  but  many 
of  the  influential  men  connected  with  those  classes  which  he  controlled 
are  now  numbered  among  his  enemies.  .  .  .  Many  people  here  think  that 
neither  Mr.  Johnson  nor  any  other  prominent  politician  should  be  placed 
in  charge  of  affairs  in  this  state,  as  it  would  only  serve  to  draw  party 
lines  and  create  fresh  troubles  which  would  not  arise  if  some  reliable 
man — such  as  General  Campbell — was  selected  for  the  position.  It  has 
been  intimated  to  me  that  the  feeling  against  Mr.  Johnson — if  he  were  in 
power — is  so  bitter  that  attempts  might  be  made  to  destroy  his  life,  for 
the  purpose  of  creating  fresh  troubles  and  gratifying  revenge  against  him 
for  his  past  course  in  opposition  to  the  Southern  Confederacy.  .  .  This 
being  the  first  state  to  be  organized  by  the  general  government,  great  care 
should  be  used:  the  people  of  the  South,  as  you  know,  are  very  sensi 
tive  upon  the  subject  of  state  rights  and  your  organization  should  be  put 
in  such  shape  as  to  enable  the  friends  of  the  Union  to  satisfy  the  people 
that  the  government  was  using  every  precaution  to  provide  them  with 
a  safe  and  prudent  government,  until  such  time  as  they — the  Union 
people — could  organize  and  elect  their  rules  under  the  constitutions 
of  the  several  states.  Any  other  course  might  lead  to  serious  rebellion 
against  the  state  organizations  and  drive  many  men  into  support  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy  who  would  otherwise  never  be  found  there.  This 
would  undoubtedly  be  the  effect  if  they  had  cause  to  believe  that  the 
establishing  of  a  military  government  was  placed  in  hands  that  would 
rule  them  with  despotic  power."  Stanton  Papers,  March  4,  1862,  Library 
of  Congress. 


CHAPTER    III 

INAUGURATION  OF  MILITARY  GOVERNMENT 

The  task  assumed  by  Governor  Johnson  was  one  of  extreme 
difficulty.  Had  he  come  as  an  alien  conqueror,  or  as  temporary 
occupant  of  territory  shortly  to  be  annexed  with  the  acquiescence 
of  its  inhabitants,  the  history  of  his  own  country  would  have 
furnished  a  precedent  and  international  law  would  have  supplied 
the  principles  on  which  to  base  his  action.  A  conqueror  holds  the 
country  firmly  in  his  grip,  his  word  is  its  only  law,  he  brings 
pressure  and  punishment  to  bear  with  unsparing  hand.  No  con 
sideration  binds  him 'except  how  to  fasten  himself  most  inevitably, 
most  completely  upon  his  conquest.  The  military  occupier  has  to 
deal  only  with  problems  of  administrative  detail,  to  preserve  the 
status  quo  until  the  civil  government  of  the  new  sovereign  assumes 
its  sway.1  Johnson's  problem,  on  the  other  hand,  involved  unique 
complications,  demanding  the  utmost  firmness,  tact,  dispassionate 
calmness,  and  invincible  courage.  His  path  had  not  been  blazed 
for  him ;  the  outcome  no  man  could  foresee. 

"You  are  hereby  appointed,"  reads  his  commission,  "military 
governor  of  the  state  of  Tennessee,  with  authority  to  exercise 
and  perform,  within  the  limits  of  that  state,  all  and  singular  the 
powers,  duties  and  functions  pertaining  to  the  office  of  military 
governor  (including  the  power  to  establish  all  necessary  offices 
and  tribunals  and  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus)  during  the 
pleasure  of  the  president,  or  until  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  that 
state  shall  organize  a  civil  government  in  conformity  with  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States."2  The  accompanying  instruc 
tions  add:  "It  is  obvious  to  you  that  the  great  purpose  of  your 
appointment  is  to  re-establish  the  authority  of  the  Federal  govern 
ment  in  the  state  of  Tennessee,  and  provide  the  means  of  maintain 
ing  peace  and  security  to  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  that  state  until 

*W.  E.  Birkhimer,  Military  Government  and  Martial  Law,  pp.  104-111. 
*O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  ix,  p.  396;  J.  P.  vol.  xvi,  3688;  Stanton  Papers, 
March  4,  1862,  Library  of  Congress. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  33 

they  shall  be  able  to  establish  a  civil  government.  Upon  your 
wisdom  and  energetic  action  much  will  depend  in  accomplishing 
the  result.  It  is  not  deemed  necessary  to  give  any  specific  instruc 
tions,  but  rather  to  confide  in  your  sound  discretion  to  adopt  such 
measures  as  circumstances  may  demand.  Specific  instructions  will 
be  given  when  requested.  You  may  rely  upon  the  perfect  confi 
dence  and  full  support  of  the  department  in  the  performance  of 
your  duties."3  The  commission  as  brigadier-general  was  added, 
of  course,  to  confer  dignity  upon  the  governor  in  his  dealings 
with  the  officers  of  the  army  and  to  enable  him  to  perform  military 
functions  and  command  military  subordinates. 

This  plenary  power  and  plenary  discretion  were  to  be  applied 
to  subjects  of  no  uniform  political  status.  The  people  of  Ten 
nessee  might,  at  this  time,  have  been  divided  into  at  least  three 
classes,  and  with  each  class  a  different  course  must  be  followed. 
To  those  whose  loyalty  to  the  Union  remained  unshaken,  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  governor,  as  the  agent  of  the  Federal  executive, 
to  secure  the  constitutional  guaranty  of  a  republican  form  of  gov 
ernment,  to  protect  them  in  their  persons  and  property,  to  restore 
to  them  the  rights  and  privileges  appertaining  to  loyal  citizenship 
under  the  Constitution,  and  to  cooperate  with  them  in  devising 
means  to  these  ends.  The  active  secessionists,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  to  be  disarmed  and  brought  into  subjection  to  the  Federal 
government,  Constitution  and  laws — not,  however,  to  be  held  as 
subjugated  enemies,  but  with  a  view  to  their  eventual  voluntary 
acquiescence  in  the  reestablishment  of  the  old  order  and  to  their 
resumption  of  their  duties  as  citizens.  The  third  class  consisted 
of  those  who  were  either  honestly  neutral  or,  at  least,  betrayed 
their  leanings  by  no  overt  acts.  These  must  be  impressed  with 
the  ability  and  determination  of  the  government  to  maintain  itself 
against  its  enemies  and  finally  to  reassert  its  authority,  while,  at 
the  same  time,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  excite  their  hostility  or 
apprehension  by  unnecessarily  harsh  or  illegal  acts,  violation  of 
their  constitutional  prejudices,  or  threatened  interference  with 
rights  or  institutions  to  which  they  were  devoted. 

To  compass  all  this  without  shipwreck  required  no  ordinary 
mind.  There  must  be  added  the  fact  that,  within  the  territory  to 

*  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  ix,  p.  396.    See  also  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  ii,  p.  106. 


34  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

be  administered  by  Governor  Johnson,  the  armies  of  Halleck  and 
Buell  were  operating  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  These  generals, 
under  the  necessity  of  making  everything  bend  to  the  success  of 
their  military  plans,  and  accustomed  by  training  and  precedent  to 
autocratic  sway  within  the  field  of  their  commands,  were  little 
likely  to  defer  to — indeed,  were  certain  to  view  with  impatience 
and  intolerance — the  projects  of  a  civil  officer  whose  position  they 
regarded  as  at  once  an  anomaly  and  an  annoyance.  A  disquieting 
portent  of  trouble  appeared  at  the  very  outset.  On  the  6th  of 
March,  Buell  telegraphed  from  Nashville  to  General  McClellan: 
"I  have  been  concerned  to  hear  that  it  is  proposed  to  organize  a 
provincial  government  for  Tennessee.  I  think  it  would  be  inju 
dicious  at  this  time.  It  may  not  be  necessary  at  all."4 

Not  only  administrative  difficulties  confronted  the  new  gov 
ernor.  The  constitutional  validity  of  his  position  was  seri 
ously  questioned.  Its  sponsors  rested  their  case  upon  the  fourth 
section  of  the  fourth  article  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides 
that  "the  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state  in  this 
Union  a  republican  form  of  government,  and  shall  protect  each 
of  them  against  invasion."  The  Confederacy,  they  maintained, 
aimed  to  subvert  the  true  republican  form  in  favor  of  a  dominant 
slave-holding  aristocracy.  The  state,  in  the  meaning  of  the  Con 
stitution,  was,  they  said,  its  loyal  citizens,  regardless  of  their 
number.  They  could  call  upon  the  government  to  make  good  the 
guaranty,  and  the  government  was  bound  to  respond.  If  they 
desired  to  remain  in  the  Union,  any  who  sought  to  force  them 
out  of  it  were  invaders  of  their  rights  and  privileges. 

Thaddeus  Stevens,  in  a  celebrated  debate5  in  the  Federal  House 
of  Representatives,  developing  his  doctrine  that  the  seceded  states 
were,  for  all  practical  purposes,  out  of  the  Union,  declared  that, 
ipso  facto,  the  Constitution  could  not  extend  to  them;  they  were 
enemies  to  be  conquered;  the  authority  of  a  military  governor 
could  be  derived  from  no  clause  of  the  Constitution,  but  existed 
only  by  the  fiat  of  the  military  commander-in-chief.  "If  the 
Constitution  still  operates  in  those  portions  of  the  country,  if  it 
is  not  a  question  of  military  power,"  he  queried,  "I  want  to  know 

*O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  n. 

a  Congressional  Globe,  37th  Congress,  3d  session,  pp.  239-244, 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  35 

by  what  authority  the  president  appoints  military  governors,  di 
rects  what  kind  of  men  shall  be  elevated  to  office  in  the  states, 
and  surrounds  the  ballot-box  with  troops."  If  the  authority  is 
the  article  cited  above,  "then,  if  the  president  happens  to  think 
that  there  is  not  a  republican  form  of  government  in  Tennessee, 
although  nine  out  of  ten  of  her  people  form  a  constitution,  and 
pass  laws  under  it,  he  has  a  right  to  place  a  governor  there  and 
supersede  the  government  of  the  people." 

A  third  view  was  advanced  by  Representative  Olin  of  New 
York,  who  repudiated  Stevens'  general  thesis  that  the  Constitu 
tion  did  not  extend  to  the  seceded  states,  but  agreed  that  the 
appointment  of  military  governors  was  justified  not  by  the  guar 
anty  clause,  but  by  military  necessity.  "It  is  the  exercise  of 
authority  by  the  commanding  general.  .  .  .  He  had  undoubtedly 
a  right,  where  military  and  where  judicial  authority  was  to  be 
exercised,  to  delegate  a  judge,  or  to  delegate  a  major-general 
for  the  exercise  of  that  power.  ...  Of  that  necessity  the  presi 
dent  is  alone  the  judge,  as  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army." 

This  would  seem  to  be  the  sound  view.  Stevens'  objection  to 
a  sweeping  interpretation  of  the  guaranty  clause  is  cogent.  As 
he  points  out,  the  opinion  of  the  president  as  to  the  existence  of 
a  republican  form  of  government  in  a  state  is,  by  that  construc 
tion,  made  decisive  in  every  case  and  under  all  circumstances, 
even  in  time  of  peace  and  with  an  all  but  unanimous  conviction 
of  its  citizens  to  the  contrary.  But,  under  his  paramount  obliga 
tion  to  maintain  the  Union,  the  president  may,  in  case  of  un 
doubted  rebellion  and  attempted  dissolution  of  the  Federal  bond, 
and  by  virtue  of  his  military  power  as  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army,  and  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  loyal  citizens 
and  the  Union  interests  in  a  state  and  restoring  them  to  their 
rights  under  the  Constitution — not  for  the  purpose  of  regulating 
a  peaceable  state  government  in  accordance  with  his  questionable 
conceptions  of  republicanism — utilize  any  machinery,  not  con 
trary  to  the  usages  of  war,  to  accomplish  his  end. 

This  explanation,  too,  is  perhaps  the  only  one  that  will  serve 
to  answer  the  strictures  of  Jefferson  Davis  upon  the  military 
government  in  Tennessee.  The  government  of  the  United  States, 
he  says,  "with  a  powerful  military  force,  planted  itself  at  Nash- 


36  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

ville,  the  state  capital.  It  refused  to  recognize  the  state  govern 
ment,  or  any  organization  under  it,  as  having  any  existence,  or 
to  recognize  the  people  otherwise  than  as  a  hostile  community. 
It  said  to  them,  in  effect:  'I  am  the  sovereign  and  you  are  the 
subjects.  If  you  are  stronger  than  I  am,  then  drive  me  out  of 
the  state;  if  I  am  stronger  than  you  are,  then  I  demand  an  un 
conditional  surrender  to  my  sovereignty.'  It  is  evident  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  was  not  there  by  the  consent 
of  those  who  were  to  be  governed.  It  had  not,  therefore,  any 
'just  powers'  of  government  within  the  state  of  Tennessee.  .  .  . 
It  is  further  evident  that,  by  this  action,  the  government  of  the 
United  States  denied  the  fundamental  principle  of  popular  liberty 
— that  the  people  are  the  source  of  all  political  power.  In  this 
instance,  it  not  only  subverted  the  state  government,  but  carried 
that  subversion  to  the  extent  of  annihilation.  It,  therefore,  pro 
ceeded  to  establish  a  new  order  of  affairs,  founded,  not  on  the 
principle  of  sovereignty  of  the  people,  which  was  wholly  rejected, 
but  on  the  assumption  of  sovereignty  in  the  United  States  gov 
ernment.  It  appointed  its  military  governor  to  be  the  head  of 
the  new  order,  and  recognized  no  civil  or  political  existence  in 
any  man,  except  some  of  its  notorious  adherents,  until,  betraying 
the  state,  he  had  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  sovereignty 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States."6 

It  is  no  part  of  this  treatise  to  debate  the  eternal  question 
whether  the  "sovereignty  of  the  people"  on  which  the  Constitution 
rested  was  the  sovereignty  of  "the  people  of  the  United  States" 
as  a  whole  or  of  the  people  of  the  states  separately  considered. 
If,  however,  as  is  now  practically  if  not  morally  established,  the 
former  is  the  correct  view,  the  argument  of  Davis  may  be  para 
phrased  into  a  statement  of  the  case  for  the  president.  Charged 
with  the  mandate  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  preserve 
the  Union,  he  was  bound  to  regard  any  state  organization  at 
tempting  to  overthrow  the  Union  by  means  at  variance  with  both 
Federal  and  state  law  as  having  no  existence,  and  all  persons  in 
arms  against  the  government  as  hostile.  Armed  with  the  "just 
powers"  derived  from  the  consent  of  the  majority  of  the  sover 
eign  people  at  the  election  of  1860,  he  came  into  Tennessee,  by 

'Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol.  ii,  pp.  455-458. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  37 

his  agent,  to  vindicate  by  arms — the  only  means  adequate  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  resistance — "the  fundamental  principle  of  pop 
ular  liberty"  that  the  people  of  the  nation  "are  the  source  of  all 
political  power,"  and  to  reestablish,  as  soon  as  might  be,  the  old 
order  "founded  on  the  principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people." 
He  "recognized  no  civil  or  political  existence"  in  any  except  the 
adherents  of  the  government,  because  others  had  voluntarily  re 
nounced  their  rights  and  duties  under  the  government  and  set 
about  destroying  it,  and  therefore  could  only  be  treated  as  rebels 
and  enemies  until,  by  an  "oath  of  allegiance,"  they  expressed 
their  readiness  to  subject  themselves  again  to  the  Constitution 
and  laws. 

'  To  Johnson,  a  return  to  his  own  state  as  the  agent  of  a  gov 
ernment  repudiated  and  hated  by  a  vast  majority  of  the  people 
must  have  promised  difficulties  which  could  have  been  overborne 
in  his  mind  only  by  a  lofty  spirit  of  patriotism  and  the  belief  that 
he,  better  than  any  other  man,  could  shorten  and  ameliorate  the 
period  of  suffering  for  his  former  fellow-citizens,  or  by  an  al 
most  inhuman  desire  to  revenge  himself  upon  those  who  had 
wronged  him  and  to  gloat  over  their  misfortunes.  There  was 
no  lack  of  those  who  suggested  the  latter  as  the  true  motive,  but, 
though  rancor  may  have  led  him  to  look  on  the  distress  of  the 
aristocrats  with  a  certain  satisfaction,  love  of  his  state  and  of 
the  Union  were  deeper  elements  in  his  nature  and  he  was  incapa 
ble  of  prostituting  them  to  any  low  impulse  of  revenge.7 

It  was  but  natural  that  the  fury  of  Tennessee  secessionists 
should  be  concentrated  upon  the  "traitor"  from  their  midst  who 
had  become  the  instrument  of  their  subjugation.  Plots  were 
formed  against  his  life,  guerilla  bands  hoped  to  intercept  his  train 
and  take  him  South  to  answer  for  his  "crimes,"  his  mail  was 
filled  with  warnings  and  insults.  "Go  it  Andy  this  is  your  day, 
But  while  you  are  going  so  high,  you  must  not  for  get  that  evry 
dog  has  his  day  And  the  day  is  not  far  advanse  when  you  will 
have  your  Just  day,  and  that  day  cannot  ever  come  untill 
you  are  tared  and  fethered  and  burnt.  We  are  preparind  a  knise 

7Oration  of  George  W.  Jones  at  the  unveiling  of  the  Johnson  monu 
ment  at  Greenville  (pamphlet),  p.  13. 


38  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

coat  of  feathers  for  that  orcation,  so  when  we  have  the  chanse 
We  will  turn  your  black  skin  read,  and  then  andy  your  black 
friends  will  not  know  you,"  threatened  an  anonymous  corres 
pondent.8  A  Confederate  soldier  wrote  to  his  wife  that  men  in 
the  army  had  vowed  to  take  the  governor's  life  and  would  do  so 
if  they  were  allowed  to  leave  their  commands.9  At  least  one 
elaborate  plan,  sanctioned  by  General  Bragg,  to  kidnap  him  by 
an  organized  force  is  reported.10 

A  letter  from  Buell  which  reached  Johnson  at  Louisville  on  his 
way  to  the  capital  advised  him  what  to  expect.  "The  mass," 
the  general  wrote,  "are  either  inimical  or  overawed  by  the  tyranny 
of  opinion  and  power  that  has  prevailed,  or  are  waiting  to 
see  how  matters  turn  out.  They  will  acquiesce  when  they  see 
that  there  is  to  be  stability.  You  must  not  expect  to  be  received 
with  enthusiasm,  but  rather  the  reverse,  and  I  would  suggest  to 
you  to  enter  without  any  display."11 

The  governor  inaugurated  his  administration  with  a  proclama 
tion — later  published  as  an  "Address  to  the  People" — explaining 
his  position  and  indicating  his  policy12  He  referred  to  the  happi 
ness  and  prosperity  of  the  people  of  Tennessee  while  in  the 
Federal  bond.  "They  felt  their  government  only  in  the  con 
scious  enjoyment  of  the  benefits  it  conferred  and  the  blessings  it 
bestowed."  He  stated  the  purpose  of  the  war  in  the  conciliatory 
words  of  the  Crittenden  resolution  and  asserted  the  duty  of  the 
president  to  protect  and  defend  the  Constitution  and  laws  and 
to  suppress  insurrection.  The  present  condition  of  the  state  was 
next  reviewed.  The  state  government  had  disappeared  and  the 
state  was  in  ruin  and  disorder.  "The  executive  has  abdicated, 
the  legislature  has  dissolved,  the  judiciary  is  in  abeyance.  .  .  . 
The  archives  have  been  desecrated;  the  public  property  stolen 

8J.  P.,  vol.  li,  1023. 

9  Ibid.,  vol.  xvii,  3810. 

10  Annals  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  vol.  i,  p.  312. 

11  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  612. 

13  J.  P.,  vol.  xvi,  3725  a,  3777  et  seq. ;  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public 
Services  of  Andrew  Johnson,  pp.  250-253.  This  proclamation  follows,  in 
general,  suggestions  submitted  to  Johnson  at  his  request  by  R.  J.  Meigs, 
a  prominent  Tennesseean,  then  clerk  of  the  United  States  court  in  the 
District  of  Columbia.  J.  P.,  vol.  xvi,  3764,  3765. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  39 

and  destroyed;  the  vaults  of  the  state  bank  violated  and  its 
treasuries  robbed,  including  the  funds  carefully  gathered  and 
consecrated  for  all  time  to  the  instruction  of  our  children.  In 
such  a  lamentable  crisis,  the  government  of  the  United  States 
could  not  be  unmindful  of  its  high  constitutional  obligation  to 
guarantee  to  every  state  in  this  Union  a  republican  form  of  gov 
ernment."  This  obligation  it  is  now  attempting  to  discharge. 
"I  have  been  appointed  in  the  absence  of  the  regular  and  estab 
lished  state  authorities,  as  military  governor  for  the  time  being, 
to  preserve  the  public  property  of  the  state,  to  give  the  protection 
of  law  actively  enforced  to  her  citizens,  and  as  speedily  as  may  be 
to  restore  her  government  to  the  same  condition  as  before  the 
existing  rebellion."  He  invited  all  persons  in  sympathy  with  his 
purpose  to  cooperate  with  him  in  the  work. 

Immediately  to  begin  the  restoration  of  order  necessitated  some 
irregularities  in  procedure.  "I  find  most,  if  not  all  of  the  offices, 
both  state  and  Federal,  vacated  either  by  actual  abandonment, 
or  by  the  action  of  the  incumbents  in  attempting  to  subordinate 
their  functions  to  a  power  in  hostility  to  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  state,  and  subversive  of  her  national  allegiance.  These 
offices  must  be  filled  temporarily,  until  the  state  shall  be  restored 
so  far  to  its  accustomed  quiet,  that  the  people  can  peaceably 
assemble  at  the  ballot-box  and  select  agents  of  their  own  choice. 
Otherwise  anarchy  would  prevail,  and  no  man's  life  or  property 
would  be  safe  from  the  desperate  and  unprincipled.  ... 

"To  the  people  themselves  the  protection  of  the  government 
is  extended.  All  their  rights  will  be  duly  respected  and  their 
wrongs  redressed  when  made  known.  Those  who  through  the 
dark  and  weary  nights  of  the  rebellion  have  retained  their  alle 
giance  to  the  Federal  government  will  be  honored.  The  erring 
and  misguided  will  be  welcomed  on  their  return.  And  while  it 
may  become  necessary  in  vindicating  the  violated  majesty  of  the 
law  and  reasserting  its  imperial  sway  to  punish  intelligent  and 
conscious  treason  in  high  places,  no  merely  retaliatory  or  vin 
dictive  policy  will  be  adopted.  To  those  especially  who  in  private, 
unofficial  capacity  have  assumed  an  attitude  of  hostility  to  the 
government,  a  full  and  complete  amnesty  for  all  past  acts  and 
declarations  is  offered,  upon  the  one  condition  of  their  again 


40  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

yielding  themselves  peaceful  citizens  to  the  just  supremacy  of 
the  laws.  This  I  advise  them  to  do  for  their  own  good,  and 
for  the  peace  and  welfare  of  our  beloved  state." 

This  proclamation  is  striking  in  its  conciliatory  tone.  The  sole 
purpose  of  the  military  government  is  to  aid  in  the  prompt  re 
storation  of  the  state  to  its  former  place  in  the  Union.13  If  the 
people,  though  hitherto  disloyal,  will  now  consent  to  further  that 
purpose,  no  unnecessary  obstacles  will  be  placed  in  their  way. 
By  implication,  also,  none  of  their  institutions  will  be  interfered 
with ;  the  Federal  government  will  neither  dictate  terms  nor  im 
pose  humiliating  requirements  of  probation  or  atonement.  The  sole 
condition  prescribed  is  submission  to  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States.  A  complete  amnesty  is  especially  offered 
to  all  private  citizens  who  renounce  their  disloyalty  and  return 
to  their  allegiance. 

The  spirit  of  the  proclamation  was  in  harmony  not  only  with 
the  well-known  humane  views  of  the  president,  but  also  with 
those  of  many  prominent  Union  men  in  Tennessee,  whose  ob 
servations  had  convinced  them  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people 
were  either  indifferent  to  the  issues  of  the  war  and  acquiesced 
in  the  proceedings  of  the  active  and  dominant  secessionists  only 
to  save  themselves  and  their  property  from  molestation,  or  were 
ignorant  and  led  astray  by  misrepresentation  of  the  purpose  of 

13  "It  (the  proclamation)  shows  that  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  as 
governor  the  restoration  of  the  ancient  government  was  still  the  object 
of  President  Lincoln's  exertion,  and  that  Johnson's  military  character 
was  the  use  of  the  military  power  merely  as  an  instrument  to  attain  this 
end.  That  his  appointment  was  made  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate 
first  being  had,  proves  conclusively  that  President  Lincoln,  as  late  as  the 
spring  of  1862,  had  not  reached  the  point  of  appropriating  to  his  sole 
use  the  powers  involved  in  the  work  of  reconstruction.  Indeed,  the 
natural  inference  is  that  no  'Presidential  Plan'  of  reconstruction  was  yet 
present  in  the  mind  of  the  President,  that  'restoration'  of  the  old  state 
governments  was  still  the  primary  object  of  Federal  endeavor,  and  that 
the  part  of  the  executive  branch  of  the  government  was  merely  to  perform 
such  duties  as  would  enable  the  restored  sections  to  send  senators  and 
representatives  to  Washington,  where  the  rest  of  restoration  would  be 
effected  or  denied  by  Congress,  according  to  its  decision  upon  the  ad 
mission  or  rejection  of  these  members  to  their  respective  houses."  Eben 
Greenough  Scott,  Reconstruction  during  the  Civil  War,  p.  319. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  41 

the  Federal  government;  that  these  would  willingly  submit  to 
a  Union  that  proved  itself  able  to  restore  order  and  protect  its 
citizens  and  animated  by  no  lawless  designs  on  their  institutions, 
persons,  or  property.14  This  was  General  Buell's  opinion  and 
controlled  his  policy  while  he  retained  command.  Colonel  Marc 
Mundy,  whose  military  administration  at  Pulaski  and  elsewhere 
was  highly  successful,  drew  similar  conclusions  from  his  experi 
ence.  "In  my  intercourse  with  the  people,"  he  testifies,  "I  found 
the  masses  had  been  largely  duped  by  the  leaders  in  being  led 
to  believe  that  our  purpose  in  coming  into  Tennessee  was  to 
take  away  all  their  civil  rights  and  destroy  their  domestic  re 
lations.  .  .  .  While  they  were  generally  rebels,  they  had  been 
made  so  by  falsehood.  The  policy  I  pursued  made  a  practical 
contradiction  to  what  had  been  taught  them  by  their  leaders, 
and  the  result  in  a  short  time  was  that  they  gained  confidence 
in  my  course  of  procedure,  and  they  themselves  proposed  that 
we  should  have  what  they  called  a  county  meeting,  in  order 
that  all  the  people  might  hear  my,  policy  from  my  own  lips.  .  .  . 
A  great  many  of  the  younger  portion  of  the  community  in  private 
conversation  with  me  explained  how  they  had  been  led  away  by 
the  rebels  assuring  them  that  we  were  not  only  come  there  to 
take  away  their  property,  but  to  ravish  their  wives  and  daughters 
and  do  everything  else  that  could  be  suggested  that  was  bad.  .  .  . 
I  found  the  masses  of  the  people  of  Tennessee  were  exceed 
ingly  ignorant,  and  depended  entirely  for  their  information  upon 
their  public  speakers,  the  stump  speakers,  as  they  are  called, 
which  accounts  for  their  gullibility  by  their  leaders.  .  .  .  They 
expressed  a  great  anxiety  to  return  to  their  loyalty,  .  .  .  but 
expressed  fears  that  some  leading  men  in  the  community  who 
were  bitter  secessionists  would  mark  them  and  have  them  pun 
ished  by  the  Southern  Confederacy.  .  .  .  We  cannot  expect  any 
demonstrations  of  loyalty  from  the  people  there  unless  we  can 
assure- them  of  protection  against  the  rebel  armies  and  guerillas. 
...  If  they  were  to  incautiously  develop  the  Union  sentiment, 
and  they  had  no  protection  from  our  forces  and  our  government, 
it  would  be  to  seal  their  doom  !"15 

14  J.  P.,  vol.  xx,  4615  et  passim. 

18  O.  R,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  i,  p.  633. 


42  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

For  the  actual  execution  of  Governor  Johnson's  restoration 
measures,  the  United  States  army  furnished  the  motive  power. 
His  instructions  from  the  war  department  advised  him  that  the 
military  commanders  operating  in  Tennessee  were  directed  to 
aid  him  in  the  performance  of  his  duty  and  to  detail  an  adequate 
force  for  the  special  purpose  of  a  "governor's  guard,"  to  act 
under  his  orders.16  In  response  to  his  request  for  more  detailed 
information  on  this  point,  Secretary  Stanton  communicated  to 
him  the  substance  of  an  order  to  General  Halleck  to  provide  the 
necessary  force,  adding:  "Important  results  are  hoped  from 
the  measure,  and  it  is  important  that  the  officer  in  command 
should  be  a  discreet  person,  who  would  act  efficiently  and  har 
moniously  with  Governor  Johnson."17  Johnson  also  addressed 
a  similar  inquiry  to  Buell,  who  replied  that  the  officers  exercis 
ing  separate  commands  under  him  in  Tennessee  would  be  ordered 
to  honor  within  their  respective  limits  any  requisition  made  on 
them  by  the  military  governor  to  enforce  his  authority  as  such, 
and  that,  for  Nashville,  his  orders  sent  directly  to  the  provost- 
marshal  would  be  executed  by  him  without  further  reference. 
"Any  requisitions  which  would  involve  the  movement  of  troops," 
the  general  concludes,  "must  of  course  be  dependent  on  the  plan 
of  military  operations  against  the  enemy.18 

The  governor's  first  concern  was  to  select  his  lieutenants. 
Edward  H.  East  was  appointed  secretary  of  state,  Joseph  S. 
Fowler,  comptroller,  Horace  Maynard,  attorney-general,  and 
Edmund  Cooper,  private  secretary  and  confidential  agent.19 

Since  the  influence  of  the  secession  leaders  and  the  fear  inspired 
by  them  were,  in  Johnson's  opinion,  the  chief  hindrance  of  the  de 
velopment  of  outspoken  Unionism  among  the  people,  he  proceeded 
directly  to  deal  with  such  of  them  as  remained  within  his  reach. 
His  purpose  was  to  have  no  one  in  authority  or  eminent  position 
who  was  not  an  avowed  friend  of  the  Union.  The  oath  of 
allegiance  was  accordingly  tendered  (March  25)  to  the  mayor, 
Richard  B.  Cheatham,  and  the  city  council  of  Nashville.  They 

wlbid.,  vol.  ix,  p.  396. 

17  Ibid.,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  pp.  56-58. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  47;  J.  P.,  vol.  xvii,  3814. 
14  Nashville  Union,  April  27,  1862. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  43 

refused  it  on  the  ground  that  the  oath  required  by  the  state 
constitution  applied  only  to  state  and  county,  not  to  corporation 
officers.  The  governor  promptly  declared  their  offices  vacant 
and  filled  them  himself  by  appointment,  pending  an  election.  The 
new  city  council  imposed  the  oath  on  all  municipal  officers,  in 
cluding  the  board  of  education  and  the  school-teachers.  On  the 
29th,  ex-Mayor  Cheatham  was  arrested  for  disloyalty  and  utter 
ing  treasonable  and  seditious  language  against  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  giving  counsel,  aid  and  comfort  to  its 
enemies,  proposing  to  invite  Jefferson  Davis  to  make  Nashville 
his  official  residence,  and  other  offenses,  and  was  imprisoned 
in  the  penitentiary.  Other  prominent  secessionists  were  similarly 
served,  the  arrests  being  made  by  the  provost-marshal  on  the 
warrant  of  the  governor.  Among  the  victims  were  ex-Governor 
Neil  S.  Brown,  Judge  Guild  of  the  chancery  court,  and  the 
president  and  cashier  of  the  Union  Bank  of  Nashville.20  Warrants 
were  also  sent  to  the  military  commanders  of  various  posts  in 
the  state,  the  use  of  them  being  sometimes  left  to  their  dis 
cretion.  Colonel  Mundy  reported  that,  for  Lebanon  and 
vicinity,  he  favored  leaving  as  many  cases  as  possible  until 
the  civil  courts^  were  restored,  to  allay  any  apprehension  of 
undue  exercise  of  the  military  power.21 

Then  came  the  turn  of  the  press.  Military  supervision  was 
extended  over  it.  The  Daily  Times  and  the  Banner  were  sup 
pressed  in  April  and  the  editor  of  the  latter  imprisoned.  The 
same  month,  S.  C.  Mercer,  a  vehement  Kentucky  Unionist, 
started  an  administration  paper,  the  Daily  Union,  which  received 
the  support  of  the  government  patronage.  The  plants  of  the 
Gazette  and  Patriot  and  the  Methodist  and  Baptist  publishing 
houses  were  also  seized  and  closed  for  propagating  disloyalty.22 

Johnson  next  laid  his  hand  upon  the  clergy.  On  the  I7th 
of  June,  six  ministers,  who  were  accused  of  preaching  treason 
from  their  pulpits,  were  summoned  before  him  and  requested 
to  take  the  oath.  After  consideration,  time  for  which  was 
allowed  them  at  their  request,  all  refused.  Five  of  them  were 

"J.  P.,  vol.  xvii,  3848  et  passim;  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  pp.  597,  764. 

*J.   P.,  vol.  xviii,  4091-4094. 

*  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  p.  766. 


44  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

promptly  thrust  into  prison,  the  governor  ordering  that  no 
visitors  be  admitted  to  comfort  or  lionize  them  and  that  no  special 
favors  be  granted  them.  Shortly  afterwards,  they  were  sent 
south,  beyond  the  Federal  lines.  The  sixth,  who  was  in  feeble 
health,  was  paroled-23  "These  assumed  ministers  of  Christ," 
Jo'hnsori  wrote,  "have  done  more  to  poison  and  corrupt  the 
female  mind  of  this  community  than  all  others,  in  fact  changing 
their  entire  character  from  that  of  women  and  ladies  to  fanatics 
and  fiends.  One  of  these  very  ministers,  in  leaving  here  for 
Louisville,  told  those  who  were  collected  to  see  him  off:  'Don't 
forget  your  God,  Jeff  Davis,  and  the  Southern  Confederacy.' 
This  is  a  specimen  of  the  'blameless  course'  pursued  by  these 
traitors  and  hypocrites,  who,  in  the  language  of  Pollock,  are 
'wearing  the  livery  of  heaven  to  serve  the  devil  in.'  "2*  In  October, 
several  of  the  ministers  were  admitted  to  parole. 

The  restoration  of  the  civil  law  was  among  the  most  important 
of  the  military  governor's  duties,  and  he  took  immediate  steps 
to  this  end,  although  but  the  slightest  progress  was  possible  in 
1862.  In  the  spring  of  that  year,  the  Federal  lines  extended 
scarcely  further  south  than  the  Cumberland  river,  from  Nash 
ville  to  Clarksville,  and  even  this  territory  they  held  by  pre 
carious  tenure.  Nashville  and  the  district  to  the  north  of  it 
were  comparatively  quiet,  but  soon  again  to  be  thrown  into 
disorder  by  Bragg's  dash  into  Kentucky.  The  capture  of 
Memphis  by  the  river  fleet  on  the  7th  of  June  and  the  presence 
of  a  powerful  Federal  garrison  there  extended  the  Union  con 
trol  down  the  Mississippi  to  that  city,  but  the  surrounding 
county  was  the  scene  of  turbulence  and  guerilla  raids  and  de 
veloped  no  considerable  loyalty  until  the  end  of  the  war.  The 
Confederates  retained  their  hold  upon  East  Tennessee  until 
September,  1863,  and,  even  after  that,  the  Union  occupation 
afforded  little  security  beyond  the  vicinity  of  the  post  garrisons. 
Southern  Middle  Tennessee  was  the  battlefield  of  the  great 
armies  of  the  west  in  every  year  of  the  war,  and  Nashville 
itself  was  in  a  state  of  siege  during  the  entire  summer  of  1862, 
and  threatened  by  Hood  as  late  as  the  winter  of  1864.  Under 

23  Nashville  Union,  July  5;  New  York  Tribune,  July  4. 
"*J.  P.,  vol.  xxiv,  5281;  vol.  xxvi,  5705,  et  passim. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  45 

such  conditions,  there  was  slight  encouragement  to  attempt  any 
thing  in  the  way  of  judicial  reorganization. 

In  early  April,  1862,  the  county  and  circuit  courts  opened  for 
business  at  various  points  in  Middle  Tennessee  under  the  pro 
tection  of  the  army.  To  avoid  all  unnecessary  annoyance  and 
delay  and  to  win  for  them  all  the  popular  support  possible, 
Johnson  did  not  require  the  officers  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance.25 
On  the  1 3th  of  May,  the  United  States  circuit  court  sat  at  Nash 
ville.  Judge  Catron,  in  his  charge  to  the  grand  jury,  admonished 
them  to  ferret  out  and  indict  all  persons  guilty  of  aiding  and 
abetting  the  marauders  who  infested  the  state.26 

Besides  the  constant  menace  of  the  enemy,  the  civil  courts 
were  subjected  to  the  discomfort  of  being  crowded  cheek  by 
jowl  with  the  military  tribunals  under  direct  control  of  the 
generals  of  the  army.  Two  rival  systems  of  law  attempted  to 
operate  side  by  side  and  under  the  most  trying  conditions.  Fric 
tion  was  inevitable,  and  increased  to  an  alarming  degree  until, 
in  March,  1863,  the  war  department  felt  compelled  to  take  up 
the  matter  and  prescribe  detailed  rules  for  the  guidance  of 
General  Rosecrans,  then  commanding  the  department  of  the 
Cumberland,  in  his  relations  with  the  civil  authorities,27  As 
these  instructions  may  be  regarded  as  expressing  the  official  at 
titude  of  the  government  on  the  subjects  of  which  they  treat, 
it  may  be  well  to  anticipate  by  considering  them  here. 

To  the  provisional  state  government,  writes  General  Halleck, 
must  be  left  "the  trial  and  adjudication  of  all  civil  and  criminal 
cases  cognizable  under  the  laws  of  the  state,  and  to  the  courts 
of  the  United  States,  reestablished  there,  must  be  left  all  cases 
which  belong  to  their  jurisdiction,  under  the  laws  of  the  United 
States.  But  military  offenses,  that  is,  offenses  under  the  Rules 
and  Articles  of  War  and  under  the  'common  law  and  usages  of 
war,'  are  not,  as  a  general  rule,  cognizable  by  the  civil  courts, 
but  must  be  tried  and  punished  by  military  tribunals.  It  is 
not  always  easy  to  accurately  define  the  dividing  line  between 
these  two  classes  of  jurisdictions — the  civil  and  military — for 

"Ibid.,  vol.  xvii,  3905,  3906. 

*  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1862,  p.  765. 

37  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii  p.  77. 


46  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

in  a  country  militarily  occupied,  or  in  which  war  is  actually 
waged,  this  line  may  vafy  according  to  the  peculiar  circumstances 
of  the  case.  Thus,  robbery,  theft,  arson,  murder,  etc,  are  or 
dinarily  offenses  cognizable  by  military  tribunals.  It  is  a  well- 
established  principle  that  a  non-combatant  inhabitant  of  a  country 
militarily  occupied,  who  robs  military  stores  and  munitions,  burns 
store-houses,  bridges,  etc.,  used  for  military  purposes,  or,  as 
military  insurgent,  bears  arms  and  takes  life,  may  be  tried  and 
punished  by  a  military  court."  Again,  where  there  are  no  civil 
courts  in  operation,  the  military  must  take  cognizance  of  all  classes 
of  cases.  Courts-martial,  it  is  true,  are  restricted  to  cases  aris 
ing  under  the  Rules  and  Articles  of  War,  but  military  commis 
sions — "courts  of  general  military  jurisdiction  under  the  common 
law  of  war" — may  be  created  to  deal  with  other  offenses. 

This  letter,  the  most  explicit  the  government  could  give  its 
agents,  has  been  considered  at  length  for  the  purpose  of  suggest 
ing  how  much  remained,  after  everything  possible  had  been  said, 
to  perplex  a  conscientious  official.  As  the  writer  says,  the 
line  between  the  two  jurisdictions  might  vary  according  to 
circumstances,  and  in  Tennessee  new  circumstances  were  de 
veloped  almost  daily.  The  military  commanders  were  determined 
to  maintain  the  prestige  of  their  authority  and,  should  a  case 
arise  cognizable  apparently  under  either  civil  or  martial  law, 
though  the  moral  and  political  advantage  of  exalting  the  civil 
jurisdiction  might  be  apparent,  the  general  would  be  loth  to  let 
the  offender  out  of  his  clutches.  Halleck's  letter  did  not  unravel 
the  legal  snarl  at  Nashville.  Elsewhere,  until  1864,  there  were 
few  courts  and  these  intermittent  and  of  little  value  to  citizens. 
In  Memphis,  from  the  spring  of  1863,  the  civil  and  criminal 
law  was  administered  by  commissions  of  citizens,  created  by 
the  commanding  general. 

At  Shiloh,  on  the  7th  of  April,  1862,  Grant  drove  Beauregard's 
army  across  the  Tennessee  river,  and  the  entire  state,  except 
East  Tennessee,  was  freed  from  any  considerable  Confederate 
force.  This  victory  gave  a  tremendous  impetus  to  Union  senti 
ment  and  severely  shook  the  faith  of  the  secessionists.  By  the 
ist  of  May,  the  disorder  caused  by  the  advance  of  the  Federal 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  47' 

army  and  the  panic  in  Nashville  had  largely  subsided.  The 
circuit,  chancery,  and  magistrates'  courts  were  in  daily  session  at 
the  capital.  Business  had  been  brought  to  a  standstill  by  the 
military  operations,  the  closing  of  regular  channels  of  trade,  the 
carrying  off  of  the  bank  funds,  the  depreciation  of  the  Tennessee 
bank  bills,  and  the  collapse  of  public  confidence;  but  here  also 
conditions  were  improving.  Northern  cotton-buyers  and  specu 
lators  followed  the  army  and  United  States  money  soon  became 
plentiful.  Cotton  rose  from  sixteen  and  seventeen  cents  in  specie 
or  United  States  treasury  notes  in  April  to  from  nineteen  to 
twenty-one  cents  before  the  middle  of  May,  and,  as  the  price 
of  necessaries  was  high  and  the  cotton-growers  needed  money, 
their  reluctance  to  sell  was  soon  overcome.  The  shipment  of 
cotton  from  Tennessee  from  the  opening  of  trade  on  the  nth 
of  March  until  the  loth  of  May  was  roughly  estimated  at  over 
3,600  bales;  700  bales  during  the  first  ten  days  of  May.  The 
Nashville  Union  figured  that  the  season's  shipment  would  reach 
18,000  bales,  and  that  the  figures  would  have  been  larger  but 
for  the  burning  of  several  thousand  bales  by  Confederate  troops 
and  marauding  parties  with  the  design  of  breaking  up  the  trade. 
The  trains  on  the  Louisville-Nashville  railroad  made  daily  trips. 
The  houses  and  stores  deserted  in  the  panic-stricken  evacuation  of 
February  rapidly  filled ;  real  estate  commanded  good  prices ;  state 
currency  and  bank  notes  began  to  appreciate  in  value.  In  a 
word,  the  uninterrupted  success  of  the  Federal  arms  and  the 
probability  that  the  expulsion  of  the  Confederates  was  final  con 
tributed  to  secure  acquiescence  in  an  accomplished  fact  and  a 
return  to  normal  conditions.28 

Politically,  the  prevalence  of  this  feeling  was  evinced  by  a 
series  of  mass  meetings  arranged  by  Union  sympathizers  through 
out  Middle  Tennessee,  with  the  support  of  the  government.  The 
most  important  of  these29  assembled  at  Nashville  on  the  I2th  of 
May,  pursuant  to  a  call  issued  by  prominent  Union  men  of  the 
city  to  their  fellow-citizens  of  the  state  who  favored  "the  restora 
tion  of  the  former  relations  of  this  state  to  the  Federal  Union.", 
Ex-Governor  William  B.  Campbell,  the  chairman  of  the  meet- 

*  Nashville  Union,  May  i,  May  10,  1862. 

"Ibid.,   May   13;   Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  v,  doc.  335. 


48  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

ing,  made  an  earnest,  conciliatory  speech,  appealing  to  all  to  re 
turn  to  their  old  allegiance.  "We  wish,"  he  said,  "to  welcome 
back  all  our  deluded  fellow-citizens  cordially.  The  government 
intends  no  sweeping  confiscation,  nor  wild  turning  loose  of 
slaves  against  the  revolted  states.  It  designs  no  infringement 
on  the  rights  of  property.  .  .  .  We  bear  no  malice  toward  any 
one,  but  deep  sympathy  for  the  deluded.  ...  The  Federal  gov 
ernment  will  pursue  a  kind,  liberal,  and  benevolent  policy  to 
ward  the  people  of  the  South,  to  bring  them  to  the  Union." 
The  meeting  authorized  t!he  chairman  to  appoint  a  "state  central 
Union  committee"  to  communicate  with  the  friends  of  the  Union 
in  various  parts  of  the  state,  and  a  committee  to  consider  the 
condition  of  Tennessee  prisoners  and  arrange  terms  for  their 
release  and  return  to  their  allegiance;  resolved  that  "the  social, 
political,  and  material  interests  of  the  people  of  Tennessee  and 
the  safety  and  welfare  of  our  friends  and  relatives  now  in  the 
Confederate  army  imperiously  demand  the  restoration  of  the  state 
to  her  former  relations  with  the  Federal  Union" ;  and  approved 
Governor  Johnson's  proclamation  of  the  i8th  of  March  and  his 
subsequent  policy.  Johnson  himself  addressed  the  meeting.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was  inspired  by  him  and  that  Campbell's 
speech  was  a  statement  of  his  official  policy  at  that  time.  Other 
meetings  revealed  the  same  guiding  spirit  and  indorsed  the 
Nashville  resolutions. 

These  popular  expressions  of  generous  and  active  loyalty  were, 
in  part,  spontaneous,  but  in  part,  also,  they  may  have  been  art 
fully  contrived  to  set  the  stage  for  the  first  act  of  the  govern 
or's  reconstruction  drama.  As  a  test  of  public  opinion,  an 
election  was  held  on  the  22d  of  May  for  judge  of  the  state 
circuit  court  in  the  district  containing  Nashville.  The  experi 
ment  ended  disastrously  in  the  election  of  the  anti-administration 
candidate,  Turner  S.  Foster,  a  man  with  a  record  of  open  dis 
loyalty,  by  a  majority  of  nearly  200  votes,  though  the  Union 
vote  of  1,000  compared  favorably  with  the  300  recorded  against 
separation  in  1861.  The  postlude  was  farcical.  The  governor, 
assuming  to  comply  with  the  forms  of  law,  gave  Foster  his  com 
mission,  and  the  same  day  had  him  arrested  and  imprisoned 
as  disloyal  and  delegated  his  defeated  opponent  to  perform  the 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  49 

duties  of  the  office.30  The  administration  had  miscalculated  the 
temper  of  the  people  and  had  sustained  a  decided  check,  and 
all  reconstruction  measures  were,  for  the  time,  abandoned.  This 
was  the  more  necessary  as  the  attention  of  the  governor  was 
now  fully  occupied  with  military  matters.  His  labors  during 
these  first  three  months  had  resulted  only  in  restoring  order 
and  intimidating  disloyalists  in  Nashville  by  force. 

30  Nashville  Union,  September  20,  1863. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  DEFENSE  OF  NASHVILLE 

The  concentration  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies  on 
the  Tennessee  river  for  the  great  battle  at  Shiloh  early  in 
April  stripped  Middle  Tennessee  of  any  considerable  bodies  of 
troops.  Only  small  garrisons  remained  to  hold  the  principal 
towns  for  the  Union. 

No  sooner  had  General  Buell's  army  moved  westward  to  join 
Grant,  than  a  new  phase  of  warfare,  of  the  utmost  importance 
in  the  military  history  of  the  state,  developed.  Detached  bodies 
of  horsemen,  splendidly  mounted,  suddenly  infested  the  country, 
spreading  terror  and  ruin  everywhere,  burning  houses,  barns 
and  cotton,  appropriating  stores,  cutting  off  supplies,  tearing 
up  railroad  tracks,  destroying  telegraph  wires,  conscripting  men 
and  horses,  and  visiting  summary  punishment  upon  Union 
adherents.  The  success  of  their  operations  and  the  enforcement 
by  them  of  the  conscription  law  brought  them  plenty  of  recruits, 
and,  as  the  possibilities  of  this  kind  of  warfare  for  holding  the 
border  states  for  the  Confederacy  became  apparent,  the  various 
bands,  at  first  acting  independently,  were  combined  and  directed 
harmoniously  under  brilliant,  capable  leaders  like  Forrest  and 
Morgan.  So  utilized,  they  became  in  the  highest  degree  formi 
dable.  They  descended  suddenly  upon  Federal  garrisons,  cap 
tured  them,  and  dashed  away  before  the  pursuit  could  be 
organized.  The  Union  cavalry  was  fully  occupied  in  covering 
the  army  and  protectmg  the  supply  trains  in  a  hostile  country, 
and  could  not  be  spared  for  operations  of  this  sort,  and  the 
active  Confederates  eluded  with  ridiculous  ease  the  slow-moving 
infantry  sent  after  them.  Whole  regiments  were  cut  off  and 
captured  and  immense  quantities  of  property  destroyed- 

Much  warmth  of  denunciation  and  defense  has  been  expended 
on  the  "guerillas"  and  their  leaders.  Without  attempting  to 
treat  the  subject  here,  it  may  be  said  that  they  constituted  the 
most  effective  weapon  the  South  could  possibly  have  contrived 
for  use  in  the  border  states,  and  a  legitimate  one,  so  long  as 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  51 

they  operated  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war.  The  Federal 
government  was  forced,  in  opposition  to  its  original  theory, 
to  treat  the  Confederate  armies  as  belligerents,  and,  upon  the 
same  necessity,  a  regularly  organized  force  like  that  of  Forrest, 
though  acting  independently,  would  seem  entitled  to  similar 
recognition;  for  both  Forrest  and  Morgan  held  commissions 
from  the  Confederate  war  department  and,  generally  speaking, 
kept  their  men  well  in  hand.  The  worst  outrages — and  there 
appear  to  have  been  many — may  be  charged  to  the  small  ir 
regular  bands  of  undisciplined  freebooters,  of  intermittent  exist 
ence,  that  assembled  to  rob  and  maltreat  peaceable  citizens  and 
destroy  property  from  motives  of  revenge,  and  dissolved  at 
the  approach  of  danger.  For  these,  the  real  guerillas,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  little  excuse  can  be  offered.  Whatever  their 
merits  and  crimes,  the  "guerillas"  were  by  far  the  greatest 
obstacle  to  Johnson's  success  in  Tennessee.1 

Buell's  departure  left  only  a  few  scattered  Union  regiments 
in  Middle  Tennessee.  The  garrison  at  Nashville  was  small. 
Only  the  strategic  points  could  be  held;  everywhere  else  the 
"guerillas"  ran  riot.  The  capital  was  exposed  to  attack  from 
the  south  and  east,  and  Johnson  felt  grave  apprehension  for  its 
safety.  He  telegraphed  Stanton  that  it  had  been  left  almost 
defenseless.  At  least  one  more  complete  brigade  was  needed. 
The  regiments  stationed  at  Camp  Chase,  Ohio,  and  Lexington, 
Kentucky,  should  be  sent  to  Nashville  immediately.  This,  too, 
was  the  opinion  of  General  Dumont,  the  commander  of  the 
garrison.2  The  force  of  this  appeal  impressed  Stanton.  "You 
can  appreciate,"  he  wired  Halleck  at  St.  Louis,  "the  consequence 
of  any  disaster  at  Nashville,  and  are  requested  to  take  im 
mediate  measures  to  secure  it  against  all  danger."3  Buell, 
replying  to  Halleck's  inquiries,  scouted  the  idea  that  the  enemy 
would  attack  Nashville  in  great  force;  but  a  dash  with  fifteen 
thousand  men  he  thought  it  well  to  guard  against.4 

1  There  are  many  accounts  of  the  exploits  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
in  Tennessee — e.g.  Wyeth,  Life  of  Forest;  Duke,  History  of  Morgan's 
Cavalry;  Bennett  H.  Young,  Confederate  Wizards  of  the  Saddle.  See 
also  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  pp.  767  et  seq. 

aO.    R.,    series    i,   vol.    x,   part  ii,   p.   76. 

*Ibid.,  p.  79;  J.  P.,  vol.  xvii,  3846. 

*O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  79. 


52  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

The  months  of  April  and  May,  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
were  consumed  by  a  slow  and  cautious  advance  of  Halleck's 
entire  army  on  Corinth.5  The  capture  of  that  post  meant  the 
control  of  the  railroad  connecting  Memphis  and  the  west  with 
Richmond  and  Charleston.  A  division  of  Buell's  army,  under 
General  Mitchel,  had  previously  been  detached  to  operate  in 
southern  Middle  Tennessee,  and,  instead  of  accompanying  the 
main  force  to  Shiloh,  had  moved  by  way  of  Murfreesboro  and 
Shelbyville  into  northern  Alabama  and  struck  the  Memphis- 
Charleston  railroad  at  Tuscumbia.  The  plan  was  for  Buell, 
after  the  fall  of  Corinth,  to  follow  the  railroad  eastward  from 
that  point,  join  Mitchel  at  Tuscumbia,  and  thus  clear  Middle 
Tennessee  of  Confederates.  Long  before  this  could  be  accom 
plished,  however,  the  Confederate  pressure  upon  Mitchel  be 
came  insupportable.  He  was  in  an  advanced  and  exposed  posi 
tion,  his  communications  were  threatened,  and,  to  enable  him 
to  maintain  his  ground,  every  available  regiment  left  in 
Tennessee  had  to  be  sent  forward  to  him.  One  went  from 
Nashville,  and  Lebanon  and  Murfreesboro  were  also  stripped. 

This  threw  Johnson  into  an  agony  of  alarm.  Not  only  did 
Nashville  seem  exposed  a  prey  to  any  chance  attack,  but, 
politically,  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  reacted  disastrously 
upon  the  Union  movement  which  had  promised  so  well.  It 
amounted,  Johnson  wrote  to  Maynard  at  Washington,  substan 
tially  to  surrendering  the  country  to  the  rebels.  "My  under 
standing  was  that  I  was  sent  here  to  accomplish  a  certain  purpose. 
If  the  means  are  withheld,  it  is  better  to  desist  from  any  further 
efforts.  .  .  .  The  effect  of  removing  the  troops  is  visible  in  the 
face  of  every  secessionist."6  On  the  same  day,  he  sent  vehement 
dispatches  to  Stanton  and  Buell,  expressing  his  fears  and  begging 
for  soldiers.7  Buell  replied  reassuringly  that  his  intention  was 
only  to  defend  Nashville  and  Middle  Tennessee  in  a  more 
advanced  position  and  that  the  regiments  withdrawn  would  be 
replaced  by  new  ones.8 

5  For  Halleck's  original  plan  of  campaign,  see  letter  of  Assistant  Sec 
retary  of  War  Thomas  A.  Scott  to  Stanton,  Stanton  Papers,  February  17, 
1862.  (Library  of  Congress). 

"O.  R.,  series  i,  vol  x,  part  ii,  pp.  126    180;  J.  P.,  vol.  xix,  4346. 

7J.    P.,   vol.   xviii,   4110. 

"Ibid.,  4112. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  53 

The  promise,  however,  could  not  be  kept.  Mitchel  was  in 
dire  straits  at  Tuscumbia.  A  constantly  augmenting  Confederate 
force  at  Chattanooga  was  preparing  to  turn  his  left  and  strike 
at  Nashville.  Nearly  half  the  rations  sent  him  by  Halleck  had 
been  destroyed  to  save  them  from  the  enemy.  On  the  24th, 
he  began  his  retreat,  and  the  relief  regiment  at  Nashville  was 
hurried  to  his  aid.  On  the  26th,  Johnson  telegraphed  a  bitter 
protest  directly  to  the  president,  complaining  of  "petty 
jealousies  and  contests  between  generals  wholly  incompetent  to 
discharge  the  duties  assigned  them/'  He  insinuated  that  Buell's 
military  dispositions  were  unnecessary.9  His  strictures  were 
communicated  by  Stanton  through  Halleck  to  Buell,  who  became 
incensed  in  his  turn.  "The  disposition  I  have  made  of  troops 
in  Middle  Tennessee,"  he  replied  to  Halleck,  "is  absolutely 
necessary  for  its  defense  and  to  support  Mitchel.  I  consider 
this  a  matter  of  far  greater  moment  than  the  gratification  of 
Governor  Johnson,  whose  views  upon  the  matter  are  absurd."10 

On  the  whole,  the  facts  seem  to  vindicate  the  judgment  of 
Halleck  and  Buell.  The  failure  of  his  political  designs  was  a 
bitter  disappointment  to  Johnson  and  his  imperious  will  chafed 
at  any  interference  with  his  plans  and  closed  his  eyes  to  the 
considerations  which  animated  the  generals.  That  the  em 
barrassments  of  the  government  impeded  reconstruction  is  cer 
tain,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  much  could  have  been  accomplished 
at  this  time,  under  even  the  most  favorable  circumstances. 
However  that  may  be,  Mitchel's  necessities  were  imperative, 
and  the  army  in  the  west  was  facing  the  crucial  Corinth  cam 
paign,  the  issue  of  which  was  considered  dubious.  "Troops 
cannot  be  detached  from  here  on  the  eve  of  a  great  battle," 
Halleck  apprised  Stanton.  "We  are  now  at  the  enemy's  throat, 
and  cannot  release  our  great  grasp  to  pare  his  toe-nails."11 
When  his  two  generals  agreed  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued, 
Lincoln  was  not  disposed  to  interfere.  "General  Halleck  under 
stands  better  than  we  can  here,  and  he  must  be  allowed  to 
control  in  that  quarter,"  he  answered  Johnson,  at  the  same 

9O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  129;  J.  P.,  vol.  xviii,  4131. 

10  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  129. 

11  Ibid.,  p.   128. 


54  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

time  urging  him  to  communicate  fully  and  freely  with  Halleck.12 
That  Lincoln  and  Stanton  should  have  devoted  so  much  atten 
tion  to  the  views  of  a  civil  official  and  should  have  troubled 
the  generals  to  justify  their  contrary  policy  is  striking  evidence 
of  their  respect  for  Johnson's  opinion  and  of  the  president's 
longing  for  the  political  restoration  of  the  border  states. 

The  Confederates  abandoned  Corinth  on  the  2Qth  of  May. 
On  the  loth  of  June,  Buell  began  his  long  delayed  advance 
along  the  line  of  the  Memphis-Charleston  railroad,  with 
Chattanooga,  the  junction  of  that  line  with  the  roads  from 
Louisville  by  way  of  Nashville  to  Montgomery,  Charleston, 
and  Savannah,  as  his  objective  point.  Halleck's  plan  probably 
contemplated  driving  the  Confederates  from  East  Tennessee 
by  the  simultaneous  movements  of  Buell  northward  from 
Chattanooga  and  of  General  George  Morgan  southward  from 
Cumberland  Gap.  Johnson  had  urged  this  in  a  letter  to  Halleck 
on  the  5th  of  June,  and  the  latter  had  replied :  "East  Tennessee 
will  very  soon  be  attended  to.  We  drive  off  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  before  we  can  attack  his  other  corps.  .  .  .  Every 
thing  is  working  well  and  in  a  few  weeks  I  hope  there  will  be 
no  armed  rebel  in  Tennessee.13 

The  plan  was  thwarted  by  the  prompt  action  of  the  Con 
federate  General  Bragg,  who  hastened  northward  with  an  army 
that  had  been  forming  in  Mississippi,  seized  Chattanooga  before 
Buell  could  establish  himself  there,  and  developed  a  strong 
line  of  defense  extending  to  Knoxville.  Buell  faced  him  at 
Battle  Creek,  Huntsville,  and  McMinnville. 

The  advance  of  the  Union  army  had  been  impeded  at  every 
turn  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  and,  during  the  remainder  of  the 
summer,  they  distracted  the  Federal  authorities  in  the  state 
and  disheartened  all  friends  of  the  Union  by  a  constant  suc 
cession  of  the  most  daring  and  successful  operations,  directed 
particularly  at  the  lines  of  communication  and  railroad  depots 
of  the  Union  army.  On  the  5th  of  July,  Lebanon  was  taken; 
on  the  1 3th,  Forrest  captured  Murfreesboro  with  its  entire 
garrison.  John  Morgan  swept  the  whole  interior  of  the  state 

13  J.  P.,  vol.  xviii,  4151;  Lincoln's  Complete  Works,  vol.  vii,  p.  150. 
13  J.  P.,  vol.  xx,  4615,  4622. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  55 

and  surrounded  Nashville.  Toward  the  end  of  the  month,  the 
communication  of  the  capital  with  the  North  by  railroad  and 
telegraph  was  completely  cut  off.  The  citizens  were  almost  in  a 
panic.  Some  of  the  streets  were  barricaded  on  the  night  of 
the  2  ist,  at  the  rumor  of  an  immediate  attack  by  Forrest. 
The  fortifying  of  the  city  was  pushed  with  the  utmost  vigor. 
A  thousand  slaves  of  secessionist  owners  were  impressed  for 
the  work,  and  their  masters  were  required  to  provide  them 
with  tools.  The  arrival  of  reinforcements  temporarily  relieved 
the  situation,  but,  by  the  middle  of  August,  the  Confederate 
net  was  again  drawn  around  the  city.  Supplies  could  not 
be  secured  and  the  price  of  necessaries  rose  to  an  unprecedented 
degree/l  On  the  22d,  Morgan  swooped  down  on  Gallatin, 
an  important  post  on  the  Louisville-Nashville  railroad,  the 
capital's  channel  of  communication  with  the  North,  captured 
General  R.  W.  Johnson,  in  command  there,  killed  or  captured 
more  than  half  his  eight  hundred  soldiers,  and  tore  up  the 
rails.  The  whole  line  of  the  Memphis-Chattanooga  railroad 
in  Buell's  rear  was  threatened.  In  the  west,  guerillas  swarmed 
along  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi  river  and  attacked  the 
shipping,  firing  from  the  shore  with  musketry  and  light  field 
artillery.  On  the  25th  of  September,  General  Sherman,  com 
manding  at  Memphis,  burned  the  town  of  Randolph  in  re 
taliation  for  an  attack  on  a  steamer  at  that  point,  and  ordered 
that,  whenever  a  boat  was  fired  on,  ten  disloyal  families  should 
be  expelled  from  Memphis.15 

In  this  crisis  of  affairs,  Governor  Johnson's  personality 
loomed  large.  All  his  native  vigor,  courage,  and  pugnacity 
were  aroused.  The  fate  of  his  state,  he  believed,  was  now  in 
the  balance,  and  every  nerve  must  be  strained  to  save  her. 
Convinced  of  the  proper  course  to  be  followed  and  intolerant 
of  opposition  or  delay,  he  speedily  involved  himself  in  a  suc 
cession  of  violent  controversies  with  Halleck,  Buell,  the  post 
commanders  at  Nashville,  and  their  subordinates.  While  Nash 
ville  was  not  immediately  beleaguered,  tolerable  harmony  had 
been  maintained  between  the  civil  and  military  authorities,  but 

i4O.  R.,   series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.   147. 
*  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  p.  767. 


56  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

the  actual  rubbing  of  elbows  in  cramped  quarters  revealed  all 
the  defects  of  divided  responsibility.  The  generals  regarded  the 
governor's  meddling  with  ill-concealed  anger,  in  which  an  ele 
ment  of  contempt  was  mingled,  and  had  no  thought  of  yielding 
an  inch  to  his  imperious  will.  He,  in  turn,  did  not  hesitate  to 
assert  their  incompetence,  question  their  bravery,  impugn  their 
motives,  and  hint  at  secret  collusion  with  the  enemy. 

As  early  as  the  I7th  of  June,  Johnson  had  addressed  a  com 
plaining  letter  to  Halleck.16  He  had  been  assured  by  the  presi 
dent  and  secretary  of  war,  he  said,  that  he  would  be  sustained 
in  his  efforts  to  restore  Tennessee  to  its  former  position  in 
the  Union,  and  had  been  authorized  to  call  on  General  Halleck 
for  an  adequate  force  to  carry  out  all  measures  he  might  devise 
to  that  end.  So  far,  he  had  not  done  so,  for  fear  of  appearing 
importunate  or  unduly  disposed  to  exercise  power.  Now,  how 
ever,  he  felt  bound  to  say  that  the  military  policy  pursued  in  the 
state  had  kept  alive  a  rebellious  spirit  that  might  otherwise 
have  been  crushed.  All  efforts  to  secure  a  sound  reaction  of 
public  sentiment  had  been  thwarted  by  the  constant  disputes 
of  military  officials.  Buell's  assistant  adjutant-general,  for  ex 
ample,  had  assumed  more  power  than  Buell  himself  would 
pretend  to,  and  the  provost-marshal  at  Nashville  was  "in  direct 
complicity  with  the  secessionists  of  this  city  and  a  sympathizer 
with  the  master-spirits  engaged  in  this  rebellion."  "The  demon- 
trations  which  have  been  made  upon  lower  East  Tennessee, 
causing  the  people  to  manifest  their  Union  feelings  and  senti 
ments  and  then  to  be  abandoned,  have  been  crushing,  ruinous 
to  thousands.  I  trust  in  God  that  when  another  advance  is 
made  upoq  that  section  of  the  state,  our  position  may  be 
maintained,  at  least  until  arms  can  be  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  people  to  defend  themselves  against  their  relentless 
oppressors." 

The  marauding  of  the  guerillas  enraged  and  alarmed  John 
son,  and  he  besought  Stanton  for  cavalry  to  disperse  them. 
Stanton  had  none  to  spare,  but  he  authorized  the  governor  to 
raise  two  regiments  and  he  set  about  it  with  vigor.17  Early  in 

"O.  R.,  series  i,  vol,  xvi,  part  i,  p.  36;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxi,  4753. 
17  O.   R.,   series   i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  47. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  57 

July,  he  received  word  from  General  Boyle  at  Louisville  that 
two  thousand  Confederate  cavalry  had  entered  Kentucky  to 
strike  the  Louisville-Nashville  railroad,  and  that  help  must  come 
from  Tennessee.18  The  safety  of  Nashville  and  Middle 
Tennessee  was  involved  in  the  maintenance  of  this  line.  Johnson 
bent  every  energy  to  reinforce  Boyle,  but  his  demands  upon 
Captain  Greene,  the  assistant  adjutant-general,  met  with  a  re 
pulse.  His  anger  blazed  in  a  letter  to  the  president,  demanding 
that  he  be  sustained.  Greene,  he  said,  had  not  only  refused  to 
cooperate  with  him,  but,  despite  the  dispatches  from  Louisville, 
had  ordered  some  troops  elsewhere  and  located  others  contrary 
to  his  wishes.  He  was  probably  in  connivance  with  the  traders, 
and  Johnson  proposed  to  arrest  him  and  send  him  out  of  the 
reach  of  bad  influences.19  The  never-failing  tact  and  considera 
tion  with  which  Lincoln  treated  his  subordinates  in  delicate 
situations  graces  his  reply.  "Do  you  not,  my  good  friend,  per 
ceive  that  what  you  ask  is  simply  to  put  you  in  command  in 
the  West?  I  do  not  suppose  you  desire  this.  You  only  wish  to 
control  in  your  own  localities ;  but  this  you  must  know  may 
derange  all  other  posts."29  He  urged  upon  both  Johnson  and 
Halleck  a  free  exchange  of  views.  "The  governor  is  a  true 
and  valuable  man — indispensable  to  us  in  Tennessee,"  he  wrote 
to  Halleck.21 

The  fall  of  Murfreesboro  on  the  I3th  of  July  brought  the 
danger  to  the  doors  of  Nashville.  An  attack  was  expected  at 
any  hour.  If  one  is.  made,  Johnson  wired  Halleck,  "we  will 
give  them  as  warm  a  reception  as  we  know  how,  and,  if  forced  to 
yield,  will  leave  them  a  site.'22  The  garrison  was  considerably 
depleted  and  rations  were  low.  On  the  2ist,  Forrest  penetrated 
to  within  six  miles  of  the  city.  General  Nelson,  in  charge  of 
the  defense,  had  no  cavalry  and  could  only  remain  behind  his 
fortifications  while  the  enemy  overran  the  surrounding  country. 
With  cavalry,  he  reported  to  Buell  on  the  29th,  he  could  have 

18  Ibid.,  p.  118. 

19  Ibid. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  122. 

21  Ibid. 

a  Ibid.  p.  142. 


58  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

attacked  and  destroyed  Morgan  and  Forrest  separately  at  any 
time  within  the  past  five  days,  but  their  junction  would  give 
them  a  picked  army  of  four  thousand.  The  disorder  and  con 
flict  of  authority  had  produced  chaos.  "You  ordered  me  to 
assume  the  command.  I  desire  to  know  of  whom,  of  what, 
for  nobody  obeys.  The  result  will  be  the  utter  destruction  of  our 
commands/'28  Brownlow  wrote  from  Philadelphia:  "The  in 
dications  are  that  the  rebels  will  have  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 
I  told  a  crowd  of  gentlemen  here  that,  if  I  were  Governor  John 
son,  I  would  resign  on  the  ground  of  not  being  backed  up 
by  the  government.  The  administration  seems  to  look  only  to 
Richmond,  and  neglects  every  other  point.  I  am  out  of  patience, 
and  feel  like  breaking  out  upon  the  government."24  The  feeling 
was  general  that  Buell  had  lost  his  grip  on  the  situation.  He 
seemed  bewildered  by  the  overthrow  of  his  original  plans 
and  the  activity  of  the  enemy.  The  slowness  of  his 
movements  and  the  inefficiency  of  his  dispositions  to  check 
Morgan  and  Forrest  were  cited  against  him  at  Washington, 
and  Halleck  was  asked  (August)  to  suggest  some  one  to  suc 
ceed  him.25  Johnson  himself  denounced  Buell  as  incompetent 
and  urged  that  General  George  H.  Thomas  be  appointed  in  his 
place  to  undertake  the  redemption  of  East  Tennessee.26  Thomas, 
however,  begged  that  his  name  be  not  considered,  and  assigned 
reasons  for  his  reluctance  to  assume  the  command  which, 
whether  intentionally  or  not,  contained  a  covert  reproof  for  the 
governor.  "We  have  never  yet  had  a  commander  of  any  ex 
pedition,"  he  wrote  to  Johnson,  "who  has  been  allowed  to  work 
out  his  own  policy,  and  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  the  most 
able  general  in  the  world  to  conduct  a  campaign  with  success, 
when  his  hands  are  tied,  as  it  were,  by  the  constant  apprehension 
that  his  plans  may  be  interfered  with  at  any  moment  either 
by  higher  authority  directly  or  through  the  influence  of  others 
who  may  have  other  plans  and  other  motives  of  policy."27 

39  Ibid.,  p.  226. 

34  J.  P.,  vol.  xxii,  5048. 

36  O.  R ,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  314. 

36  J.   P.,  vol.  xxiv,  5448. 

27  Ibid. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  59 

Major  W.  H.  Sidell,  who  succeeded  Greene  as  assistant 
adjutant-general  at  "Nashville,  gives  the  substance  of  a  con 
versation  with  Johnson  at  about  this  time,  which  is  the  best 
of  evidence  of  the  governor's  keenness  of  insight  in  accurately 
gauging  the  political  and  military  situation.28  He  expressed 
himself  as  convinced  that  the  Confederates  would  soon  make  an 
attempt  to  regain  Tennessee  and  that,  in  their  project,  the  pos 
session  of  the  capital  was  a  necessary  incident.  Their  success 
would  injure  the  Union  cause  both  materially  and  morally.  They 
could  count  on  the  support  not  only  of  avowed  adherents,  but 
also  of  many  secret  sympathizers  in  the  state,  particularly  if  such 
support  entailed  no  very  considerable  risks;  but  the  probability 
of  sacrifices  would  deter  most  of  these  lukewarm  friends.  The 
best  policy  for  the  government,  then,  was  to  convince  them  that 
there  was  to  be  no  easy  Confederate  triumph.  This  could  be 
done  .by  manifesting  a  determination  to  resist  to  the  last  extrem 
ity.  During  the  last  siege  of  Nashville,  a  secret  committee  of 
citizens  had  sent  an  appeal  to  their  friends  in  the  attacking  army 
to  abandon  the  assault,  as  the  defenders  had  resolved  to  destroy 
the  city  rather  than  surrender.  Therefore,  the  governor  urged,  let 
the  fortifications  be  completed  and  extended  by  contraband  labor, 
and  the  enemy  would  shrink  before  the  magnitude  of  the  task 
confronting  them. 

Finally,  on  the  2ist  of  August,  Bragg  sprang  the  surprise  he 
had  been  preparing  for  Buell.  Issuing  suddenly  from  Chatta 
nooga,  he  marched  around  the  left  flank  of  his  adversary  into 
Kentucky,  and,  amusing  Buell  with  a  powerful  demonstration  in 
the  direction  of  McMinnville  to  deceive  the  latter  into  thinking 
that  his  objective  was  Nashville,  he  struck  the  Louisville-Nash 
ville  railroad,  Buell's  line  of  communication  and  supply,  at  Mun- 
fordsville,  the  principal  station  between  those  two  cities,  and 
captured  it  with  its  entire  defending  force  of  about  forty-five 
hundred  men  (September  14) ,29  At  the  same  time,  General 

28  Ibid.,  vol.  xxv,  5475 ;  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  242. 

""Thus  sacrificing  precious  time  which  should  have  been  devoted  to 
more  important  ends."  Nathaniel  S.  Shaler,  The  Kentucky  Campaign  of 
1862,  in  Campaigns  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  1862-1864.  Papers  of  the 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  vol.  vii,  p.  212.  "General 


60  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Kirby  Smith,  from  Knoxville,  flanked  General  G.  H.  Morgan 
by  a  similar  manoeuvre  and  marched  westward  to  join  Bragg  for 
a  joint  attack  on  Louisville.30  At  first  Buell  was  perplexed  as 
to  the  purpose  of  the  enemy.  He  moved  his  army  in  an  arc, 
attempting  to  cover  Nashville  and  the  railroad.  Convinced,  at 
last,  that  Bragg's  destination  was  Louisville,  he  followed  hotly 
in  pursuit  along  the  line  of  the  railroad,  and  when  Bragg,  ap 
parently  wishing  to  avoid  a  battle  until  his  junction  with  Smith, 
turned  off  eastward,  threw  himself  into  the  city.31 

The  apparent  failure  of  Buell's  strategy  and  the  consequent 
retrograde  movement  of  his  army  from  Huntsville  to  Louisville 
precipitated  the  long  impending  rupture  between  him  and  Johnson. 
On  the  3Oth  of  August,  he  had  sent  the  governor  a  dispatch, 
explaining  and  defending  his  course.  His  army,  he  said,  was 
reduced  by  detailing  garrisons  and  forces  to  protect  his  communi 
cations  and  by  other  causes  to  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  men. 
Bragg  had  from  forty  to  sixty  thousand.  By  falling  back  along 
his  line  of  communications,  the  conditions  would  be  exactly  re 
versed:  he  would  pick  up  additional  troops,  which,  with  rein 
forcements  coming  from  Corinth,  would  swell  his  force  to  fifty 
thousand,  while  Bragg  must  constantly  lose  strength  as  he 

Buell's  command  was  in  Southern  Tennessee,  and  he  had  to  apprehend 
that  it  might  move  to  the  northeast  into  Central  Kentucky.  By  moving 
towards  Nashville  he  probably  thought  to  secure  a  chance  to  beat  Buell's 
force  in  detail  before  that  general  had  concentrated  his  army.  Moreover, 
by  moving  in  that  direction,  he  could  the  more  quickly  obtain  possession 
of  the  Louisville-Nashville  railway  which  was  Buell's  most  valuable 
line  of  communication  with  the  north.  He  appears  to  have  had  some 
hopes  of  capturing  Nashville,  a  success  which  would  have  enabled  him 
at  once  to  replace  the  Confederate  government  of  Tennessee  in  its  capital 
and  to  secure  a  strongly  fortified  post  which  would  serve  to  protect  his 
rear  during  his  efforts  in  Kentucky."  Ibid.,  p.  211. 

M  Kirby  Smith  designed,  perhaps,  to  guard  the  main  column  of  Bragg's 
army.  Ibid. 

81  "He  conceived  his  errand  in  Kentucky  to  be  partly  of  a  political  nature 
...  to  place  the  long  wandering  Confederate  government  of  the  state  in 
office  at  Frankfort.  He  expected  also  a  support  from  the  people  of  the 
commonwealth  and  waited  for  them  to  flock  to  his  standard."  Ibid.,  p.  214. 
Colonel  Henry  Stone,  in  an  article  on  The  Operations  of  Buell  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  1862-1864,  in  the  same  publication,  'also  holds 
this  view. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  6f 

ventured  further  from  his  base.32  Johnson's  reply  made  little 
effort  to  conceal  the  contempt  he  felt  for  Buell  and  his  defensive 
policy.  Bragg's  force  could  not  exceed  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
he  declared.  Fifty  thousand  could  not  subsist  in  the  country 
through  which  the  Confederates  were  moving.  His  own  opinion 
was  that  Bragg  had  not  half  of  twenty-five  thousand.  He  would 
not  attack  Nashville  unless  Buell  retreated.33 

The  next  day,  overwrought  by  disappointment,  the  governor 
sent  a  long,  bitter,  almost  despairing  letter  to  Lincoln.34  "On 
two  occasions,"  he  said,  "I  have  stated  to  the  president  that 
General  Buell  would  never  enter  and  redeem  the  eastern  portion 
of  this  state.  I  do  not  believe  he  ever  intended  to,  notwithstand 
ing  his  fair  promises  to  the  president  and  others  that  he  would. 
...  In  my  opinion,"  he  "could  meet  Bragg  and  whip  him  with 
the  greatest  ease, — entering  lower  Tennessee,  and  turn  the  rear 
of  the  force  said  to  be  now  before  General  Morgan  at  Cumber 
land  Gap,  leaving  Morgan  to  march  into  East  Tennessee  and  take 
possession  of  the  railroad,  at  once  segregating  and  destroying 
the  unity  of  their  territory,  and  that  too,  in  the  midst  of  a 
population  that  is  loyal  and  will  stand  by  the  government.  .  .  . 
Instead  of  meeting  and  whipping  Bragg  where  he  is,  it  is  his 
intention  to  occupy  a  defensive  position,  and  (he)  is  noiw, 
according  to  the  best  evidence  I  can  obtain,  concentrating  all  his 
forces  upon  Nashville,  giving  up  all  the  country  which  we  have 
had  possession  of  south  and  east  of  this  place,  leaving  the  Union 
sentiment  and  Union  men  who  took  a  stand  for  the  government 
to  be  crushed  out  and  utterly  ruined  by  the  rebels,  who  will  all 
be  in  arms  upon  the  retreat  of  our  army.  It  seems  to  me  that 
General  Buell  fears  his  own  personal  safety,  and  has  concluded 
to  gather  the  whole  army  at  this  point  as  a  kind  of  body-guard 
to  protect  and  defend  him,  without  reference  to  the  Union  men 
who  have  been  induced  to  speak  out,  believing  that  the  govern 
ment  will  defend  them.  General  Buell  is  very  popular  with  the 
rebels,  and  the  impression  is  that  he  is  more  partial  to  them 
than  to  Union  men,  and  that  he  favors  the  establishment  of  a 

30  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  451 ;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxv,  5579- 

33  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  461 ;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxv,  5581. 

34  New  York  Tribune,  November  18,  1862. 


62  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Southern  confederacy."  Without  going  as  far  as  that,  the  gov 
ernor's  opinion  is  "that  if  he  had  designed  to  do  so,  he  could  not 
have  laid  down  or  pursued  a  policy  that  would  have  been  more 
successful  in  the  accomplishment  of  both  these  objects.  .  .  . 
East  Tennessee  seems  doomed.  There  is  scarcely  a  hope  left  of 
her  redemption ;  if  ever,  no  one  now  can  tell.  May  God  save  my 
country  from  some  of  the  generals  that  have  been  conducting  this 
war/' 

As  Buell  moved  northward  in  pursuit  of  Bragg,  he  furnished 
the  governor  a  fresh  cause  for  distraction.  He  continued  to 
overestimate  the  force  of  the  enemy  and,  believing  himself  out 
numbered  and  desiring  to  get  every  available  soldier  into  the  field, 
he  considered  the  expediency  of  abandoning  Nashville.  No 
sooner  had  his  army  left  the  vicinity  of  that  city  than  Forrest 
and  Morgan  closed  in  upon  it.  Between  the  middle  of  September 
and  the  middle  of  November,  it  was  cut  off  from  the  outside 
world.  A  large  garrison,  which  Buell  was  anxious  to  have  at 
the  front,  was  required  for  its  defense.  The  Confederates  con 
stantly  intercepted  foraging  parties  and  immense  quantities  of 
supplies  fell  into  their  hands.  The  defense  of  the  line  of  the 
railroad  on  which  the  city  depended  required  more  men  than 
Buell  could  spare,  intent  as  he  was  upon  devoting  every  resource 
to  the  defeat  and  capture  of  Bragg's  army.  To  Johnson,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  retention  of  the  capital  seemed  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  the  mission  on  which  he  had  been  sent.  Politi 
cally,  its  loss  would  be  a  catastrophe.  The  ridicule  which,  since 
February,  the  Unionists  had  heaped  on  the  homeless,  itinerant 
government  of  Harris,  would  return  to  mock  them.  All  the 
governor's  prestige  would  fly  northward  with  him,  all  the  ground 
so  painfully  won  would  be  lost.  Believing,  too,  as  he  did,  that 
Buell  was  already  far  stronger  than  Bragg,  so  tremendous  a 
sacrifice  for  no  sound  reason  whatever  seemed  to  him  criminally 
absurd.  Buell  appeared  in  his  eyes  an  imbecile  or  worse.  Rather 
than  see  the  Confederates  exulting  in  the  possession  of  Nashville, 
he  declared,  it  should  be  destroyed.  Buell  retorted  that  it  should 
be  left  as  he  found  it.  Despite  Johnson's  demand  that  Thomas 
be  left  at  the  capital,  Buell  ordered  him  to  join  the  army,  but  a 
force  under  General  John  M.  Palmer  was  sent  to  take  his  place. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  63 

In  fact,  the  city  was  well  garrisoned  and,  though  closely  belea 
guered  for  two  months,  seems  never  to  have  been  in  serious  danger 
of  capture.35 

Buell's  real  designs  regarding  Nashville  have  been  a  perman 
ent  source  of  controversy  between  his  friends  and  opponents,  and, 
with  all  his  operations  in  the  campaign  of  1862,  were  made  the 
subject  of  a  court  of  inquiry  into  his  conduct  which  sat  from 
November  of  that  year  until  the  following  April.  Johnson  de 
posed  for  this  investigation  that  the  rumor  that  Nashville  would 
be  surrendered  was  current  among  Unionists  and  Confederates, 
and  many  prominent  secessionists,  former  residents  of  the  city,  re 
turned  with  Bragg's  army  in  the  confident  expectation  of  regain 
ing  their  homes.  He  had  obtained  an  interview  with  Buell  and 
earnestly  urged  the  political  considerations  involved,  begging  that 
the  city  be  held  at  all  hazards,  or,  if  absolutely  necessary,  de 
stroyed,  but  never  surrendered.  The  general  had  replied  im 
patiently  that  he  should  conduct  his  campaign  in  accordance  with 
his  own  judgment,  regardless  of  criticism.  Upon  military  prin 
ciples,  he  was  convinced,  Nashville  should  have  been  abandoned 
three  months  before.  But  Johnson's  representations  finally 
opened  his  eyes  to  the  broader  aspects  of  the  situation  and,  in 
a  later  interview,  he  informed  him  that  he  had  concluded  to 
defend  the  capital  "not  so  much  from  military  as  from  political 
considerations  which  had  been  pressed  with  so  much  earnestness 
upon  him."36 

Buell,  in  his  own  statement  before  the  commission,  tells  a 
different  story  and  openly  denounces  Johnson's  testimony  as 
false.  He  declares  that  he  himself  was  fully  alive  to  the  political 
advantages  of  holding  the  capital  and  that  he  made  his  own 
decision.  No  interviews  on  the  subject  were  held  with  the  gov 
ernor.  "I  had  not,"  he  remarks  pithily,  "that  confidence  in  his 
judgment  or  that  distrust  of  my  own  which  would  have  induced 
me  to  seek  his  counsel."37 

The  commission,  in  its  finding,  accepted  Johnson's  account 
rather  than  Buell's.  "He  takes  and  uses  up  Governor  John 
son's  opinion,"  it  declared,  "when  he  says  that  the  place  should 

33  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  490;  part  i,  p.  713. 
86  Ibid.,    part    i,    p.   697. 
m  Ibid.,  p.  59. 


64  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

be  preserved  on  account  of  its  political  importance.  .  .  .  He 
was  hesitating  .  .  .  when  Governor  Johnson  .  .  .  pressed  this 
political  view  on  him."  Even  so,  his  action  was  half-hearted  and 
inefficient;  in  falling  back,  he  still  failed  to  close  the  road  by 
which  Nashville  could  be  attacked.  The  credit  for  the  saving 
of  the  capital  is  accorded  to  Johnson.38 

Whatever  doubts  as  to  his  proper  course  may  have  clouded 
the  judgment  of  the  general,  the  governor  was  disturbed  by 
none.  He  was  possessed  by  an  unshakable  resolve  to  hold  Nash 
ville  to  the  last  gasp.  He  became  the  soul  of  the  defense.  During 
the  last  two  weeks  of  September,  Buell  was  far  away  in  Ken 
tucky  and  the  enemy  was  at  the  gates.  The  commander  of  the 
post,  General  Negley,  did  not  act  with  sufficient  energy  to  suit 
Johnson  and  the  latter  lost  no  time  in  demanding  his  removal.39 
An  order  putting  him  personally  in  command  would,  one  surmises, 
have  been  grateful  to  him.  "I  am  no  military  man,"  he  is 
reported  to  have  said,  "but  any  one  who  talks  of  surrendering 
I  will  shoot."40 

To  this  time  belongs  Lincoln's  story,  which  merits  reproduc 
tion  as  affording  one  of  the  very  few  intimate  personal  views 
of  Johnson  in  these  early  days.  Lincoln  had  it  from  Colonel 
Moody,  the  righting  Methodist  parson,  a  character  in  the  army, 
who  was  in  Nashville  the  day  it  was  rumored  that  Buell  would 
evacuate  the  city.  In  Moody's  words,  as  Lincoln  reports  them: 

"  'I  went  in  search  of  Johnson  at  the  close  of  the  evening  and 
found  him  at  his  office  closeted  with  two  gentlemen,  who  were 
walking  the  floor  with  him,  one  on  each  side.  As  I  entered 
they  retired,  leaving  me  alone  with  Johnson,  who  came  up 
to  me  manifesting  intense  feeling  and  said :  'Moody,  we  are  sold 
out!  Buell  is  a  traitor!  He  is  going  to  evacuate  the  city, 
and  in  forty-eight  hours  we  shall  be  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels/ 
Then  he  commenced  pacing  the  floor  again,  twisting  his  hands 
and  chafing  like  a  caged  tiger,  utterly  insensible  to  his  friend's 
entreaties  to  become  calm.  Suddenly  he  turned  and  said: 
'Moody,  can  you  pray?'  'That  is  my  business,  sir,  as  a  minister 

"Ibid.,  pp.  17-18. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  583- 

*  Peterson  &  Brothers,  Life,  Speeches,  and  Services  of  Andrew  Johnson. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  65 

of  the  Gospel,'  returned  the  colonel.  'Well,  Moody,  I  wish 
you  would  pray,'  said  Johnson;  and  instantly  both  went  down 
upon  their  knees  at  opposite  sides  of  the  room.  As  the  prayer 
became  fervent,  Johnson  began  to  respond  in  true  Methodist 
style.  Presently  he  crawled  over  on  his  hands  and  knees  to 
Moody's  side,  and  put  his  arm  over  him,  manifesting  the  deepest 
emotion.  Closing  the  prayer  with  a  hearty  'Amen!'  from  each, 
they  arose.  Johnson  took  a  long  breath,  and  said  with  em 
phasis:  'Moody,  I  feel  better!'  Shortly  afterward  he  asked: 
'Will  you  stand  by  meT  'Certainly,  I  will,"  was  the  answer. 
'Well,  Moody,  I  can  depend  upon  you ;  you  are  one  in  a  hundred 
thousand!'  He  then  commenced  pacing  the  floor  again.  Sud 
denly  he  wheeled,  the  current  of  his  thought  having  changed, 
and  said :  'Oh !  Moody,  I  don't  want  you  to  think  I  have  become 
a  religious  man  because  I  asked  you  to  pray.  I  am  sorry 
to  say  it,  but  I  am  not,  and  have  never  pretended  to  be,  religious. 
No  one  knows  this  better  than  you;  but,  Moody, — there  is 
one  thing  about  it — I  do  believe  in  Almighty  God !  And  I  be 
lieve  in  the  Bible,  and  I  say  I'll  be  damned  if  Nashville  shall  be 
surrendered !'  And  Nashville  was  not  surrendered."41 

Buell's  pursuit  of  Bragg  from  Louisville,  the  battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  and  the  retirement  of  the  Confederate  army  into  East 
Tennessee  during  the  month  of  October  are  important  for  this 
sketch  only  from  the  fact  that  they  relieved  the  pressure  on 
Nashville.  Dissatisfaction  with  Buell  had  constantly  increased 
at  Washington.  It  was  felt  that  he  had  been  outgeneralled  in 
August  and  that  he  should  have  crushed  or  seriously  crippled 
Bragg  in  Kentucky  in  October.42  As  early  as  the  2Qth  of  Sep- 

41  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  272. 

"The  campaign  of  Buell  against  Bragg  is  one  of  the  persistent  polemi 
cal  heritages  of  the  war.  Buell  himself,  a  pathetic  figure,  devoted  bitter 
years  to  a  disheartening  attempt  to  secure  the  vindication  which  has  now 
been  accorded  him  in  the  highly  eulogistic  tributes  of  the  principal  authori 
ties  on  military  history.  General  Grant  said:  "I  think  Buell  had  genius 
enough  for  the  highest  commands."  J.  R.  Young,  Around  the  World  with 
General  Grant,  vol.  ii,  p.  289,  quoted  by  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United 
States,  vol.  iv,  p.  184,  note.  'See  also  the  estimates  of  Ropes,  Story  of 
the  Civil  War;  Fry,  The  Army  under  Buell;  and  J.  D.  Cox  in  The  Nation, 
October  2,  1884.  Citations  in  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  vol. 


66  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

tember,  an  order  relieving  him  from  command  in  favor  of 
Thomas  had  been  delivered  to  him,43  but  withdrawn  five  days 
later,  owing  to  his  successful  arrival  in  Louisville  and  the 
generous  representations  of  Thomas  that  Buell's  obstacles  had 
been  great  and  that  his  preparations  to  move  against  the  enemy 
were  then  completed,  while  Thomas  himself  had  not  the  in- 

iv  pp.  173-184.  Colonel  (Henry  Stone,  in  Papers  of  the  Military  Histori 
cal  Society  of  Massachusetts,  vol.  vii  (1908),  pp.  257  et  seq.,  completely 
exonerates  Buell,  ascribes  the  misfortunes  of  the  Union  army  to  the 
weakness  and  dilatoriness  of  Halleck,  and  characterizes  the  proceedings 
of  the  Buell  commission  a3  without  "regard  for  law  or  justice"  and 
"founded  on  misconception  and  ignorance."  He  quotes  the  Confederate 
general  Basil  Duke  as  saying:  "It  can  be  demonstrated,  I  think,  that 
upon  no  effort  which  the  Confederacy  made  .  .  .  did  more  depend  than 
on  the  success  or  failure  of  Bragg's  well-considered  but  futile  attempt  to 
transfer  the  combat  to  fields  where  victories  might  be  of  some  value  and 
give  hope  of  final  triumph.  .  .  .  The  promise  of  substantial  and  perma 
nent  benefit  to  the  Southern  cause  which  a  successful  consummation  of 
this  campaign  in  Kentucky  offered  was  larger  and  more  certain,  I  am 
persuaded,  than  at  Manassas  or  Gettysburg."  Colonel  Stone  concludes : 
"Buell's  pursuit  of  his  enemy  into  and  out  of  Kentucky  in  September 
and  October,  1862,  evinced  far  greater  courage,  energy,  skill,  and  all  the 
higher  military  virtues  than  were  shown  by  the  commander  of  the  Potomac 
army  in  June  and  July,  1863."  "In  reviewing  the  operations  of  Buell  from 
the  beginning  of  his  retreat  to  the  battle  of  Perryville  there  appears  to  be 
nothing  to  be  criticized.  His  concentration  was  skilfully  and  speedily 
effected  and  his  northward  march  so  ordered  as  to  bring  his  army  in 
good  condition  into  Louisville.  It  was  there  reorganized  with  admirable 
celerity,  the  plan  of  campaign  was  well  contrived,  and  but  for  the  curious 
accident  at  Perryville  might  have  led  to  a  very  successful  issue.  .  .  .  The 
failure  properly  to  explore  the  country  in  his  front  is  the  only  serious 
omission  which  can  be  charged  to  General  Buell's  account.  It  was  the 
common  blunder  of  our  Federal  commanders  during  the  first  two  years 
of  our  Civil  War.  At  no  time  in  this  conflict  was  our  cavalry  service 
adequate  to  the  needs.  .  .  .  When  Buell  marched  from  Louisville  to  try 
the  issue  of  battle  with  Bragg  every  reasonable  critic  would  have  been 
willing  to  compromise  for  the  results  which  were  won  by  the  Perryville 
engagement.  .  .  .  We  cannot  resist  the  conclusion  that,  so  far  as  Buell's 
work  is  concerned,  the  campaign  was  one  of  the  best  conducted  of  our 
Civil  War."  N.  S.  Shaler,  The  Kentucky  Campaign  of  1862,  Papers  of 
the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  vol.  vii,  pp.  205  et  seq. 
Captain  Ephraim  A.  Otis'  article  in  the  same  publication,  p.  277,  is  un 
favorable  to  Buell,  but  unconvincing. 
48  O.  iR.  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  pp.  538,  554. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  67 

formation  necessary  for  such  a  crisis.44  The  fine  honor  of 
Thomas'  character  held  him  always  scrupulously  loyal  to  his 
chief.  To  Johnson,  who  was  urging  him  for  Buell's  place,  he 
had  written  in  August:  "I  believe  that  the  relief  of  East 
Tennessee  has  been  entrusted  to  an  able  commander,  and  that 
he  will  eventually  give  it  sure  and  permanent  relief."  45  Senator 
Crittenden  and  others  protested  against  Buell's  removal,  asserting 
that  the  army  confided  in  and  loved  him.46  But  his  enemies, 
chief  among  whom  was  Johnson,  were  implacable.47  The  suc 
cessful  escape  of  Bragg  sealed  his  doom.  Johnson  was  impor 
tuning  the  war  department  to  embrace  the  opportunity  to  re 
deem  East  Tennessee  and  Halleck  himself  sent  Buell  an  urgent 
order  to  occupy  that  district  during  the  fall.  Buell  hesitated 
to  comply.  He  declared  that  Bragg  had  sixty  thousand  men  to 
oppose  him  and  that  Nashville  should  first  be  cleared  of  the 
enemy  and  made  a  safe  base  of  supplies.48  In  fact,  his  position 
was  intolerable.  Realizing  that  he  had  lost  the  confidence  of 
the  president  and  Stanton,  his  own  confidence  was  also  gone, 
and  he  must  have  welcomed  the  order  (October  24)  relieving 
him  and  placing  General  Rosecrans  in  command.  As  the  latter, 
with  reinforcements,  advanced  to  Nashville,  the  Confederates 
abandoned  hope  of  capturing  the  city  and  withdrew.  By  No 
vember  the  peril  had  passed. 

Although  Johnson's  authority  extended  nominally  over  the 
whole  of  Tennessee,  the  field  of  its  practical  exercise  was  re 
stricted,  during  the  year  1862,  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Nashville.  The  rest  of  the  state  was  the  scene  of  the  marching  and 

"Ibid.,  p.  555- 

*J.   P.,  vol.  xxiv,  5448. 

46  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  558. 

47  It  seems  certain  that  Buell  was  sacrificed  to  the  impatience  for  im 
mediate,  decisive  victories  which  was  chronic  in  the  North  early  in  the 
war.     His  difficulties  were  not  appreciated  at  Washington  and  he  seems 
to  have  lacked  the  art  of  making  friends  and  to  have  drawn  too  much 
into  himself,  even  to  the  point  of  appearing  uncandid.     Besides  Johnson, 
Governors  Morton  of  Indiana,  Yates  of  Illinois,  and  Tod  of  Ohio  urged 
his  removal.     Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iv,  pp.  182,  183. 

48  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  pp.  642,  636. 


68  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

countermarching  of  armies,  great  battles,  raids,  and  depredations 
by  the  guerillas.  Even  within  the  city  itself,  his  freedom  of  action 
was  almost  destroyed  by  the  presence  of  that  immediate  military 
necessity  which  subjected  everything  to  the  arbitrary  will  of 
the  commanding  general.  Under  such  circumstances,  there 
seemed  to  be  no  room  for  the  governor.  Obviously  he  could 
make  no  progress  in  his  mission  of  peaceful  reconstruction. 
His  only  importance  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  was  a  brigadier- 
general,  whose  place  in  the  system  was  doubtful.  A  man  of 
less  self-assertiveness  and  force  of  character  would  have  sunk 
into  temporary  obscurity,  while  the  army  cleared  the  stage  for 
him  to  perform  his  part.  But  to  Johnson  no  such  course  was 
possible.  Unable  to  exercise  his  civil  functions  and  equally 
unable  to  remain  passive,  he  proceeded  to  make  himself  felt, 
often  painfully,  in  a  military  capacity.  The  record  of  his  office 
during  this  period  is  one  of  alternate  cooperation  and  conflict 
with  Buell  and  his  subordinates. 

Besides  an  indomitable  will,  relentless  persistence,  and  un- 
scrupulousness,  Johnson  possessed,  in  the  confidence  of  the 
president,  the  greatest  possible  asset  for  gaining  his  ends. 
Lincoln  was  promptly  drawn  by  natural  sympathy  to  a  per 
sonality  in  many  respects  resembling  his  own.  He  appreciated 
and  admired  Johnson's  early  struggles,  his  self-reliance,  his 
physical  and  moral  courage,  and  his  impressions  were  confirmed 
by  his  independent  loyalty  in  1861,  his  readiness  to  assume  the 
lead  where  many  hesitated  to  follow,  his  quick  grasp  of  the 
essential  issues  of  the  war,  and  his  prophetic  insight  into  con 
ditions  in  the  border  states.  The  assurance  and  efficiency  with 
which  he  administered  the  difficult  office  of  military  governor  de 
lighted  the  president.  While  he  had  had  many  troublesome  ques 
tions  to  settle  from  other  governors  and  officers,  he  told  Schuyler 
Coif  ax  in  the  summer  of  1862,  "Andy  Johnson  had  never  em 
barrassed  him  in  the  slightest  degree."49  Stanton  shared  the 
president's  view.  Their  conviction  of  his  unique  value  to  the 
Union  cause  in  Tennessee  induced  them  to  lend  a  ready  ear  to 
his  complaints  and  to  give  him  his  way  whenever  possible. 
The  military  officers  who,  believing  in  their  superior  importance, 

49  J.  P.,  vol.  xxi,  4944. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  69 

chose  to  ignore  or  antagonize  him,  discovered  in  the  end  the 
unwisdom  of  such  a  course. 

The  quarrel  between  Johnson  and  Buell  over  the  general 
military  policy  in  Tennessee  and  its  outcome  have  been  treated 
already.  The  governor's  relations  with  most  of  the  lesser  officers 
with  whom  he  came  in  contact  were  no  less  strained.  The  fact 
is,  he  was  self-willed,  uncompromising  and  dictatorial,  and,  once 
his  mind  was  made  up,  intolerant  of  opposition  or  even  of 
honest  opinion  in  conflict  with  his  own.  Impatient  and  rough 
in  speech,  abrupt  and  belligerent  in  manner,  his  attitude  repelled 
any  calm  discussion  and  adjustment  of  difficulties  with  officers 
accustomed  to  military  etiquette  and  jealous  of  the  dignity  of 
their  positions.  Controversies  with  Generals  Nelson  and  Negley, 
commanders  of  the  post  at  Nashville,  resulted  in  demands  by 
Johnson  for  the  removal  of  these  officers  and,  whether  or  not 
in  consequence  of  the  demand,  the  desired  changes  were  made. 
Colonel  Matthews,  the  provost-marshal,  also  felt  the  force  of 
the  governor's  hostility  and,  even  after  his  departure,  Johnson's 
animosity  pursued  him  and  prevented  his  promotion  in  the 
army.50 

The  governor's  pet  antipathy,  perhaps,  was  Captain  Greene, 
the  assistant  adjutant-general.  He  first  alienated  Johnson  by 
dispatching  to  the  front  troops  that  the  latter  considered  necessary 
for  service  in  Nashville.  A  more  direct  ground  of  contention 
was  an  order  issued  by  Buell  that  all  officers  assigned  to  the 
command  of  troops  live  in  camp  with  their  soldiers,  and  not 
in  houses  in  Nashville.  In  Greene's  absence,  Johnson  had  taken 
possession  of  certain  houses  by  virtue  of  his  authority  as  military 
governor  and  allotted  them  as  residences  to  officers  of  his  guard 
and  their  families.  Greene,  who  seems  to  have  acted  always 
in  good  faith  as  a  responsible  subordinate,  reported  the  facts 
to  Buell's  chief -of -staff  for  instructions  and  received  reply  that 
the  order  admitted  of  no  exceptions.  Thereupon  he  directed  the 
provost-marshal,  Colonel  Campbell,  to  eject  one  of  the  families 
instated  by  Johnson.  Campbell,  prompted  in  advance,  refused, 
and  Greene  placed  him  under  arrest.  The  governor  was  now 
thoroughly  aroused.  He  brought  his  influence  to  bear  and, 

00  Ibid.,  4758,  4759- 


70  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

within  two  days,  had  secured  a  disavowal  of  the  order  from 
Buell,  the  restoration  of  the  house,  the  release  of  Campbell, 
the  transfer  of  Greene  from  Nashville,  and  authority  himself 
to  appoint  a  provost-marshal  in  sympathy  with  him  and  under 
his  orders.  "The  president  hopes  this  will  be  satisfactory  to 
you,"  telegraphed  Stanton,  "and  that  you  will  use  efforts  to 
prevent  any  disputes  or  collision  of  authority  between  your 
subordinates  and  those  of  General  Buell."51  This  incident,  un 
important  in  itself,  illustrates  vividly  the  disposition  of  the 
Federal  executive  to  hold  up  the  governor's  hands. 

Johnson  took  care  that  the  military  commanders  should  not  be 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  scope  of  his  powers.  To  every  general 
newly  arrived  in  the  department  he  sent  a  copy  of  his  com 
mission  and  instructions,  sometimes  with  his  own  explanatory 
comment.  General  Negley,  who  gave  signs  of  a  disposition 
to  repeat  the  errors  of  Buell  and  Greene,  received  a  pointed  note 
to  the  effect  that,  if  Buell  had  formerly  appointed  provost- 
marshals,  he  had  done  so  at  the  suggestion  and  by  the  consent 
of  the  governor,  to  whom  the  actual  authority  belonged.52 

Not  military  men  alone  felt  Johnson's  imperious  disfavor.  He 
fell  into  a  violent  altercation  with  John  Lellyett,  the  postmaster 
of  Nashville,  a  cultured  gentleman  of  high  character,  to  whose 
appointment,  as  a  sop  to  the  conservative  loyal  element,  he 
had  reluctantly  consented.  Lellyett  clung  to  a  liberal  and  pacific 
policy  toward  the  secessionists,  demanding  that  return  to  the 
Union  "as  it  was"  be  the  only  condition  imposed  upon  them. 
He  positively  refused  to  follow  Johnson's  lead  and  probably 
showed  some  disdain  in  his  treatment  of  him.  He  himself 
says  that  the  opposition  of  his  friends  to  Johnson's  candidate 
for  postmaster  directed  the  governor's  hostility  to  him.  Both 
communicated  their  grievances  to  Washington,  Lellyett  request 
ing  that  his  successor  be  appointed  "in  case  it  is  esteemed,  as  it 
seems  to  be  assumed  by  Governor  Johnson,  that  I  hold  my  office 
merely  at  his  pleasure."  Such  apparently  was  the  fact,  for  the 
postmaster  was  soon  numbered  among  the  victims  of  Johnson's 
animosity.53 

m  O.  R.,  series  i.  vol.  x,  part  ii,  pp.  629,  631 ;  vol.  xvi,  part  i,  pp. 
119,  122,  135,  175;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxi,  4990,  5024,  5026. 

52  J.  P.,  vol.  xxvi,  5776. 

53  Ibid.,  vol.  xix,  4438,  4451,  4453. 


CHAPTER    V 

REPRESSION   UNDER  ROSECRANS 

In  his  initial  proclamation,  Johnson  had  announced  a  mild  and 
liberal  policy  of  pacification,  for  the  purpose  of  winning  back 
the  state  to  its  allegiance  with  the  least  possible  friction  and 
avoiding  all  unnecessary  hardship  to  the  citizens.  Buell  devoted 
himself  to  the  same  end.  In  fact,  his  known  border-state  con 
nections  and  sympathies  were  regarded  as  peculiarly  fitting  him 
for  the  work  in  hand.  The  belief  was  general  at  Washington 
that  Tennessee  was  only  half-hearted  in  the  rebellion  and  could 
be  converted  by  kindness.  Citizens  not  actively  in  opposition  to 
the  government  received  the  protection  of  the  army  and  every 
effort  was  made  to  keep  all  property  in  statu  quo  in  the  hope  that 
gratitude  would  draw  the  owners  towards  the  Union.1 

Before  long,  however,  it  became  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclu 
sion  that  the  hearts  of  the  Southern  sympathizers  were  hardened 
and  that  no  appreciable  number  would  declare  loyal  sentiments 
while  reasonable  'prospects  of  Confederate  success  remained. 
Fear  stopped  the  mouths  of  many.  The  secessionists  fully  under 
stood  the  importance  of  Tennessee  to  the  Confederacy;  they 
instituted  a  systematic  persecution  of  Union  men,  and  any  avowal 
of  loyalty  to  the  Federal  government  invited  prompt  retribution, 
as  agents  of  which  the  guerillas  were  unsurpassed.  Everywhere, 
except  in  portions  of  East  Tennessee,  a  Unionist  was  boycotted 
by  his  neighbors  and  his  life  was  in  danger.  "I  passed  a  squad 
of  my  used-to-be  friends,"  wrote  a  Davidson  county  man  to  John 
son,  "and  one  of  them  asked  me  how  I  liked  the  Federals.  I 
told  him  I  liked  them  pretty  well.  He  said,  'You  don't,  do  you?' 
and  I  said,  'Yes.'  He  then  said,  'Very  well,  old  fellow,  we  will 
jerk  you  off  the  ground  when  they  go  away  from  here.'  And 
there  are  men  going  to  and  returning  from  the  rebel  army 
all  the  time, — at  least,  they  say  they  have  been  there  and  seen 
the  iboys — and  they  tell  the  people  to  keep  in  good  spirits, 

Nashville  Union,  August  3,  1862. 


72  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

that  the  rebel  army  will  be  back  here  by  the  first  of  June  next."2 
The  policy  of  conciliation  was  generally  regarded  as  not  only 
futile,  but  positively  disastrous.  The  rebels,  testified  Parson 
Brownlow  before  the  Buell  commission,  "attribute  our  forbear 
ance  toward  them  to  cowardice  and  think  that  we  are  afraid  of 
them.  It  disheartens  and  discourages  the  Unionists.  I  heard 
them  complain  at  Nashville  even  of  Governor  Johnson's  for 
bearing  and  conciliatory  policy  toward  the  rebels."  The  latter, 
he  affirmed,  gained  by  pursuing  the  opposite  course.3 

Under  such  circumstances,  Johnson,  in  whose  nature  charity 
was  not  an  essential  element,  did  not  long  hesitate  to  adapt 
himself  to  actualities.  His  first  step  in  the  direction  of  greater 
stringency  was  a  proclamation,4  on  the  Qth  of  May,  aimed  to 
prevent  the  maltreating  and  plundering  of  Union  citizens. 
Whenever  a  Union  man  was  misused,  five  or  more  of  the  most 
prominent  "rebels"  of  the  immediate  neighborhood  should  be 
"arrested,  imprisoned,  and  otherwise  dealt  with  as  the  nature 
of  the  case  may  require,"  and  whenever  the  property  of  loyalists 
was  taken  or  destroyed,  remuneration  should  be  made  to^  them 
out  of  the  property  of  those  in  the  vicinity  who  had  given 
"aid,  comfort,  information  or  encouragement"  to  the  offenders. 
"This  order,"  concludes  the  proclamation,  "will  be  executed 
in  letter  and  spirit.  All  citizens  are  hereby  warned,  under 
heavy  penalties,  from  entertaining,  receiving,  or  encouraging 
such  persons  so  banded  together,  or  in  any  wise  connected 
therewith."  That  this  was  -no  idle  threat  was  shown  the  follow 
ing  month,  when  the  mayor  and  aldermen  of  Pulaski,  despite 

2J.  P.,  vol.  xviii,  4156. 

8O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  i,  p.  674.  Testimony  to  the  contrary  is, 
however,  not  lacking.  Lieutenant  Holloway,  a  cavalry  officer,  captured  by 
the  Confederates  and  later  paroled  declared:  "I  talked  with  many  of 
Breckenridge's  staff.  ...  I  think  a  lenient  course  would  soon  win  Ten 
nessee  back.  General  Buell's  course  was  productive  of  much  good.  He 
has  made  a  number  of  good  Union  men  all  through  the  South.  General 
Breckenridge  told  me  that  General  Buell  hurt  the  South  more  than  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  by  his  lenient  policy.  The  people  in  Ten 
nessee  had  written  to  their  sons  to  desert  and  come  home;  that  General 
Buell  would  not  incarcerate  them  in  prison,  as  they  supposed."  O.  R., 
series  i,  vol.  xx,  part  ii,  p.  25. 

*  Nashville  Union,  July  5 ;  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  v,  doc.  123. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  73 

their  vigorous  protests,  were  forced  to  provide  compensation 
to  Union  men  for  their  property  seized  or  damaged  by  Morgan's 
raiders,  who,  according  to  the  testimony  before  a  board  of 
inquiry,  entered  the  town  with  the  welcome  of  many  of  its 
citizens  and  were  permitted  to  plunder  withoult  protest  by  the 
municipal  officers."5  "It  is  well  known,"  commented  the  governor 
tartly,  in  affirming  the  judgment  of  the  board,  "that  such  bands 
only  go  and  remain  in  places  where  they  have  sympathizers. 
...  Such  disloyal  citizens  have  brought  about  and  are  now, 
by  acts  of  disloyalty,  contributing  to  the  organization  and  support 
of  these  bands."6 

Secession  sympathizers  who,  by  open  or  covert  threats,  falling 
short  of  actual  violence,  intimidated  Union  men  and  prevented 
the  free  expression  of  loyalty,  next  occupied  the  governor's  at 
tention.  Early  in  June,  he  ordered  that  all  persons  guilty  of 
uttering  disloyal  sentiments,  who  refused  to  take  the  oath  and 
give  bonds  for  their  future  good  behavior,  be  sent  south  and 
treated  as  spies  if  they  ventured  back  during  the  war.7  The 
application  of  this  order  in  specific  instances  has  already 
been  described.  To  Colonel  Mundy,  who  executed  it  at  Pulaski, 
he  wrote  that  a  few  of  the  most  important  cases  should  be 
selected  first,  and  subsequent  action  taken  according  to  the 
effect  produced  on  the  public  mind.8  At  the  same  time,  he  asked 
and  obtained  the  consent  of  Lincoln  to  arrest  seventy  "vile 
secessionists"  and  offer  them  in  exchange  for  an  equal  number 
of  prominent  loyal  East  Tennesseeans  imprisoned  at  Mobile. 
If  exchange  was  refused,  he  proposed  to  send  his  prisoners 
south  at  their  own  expense  and  forbid  their  return.9 

The  operations  of  the  Union  army,  too,  were  seriously  handi 
capped  by  the  disloyalty  of  the  Tennesseeans.  Buell  declared 
that  he  could  learn  nothing  from  the  people,  while  every  detail 
of  his  movements  was  immediately  communicated  to  the  enemy. 
Almost  no  supplies  could  be  obtained  and  the  army  was  COITH 

5J.   P.,  vol.  xix,  4424,  4460;   vol.   xx,  4523. 

"Ibid.,   vol.   xx,   4525. 

''Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  p.  766. 

8J.   P.,  vol.  xx,  4646;  vol.  xxi,  4693. 

'Ibid.,  vol.  xx,  4609,  4638;  Lincoln's  Complete  Works,  vol.  vii,  p.  215. 


74  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

pelled  to  move  slowly  and  protect  its  long  line  of  communica 
tions,  but  "wherever  Forrest  stopped  he  found  prepared  food 
and  forage  in  ample  quantities."10  In  August,  General  William 
Sooy  Smith,  guarding  the  railroad  between  Nashville  and 
Stevenson,  complained  to  Johnson  that  the  enemy  were  able 
to  capture  his  detachments  through  information  furnished  them 
by  citizens  and  that  all  Union  families  were  being  driven  into 
camps  of  refuge.  Either  the  government  should  change  its 
mild  policy  or  he  should  be  released  from  a  service  so  in 
tolerable.  "Let  all  disloyal  persons,"  he  urged,  "be  driven  at 
once  across  the  lines  to  the  rebels  where  they  belong"  and  "let 
the  loyal  patriotic  citizens  of  the  land  be  organized,  armed  and 
equipped  for  their  own  home  defense  and  the  protection  of 
our  lines  of  communication."11 

Johnson  was  by  this  time  thoroughly  committed  to  the  doc 
trine  that  the  foes  of  the  government  "must  be  made  to  feel 
the  burden  of  their  own  deeds  and  to  bear  everything  which 
the  necessities  of  the  situation  require  should  be  imposed  on 
them."12  On  the  26th  of  June,  he  urged  upon  Stanton  that  the 
army  be  subsisted  on  the  enemy.  This,  he  maintained,  would 
bring  rebels  to  their  senses.  They  "must  be  made  to  feel  the 
weight  and  ravages  of  the  war  they  have  brought  upon  the 
country.  Treason  must  be  made  odious  and  traitors  impover 
ished.  We  are  raising  forces  here- — infantry  and  cavalry — 
and  in  obtaining  horses  and  supplies  the  secretary  of  war  need 
not  be  surprised  if  we  make  rebels  meet  the  demand.13  He  in 
structed  General  Negley,  at  Columbia,  fully  to  compensate 
plundered  Union  men  out  of  the  property  of  disloyalists  and 
to  make  all  arrests  required  by  the  public  interests,  "let  them 
be  many  or  few."14  Only  the  fear  of  the  army  and  relentless 
repression  by  Johnson  kept  the  secessionists  subdued,  wrote  the 
correspondent  of  the  New  York  Tribune.  "Should  he  loosen 
his  hold  in  the  least,  they  would  at  once  resume  their  treason- 

10  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.  85. 
11 J.    P.,   vol.   xxiii,   5249. 

12  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  242;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxv,  54/5. 

13  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  <i,  p.  216. 

14  J.  P.,  vol.  xxiv,  5337- 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  75 

able  practices,  and  so  he  keeps  the  screws  tight  down  upon 
their  thumbs."15 

The  appointment  of  Rosecrans  to  the  command  of  the  depart 
ment  of  the  Cumberland  in  November  gave  the  governor  an 
ally  heartily  disposed  to  lend  the  full  support  of  the  army  to 
the  program  of  repression.  Establishing  his  headquarters  at 
Nashville,  he  promulgated  orders  indicative  of  the  course  he 
proposed  to  follow.  All  peaceable  inhabitants  were  promised 
immunity  from  interference,  other  than  necessary  surveillance, 
but  outspoken  rebels  need  expect  no  other  protection  than  that 
dictated  by  the  laws  of  war  and  humanity.  Citizens  guilty  of 
acts  of  hostility  or  belonging  to  partisan  corps  not  under  proper 
military  control  were  to  be  treated  as  pirates  and  robbers.  Sol 
diers  were  forbidden  to  enter  private  grounds  or  houses  with 
out  written  permission  or  order  from  a  commissioned  officer, 
who  was  held-  responsible  for  their  acts.  Provost-marshals 
were  to  avoid  unjust  and  unnecessary  arrests  of  private  persons. 
Trade  in  necessaries  in  towns  and  cities  within  the  lines  of 
the  army  was  restricted  to  resident  traders.16 

The  policy  of  the  government,  henceforth  to  be  enforced  by 
both  the  civil  and  the  military  arms  was,  as  the  Nashville  Union 
concisely  stated  it,  "to  draw  a  line  between  its  friends  and  its 
enemies,  and  give  protection  where  it  finds  allegiance."17  To 
establish  this  distinction,  Rosecrans  and  Johnson  introduced  a 
certificate  or  guarantee  of  protection,  which  was  issued  to  per 
sons  of  well-known  loyalty,  and  to  such  other  persons  as  gave 
bond  to  "keep  the  peace,  and  afford  neither  aid  nor  comfort 
to  the  enemies  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,"  to  be 
"true  and  steadfast"  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  not  to 
"go  beyond  the  lines  of  the  Federal  armies,  nor  into  any  section 
of  the  country  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  without  permission 
of  the  authorities  of  the  United  States."  This  was  called  the 
non-combatant  parole.  The  certificate  pledged  to  its  holder 
the  protection  of  the  United  States,  commanded  all  persons, 
military  and  civil,  to  respect  him  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  property, 

16  New  York  Tribune,  September  i,  1862. 
™  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1862,  p.  598. 

17  Nashville  Union,  November  30.  ' 


76  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

and  forbade  foraging  upon  his  premises  except  for  the  actual 
necessities  of  the  army,  and  then  only  with  the  utmost  care 
and  in  return  for  a  receipt  entitling  the  owner  to  compensation 
from  the  government.  At  Rosecrans'  request  and  to  relieve  the 
regular  army  officers  of  the  task  of  administering  the  oath  of 
allegiance  and  taking  the  bonds  with  the  non-combatant  parole, 
Johnson  appointed  commissioners  in  the  various  counties,  so 
far  as  practicable,  and  also  one  to  accompany  Rosecrans'  army 
for  the  same  purpose.18 

The  ousting  of  Buell  in  favor  of  Rosecrans  had  highly  grati 
fied  Johnson.  "I  feel  in  strong  hopes,"  he  wrote  to  Lincoln, 
"that  things  will  go  well  in  a  few  days,  as  we  have  a  man  at 
the  head  of  this  army  who  will  fight."19  It  soon  appeared,  how 
ever,  that  the  harmony  would  be  short-lived.  The  fact  was  that 
the  dual  system  of  government  devised  by  Lincoln  and  Stanton 
could  not  run  smoothly  under  the  unfavorable  conditions  with 
which  it  had  to  contend.  Had  the  Union  army  succeeded  in 
promptly  driving  the  Confederate  forces  out  of  the  state  and 
in  handing  over  to  the  governor  a  territory  cleared  of  enemies 
for  political  reconstruction,  while  the  army  operated  on  the 
borders  of  the  state  or  beyond  them,  it  is  conceivable,  even 
probable,  that  the  two  authorities,  with  plenty  of  room  for 
their  movements,  might  have  performed  their  respective  parts 
without  disturbing  each  other.  Instead  of  this,  the  failure  of 
Buell  threw  the  army  back  upon  the  capital,  and  civil  and 
military  officers  were  crowded  together  into  the  northern  part 
of  the  state,  while  Nashville,  the  seat  and  source  of  the  civil 
power,  became  also,  as  a  strategic  centre,  the  military  head 
quarters;  and  Rosecrans,  in  whose  aggressive  qualities  John 
son  had  gloried,  proved  quite  as  disposed  to  overrule  a  governor 
who  interfered  with  his  plans  as  to  attack  an  enemy  in  the  field. 

A  glance  at  the  jumble  of  offices  and  authorities  in  Nashville 
during  the  winter  of  1862-63  clearly  shows  the  hopelessness 
of  the  situation.  General  Rosecrans  had  established  there  his 
office  as  commander  of  the  department,  and  the  other  depart 
ment  functionaries — the  chief  quartermaster,  chief  commissary, 

15  Ibid.,  November  29;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxvii,  6070. 
19  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xx,  part  ii,  p.  70. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  77 

provost-marshal  general,  and  medical  director — had  each  fiis 
separate  establishment.  There  also  were  the  headquarters  of 
the  post  commander,  General  Mitchell,  and  the  offices  of  his 
five  assistant  quartermasters.  When  Rosecrans  was  not  in  the 
city,  there  was  an  office  for  the  district,  presided  over  by  an 
assistant  adjutant-general,  and  the  provost-marshal  general  gave 
place  to  a  provost-marshal  responsible  both  to  the  district  com 
mander  and  to  Governor  Johnson.  Side  by  side  with  the  military 
existed  the  civil  administration  of  the  state  (the  governor  and 
his  council),  the  officers  of  Davidson  county,  and  the  mayor, 
aldermen,  common  council,  and  minor  officers  of  the  city  of  Nash 
ville.  The  county,  circuit,  criminal,  and  chancery  courts  held  ses 
sions  in  the  city,  also  the  municipal  court  of  the  recorder.  Military 
commissions  and  tribunals  administered  martial  law.  There 
were  the  county  sheriff,  the  city  marshals,  and  the  provost- 
marshal;  the  county  constables,  the  municipal  police,  and  the 
provost-marshal's  guard.  To  these  was  soon  added  the  secret 
detective  police  of  the  army.  The  contemplation  of  such  a 
list  gives  an  impression  of  confusion  worse  confounded.  That 
utter  chaos  did  not,  in  fact,  result  is  a  tribute  to  the  good  sense 
and  forbearance  of  both  Rosecrans  and  Johnson. 

In  such  a  situation,  the  general  of  the  army,  as  the  visible 
source  of  power,  was  certain  to  predominate.  Even  as  resolute 
a  civil  officer  as  Johnson  suffered  severely  in  prestige.  Every 
new  military  commander,  said  the  Nashville  Press,  trespassed 
upon  his  province  and  each  had  a  different  system  from  hix 
predecessor.  The  Press  paid  a  tribute  to  the  governor's  modera 
tion  and  unselfish  labors  for  harmony.  Although  empowered 
to  countermand  any  military  order  touching  civil  affairs,  he 
refrained  from  exerting  his  authority  in  opposition  to  the 
military,  which  was  thus  encouraged  in  its  usurpations.  So  the 
people  were  led  to  think  that  the  general  was  the  real  force 
to  be  reckoned  with.20  The  prevailing  view  is  well  expressed 
by  a  contemporary  writer:  "Honorable  Andrew  Johnson,  the 
military  governor  of  Tennessee,  appeared,  to  the  eyes  of  super 
ficial  observers,  to  be  busy  enough,  but  it  was  difficult  to  define 
his  functions.  His  authority  could  not  extend  beyond  the  military 

20  Nashville  Press,  June  8. 


78  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

lines,  which  were  then  rather  contracted.  The  civil  and  military 
administration  of  Tennessee  .  .  .  were  so  intimately  blended 
that  it  was  quite  impossible  to  separate  them,  so  that  the  re 
sponsibility  of  civil  government  really  devolved  on  General 
Rosecrans.  Rebels  who  had  business  with  the  government  de 
clined  generally  to  hold  intercourse  witih  the  governor,  and 
loyal  men  sought  the  attention  of  the  military  chief.  Excepting 
the  issuance  of  commissions  to  officers  of  Tennessee  volunteers, 
and  to  a  magistrate  now  and  then;  the  collection  and  distribu 
tion  of  taxes  levied  upon  wealthy  rebels  for  charitable  purposes ; 
and  correspondence  with  the  state  department  at  Washington, 
there  was  really  nothing  else  for  the  governor  to  do.  Honorable 
Hugh  Smith  was  mayor  of  Nashville,  but  his  office  was  almost 
a  sinecure,  the  municipal  government  being  reduced  to  petty 
police  business  and  the  hebdomadal  meetings  of  aldermen."-1 
The  principal  bone  of  contention  between  Johnson  and 
Rosecrans  was  the  new  police  system  introduced  by  the  latter 
in  December  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  order,  ferreting 
out  hidden  treason,  and  detecting  violations  of  the  trade  regu 
lations  in  his  department.  The  initial  step  was  the  detailing 
of  a  provost  guard  to  act  in  conjunction  with  the  local  police, 
an  arrangement  which  at  first  worked  very  successfully.  A 
provost  court  was  also  erected  for  the  trial  of  cases  under 
military  law,  and  this  was  supplemented  by  the  army  detective 
police  under  Colonel  Truesdail,  a  capable,  but  apparently 
arbitrary,  tactless  and  unscrupulous  officer,  a  confidant  of  Rose 
crans.  The  wide  and  secret  ramifications  of  this  organization, 
its  assumptions  of  authority,  its  interference  with  the  daily 
life  of  the  people  soon  aroused  both  animosity  and  apprehension 
in  the  community.  The  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times 
reported  that  Truesdail  appropriated  all  the  Confederate  money 

21  Nashville  Union,  June  17.  "He  daily  thundered  incoherent  invectives 
against  the  'Hell-hounds  of  the  hell-born  and  hell-bound  Confederacy', 
when  he  was  capable  of  articulate  utterance,  or  could  find  so  much  as  an 
audience  of  one  to  listen.  This,  and  sending  false  and  misleading  tele 
grams  to  Washington,  was  the  extent  to  which  he  exercised  the  mixed 
functions  of  his  anomalous  position  as  brigadier-general  and  military 
governor."  Colonel  Henry  Stone,  Papers  of  the  Military  Historical  So 
ciety  of  Massachusetts,  vol.  vii  (1908),  p.  275. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  79 

in  the  banks  and  exchange  offices  at  Nashville,  seized  and  con 
fiscated  property  without  show  of  justice  or  regard  for  Union 
interests,  made  arbitrary  arrests  on  charges  of  treason,  tried  the 
accused  in  his  own  court  and  convicted  them  on  insufficient 
evidence,  and  exercised  for  his  own  profit  the  exclusive  privileges 
of  granting  passes  through  the  lines,  carrying  the  mails,  and 
transporting  soldiers,  while  Rosecrans  winded  at  these  out 
rageous  proceedings.22  "It  became  a  by-word  that  this  person 
was  commander-in-chief."  The  Nashville  Union,  whose  state 
ments  are,  however,  always  to  be  regarded  with  suspicion, 
charged  that  Truesdail  had  proposed  to  Rosecrans  and  Johnson 
that  they  establish  a  "military  triumvirate,"  proclaim  martial 
law  throughout  the  state,  and  enter  upon  a  career  of  "indis 
criminate  confiscation,  exile,  imprisonment,  and  execution"  as 
the  shortest  road  to  reconstruction.  To  this  was  added  the 
accusation  that  he  and  his  satellites  were  not  beyond  the  reach 
of  corrupt  influences  in  granting  favors  and  administering  the 
trade  regulations.23 

By  the  middle  of  January,  the  encroachments  of  Truesdail's 
police  had  become  so  pronounced  and  public  protest  so  general 
that  Johnson  felt  constrained  to  complain  to  Rosecrans.  This 
he  did  reluctantly,  as  the  general's  satisfaction  with  his  new 
engine  of  repression  was  well  known.  "A  detective  police,  prop 
erly  organized  and  conducted  upon  correct  principles,"  he 
conceded,  "might  do  some  good  in  connection  with  the  interests 
and  movements  of  the  army,  but  I  am  compelled  to  say  that 
the  provost  court  and  detective  police  here,  by  the  extensive 
jurisdiction  assumed,  and  the  summary  manner  in  which  they 
undertake  to  dispose  of  the  persons  and  property  of  citizens, 
have  not  only  excited  a  feeling  of  indignation  among  the  more 
conservative  portion  of  the  community,  but  have  greatly  im 
paired  the  confidence  of  the  loyal  men,  that  class  to  whom  we 
look  for  active  support,  in  the  correct  intentions  of  the  govern 
ment,  it  being  held  responsible  for  the  unjust  acts  of  its  reputed 
agents."  He  pointed  out  that,  within  the  district  restored 
to  Federal  control,  already  existed  all  the  machinery  necessary 

22  Nashville  Union,  October  29. 

23  Ibid.,  October  31. 


8o  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

for  enforcing  both  civil  and  military  law.  If,  however,  the 
general  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  this  additional  agent, 
let  it,  for  the  sake  of  the  public  good,  be  confined  solely  to 
military  affairs  and  the  execution  of  military  law.24  In  reply, 
Rosecrans  acknowledged  that  some  complaints  had  reached  him, 
but  he  thought  they  came  from  smugglers  and  Jews  whose 
contraband  trade  had  been  broken  up.  He  assured  the  gov 
ernor  that  justice  should  be  done  in  every  specific  case  reported 
to  him.25 

Meanwhile,  Johnson  had  not  failed  to  lay  his  grievances  be 
fore  his  friends  in  Washington,  on  whose  decisive  support  he 
could,  with  certainty,  rely,  as  Rosecrans  might  have  learned  by 
contemplating  his  predecessor's  history.  Promptly  came  from 
Halleck  a  detailed,  unequivocal  letter,26  designed  to  convince 
Rosecrans  that  the  authority  of  the  governor  was  a  potent 
reality  and  pointedly  prescribing  the  bounds  which  the  military 
should  not  pass.  The  office  held  by  Johnson  was  created,  Halleck 
explains,  to  mitigate  the  evils  of  a  purely  military  government, 
and  to  restore  the  civil  machinery  as  promptly  and  thoroughly 
as  possible,  and  the  civil  authorities  thus  restored  are  entitled 
to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  Kentucky,  Missouri,  or  any  other 
state  that  happens  to  be  a  theatre  of  war.  "In  other  words, 
the  military  forces  of  the  United  States  will  not  interfere  with 
the  authority  and  jurisdiction  of  the  loyal  officers  of  the  state 
government,  except  in  case  of  urgent  and  pressing  necessity." 
After  attempting  to  distinguish  between  civil  and  military  juris 
diction,  Halleck  observes  that  the  provost-marshals  must  confine 
/their  activities  to  matters  purely  and  indubitably  military, 
leaving  everything  else  to  the  local  police.  To  insure  harmony, 
it  might  be  well  to  put  Johnson,  as  a  brigadier-general,  in 
command  of  the  troops  in  Nashville. 

Either  Rosecrans  failed  to  recognize  the  veiled  warning,  or 
his  discretion,  clouded  by  anger,  led  him  into  the  wrong  course. 
He  acknowledged  Halleck's  letter  in  a  rather  abrupt  telegram,27 

*J.   P.,  vol.  xxix,  6326. 

36  Ibid.,  6353. 

*  O.  iR.,  series  iii,  vol.  Hi,  p.  77. 

"  lbid;,  series  i,  vol.  xxiii,  part  ii,  p.  174. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  81 

denying  any  knowledge  of  a  conflict  of  authority.  Nashville, 
he  said,  was  too  important  a  post  to  entrust  to  Johnson,  but  if 
the  latter  would  report  to  him,  he  would  place  him  in  command 
at  Gallatin.  Respect  for  Rosecrans'  intelligence  forces  one  to 
the  conclusion  that  he  deliberately  and  wilfully  misinterpreted 
his  instructions.  If  so,  he  was  not  long  in  discovering  that  he 
had  made  a  false  step.  Halleck's  stinging  reply  brought  the 
aspiring  officer  to  heel  without  ado  and  showed  him  plainly 
that  his  business  was  to  cooperate  with  the  governor,  not  to 
dominate  him.  Johnson,  he  was  told,  was  no  ordinary  brigadier- 
general,  but  the  governor  of  a  state,  with  the  full  powers  ap 
pertaining  to  that  office,  and  Rosecrans'  suggestion  that  he 
should  report  to  him  for  a  command  "was  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  wishes  of  the  government"  as  communicated  in  Halleck's 
letter,  and  "was  received  by  the  war  department  with  marked 
dissatisfaction."28 

Rosecrans  learned  his  lesson.  "I  assure  you,"  he  hastened 
to  answer  Halleck,  "I  have  done  all  I  possibly  could,  con 
sistently  with  military  safety,  to  build  up  and  sustain  the  civil 
authority  wherever  I  have  had  command,  especially  in  Ten 
nessee.  No  one  appreciates  the  sacrifice  and  the  delicate  and 
trying  position  of  Governor  Johnson  more  than  I  do.  .  .  .  But 
Nashville  is  an  enclosed  garrison,  and  my  grand  depot.  It  is 
full  of  traitors  and  spies,  and  to  it  go  all  the  rascals  and 
speculators  that  follow  an  army.  I  am,  therefore,  obliged  to 
have  it  commanded  by  an  able  and  experienced  officer,  and 
to  exercise  a  rigid  military  policy ;  but  am  not  aware  of,  nor  do  I 
believe  there  has  been,  any  material  departure  from  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  your  instructions  of  the  2Oth,  and  my  reply  to  it, 
though  brief,  was  not  to  treat  the  suggestion  about  putting 
the  governor  in  military  command  with  disrespect,  but  to  say, 
if  done,  that,  in  my  opinion,  would  (not?)  be  best  for  thfe 
country."  He  reiterates  his  utter  ignorance  of  any  conflict 
of  authority,  and  requests  that  all  complaints  be  forwarded  to 
him.  "I  will  either  show  they  are  unfounded,  remedy  them, 
or  prove  that  it  cannot  be  done  without  injury  to  the  country."29 

28  Ibid.,  p.  191. 

29  Ibid,  p.  208. 


82  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

At  the  same  time,  he  sent  to  Stanton  a  similar  open  letter  for 
Johnson,  which  elicited  from  the  latter  the  response:  "There 
has  been  nothing,  there  will  be  nothing  desired  by  me  but  har 
mony  and  concert  of  action  to  put  down  the  rebellion  and  restore 
to  the  people  of  Tennessee  all  their  legal  and  constitutional 
rights;  of  this  you  know  I  have  given  assurance  both  in  action 
and  words."30 

Good  resolutions,  however  honest,  were  of  slight  avail  against 
impossible  conditions.  Truesdail  and  his  policy  still  remained  a 
vexation.  In  the  discharge  of  his  duty  to  prevent  infringements 
of  the  treasury  regulations,  he  came  into  contact  with  the  cotton 
traders  and  proved  susceptible  to  their  blandishments.  Soon  it 
was  widely  rumored  that  he  and  those  who  had  his  favor  were 
enjoying  a  practical  monopoly  of  the  cotton  trade,  and  suspicion 
attached  even  to  Rosecrans,  whose  vigorous  support  of  Trues 
dail,  it  was  hinted,  might  be  explained  by  his  personal  interest 
in  the  cotton  speculation.  Finally  it  came  to  the  general's  ears 
that  Johnson  himself  had  reported  the  scandal.  He  at  once  dis 
patched  him  a  hotly  indignant  letter,31  condemning  the  rumor 
as  utterly  false  and  calling  upon  him  "as  a  man  of, standing  and 
honor  and  one  whom  I  believe  to  be  my  friend"  to  furnish  him 
with  all  the  information  he  possessed  and  to  vindicate  him  in  the 
fullest  manner.  Only  after  an  ungracious  silence  of  nearly  two 
months  did  Johnson  reply  that  he  had  no  information  affecting 
Rosecrans'  character  as  a  citizen  or  soldier.  His  response  to  the 
appeal  for  vindication,  though  rendered  less  grateful  by  the  irri 
tating  delay,  was  sufficiently  hearty.  "You  state  in  your  tele 
gram,"  he  wrote,  "that  you  consider  me  your  friend.  You  are 
right  in  this,  and  no  one  will  go  further  than  I  in  vindication  of 
your  character.  I  have  never  believed,  and  do  not  now  believe, 
that  you  have  fully  understood  the  character  and  extent  of  the 
proceedings  under  Truesdail's  direction.  ...  I  fear  that  some 
designing  persons  have  been  trying  to  make  an  impression  in 
tended  to  disturb  that  good  feeling  which  was  understood  to 
exist  between  us  while  you  were  here.  If  so,  it  will  all  be 
dispersed."32 

w  Ibid.,  p.  220. 

31 J.    P.,   vol.   xxx,   6731. 

"O.  R,  series  i,  vol.  xxiii,  part  ii,  p.  380. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  83 

The  gravity  of  the  charges  against  Truesdail  and  the  publicity 
given  the  matter  constrained  Stanton  to  order  the  appointment 
of  a  mixed  commission  of  officers  and  civilians  to  investigate  the 
entire  police  administration  of  Nashville  since  its  occupation  by  the 
army  and  the  effect  on  the  public  interests  and  individual  rights 
of  the  operations  of  both  military  and  civil  police.  Truesdail's 
skirts  were  generally  believed  to  be  smirched,  and  it  was  after 
wards  alleged  that  Rosecrans'  support  of  him  was  one  of  the 
causes  of  that  general's  removal  in  October.33  Johnson  himself 
denied  any  complicity  in  the  matter,  but  condemned  Truesdail 
unsparingly  as  "a  base  and  unmitigated  Jesuitical  parasite,"34 
and  declared  that  he  had  rejected  applications  for  the  release  of 
fifty  convicts  in  the  state  prison  who  were  better  men  than  he.35 

Rosecrans'  experience  had  taught  him  caution,  but  he  could 
.not  conceal  his  displeasure  when,  on  the  3d  of  May,  Johnson 
obtained  the  transfer  of  the  first  Tennessee  infantry  regiment 
from  the  general  service  to  the  governor's  personal  command, 
as  a  nucleus  for  the  guard  he  was  then  forming.  He  would,  he 
said,  give  the  requisite  orders,  but  he  could  ill  spare  the  regi 
ment,  and,  what  was  more  important,  a  force  located  within 
the  garrison  of  Nashville,  but  not  subject  to  the  orders  of  the 
garrison  commander,  would  do  little  but  breed  discord.36  His 
observations  were  only  good  common-sense,  but  the  transfer 
was  made,  notwithstanding. 

The  utter  impossibility  of  developing  any  considerable  Union 
sentiment  in  Tennessee  under  the  conditions  then  existing  was 
emphasized  by  the  bitterness  which  the  new  repressive  policy 
engendered.  Buell  had  been  too  mild ;  Rosecrans  was  too  severe. 
"No  wonder  the  national  cause  has  made  such  slight  headway 
in  Tennessee,"  remarked  the  Louisville  Journal.  "Many  of  those 
who  have  it  in  charge  appear  especially  to  study  how  little  they 
can  make  it  look  like  the  cause  of  restoration  and  how  much  like 
the  cause  of  subjugation.  The  restoration  of  the  Union  under 

33  Quoted  by  Nashville   Union,  October  29. 

34  Unscrupulous  enemies  of  Rosecrans  made  much  of  the  fact  that"  he 
was  a  Catholic. 

85  J.    P.,   vol.    xxxvi,    7877. 

39  O.   R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxiii,  part  ii,  p.  308. 


84  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

such  auspices  is  uphill  work."37  On  this  point,  however,  Rose- 
crans  and  Johnson  were  in  full  accord  and  acted  with  unhesi 
tating  efficiency.  Their  resolution  was  strengthened  by  detailed 
instructions38  from  Halleck  in  March,  prescribing  the  correct 
treatment  for  the  various  classes  of  inhabitants  in  the  state. 

The  so-called  neutrals,  said  Halleck,  have  no  proper  standing 
in  a  civil  war.  Non-combatants  must  therefore  be  considered  as 
rebel  sympathizers.  As  such,  they  must  not  be  molested  or 
deprived  of  their  property,  except  through  military  necessity,  so 
long  as  they  attend  quietly  to  their  own  affairs,  but  they  are 
subject  to  forced  loans  and  military  requisitions  and  their  houses 
may  be  taken  for  soldiers'  quarters  or  other  temporary  military 
uses.  With  these  exceptions,  they  are  to  be  protected.  But 
should  they  at  any  time  resort  to  arms  or  give  aid  or  information 
to  the  enemy,  they  become  "rebels  or  military  traitors,"  to  be 
punished  with  death;  if  captured,  they  will  next  be  regarded  as 
prisoners  of  war  and  their  property  is  subject  to  confiscation. 
Hitherto,  such  persons  have  been  treated  altogether  too  leniently. 
Another  class  comprises  those  who,  though  not  in  arms  against 
the  United  States,  are  avowedly  hostile  to  the  occupying  army. 
These  are  under  all  the  disabilities  of  non-combatants  and,  in 
addition,  are  liable  to  be  arrested  and  confined  as  prisoners 
of  war  or  expelled  from  the  country  as  enemies.  Halleck' s 
opinion  is  that  they  should  not  be  permitted  to  go  at  large 
within  the  Federal  lines.  There  are  also  obvious  disadvantages 
in  sending  them  south  to  swell  the  force  of  the  enemy  and  in 
imprisoning  them  and  weakening  the  army  by  detailing  guards 
for  them.  The  course  to  be  followed  in  each  case  is  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  general,  with  the  injunction  Ithat  the 
laws  of  war  must  be  more  strictly  enforced  than  heretofore 
against  all  open  and  secret  foes  of  the  government.  The 
people  of  Tennessee  were  to  be  brought  by  sad  experience  to 
appreciate  the  importance  of  reestablishing  the  exclusive  sway 
of  the  civil  law,  which  alone  is  no  respecter  of  persons.  To 
this  end  the  army  was  to  provide  the  propulsive  force  and  the 
governor  the  machinery. 

37  Nashville  Union,  February  28,  1863. 
88  Ibid,  March  21. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  85 

A  beginning  had  already  been  made,  as  we  have  seen.  In 
February,  the  military  arm  had  fallen  upon  the  defiant  Nash 
ville  Gas  Light  Company,  which  had  refused  to  transfer  shares 
sold  to  Northern  purchasers  on  the  ground  that  the  rights  of 
Northern  persons  to  Southern  property  were  forfeited  under 
the  Confederate  sequestration  act.  Post-commander  Mitchell 
immediately  ordered  that  any  attempt  of  individuals  or  cor 
porations  to  avail  themselves  of  or  obey  any  law  of  the  Con 
federate  Congress  or  any  disloyal  state  legislature  should  work 
forfeiture  of  all  their  property  under  the  Federal  confiscation 
act,  and  that  individuals  so  acting  for  themselves  or  for  cor 
porations  should  be  sent  south  of  the  lines  of  the  United  States 
army.39  On  the  2Oth,  Johnson,  in  accordance  with  the  con 
fiscation  act,  had  warned  all  persons  not  to  pay  profits  or  rents 
to  secessionists  or  their  agents,  but  to  retain  them  until  a 
United  States  officer  should  be  appointed  to  receive  them;40 
and,  at  the  governor's  request,  General  Mitchell  ordered  the 
seizure  of  the  goods  of  delinquents  in  the  contribution  assessed 
for  the  support  of  destitute  women  and  children.41  On  the 
1 6th  of  March,  a  commission  composed  of  three  citizens  and 
two  officers  of  the  army  was  established  by  Rosecrans  to  pass 
on  claims  for  damages  sustained  by  the  citizens  of  Nashville 
and  vicinity  from  the  occupation  by  the  army;42  and  a  month 
later  (April  14),  a  board  of  claims  was  constituted  which, 
in  its  hearings,  was  to  accord  preference  to  those  who  declared 
themselves  true  and  faithful  citizens  of  the  United  States.43 
This  last  measure  was  a  shrewdly  practical  inducement  for 
avowed  Unionism,  and  many  whom  benevolence  had  failed  to 
win  now  consulted  their  material  interests  and  openly  renewed 
their  allegiance.  While  every  favor  was  extended  to  confessed 
penitents,  the  lot  of  the  recalcitrants  became  constantly  harder. 
As  if  to  point  the  contrast,  Rosecrans,  on  the  very  day  the 
board  of  claims  was  established,  directed  the  arrest  of  a  large 

""Ibid.,  February  28. 
40  Ibid.,  February  21. 
fl  Ibid.,  February  27. 
42  Ibid.,  March  18. 
*Tbid.,    August    14. 


86  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

number  of  citizens  of  Nashville  whose  secessionist  propensities 
were  well  known.44  The  last  loophole  for  Nashville  secessionists 
was  closed  on  the  2ist  by  General  Mitchell's  uncompromising 
order  that  all  white  persons  over  eighteen  years  of  age  residing 
within  the  lines  of  his  command,  who  had  not  already  taken 
the  oath  of  allegiance  and  the  non-combatants'  parole  and  after 
wards  faithfully  observed  them,  do  so  and  give  the  required 
bond  within  ten  days,  or  go  south  of  the  lines  of  the  army.45 
Disability,  in  whatever  form,  was  no  longer  to  be  coddled. 
On  the  3d  of  May,  a  number  of  persons  who  had  acted  or 
spoken  in  hostility  to  the  government  were  directed  to  remove 
north  of  the  Ohio  river,  where  their  influence  would  be  in 
nocuous,  and  to  remain  there  until  the  close  of  the  war,  under 
penalty  of  arrest  and  trial  as  spies,  if  they  returned  to 
Tennessee.46  On  the  23d  of  June,  the  confiscation  act  went 
into  full  effect  in  Nashville  and  Davidson  county  through  the 
appointment  of  a  commissioner  (Charles  Davis)  to  take  posses 
sion  of  and  collect  the  rents  on  the  property  of  Confederates, 
rent  or  lease  it  at  his  discretion,  subject  to  Johnson's  approval, 
and  hold  the  receipts  to  the  order  of  the  United  States  gov 
ernment,  as  represented  by  the  governor.47  No  longer  could 
it  be  said,  as  in  Buell's  day,  that  rebels  were  protected  and 
loyal  men  left  to  suffer  without  redress. 

**Ibid.,  April  15. 

48  Ibid.,  April  22. 

*J.    P.,   vol.   lv  — 1906. 

*TlIbid.,  vol.  xxxii,  7039. 


CHAPTER    VI 

MILITARY  AND  POLITICAL  REVERSES  OF  1863 

In  the  history  of  the  restoration  of  civil  institutions  in 
Tennessee,  the  exciting  summer  months  of  1862  are  only  an  un 
eventful  interlude.  No  progress  was  possible ,  while  the  rival 
armies  wrestled  desperately  on  her  soil,  her  cities  were  turned 
into  military  camps  or  beleaguered  strongholds,  and  raiding 
cavalry  scoured  the  country.  On  only  one  section  of  the  state, 
the  west,  was  the  hold  of  the  Union  army  secure,  as  the  result 
of  Grant's  victories  .in  the  spring,  and  that  section,  unfortunately 
for  the  progress  of  the  Union  cause,  was  overwhelmingly  for 
the  Confederacy. 

Despite  the  hostile  public  sentiment,  an  attempt  was  made 
to  hold  an  election  for  municipal  officers  in  Memphis  on  the 
26th  of  June,  under  the  protection  of  the  military.  The  Union 
ticket  was  the  only  one  in  the  field,  and  only  about  seven 
hundred  votes  were  cast.  Fear  kept  many  from  the  polls.  The 
voters  were  required  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
United  States,  which  excluded  many  more.  At  a  liberal  esti 
mate,  not  more  than  a  third  of  the  citizens  then  in  the  city 
voted.1  John  Park  was  re-elected  mayor.  The  result  could  not 
be  considered  encouraging  from  a  Union  standpoint.  The  mass 
of  the  people  declined  actively  to  participate  in  the  restoration 
of  a  civil  government  bearing  the  stamp  of  loyalty,  heavily  as 
they  felt  the  burden  of  military  rule.2 

The  Union  men  of  the  western  counties,  however,  whose 
yearning  for  a  government  of  laws  did  no  violence  to  their 
political  convictions,  urged  the  governor  to  new  efforts.  He 
was  deluged  with  petitions  importuning  him  to  hold  the  regular 
elections  for  members  of  the  Federal  Congress  in  the  9th  and 
loth  districts.  County  meetings  pressed  this  course  on  him  in 
resolutions.3 

1  Memphis'   vote   in   peace   times    was   nearly    5,000. 
3  New  York  Tribune,  July  4,  1862. 
3J.  P.,  vol.  xxvi  passim. 


88  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Lincoln's  anxiety  for  signs  of  political  regeneration  in  the 
border  states  was  almost  painful  in  its  intensity.  He  watched 
eagerly  for  an  excuse  to  push  forward  the  boundaries  within 
which  the  people  themselves  acknowledged  the  sovereignty  of 
the  United  States.  To  this  end,  notwithstanding  the  precarious 
situation  of  the  army,  he  sent,  in  October,  commissioners  to 
Tennessee,  Louisiana,  and  Arkansas,  states  in  which  the  Union 
army  had  established  itself,  to  stimulate  popular  sentiment  favor 
able  to  holding  congressional  and  state  elections  and  securing 
representation  of  the  state  in  the  Federal  Senate.  The  gover 
nors  were  requested  to  lend  their  heartiest  cooperation  to  this 
movement.  "In  all  available  ways,"  ran  the  instructions,  "give 
the  people  a  chance  to  express  their  wishes  at  these  elections. 
Follow  forms  of  law  as  far  as  convenient,  but  at  all  events 
get  the  expression  of  the  largest  number  of  the  people  possible. 
All  see  how  such  action  will  connect  with  and  affect  the  proc 
lamation  of  September  22.  Of  course  the  men  elected  should 
be  gentlemen  of  character,  willing  to  swear  support  to  the 
Constitution,  as  of  old,  and  known  to  be  above  reasonable 
suspicion  of  duplicity/'4 

The  proclamation  of  the  22d  of  September  (1862)  referred 
to  by  the  president,  was,  of  course,  the  famous  one  declaring 
the  purpose  of  the  war  to  be  the  restoration  of  the  constitutional 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  seceded  states, 
asserting  the  purpose  of  the  president  to  recommend  com 
pensation  for  the  slaves  in  all  states  not  in  rebellion  that 
should  voluntarily  free  their  bondmen,  and  announcing  eman 
cipation  by  the  executive,  on  the  ist  of  January,  1863,  of  all 
slaves  in  the  states  still  in  arms  against  the  government.5  By 
promptly  taking  steps  to  reinstate  herself  as  a  member  of  the 
Union,  Tennessee  would  therefore  share  in  any  financial  relief 
afforded  by  Congress  to  loyal  slave  states  and  her  own  con 
gressmen  would  have  a  hand  in  the  measures  adopted.  The 
effect  of  the  proclamation  upon  the  slaveholders  was  immediate, 
but  hardly  such  as  to  please  or  encourage  Lincoln.  Slaves 

4O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  ii,  p.  675. 

5  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vi,  p.  96. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  89 

were  gathered  up  and  carried  south  as  expeditiously  as  passible. 
Whole  plantations  were  depopulated.6 

Although  but  cold  comfort  had  been  derived  from  his  previous 
experiments  with  popular  sentiment,  Johnson  resolved  on  one 
more  attempt  to  gratify  the  president.  On  the  8th  of  December, 
he  issued  a  proclamation7  for  elections  on  the  29th  for  mem 
bers  of  Congress  in  the  9th  and  loth  districts,  where  the 
activity  and  the  petitions  of  the  Unionists  encouraged  some 
faint  hopes  of  success.  Pursuant  to  the  policy  of  committing  the 
restoration  of  the  state  to  its  conspicuously  loyal  citizens,  the 
governor  added  to  the  legal  requirements  for  electors  that  of 
loyalty  established  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judges  of  elections, 
who,  on  their  part,  were  to  take  oath  to  exclude  all  persons 
whose  devotion  to  the  Union  they  suspected. 

The  proclamation  had  announced  the  belief  that  a  majority 
of  the  voters  of  these  districts  had  given  evidence  of  their 
allegiance  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States. 
The  grounds  for  any  such  inference  are  not  apparent.  The 
districts,  which  lay  along  the  Mississippi  boundary  and  in 
cluded  Memphis,  were  in  the  cotton-growing  section,  devoted  to 
slavery,  and  had  been  secessionist  from  the  start.  The  citizens 
had  acquiesced,  perforce,  in  the  military  occupation,  but,  with 
few  exceptions,  expressions  in  favor  of  the  Union  were  of  the 
perfunctory,  time-serving  variety.  The  comment  of  a  corre 
spondent  of  the  Indianapolis  Sentinel  regarding  the  "Unionism" 
of  Nashville  at  this  time,  applies  with  even  greater  force  to 
West  Tennessee.  A  citizen  with  whom  he  has  conversed,  he 
says,  is  in  favor  of  the  Union  "provided  the  government  will 
agree  to  redeem  the  Confederate  bonds  with  Lincoln  greens. 
He  thinks  that  all  rebels  should  be  pardoned  in  full,  and* 
Southern  war  expenses,  including  the  cotton  burnt,  farms,  rail 
roads  and  bridges  destroyed  by  both  parties,  and  the  general 
expenses  should  be  assumed  by  the  Washington  government, 
and  then  the  Constitution  should  be  amended  so  as  to  guarantee 
a  veto  power  at  least  to  the  Southern  states.  .  .  ,  He  assured 
me  there  was  no  other  'kind  of  Unionism'  in  this  country, 

8  Nashville  Union,  November  27. 
7  Ibid.,  December  Q. 


90  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

except  a  few  fanatics  of  the  Andy  Johnson  school,  who  could 
not  muster  a  corporal's  guard  in  all  Tennessee.  I  guess  the 
man  is  more  than  half  right."8 

That  this  hardly  overstated  the  attitude  of  the  people,  the 
governor  must  have  appreciated  after  reading  the  resolutions' 
adopted  by  a  mass  meeting  of  representatives  of  Hardeman, 
Hay  wood,  and  Fayette  counties  on  the  I5th  of  December  to 
nominate  a  candidate  for  the  loth  district.  Starting  with  the 
observation  that  the  time  had  come  when  Tennessee  should  be 
represented  in  Congress,  on  the  principle  that  participation  in 
governing  one's  self  is  preferable  to  being  governed  by  others, 
and  declaring  for  "an  honorable  and  speedy  peace  and  a  re 
construction  of  the  Union  on  the  old  terms  of  the  Constitution," 
the  paper  closed  with  instructions  to  the  prospective  represen 
tative  of  the  district  "to  oppose  the  emancipation  proclamation 
of  President  Lincoln  and  to  endeavor  to  procure  the  passage 
of  some  law  which  will  enable  masters  to  recover  their  fugitive 
slaves  and  which  will  enable  loyal  citizens  to  receive  full  pay 
ment  for  all  losses  inflicted  on  them  by  the  Federal  army, 
including  the  loss  of  slaves."  This  was  arrant  copperheadism. 
General  Brayman,  who  commanded  the  post  at  Bolivar,  reported 
the  proceedings  of  the  meeting  to  Johnson  with  the  remark 
that  resolutions  so  lacking  in  the  patriotism  demanded  by  the 
occasion  could  hardly  aid  the  purpose  of  the  government.10 
Perhaps  it  was  as  well  for  the  prestige  of  the  president  and 
the  governor  that  a  well-timed  raid  by  Forrest  on  the  day  set 
for  the  elections  prevented  the  opening  of  the  polls  and  the 
registering  of  an  insignificant  vote  or  the  choice  of  anti-ad 
ministration  congressmen.11 

Indeed,  the  political  situation  depended  entirely  upon  the 
success  or  failure  of  the  army,  and  so  far  the  army  had  done 
nothing  decisive.  Bragg  and  the  guerillas  remained  in  full 
force  in  the  state.  To  eject  them  was  now  a  part  of  the  great 

"Ibid.,  December  14. 
'J.    P.,    vol.    xxviii,    6149. 
"  Ibid.,  6148. 

11  Contested  Election  Cases,  House  of  Representatives,  3?th  Congress, 
3?d  session,  no.  46. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  91 

project  conceived  by  the  war  department,  involving  the  con 
quest  of  the  southwestern  states  by  a  simultaneous  eastward 
advance  of  all  the  Federal  forces  from  Tennessee  on  the  north 
to  Louisiana  and  Texas  on  the  south,  and  the  crowding  back  of 
the  rebellion  upon  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  In  pursuance  of  this 
plan,  Rosecrans  took  the  offensive  against  Bragg,  and,  on  the 
2d  of  January,  1863,  defeated  him  at  Stone  River12  and  pushed 
him  south  to  Tullahoma,  thus  almost  recovering  the  position 
out  of  which  Buell  had  been  manoeuvred  in  August.  The 
victory,  so  Johnson  wrote  to  Lincoln,  greatly  rejoiced  the  friends 
of  the  Union  and  discouraged  the  Confederates,  but  increased 
their  bitterness;  still,  not  enough  had  been  done.  Nothing 
could  accomplish  so  much  to  win  back  Tennessee  as  the  eviction 
of  the  enemy  from  East  Tennessee  and  the  resulting  conviction 
of  the  people  that  the  government  was  succeeding  in  reestablish 
ing  its  sway  throughout  the  state.13 

At  this  most  critical  juncture,  the  president's  emancipation 
proclamation  appeared.  From  its  operation  Tennessee,  alone 
of  the  seceding  states,  was  excepted,  and  thus  placed  in  a 
conspicuous  and  unique  relation  to  the  Federal  government. 
The  exception  was  made  at  Johnson's  request.14  Tenacious  of 
his  pet  theory  that  the  states  had  never  been  out  of  the  Union 
and  that  the  loyal  citizens  of  Tennessee  retained  in  full  vigor 
all  their  personal  and  property  rights,  he  most  earnestly  desired 
them,  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  to  do  away  with  the  institution 
of  slavery  by  their  own  voluntary  act.  Originally  a  slave-holder 
and  a  defender  of  slavery  as  based  upon  vested  rights  which 
the  government  was  bound  to  respect,  he  had  been  impelled  by 
the  logic  of  events  to  the  view  that  the  institution  was  in 
compatible  with  a  free  government  and  that  one  or  the  other 
must  fall.  This  idea  once  grasped,  his  choice  was  made.  The 
preservation  of  the  "best  government  under  Heaven"  was  his 
consuming  passion.  His  stand  was  already  taken  early  in  1862. 

13  Popularly  known  as  the  Battle  of  Murf  reesboro.    The  battle  itself  was 
hardly  more  than  a  draw,  but  the  results  favored  the  Union  army. 

18  O.  R.}  series  i,  vol.  xx,  part  ii,  p.  317. 

14  J.  G.  Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  vol.  i,  p.  446.    I  can  find  no 
categorical  confirmation  of  this  statement,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  gen 
erally  believed  that  Johnson  was  behind  the  measure. 


92  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

At  a  gathering  in  Nashville  on  the  4th  of  July,  he  had  said: 
"I  am  for  this  government  above  all  earthly  possessions,  and 
if  it  perish,  I  do  not  want  to  survive  it.  I  am  for  it,  though 
slavery  should  be  struck  from  existence  and  Africa  swept  from 
the  balance  of  the  world.  I  believe,  indeed,  that  the  Union  is 
the  only  protection  of  slavery — its  sole  guarantee;  but  if  you 
persist  in  forcing  this  issue  of  slavery  against  the  government, 
I  say,  in  the  face  of  Heaven,  give  me  my  government  and  let 
the  negro  go!"15  His  devotion  to  the  poor  white  laborers  from 
whom  he  sprang  and  whose  representative  he  was,  and  his 
enthusiasm  for  democracy  and  equality  of  opportunity  made  it 
easy  for  him  to  break  with  slavery  as  the  source  of  privilege. 
"I  am  for  a  government  based  on  and  ruled  by  industrious, 
free  white  citizens,  and  conducted  in  conformity  with  their 
wants,  and  not  a  slave  aristocracy,"  he  asserted.16  The  excep 
tion  of  Tennessee  from  the  proclamation,  he  told  the  president, 
had  disappointed  and  disarmed  many  enemies  of  the  govern 
ment  in  the  state.  The  important  thing  was  to  have  the  people 
understand  it.17 

Already  in  December,  the  Nashville  Union,  in  close  sympathy 
with  Johnson,  had  come  out  definitely  in  favor  of  emancipation. 
Slavery,  it  mantained,  had  fallen  as  the  direct  result  of  the 
war.  It  could  not  exist  under  current  conditions.  The  slave 
owners  were  ruined.  Their  slaves  were  of  no  value  to  them, 
but  rather  a  source  of  expense  and  further  impoverishment. 
"Instead  of  adding  their  former  reputed  value  to  the  wealth 
of  the  South,  we  have  better  reason  to  double  the  sum  of 
their  estimated  value,  and  subtract  it  from  our  aggregate 
wealth."18  R.  J.  Meigs,  a  former  attorney-general  of  the  state 
and  a  lawyer  of  distinction,  urged  not  only  that  the  slaves  of 
rebels  be  seized  as  constituting  part  of  their  resources  for 
continuing  the  war,  but  also  that  the  right  to  hold  them  be 
annulled  in  order  "to  obtain  security  against  a  repetition  of 
the  wrong  in  the  future."19  Late  in  February,  Johnson  himself 

19  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  269. 

16  Nashville   Union,  August  25. 

11  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xx,  part  ii,  p.  317. 

18  Nashville   Union,  December  3. 

"Ibid.,  June  27. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  93 

started  on  a  speech-making  tour  through  Ohio,  Pennsylvania, 
New  Jersey  and  New  York,  and  at  Nashville,  his  point  of 
departure,  he  delivered,  on  the  26th,  an  address,20  the  substance 
of  which  he  repeated  to  the  audiences  all  along  his  route.  As 
always,  his  great  theme  was  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 
"The  time  has  come  and  is  now  open  us,"  he  reiterated,  "to 
teach  the  South  and  North  that  institutions  are  not  to  exist 
here  that  are  more  powerful  than  the  government  itself.  If 
it  is  banks,  put  it  down ;  if  it  is  aristocracy,  put  it  down ;  if  it  is 
slavery,  put  it  down.  .  .  .  Has  slavery  a  right  to  agitate 
the  government  and  shake  it  to  its  center,  and  then  deny  to 
the  government  the  privilege  to  agitate  slavery?  .  .  .  Never 
ground  your  arms  until  the  Constitution  is  enforced  and  the 
enemies  put  down.  ...  I  say  you  dishonor  yourselves  and  the 
graves  of  your  offspring,  if  you  let  them  sleep  there  upon  the 
confines  of  a  Confederacy  established  upon  the  remains  of  this 
government." 

On  the  2jd  of  April,  great  interest  and  excitement  were 
aroused  by  the  publication  of  a  declaration  of  principles21  by 
the  Nashville  Union  Club,  "one  of  the  largest  and  most  intelligent 
associations  which  were  ever  organized  in  Tennessee."22  The 
members  proclaimed  their  loyalty  to  the  Constitution  and  the 
Union.  Union  leagues  were  to  be  formed  throughout  the 
state  to  assist  in  the  work  of  restoration  and  to  furnish  the 
civil  and  military  authorities  with  reliable  information.  The 
war  must  be  continued  until  the  rebellion  was  crushed,  and 
all  disloyal  men  must  be  deprived  of  their  property  and  ex 
cluded  from  participation  in  the  government  and  enjoyment  of 
the  franchise  during  a  period  of  probation  at  least  as  long  as 
that  required  of  "unbiased  and  unprejudiced  foreigners."  The 
lovers  of  freedom  of  every  land  were  invited  to  settle  in  Ten 
nessee  in  place  of  the  traitorous  aristocrats.  Finally,  an  im 
pressive  and  radical  position  was  taken  on  the  question  of 
slavery.  "We  do  most  solemnly  affirm,  as  the  result  of  our 
life-long  acquaintance,  and  of  our  intimate  familiarity  with  all 

20  Ibid.,  March  3,  1863. 

21  Ibid.,  April  23. 

22  Ibid. 


94  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

its  workings,  that  the  institution  of  slavery  tends  to  dishonor 
labor  and  smother  enterprise;  is  incompatible  with  an  intelligent 
public  policy,  sound  morality,  the  safety  and  permanency  of 
the  Republic,  the  development  of  the  resources  of  the  state; 
that  it  roots  out  the  industrious,  and  has  the  effect  of  lessening 
the  free  population  of  the  country."  On  these  grounds  its 
abolition  was  demanded  at  the  earliest  practicable  time  consistent 
with  "safety  to  the  slaves  and  justice  to  loyal  masters." 

The  considerate  treatment  of  Tennessee  by  the  president  on 
the  slavery  issue  clearly  helped  the  Union  cause;  but  a  far 
more  invigorating  tonic  was  the  success  of  the  Northern  armies. 
Their  hold  on  the  western  part  of  the  state  constantly  strength 
ened,  while  Bragg  had  been  driven  almost  off  its  soil.  Were  he 
again  defeated  by  Rosecrans,  only  a  precipitate  retreat  would 
save  Buckner  in  East  Tennessee.  The  Confederates  were  dis 
couraged.  The  magnitude  to  which  the  war  had  grown  utterly 
surpassed  anything  they  had  dreamed  of  a  year  before.  Their 
state  was  almost  destroyed  already.  "They  have,"  said  the 
Union,  "awakened  at  last  to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  the 
civil  war  is  involving  them  in  a  ruin  which  if  prolonged  a  few 
months,  will  be  remediless,  so  far  as  they  personally  are  con 
cerned,  while  a  future  of  unknown  horrors  will  await  their 
innocent  children."23  Real  love  for  the  Union  had  made  no 
perceptible  progress.  The  great  majority  would  doubtless  still 
have  rejoiced  at  the  expulsion  of  the  Union  army  from  the* 
state,  but  this,  it  became  more  and  more  apparent,  was  im 
possible.  Their  slaves  ran  away  or  were  carried  off  and  the 
owners  left  destitute.  Foraging  parties  stripped  the  farms. 
The  citizens  themselves  were  conscripted  by  the  Confederates, 
particularly  the  poorer  classes,  who  began  to  realize  that  they 
were  fighting  and  suffering  for  a  cause  the  success  of  which 
would  bring  them  nothing  better  than  they  had  had  in  peace 
under  the  old  government.  Abstract  theories  of  states'  rights 
and  sovereignty  had  little  place  in  hearts  torn  with  anguish 
for  the  death  of  loved  ones  and  the  loss  of  all  earthly  posses 
sions.  Many  who  had  sought  the  dissolution  of  the  Union 

83  Ibid.,  January  27. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  95 

were  now  eager,  from  utter  exhaustion  and  misery,  to  give  up 
the  struggle  and  accept  any  settlement  that  would  bring  peace. 

The  month  of  June  witnessed  the  final  episode  in  the  political 
history  of  the  Confederacy  in  Tennessee.  According  to  the 
state  constitution,  the  regular  congressional  elections  fell  in 
August  of  the  current  year,  and  the  Union  party  hoped  for 
a  victory  by  Rosecrans  in  time  to  stimulate  the  movement  for 
peace  and  restoration  and  afford  assurances  against  a  repetition 
of  the  fiasco  of  the  previous  December.  That  the  secessionists, 
whose  hold  in  the  state  was  restricted  practically  to  East  Ten 
nessee,  indubitably  hostile  to  them,  would  also  attempt  an  election, 
could  hardly  have  been  anticipated.  However,  in  May,  a  procr 
lamation  by  Governor  Harris  and  an  unsigned  call  published 
in  the  Chattanooga  Rebel  of  May  23d  announced  a  convention 
to  be  held  at  Winchester,  in  Franklin  county,  on  the  I7th  of 
June,  to  select  candidates  for  governor  and  a  general  congres 
sional  ticket.  "It  is  more  important,"  declared  the  call,  "that 
this  duty  should  be  performed  now  than  at  any  other  previous 
period  in  our  history.  We  must  exhibit  to  the  enemy  our 
unalterable  firmness  of  purpose  and  determination  to  preserve 
and  perpetuate  our  free  institutions."  As  the  Union  armies 
dominated  the  state,  no  regular  method  of  naming  the  delegates 
was  possible.  Both  the  citizens  and  the  Tennessee  regiments 
in  the  Confederate  service  were  requested  to  send  representatives 
chosen  by  public  meetings  "or  such  other  mode  as  they  may 
deem  best,"  and  exiles  and  representatives  from  counties  within 
the  enemy's  lines  were  invited  to  attend  for  their  counties. 

The  convention  which  assembled  in  response  to  this  call  was, 
of  course,  in  no  legal  sense  representative.  It  decided  to  regard 
"all  loyal  citizens  of  the  state"  present  as  delegates  for  their 
respective  counties,  many  of  which  were  within  the  lines  of 
the  Union  army.  Resolutions  of  endorsement  and  thanks  to 
Governor  Harris  were  adopted  and  Harris  himself  addressed 
the  meeting.  Judge  Robert  L.  Caruthers  was  nominated  for 
governor  on  the  third  ballot  and  a  full  congressional  ticket  was 
also  drawn  up.24 

*Ibid.,   May  30,   June   28;   Nashville   Dispatch,  June   27. 


96  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Meanwhile,  the  Union  leaders  had  not  been  blind  to  the 
advantages  of  an  election  in  August  under  the  sanction  of  the 
state  constitution  and  the  control  of  the  army.  Their  call, 
signed  by  Maynard,  Brownlow  and  others,  appeared  on  the 
2oth  of  June  and,  in  purposely  vague  terms,  summoned  "those 
who  desire  to  maintain  the  state  government  in  connection  with 
the  Federal  Union  as  it  stood  prior  to  the  rebellion  and  the  war" 
to  meet  at  the  capitol  in  Nashville  on  the  ist  of  July.25  Irregu 
larities  characterized  this  convention26  as  well  as  its  Confederate 
predecessor  at  Winchester.  Refugees  from  East  Tennessee  and 
other  sections,  where  no  delegates  could  be  chosen,  and  soldiers 
from  Tennessee  regiments  were  admitted  to  seats.  Forty  counties 
were  represented  and  each  county  was,  by  resolution  of  the 
convention,  allowed  one  vote  for  every  five  thousand  white 
inhabitants. 

Those  who  hoped  for  a  complete  harmony  of  thought  and 
action  among  the  Unionists  were  promptly  disappointed  by  the 
appearance  of  dissension  on  several  points  of  high  importance. 
First,  the  delegates  disagreed  vigorously  as  to  the  purpose  and 
powers  of  the  convention.  The  radicals  wished  it  to  nominate 
candidates  for  Congress  and  the  state  legislature.  Many  favored 
the  nomination  of  a  civil  governor  and  all  the  other  state  officers, 
to  be  elected  at  the  same  time  as  the  legislature.  To  omit 
these  from  the  ticket,  they  held,  was  to  depart  unnecessarily 
from  the  constitution,  which  required  the  election  of  all  the 
officers  in  August.  Moreover,  to  have  a  military  governor,  who 
was  not  responsible  to  the  people  of  the  state,  to  deal  with  an 
elected  legislature,  would  produce  a  hopeless  jumble  of  authority. 
A  resolution,  championed  by  J.  B.  Bingham  of  Memphis,  pro 
posed  that  the  convention  itself  constitute  Governor  Johnson 
provisional  governor  of  the  state — thus,  in  the  view  of  its  pro 
jectors,  fortifying  him  with  the  sanction  of  the  people  whom 
the  delegates  professed  to  represent — and  request  him  to  issue 
writs  of  election  and  appoint  the  necessary  agents  to  enable  the 
people  to  elect  all  the  state  officers  provided  for  in  the  con 
stitution  on  the  day  fixed  by  that  instrument.  Another  resolu- 

*  Nashville   Union,  June  23. 

38  Ibid.,  July  2-8,  July  18;  Nashville  Dispatch,  July  3. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  97 

tion  contemplated  the  election  by  the  convention  of  a  governor's 
council  of  three  members,  to  consult  with  and  advise  Johnson 
in  the  interests  of  the  people  until  the  full  civil  government 
could  be  restored. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  convention 
was  in  no  proper  sense  a  representative  body,  but  at  best  only  an 
irregular  assembly  of  loyal  citizens,  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
counsel  with  and  advising  the  governor.  It  was  ridiculous  to 
assume  that  such  a  body  could  do  what  the  president  of  the 
United  States  himself  could  not  do — make  Johnson  a  provisional 
governor.  The  president  could  only  make  him  military  governor 
by  virtue  of  the  war  power.  No  civil  functions  could  be  ex 
ercised  in  Tennessee  except  in  accordance  with  the  state  con 
stitution  or  through  the  action  of  the  sovereign  people.  Since 
the  constitution  had  been  thrown  out  of  gear  by  the  rebellion, 
the  people  must  act,  and  their  first  action  could  not  be  along 
the  lines  prescribed  by  the  constitution,  but  must  be  an  irregular 
action  to  restore  regularity,  and  the  military  governor  was 
in  Tennessee  for  the  express  purpose  of  starting  and  directing 
the  movement  of  the  people.  His  power  was  not  derived  from 
the  disordered  state  constitution  nor  from  the  people  of  Ten 
nessee  at  all,  but  from  the  president.  Power  so  derived  was 
plenary  for  the  purpose  contemplated.  A  civil  governor  and 
other  state  executive  officers  represented  the  people  of  the  state 
as  a  whole.  They  could  not  properly  be  chosen  until  the  state 
was  entirely  clear  of  the  enemy.  This  position  was  stoutly 
maintained  by  the  East  Tennesseeans.  Their  section,  they  said, 
was  the  most  loyal  part  of  the  state,  but  it  was  at  present  in 
the  grip  of  the  Confederacy,  and  to  elect  a  governor  now  would 
be  to  commit  his  choice  to  the  less  loyal  districts  of  Middle 
and  West  Tennessee.  To  "carry  the  ballot-box"  to  the  East 
Tennesseeans  in  the  army,  as  had  been  proposed,  was  no  ade 
quate  remedy  for  this  grievance.  Thousands  of  East  Tennessee 
loyalists  were  refugees  or  held  down  by  terrorism  and  were 
not  in  the  army  at  all.  The  legislature,  on  the  contrary,  was 
chosen  not  for  the  state  as  a  whole,  but  for  districts.  There 
was,  therefore,  no  reason  why  all  districts  protected  by  the 
Union  army  should  not  elect  legislators  in  August.  The  legis- 


98  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

lature  could  assemble  on  the  day  fixed  by  law  and  adjourn 
from  day  to  day  until,  by  the  freeing  of  more  districts  and 
the  election  of  members  from  them,  a  quorum  should  be  ob 
tained.  It  could  then  proceed  to  redistrict  the  state  and  make 
provision  for  future  congressional  and  legislative  elections,  the. 
machinery  for  which  could  be  put  in  motion  by  the  military 
governor,  who  had  full  power  to  appoint  sheriffs,  judges  of 
elections,  and  other  necessary  officials,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
his  military  resources  would  protect  the  ballot-box  from  attack. 

The  latter  view  finally  prevailed.  The  resolutions  adopted 
declared  all  laws,  resolutions,  and  ordinances  passed  by  the 
legislature  of  Tennessee  since  April  12,  1861,  the  work  of 
usurpation  and  void,  approved  the  action  of  the  president  in 
appointing  a  military  governor,  indorsed  Governor  Johnson's 
administration,  emphasized  the  importance  of  electing  a  state  leg 
islature,  and  requested  the  military  governor  to  issue  writs  and 
appoint  agents  for  such  an  election,  to  be  held  on  the  first 
Thursday  in  August,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  might  be  ex 
pedient.  The  convention  also  named  a  Union  state  executive 
committee,  consisting  of  Horace  Maynard,  W-  G.  Brownlow 
and  John  A.  Campbell  for  East  Tennessee ;  M.  M.  Brien,  William 
P.  Jones  and  Horace  H.  Harrison  for  Middle  Tennessee;  and 
J.  B.  Bingham,  J.  M.  Tomeny,  and  J.  Leftrick  for  West  Ten 
nessee — a  sort  of  standing  committee,  to  keep  an  eye  on  the 
political  situation  and  call  another  convention  whenever  they 
deemed  it  desirable. 

The  convention  had  been  held  under  cover  of  the  renewed 
activity  of  the  army.  Since  his  victory  at  Stone  River  in 
January,  Rosecrans  had  remained  near  Murfreesboro,  facing 
Bragg,  who  had  taken  position  north  of  Tullahoma.  The  Union 
general's  purpose  was  not  to  fight  a  pitched  battle  at  once,  but 
to  prevent  Bragg  from  cooperating  with  Johnston  in  Mississippi 
until  Grant  disposed  of  the  latter,  after  which  the  armies  of 
the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumberland  would  be  far  too  strong  for 
any  force  that  could  be  brought  against  them,  and  Bragg 
would  be  compelled  to  flee  southward,  with  the  possibility  of 
being  demoralized  and  routed  on  the  way.  In  June,  however, 
information  reached  the  war  department  that  Bragg,  while 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE  99 

amusing  Rosecrans,  was  sending  off  reinforcements  to  both 
Johnston  and  Lee.  To  prevent  this,  an  immediate  attack  was 
determined  upon.  While  Rosecrans  struck  directly  at  Bragg, 
Burnside,  with  the  army  of  the  Ohio,  was  to  invade  East 
Tennessee,  clear  that  district,  and  press  southward  toward 
Chattanooga  to  cooperate  with  Rosecrans,  in  case  Bragg  should 
turn  on  him.  On  the  24th,  Rosecrans,  by  a  flanking  march 
through  Hoover's  and  Liberty  Gaps  to  Manchester,  succeeded 
in  turning  Bragg's  position  at  Tullahoma.  The  Confederates 
were  forced  to  abandon  their  whole  line  and  fall  back  to 
Chattanooga,  which  they  strongly  fortified.  This  reverse  was 
demoralizing  to  them,  and  even  more  so  to  their  interests  in 
Tennessee.  Though  Burnside  was  delayed  and  did  not  enter 
East  Tennessee  until  the  end  of  August,  the  rest  of  the  state 
was  held  by  the  Federal  armies  in  July. 

The  regular  election  day  was,  nevertheless,  allowed  to  pass 
without  any  official  action  by  the  governor.  He  still  adhered 
to  his  oft  expressed  conviction,  strengthened  by  sad  experience, 
that  no  adequate  Union  strength  could  be  developed  in  the 
state  while  the  guerillas  remained  to  menace  the  inhabitants  and 
East  Tennessee  was  unredeemed.  That  this  was  the  wise  and 
proper  course,  anyone  who  cared  to  review  the  history  of  past 
failures  must  have  conceded,  but  insinuations  were  not  lacking 
that  Johnson  was  neglecting  opportunities  to  perform  his  clear 
duty,  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  his  power,  further  per 
secuting  the  aristocracy,  and  having  his  own  way. 

The  Confederates,  it  seems,  held  some  sort  of  an  election  on 
the  4th  of  August,  for  Judge  Caruthers  was  declared  governor 
and  Tennessee  representatives  were  admitted  to  the  Richmond 
Congress.  The  vote,  except  by  Tennesseeans  in  the  Confederate 
army,  must  have  been  infinitesimal,  and  the  whole  proceeding 
was  but  an  empty  formality,  so  far  as  any  effect  in  Tennessee 
was  concerned.27 

Far  more  annoying  to  the  administration  was  an, election  held 
on  the  same  date  by  the  conservative  Union  party  in  the  state, 
opposed  to  Johnson,  for  the  purpose  of  ousting  him  from 
power.  This  party  was  headed  by  Emerson  Etheridge,  who  had 

87  Miller's  Manual  of  Tennessee,  p.  46. 


ioo  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

been  one  of  the  most  prominent  and  outspoken  Union  leaders 
in  East  Tennessee  during  the  secession  period.  An  impressive, 
bold  speaker,  of  imposing  presence  and  much  fascination  of 
manner,  he  drew  after  him  a  considerable  personal  following. 
Passionate  in  his  attachment  to  the  Union,  he  had  broken  with 
the  radicals  on  the  slavery  issue  and  violently  opposed  the 
president's  emancipation  policy.  He  also  assailed  Johnson  as 
half-hearted  in  his  efforts  to  restore  order  in  the  state,  and 
intimated  that  his  devotion  was  rather  to  the  cause  of  the 
negro  than  to  the  cause  of  peace.  His  enemies  retorted  with 
the  cry  of  "Copperhead!"  and  explained  his  assaults  on  Johnson 
as  the  bitter  fruit  of  a  disappointed  ambition  for  the  governor's 
place. 

The  scheme  devised  by  Etheridge  and  his  friends  was  to  get 
out  a  vote  for  governor  on  the  day  fixed  by  the  state  constitution, 
whether  an  election  was  ordered  by  Johnson  or  not;  indeed, 
they  much  preferred  that  the  latter  should  remain  quiescent, 
for,  in  that  case,  their  candidate  seemed  certain  of  a  majority 
of  the  vote  cast  and,  under  the  constitution,  would  be  the 
legal  governor  by  action  of  the  people.  This  project  was,  in 
part,  actually  carried  out.  By  whatever  means,  some  sort  of 
an  election  was  held  in  Shelby,  Bedford,  and  perhaps  one 
other  county,  and  at  least  2,500  votes  were  cast.  The  only 
authority  for  such  a  proceeding  was  the  clause  in  the  state 
constitution  concerning  elections,  and  all  the  legally  prescribed 
preliminaries  of  a  regular  election  were  wanting.  Nobody  had 
proclaimed  one  except  Governor  Harris.  Johnson  had  remained 
entirely  passive.  There  were  no  county  officers  to  appoint  judges 
of  elections.  It  was  difficult  to  see  how  any  governor  could 
maintain  himself  in  the  state  except  by  the  support  of  the 
bayonets  of  the  army.  Yet  the  Etheridge  party  declared  that 
their  candidate,  General  W.  B.  Campbell,  had  received  all  the 
votes  cast  and  was  legally  chosen  civil  governor,  and  Etheridge 
himself  went  to  Washington,  and  urged  the  president  to  rec 
ognize  and  instate  Campbell.  His  failure  in  this  mission  was 
a  foregone  conclusion.  Campbell's  position  was,  indeed,  ridicu 
lous  ;  and  the  Nashville  Union  even  asserted  that  another  man, 
friendly  to  the  administration,  had  actually  received  several 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         101 

hundred  more  votes  than  Campbell  at  the  abortive  election. 
Probably  there  was  no  way  of  proving  or  disproving  any  state 
ment  that  either  party  cared  to  make.  For  practical  purposes, 
the  episode  only  furnished  unfortunate  evidence  of  the  division 
in  the  ranks  of  the  Unionists  and  so  tended  to  encourage  the 
"neutral"  pro-slavery  people  and  embarrass  the  government.28 

By  the  middle  of  August,  Rosecrans  had  established  a  de 
pendable  line  of  communications  by  repairing  the  railroad  from 
Nashville,  his  depot,  to  Stevenson,  Alabama,  and  was  ready  to 
undertake  the  difficult  movement  from  the  latter  point  against 
Chattanooga.  His  army  proceeded  cautiously  over  and  between 
the  mountain  ridges  which  covered  the  city  and,  by  the  first 
of  September,  his  right  wing  had  reached  Lookout  Mountain 
and  threatened  to  cut  Bragg's  communications  with  the  South. 
Simultaneously,  Burnside  made  his  way  over  the  mountains  from 
Kentucky  into  East  Tennessee,  the  Confederates  under  Buckner 
retiring  before  him.  The  loyal  East  Tennesseeans,  who,  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  had  been  left  to  the  mercy  of  the 
enemy  and  had  paicl  for  their  devotion  to  the  Union  with  their 
property  and  frequently  with  the  risk  of  their  lives,  received 
their  liberators  with  transports  of  joy  and  lavished  upon  officers 
and  soldiers  food  and  clothing  from  their  scanty  store.  On  the 
ist  of  September,  Burnside  occupied  Knoxville,  and,  on  the 
9th,  General  Shackelford  captured  the  entire  Confederate  force 
at  Cumberland  Gap,  with  its  artillery  and  supplies.  The  army 
then  advanced  rapidly  southward  to  cooperate  with  Rosecrans 
and  attack  Chattanooga  from  the  north.  Already,  on  the  8th, 
however,  Bragg  had  realized  his  predicament  and  had  fallen 
back  into  Georgia,  while  Rosecrans  followed  him  closely  through 
the  dangerous  mountain  passes. 

These  successes  filled  Johnson  with  joy.  At  last,  it  seemed, 
the  nerve-racking  alternation  of  bright  hopes  and  sickening  dis 
appointments  was  to  end  in  the  redemption  of  his  state.  Bragg 
had  been  driven  over  the  border;  for  the  first  time  East  Ten 
nessee  was  free.  The  armies  of  the  Confederacy  were  apparently 
in  full  retreat :  it  remained  only  to  attend  to  the  guerillas ;  then, 

28  Nashville  Union,  October  I,  October  4;  Memphis  Argus,  September 
4;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxiii,  7279. 


102  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

in  security  and  confidence,  the  Union  men  would  answer  the 
summons  to  the  polls  and  restoration  would  be  an  accomplished 
fact.  The  secessionists  were  crushed  by  the  disasters  that  had 
befallen  their  arms  and  the  feeling  gained  ground  among  them 
that  their  only  possible  course  was  to  make  the  best  of  an  in 
evitable  situation.  Moderate  Unionists  throughout  the  state 
implored  the  government  to  take  advantage  of  this  reaction  to 
enlist  as  many  Tennesseeans  as  possible  in  the  work  of  recon 
struction.  As  early  as  the  4th  of  August,  the  Nashville  Press 
had  pointed  out  that,  if  only  invariable  loyalists  were  allowed 
to  participate,  probably  not  one-tenth  of  the  former  citizens 
could  qualify,  and  urged  the  inclusion  of  "all  who  are  now 
ready  to  act  with  us,  regardless  of  antecedents."  Otherwise,  it 
observed,  the  Union  party  would  remain  in  a  hopeless  minority 
for  twenty  years. 

Johnson  himself  was  disposed  to  smooth  the  path  for  the  return 
of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  disaffected  to  their  old  allegiance. 
Weight  of  numbers,  he  knew,  was  of  the  utmost  importance  in 
sustaining  the  new  structure  he  proposed  to  erect.  Toward  the 
secession  leaders,  on  the  contrary,  he  was  implacable.  "Many 
humble  men,"  he  said,  "the  peasantry  and  yeomanry  of  the 
South,  who  have  been  decoyed,  or  perhaps  driven  into  the  re 
bellion,  may  look  forward  with  reasonable  hope  for  an  amnesty. 
But  the  intelligent  and  influential  leaders  must  suffer.  The  tall 
poppies  must  be  struck  down/'29  To  moral  reprobation  of  con 
scious,  deliberate  treason  was  added  the  fear  that  the  secessionist 
chiefs,  if  admitted  to  pardon  and  allowed  to  recover  the  rights 
of  citizens,  would,  once  the  army  was  withdrawn,  regain  their 
ascendency  with  the  people  and  use  it  to  depose  the  Union 
leaders  and  visit  them  with  retribution.  "We  wonder,"  re 
marked  the  Nashville  Union,  "how  many  of  the  Union  men  of 
Nashville  would  have  received  an  amnesty,  and  how  many  se 
questrated  Northern  debts  would  have  been  paid,  had  this  plot 
succeeded.  ...  If  treason  be  not  a  crime,  then  strike  the  word 
crime  from  the,  lexicon ;  if  a  traitor  be  not  the  greatest  of  all 
criminals,  and  the  southern  rebel  leaders  the  greatest  of  all 
traitors,  then  let  felons  be  honored  with  an  apotheosis,  and  let 

28  Nashville  Union,  August  25. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         103 

us  canonize  the  names  enrolled  on  the  Newgate  calendar."30 
On  the  5th,  the  Union  published  an  "officially  authorized" 
statement  of  the  governor's  own  policy.  "Governor  Johnson," 
it  declared,  "proposes  issuing  writs  of  election  for  a  legislature, 
at  the  very  earliest  practicable  day;  that  is,  when  the  progress 
of  our  military  operations  is  such  that  loyal  citizens  can  go 
to  the  polls  in  safety,  and  when  sympathizers  of  the  rebellion 
will  no  longer  dare,  backed  by  the  presence  of  Confederate 
troops  and  by  guerilla  terrorism,  to  control  the  policy  of  the 
state.  Regard  will  also  be  had  to  the  disposition  manifested 
by  the  people  to  resume  their  former  privileges  in  the  Federal 
Union.  They  must  indicate  in  some  way  a  desire  to  vote  for 
their  officers,  as  loyal  citizens.  Elections  will  not  be  forced  upon 
them  against  their  will.  .  .  .  The  delay  in  issuing  writs  of 
election  hitherto  has  been,  as  all  intelligent  observers  must  have 
seen,  not  a  matter  of  choice,  but  of  inexorable  and  painful 
necessity.  Practically,  it  has  been  impossible  to  hold  Union 
meetings  of  the  people,  or  go  through  the  form  of  election  in 
one-fifth  of  the  counties  of  Tennessee.  We  doubt  whether  any 
one  of  those  who  have  been  most  urgent  for  holding  elections 
and  restoring  civil  government  would  at  any  time  within  the 
past  twelve  months  have  run  the  risk  of  making  speeches  for 
the  Union  and  against  the  rebel  government  at  any  precinct  ten 
miles  from  a  Federal  encampment.  Throughout  the  state  at 
large  the  loyal  people  are  unorganized,  while  the  ramifications 
of  rebel  organization  extend  everywhere,  in  the  shape  of  cavalry 
bands,  or  guerilla  troops,  organized  for  pillage  and  murder,  or 
such  lodges  as  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle.  .  .  .  Why  issue  a 
writ  of  election  for  a  county,  when  a  guerilla  band  of  from 
twenty  to  fifty  might  visit  every  precinct  in  the  county  on  the 
day  of  election?  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  people,  es 
pecially  all  the  loyal  people,  have  been  disarmed  and  can't  defend 
themselves.  ...  To  invite  the  people  to  vote  for  loyal  can 
didates  under  these  circumstances,  before  the  overthrow  and 
complete  expulsion  of  the  rebel  military  power,  would  be  to 
invite  both  people  and  candidates  to  destruction.  ...  It  is  the 
ardent  desire  of  the  government  that  Tennessee  shall  also  be 

80  Ibid.,  August  26. 


104  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

represented  in  the  national  councils,  as  soon  as  practicable,  and 
writs  of  election  will  be  issued  for  the  purpose  of  electing  con 
gressmen.  It  is  the  intention  also  to  appoint  judges  for  the 
county  and  circuit  courts,  to  hold  office  pro  tempore,  until  their 
successors  can  be  regularly  elected.  In  brief,  it  is  designed  to 
restore  all  the  branches  of  the  state  government,  in  some  cases 
by  temporary  appointment,  and  in  all  cases  by  elections  so 
soon  as  the  condition  of  the  state  will  admit  of  such  a  step." 

Economic  reasons  were  not  lacking  to  reinforce  the  political 
arguments  for  reconstruction.  Save  in  Nashville,  Memphis, 
and  a  few  other  points  relieved  by  the  disbursements  of  the 
occupying  army,  the  people  of  Tennessee  were  in  very  real  dis 
tress.  The  country  had  been  stripped  almost  bare  by  the  con 
tending  forces.  Millions  of  dollars  beyond  the  production  of 
the  last  two  years  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Nashville  Press, 
be  required  to  save  the  people  from  starvation  and  nakedness. 
Since  the  products  of  the  state  had  dwindled  into  insignificance, 
purchasers  of  supplies  had  been  compelled  to  draw  on  their 
reserve  of  capital  and  to  pay  from  it  at  the  advanced  prices 
resulting  from  the  inflation  of  the  currency  and  other  conditions 
brought  on  by  the  war.  The  average  advance  in  prices  in  two 
years  was  estimated  at  one  hundred  per  cent.  The  only  possible 
alleviation  would  come,  thought  the  Press,  through  a  return  to 
loyalty.  Tennessee  would  then  become  the  basis  of  supply  for 
the  Union  army.  As  such,  her  agriculture  and  industries  would 
be  most  carefully  protected  and  "instead  of  being  harried  and 
stripped  as  she  has  been  and  still  is  by  Federal  armies  that 
won't  pay  rebels  and  by  Confederates  that  can't  pay  anybody," 
her  products  would  command  high  prices  in  good  money.31 

On  the  nth  of  August,  General  Hurlbut,  the  Federal  com 
mander  at  Memphis,  expressed  to  Lincoln  his  belief  that  Ten 
nessee  was  prepared  to  adopt  a  fair  system  of  gradual  emanci 
pation  and  return  to  the  Union.  As  soon  as  East  Tennessee 
should  be  liberated  and  able  to  participate  in  the  work,  he  advised 
that  a  legislature  be  elected,  which,  in  turn,  should  call  a 
convention,  and  restoration  could  be  accomplished  in  sixty  days. 
"Then,"  he  comments  with  sober  naivete,  "we  can  use  upon  the 

31  Nashville  Press,  August  7. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         105 

Tennessee  troops  in  Southern  service  the  same  tremendous  lever 
of  state  pride  and  state  authority  which  forced  them  into  hostile 
ranks."32  Hurlbut  did  not  disclose  the  source  of  his  information 
as  to  this  remarkable  prospective  face-about  by  the  West  Ten- 
nesseeans.  He  seems  to  have  shut  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that 
the  real  levers  which  forced  them  into  the  Southern  army — 
personal  conviction  and  an  all  but  unanimous  public  sentiment — 
would  not  be  available  to  force  them  out  again,  even  if  a 
handful  of  citizens  should  succeed  in  going  through  the  forms  of 
a  loyal  election. 

Coincidently  with  the  advance  of  Rosecrans  and  Burnside, 
Charles  A.  Dana,  the  assistant  secretary  of  war,  visited  Tennessee 
to  observe  the  operations  of  the  armies  and  their  effect  on 
political  conditions  in  the  border  states,  and,  on  the  8th  of 
September,  he  had  a  most  interesting  interview  with  Johnson.33 
The  governor  was  greatly  cheered  by  the  aspect  of  affairs,  and 
particularly  by  the  realization  of  his  hopes  for  East  Tennessee. 
There  was  now,  he  thought,  every  prospect  of  a  successful  re 
construction,  and  the  work  was  to  be  pushed.  He  proposed 
promptly  to  appoint  the  judges  and  set  the  courts  in  operation, 
and  to  follow  this  up  by  proclaiming  a  general  election  in  the 
first  week  in  December  for  a  governor  and  other  state  officers, 
a  legislature,  and  members  of  Congress.  Care  would  be  taken 
that  only  loyal  citizens  voted  or  were  candidates  for  office. 
When  the  legislature  assembled,  he  would  urge  on  it  immediate, 
unconditional  emancipation,  both  as  a  moral  obligation  and  as 
an  indispensable  inducement  to  the  immigration  of  the  free  labor 
necessary  to  repeople  the  state  and  develop  its  resources.  In 
his  opinion,  slavery  was,  in  fact,  already  dead  in  Tennessee, 
but  it  was  desirable  to  abolish  it  legally,  and  he  expressed  no 
doubt  that  the  legislature  would  do  so,  though  immediate  eman 
cipation  was  not  certain.  The  great  majority  of  the  people  now 
favored  freeing  the  negro,  but  were  in  doubt  regarding  his  status 
after  he  was  freed.  The  movements  of  the  army,  the  governor 
complained,  were  much  too  slow ;  months  of  precious  time  had 
been  wasted  in  constructing  useless  fortifications.  Rosecrans 

83  O.    R.,    series,    i,    vol.    xxiv,    part    iii,    p.    588. 
93  Ibid.,  vol.  xxx,  part  i,  p.   182. 


106  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

was  a  patriot  at  heart,  but  he  had  fallen  under  bad  influences. 
Truesdail  was  holding  up  the  whole  army  while  he  and  his 
friends  fattened  on  contracts. 

For  some  months,  Johnson  had  'been  in  correspondence  with 
the  president  regarding  the  proper  time  and  method  for  restoring 
the  state.  He  had  visited  Washington  in  the  spring  and  sub 
mitted  to  Lincoln  a  complete  proposition  embodying  his  views 
and  the  results  of  his  experience,  which  the  latter  had  approved.34 
Thus  all  was  in  readiness  for  immediate  action  as  soon  as  a 
decisive  victory  by  Rosecrans  and  Burnside  should  furnish  as 
surance  that  the  Union  occupation  of  the  state  was  to  be  per 
manent.  The  events  of  early  September  were  to  Lincoln  the 
turning  of  the  tide,  so  long  and  painfully  awaited.  On  receiving 
the  news  of  Bragg's  evacuation  of  Chattanooga,  he  telegraphed 
to  Johnson :  "All  Tennessee  is  now  clear  of  armed  insurrec 
tionists.  You  need  not  be  reminded  that  it  is  the  nick  of  time 
for  reinaugu rating  a  loyal  state  government.  Not  a  moment 
should  be  lost.  You  and  the  cooperating  friends  there  can  better 
judge  of  the  way  and  means  than  can  be  judged  by  any  here. 
I  only  offer  a  few  suggestions.  The  reinauguration  must  not  be 
such  as  to  give  control  of  the  state  and  its  representation  in 
Congress  to  the  enemies  of  the  Union,  driving  its  friends  there 
into  political  exile.  The  whole  struggle  for  Tennessee  will  have 
been  profitless  to  both  state  and  nation  if  it  so  ends  that  Gov 
ernor  Johnson  is  put  down  and  Governor  Harris  is  put  up. 
It  must  not  be  so.  You  must  have  it  otherwise.  Let  the  recon 
struction  be  the  work  of  such  men  only  as  can  be  trusted  for 
the  Union.  Exclude  all  others ;  and  trust  that  your  govern 
ment  so  organized  will  be  recognized  here  as  being  the  one  of 
republican  form  to  be  guaranteed  to  the  state,  and  to  be  pro 
tected  against  invasion  and  domestic  violence.  It  is  something 
on  the  question  of  time  to  remember  that  it  cannot  be  known 
who  is  next  to  occupy  the  position  I  now  hold  nor  what  he  will 
do.  I  see  that  you  have  declared  in  favor  of  emancipation  in 
Tennessee,  for  which  may  God  bless  you.  Get  emancipation 
into  your  new  state  government — constitution — and  there  will  be 
no  such  word  as  fail  for  your  case."35 

34  Ibid.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  819 ;  J.  P.  vol.  xxxiv,  7447. 

38  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  789;  Lincoln's  Complete  Works,  vol.  ix,  p.  116. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         107 

These  injunctions  of  Lincoln  have  been  quoted  at  length,  be 
cause  they  are  the  very  best  answer  to  some  of  the  severest 
criticisms  on  Johnson's  acts  in  1864.  Johnson  was  in  complete 
accord  with  the  president,  but,  appreciating  the  gravity  of  the 
step  he  was  about  to  take,  he  requested  a  delegation  of  authority 
directly  from  Lincoln,  under  the  clause  of  the  Federal  Con 
stitution  securing  to  each  state  a  republican  form  of  government, 
to  exercise  all  powers  necessary  for  that  purpose.36  This  he 
promptly  received,  substantially  in  the  terms  he  suggested,  but 
with  two  modifications  which  the  president  designed  to  remove 
every  impediment  to  his  freedom  of  action.  Instead  of  being 
authorized  himself  to  carry  out  the  constitutional  guarantee, 
he  was  empowered  so  to  act  as  to  require  the  government  to 
do  so;  and  a  clause  in  his  original  draft  committing  him  to 
the  ante-bellum  constitution  of  Tennessee  was  dropped  by  Lincoln, 
lest  it  embarrass  a  movement  to  frame  an  entirely  new  con 
stitution.37 

The  machinery  of  agitation  was  at  once  put  in  motion  to 
create  interest  in  the  coming  event.  Mass  meetings  were  held 
in  all  parts  of  the  state.  Johnson  himself  was  a  frequent  and 
forceful  speaker.  His  efforts  were  chiefly  directed  to  showing 
that  the  process  of  reconstruction  was  a  natural  and  painless 
one  and  would  bring  only  good  to  the  people — like  the  restora 
tion  of  the  human  body  from  sickness  to  health.  "Here  lies 
your  state,"  he  said,  "a  sick  man  in  his  bed,  emancipated  and 
exhausted,  paralyzed  in  all  his  powers,  and  unable  to  walk 
alone.  The  physician  conies.  .  .  .  The  United  States  sends  an 
agent,  or  a  military  governor,  whichever  you  please  to  call  him, 
to  aid  you  in  restoring  your  government."  He  outlined  the 
method  the  administration  proposed  to  adopt,  and  declared  that 
only  the  obstinacy  of  the  citizens  prevented  the  immediate  and 
thorough  cure  of  their  sick  state.38 

Without  warning,  all  these  high  hopes  were  dashed  and  the 
Unionists  crushed  back  in  despair — for  again  the  army  failed. 
Rosecrans,  believing  that  Bragg's  reverses  had  completely  de- 

38  O.  R.,  series  Hi,  vol.  iii,  p.  823. 

3(7  Ibid.,  p.  825. 

38  Frank  Moore,  Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  xxix. 


io8  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

moralized  him,  eager,  if  possible,  to  destroy  his  force,  and 
stung,  perhaps,  by  complaints  of  his  former  sluggishness,  pur 
sued  the  Confederates  hotly  through  the  mountains,  dividing 
his  army  to  expedite  his  progress.  Bragg,  however,  was  in  no 
such  straits  as  Rosecrans  supposed.  He  had  his  men  in  hand 
and,  what  was  far  more  important,  he  had  received  Longstreet's 
entire  corps  from  Lee's  army  as  a  reinforcement.  Suddenly 
he  turned  upon  the  pursuing  foe  before  they  could  emerge  from 
the  mountains.  Rosecrans  was  taken  aback  and  his  confidence 
gave  place  to  alarm.  By  desperate  efforts  he  succeeded  in  ex 
tricating  his  army  from  the  immediate  danger  of  being  destroyed 
piecemeal  and,  by  a  retrograde  movement,  concentrated  it  near 
Chickamauga  Creek,  but  he  had  been  shaken  and  unnerved,  the 
elan  of  the  advance  was  gone  and,  when  Bragg  pressed  the 
attack,  he  seemed  bewildered.  A  vaguely  worded  order  opened  a 
gap  in  the  Union  line,  into  which  the  enemy  thrust  themselves, 
smashing  Rosecrans'  whole  right  and  centre  and  scattering  them 
in  confusion.  Only  the  heroic  stand  of  General  Thomas  with 
the  left  averted  a  rout,  and  allowed  the  broken  troops  to  recover 
and  make  good  their  retreat  to  Chattanooga.39  This  victory 
enabled  Bragg  to  detach  Longstreet  to  operate  against  Burn- 
side  and,  by  the  middle  of  November,  the  army  of  the  Ohio 
had  been  driven  out  of  all  the  southern  part  of  East  Tennessee 
and  was  shut  up  in  Knoxville,  short  of  supplies  and  in  the 
gravest  danger.  Most  of  what  had  been  gained  by  the  laborious 
efforts  of  the  summer  was  lost  again,  and  the  president  and 
governor  could  but  resume  their  weary  vigil  and  abandon  any 
idea  of  reconstructing  Tennessee  during  the  immediate  future. 
Nothing  daunted  by  these  disasters,  the  Federal  government 
projected  a  fall  and  winter  campaign  on  a  grander  scale  than 
before.  Rosecrans  was  relieved  and  Thomas  succeeded  him 
in  the  department  of  the  Cumberland.  The  three  departments 
of  Tennessee,  Cumberland,  and  Ohio,  were  placed  under  the 
command  of  General  Grant,  and  with  this  splendid  army  he 
proceeded  to  retrieve  the  Union  cause  by  an  uninterrupted 

"*  Chickamauga  still  provides  material  for  debate  and  recrimination. 
The  latest  work  on  the  subject  is  A.  Grade's  The  Truth  about  Chicka 
mauga. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         109 

series  of  decisive  victories.  The  battles  of  Lookout  Mountain 
(November  24)  and  Missionary  Ridge  (November  25)  at 
last  shattered  Bragg  and  drove  him  in  confusion  into  Georgia; 
and  Sherman,  hastening  to  the  relief  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville, 
compelled  Longstreet,  after  a  last  desperate  attempt  to  take  the 
city  by  storm,  to  retreat  precipitately  into  Virginia  (December). 
The  danger  of  a  permanent  Confederate  occupation  of  Tennessee 
had  finally  disappeared. 


CHAPTER  VII 

PROGRESS  OF  REORGANIZATION 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  war  until  the  first  of  December, 
1863,  the  most  important  factor  in  Tennessee  history  had  been 
the  army.  Governor  Johnson  was  obliged  to  accept  a  subor 
dinate  role,  defer  to  the  military  policy  of  the  generals,  and 
steer  his  course  in  accordance  with  their  successes  and  failures. 
But,  after  that  date,  the  positions  were  reversed.  The  victories 
of  Grant  carried  the  Union  flag  forward  to  other  fields;  the 
process  of  reconstruction  holds  the  centre  of  the  stage  and 
suffers  but  one  serious  interruption — from  the  invasion  of  Hood 
in  November,  1864. 

The  campaigns  of  1863  had  at  last  brought  to  the  front 
generals,  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Thomas,  to  whom  the  president 
was  convinced  he  could  safely  entrust  the  destruction  of  the 
now  tottering  Confederacy,  while  he  devoted  himself  to  the 
grateful  task  of  restoring  the  Union  and  leading  a  reunited  nation 
to  bury  in  oblivion  the  bitterness  engendered  by  civil  strife.  To 
this  he  bent  his  energy  "with  malice  toward  none,  with  charity 
for  all,"  and  his  magnanimous  nature  found  a  happy  relief  in 
turning  from  the  contriving  of  ruin  to  a  labor  of  love. 

Lincoln's  policy  is  embodied  in  his  proclamation  of  amnesty 
and  reconstruction1  of  the  8th  of  December,  1863.  This  familiar 
document  has  been  the  subject  of  such  detailed  examination 
and  discussion  that  only  the  barest  summary  of  its  provisions 
need  be  given  here.  By  virtue  of  the  Constitution  and  the  acts 
of  Congress,  the  president  offered  a  full  pardon  to  all  persons, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  specified  classes,  who  had  par 
ticipated  in  the  rebellion,  and  proposed  to  restore  to  them  all 
their  property  rights,  except  as  to  slaves  and  in  cases  where 
rights  of  third  parties  had  intervened,  on  condition  of  their 
taking  a  solemn  oath  henceforth  faithfully  to  "support,  protect 
and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Union  of  the  states  thereunder"  and  all  acts  of  Congress  and 

1  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1863,  p.  781. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         in 

proclamations  of  the  president  relating  to  slaves  passed  during 
the  war,  so  far  as  these  were  not  modified  by  the  proper  legal  au 
thorities.  Whenever,  in  any  state,  a  number  of  persons,  qualified 
as  voters  in  that  state  under  the  election  laws  in  force  previous 
to  the  act  of  secession  and  equal  to  one-tenth  of  those  voting 
in  the  state  at  the  presidential  election  of  1860,  should,  after 
taking  the  amnesty  oath,  reestablish  a  state  government,  republi 
can  in  character  and  not  in  contravention  of  that  oath,  such 
government  should  be  recognized  as  the  true  government  of  the 
state,  entitled  to  all  the  guarantees  and  protection  promised  by 
the  Constitution. 

So  far  as  Tennessee  was  concerned,  there  was  every  reason 
to  expect  that  a  far  greater  proportion  than  the  required  one- 
tenth  would  participate  in  the  work  of  restoration.  The  mani 
fest  weakening  of  the  Confederacy  and  the  inducements  to  loyalty 
held  out  in  the  conciliatory  messages  and  speeches  of  Lincoln 
and  Johnson  had  produced  among  the  despairing,  war-weary 
population  a  sort  of  latent  Unionism — or  rather,  perhaps,  a  dis 
position  to  acquiesce  in  any  honorable  settlement  that  would 
bring  peace — which  only  awaited  the  absolute  assurance  that 
the  rebellion  was  crushed  in  order  to  declare  itself.  The  pro 
nounced  Unionists  were  pushing  actively  for  reconstruction, 
which  meant  for  them  political  plums  as  well  as  personal  security. 
The  Nashville  council  of  the  Union  League — an  organization 
claiming  to  represent  sixty  thousand  voters,  with  branches 
throughout  the  state,  formed  to  protect  Union  men  and  further 
the  Union  cause — presented  resolutions  to  Johnson  in  November, 
which  were  indorsed  by  several  of  the  allied  councils.2  These 
begged  the  governor  to  declare  null  and  void  all  elections  and 
appointments  that  had  occurred  in  Tennessee,  pronounce  all  civil 
offices  vacant,  and  fill  them  himself  with  unquestioned,  uncon 
ditional  Union  men.  The  officers  of  Davidson  county,  they 
pointed  out,  were  chosen  under  the  rule  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  common  council  of  Nashville  contained  former  well-known 
rebel  sympathizers,  and  two-thirds  of  their  appointees  were  of 
doubtful  loyalty.  Such  men  could  not  be  trusted  to  protect 
the  property  of  the  government  and  its  adherents.  No  election 

2J.   P.,   vol.  xxxviii,  8429. 


ii2  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

should  be  held  until  East  Tennessee  was  free  from  rebel  domina 
tion.  A  final  resolution  laid  down  the  "broad  platform  of  Our 
Country,  let  Our  Country  be  right  or  wrong."  The  council 
of  the  German  members  of  the  league  went  even  further.  They 
indicted  slavery  as  "contrary  to  reason  and  repulsive  to  hu 
manity,"  "based  on  compromise  and  by  no  means  on  divine  or 
human  right,"  and  degrading  to  labor,  declared  that  its  abolition 
would  bring  prosperity  and  happiness  to  the  South,  and  favored 
the  continuation  of  Johnson's  government  until  the  people  had 
given  ample  proof  of  their  loyalty  and  were  ready  to  incorporate 
a  prohibition  of  slavery  in  their  constitution.3 

On  the  other  hand,  a  mass  meeting  at  Memphis,  on  the  26th 
of  December,  petitioned  for  the  speedy  establishment  of  civil 
government  in  accordance  with  Lincoln's  proclamation.  On 
those  terms,  they  believed,  two-thirds  of  the  remaining  resi 
dents  of  Memphis  and  half  those  of  the  rural  sections  of  the 
same  congressional  district  would  favor  restoration.  They  sug 
gested  that  the  administering  of  the  oath,  the  registration  of 
those  taking  it,  and  the  election  of  delegates  to  a  convention 
should  all  occur  simultaneously,  and  if  the  total  vote  reached 
the  necessary  tenth,  the  convention  could  assemble  without 
delay.4  From  Knoxville  came  requests  for  the  institution  of  a 
Federal  court  to  try  political  offences  an"d  violations  of  the 
treasury  regulations  and  compensate  Unionist  creditors  out  of 
enemies'  property  still  available  for  that  purpose,  but  being 
rapidly  destroyed  or  carried  away.5  Thomas,  from  Chattanooga, 
assured  the  governor  that  the  revival  of  civil  authority  would 
restore  confidence  and  reinforce  the  Unionists  by  many  who 
still  delayed,  uncertain  of  the  intentions  of  the  government.6 
About  the  middle  of  January,  1864,  Lincoln  sent  to  Tennessee, 
as  he  already  had  to  other  states,  an  agent  with  blanks  and 
instructions  to  enroll  citizens  who  would  take  the  oatE.7 

Two  difficulties  in  connection  with  the  oath  arose  to  perplex 

3  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxvii,  8160. 

*Ibid.,  vol.  xxxviii,  8296. 

6  IbicT,  8455,  8499. 

*  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxii,  part  ii,  p.  64. 

7Nicholay  and  Hay,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  v5ii,  p.  443. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         113 

Johnson.  The  first,  as  to  the  proper  officers  to  administer  it, 
was  promptly  resolved  by  the  president's  explanation  that  this 
might  be  done  by  the  military  governor,  the  commander  of  the 
department,  and  "all  persons  designated  by  them  for  that  pur 
pose."8  A  second  complication  was  far  more  serious.  A  decided 
objection  to  taking  the  oath  at  all  developed  among  those  who 
had  been  unswerving  Unionists  from  the  beginning,  on  the 
ground  that  such  a  requirement  implied  a  doubt  as  to  their 
notorious  loyalty  and  placed  them  in  the  same  category  with 
repentant  rebels.9  Lincoln,  however,  was  explicit  that  the  oath 
should  be  taken  by  loyal  as  well  as  disloyal.  "It  does  not  hurt 
them,"  he  said,  "clears  all  question  as  to  the  right  to  vote,  and 
swells  the  aggregate  number  who  take  it,  which  is  an  important 
object."10  From  this  statement  it  appears  that  Lincoln  originally 
intended  subscription  to  his  oath  to  carry  with  it  the  franchise. 
Such  was  certainly  the  general  view  at  the  time,  and,  on  that 
assumption,  General  S.  P.  Carter  had  suggested  that  the  de 
mands  of  the  "notorious  Unionists"  for  a  sharp  distinction  be 
tween  them  and  the  disloyalists  who  had  recovered  the  ballot 
with  amnesty  be  met  by  dividing  the  oath-takers  into  two 
separate  lists — a  loyal  men's  record  and  a  disloyal  men's  record — 
the  former  to  constitute  a  roll  of  honor  from  which  the  names  of 
those  against  whom  any  defection  from  allegiance  could  be 
shown  should  be  excluded.11 

With  Johnson,  vindictive  by  nature  and  worn  out  and  aggra 
vated  by  two  years  of  constant  futile  attempts  to  make  some 
impression  upon  the  stubborn  inertia  of  a  population  always 
disloyal  at  heart,  the  magnanimous  views  of  Lincoln  found  little 
sympathy.  Before  the  middle  of  January,  in  a  letter  to  Horace 
Maynard  intended  for  the  president's  eye,  he  had  expressed  his 
opinion  that  the  voters  "should  be  put  to  the  severest  test."12 
His  contention,  as  stated  by  the  Nashville  Union,  was  that  the 

8  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  pp.  31,  46;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxix,  8521. 

9  Nicholay  and  Hay,  Life  of  Lincoln,  vol.  viii,  p.  444;  Nashville  Union, 
January  2,  1864. 

10  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv%  p.  46. 

11  Nashville  Union,  February  16. 
13  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  p.  31. 


ii4  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

amnesty  oath  should  be  regarded  simply  as  securing  a  pardon  for 
traitors  who  desired  it;  "one  who  takes  it  sets  himself  right 
again  with  lawful  authority."13  By  no  means  all  who  were  ad 
mitted  to  it  should,  by  that  act  alone,  gain  the  ballot.  The 
clamor  of  the  loyalists  against  -being  classed  indiscriminately 
with  newly  returned  prodigals  afforded  him  a  chance  to  advance 
a  new  proposition  in  accord  with  his  own  ideas — that  a  second 
and  more  stringent  oath  be  required  of  voters,  which  should 
at  once  distinguish  them  from  those  who,  though  not  whole 
heartedly  regenerate,  had  gained  amnesty,  and  should  bind  them 
unequivocally  and  actively 'to  the  Union  party. 

Once  determined  upon  the  course  to  be  pursued,  he  lost  no 
time  in  setting  to  work.  Presumably  at  his  instigation,  a  mass 
meeting  assembled  at  the  capitol  in  Nashville  on  the  2ist  of 
January,  to  give  the  initial  impulse  to  the  reconstruction  move 
ment.  It  was  addressed  by  the  governor  in  a  speech  14  which, 
though  alleged  to  be  extemporaneous,  gives  every  evidence  of 
being  most  carefully  prepared  to  measure  up  to  a  great  occasion, 
of  the  momentous  importance  of  which  the  author  was  fully 
aware.  In  any  case,  it  is  the  ablest,  most  elaborate,  and  most 
impressive  effort  made  by  him  during  his  entire  term  as  gov 
ernor,  presenting  a  complete  epitome  of  his  political  principles, 
motives,  and  projects,  and  indicating  to  the  people  the  proper 
path  to  be  followed  for  the  redemption  of  the  state. 

He  begins  with  a  reiteration  of  his  favorite  theory  that 
Tennessee  has  never  been  out  of  the  Union.  Its  functions 
"have  only  been  paralyzed — its  powers  are  only  remaining  in 
active."  The  president,  "in  the  exercise  of  his  constitutional 
obligations,  may  appear  in  the  state  of  Tennessee  in  the  person 
of  an  agent"  and  restore  to  the  people  a  republican  form  of 
government.  Since  the  functions  of  the  government  are  sus 
pended,  the  president's  agent  "supplies  the  vacuum."  "Is  there 
anything  outside  of  the  principles  of  the  Constitution  in  that? 
Is  there  any  usurpation  in  it?  There  must  be  a  beginning 

M  Nashville  Union,  January  2. 

14  Speech  of  Governor  Andrew  Johnson  on  the  Restoration  of  State 
Government,  pamphlet,  Library  of  Congress.  For  the  sake  of  clearness, 
I  have  slightly  changed  the  order  of  sentences. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         115 

somewhere.  In  the  absence  of  government  there  must  be  steps 
taken,  though  they  may  be  irregular,  for  the  purpose  of  bring 
ing  back  order.  .  .  .  In  turning  to  the  laws  and  Constitution  of 
the  state  we  find  that  when  vacancies  occur  by  death,  resigna 
tion,  or  otherwise,  the  executive  shall  make  lemporary  appoint 
ments,  and  these  appointees  shall  hold  their  places  until  their 
successors  are  elected  and  qualified.  Then  we  see  how  easy 
the  process  is.  Begin  at  the  foundation,  elect  the  lower  officers, 
and,  step  by  step,  put  the  government  in  motion.  ...  If  it 
is  done  in  a  half  dozen  counties,  it  is  so  much  done,  and  that 
much  done  we  can  do  more." 

Turning  to  the  vexed  question  of  the  proper  persons  to 
participate  in  the  active  work  of  reconstruction,  the  governor 
prefaces  his  discussion  with  the  assumption  that  every  individual 
engaged  in  the  rebellion  "has  been,  by  his  own  act,  expatriated." 
"Shall  we  lay  down  a  rule  which  prohibits  all  restoration?  .  .  . 
It  is  easy  to  talk  that  rebels  shall  not  vote  and  Union  men 
may,  but  it  is  difficult  to  practice  this  thing.  .  .  .  We  want 
some  standard  by  which  we  can  put  him  that  has  been  a  traitor 
to  the  test,  though  he  has  repented.  .  .  .  We  are  told  upon 
pretty  high  authority  that  sinners  sometimes  repent;  and  we 
are  told  that  in  this  repentance  there  should  be  works  meet 
for  repentance — there  should  be  some  evidence  of  it  ...  I 
know  it  has  been  said  by  some  Union  men  that  we  should  not 
be  placed  in  the  attitude  of  culprits — of  men  asking  for  par 
don.  .  .  .  But  in  the  election  of  officers  who  are  to  take  charge 
of  the  government  we  want  some  test,  at  least,  that  the  men 
who  vote  are  loyal  and  will  act  with  Union  men.  .  .  .  We 
want  a  hard  oath — a  tight  oath — as  a  qualification  for  every 
body  that  votes.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  anybody 
in  this  large  assembly  of  voters  who  needs  or  desires  a  pardon 
or  amnesty,  whether  he  seeks  it  in  good  faith  or  for  the  purpose 
of  saving  a  little  negro  or  any  other  property,  I  would  say  to 
him,  'Go  over  there;  there  is  an  altar  for  you.  There  is  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  altar,  if  you  want  pardon  or  amnesty — if  petition 
ing  to  the  president  for  executive  clemency.  If  you  want  to  es 
cape  the  penalties  you  have  incurred  by  violations  of  law  and 
the  Constitution,  go  over  there  and  get  your  pardon.  We  are 


n6  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

not  in  need  of  it;  we  wish  not  to  take  that  oath;  that  is  the 
oath  for  him  who  has  committed  crime.' '' 

After  the  local  machinery  in  the  counties  shall  have  been 
put  in  operation,  the  governor  continues,  the  people  have  to 
consider  the  best  means  for  reestablishing  the  central  govern 
ment  of  the  state.  Here  also  he  has  no  doubt  as  to  the  proper 
course.  "To  carry  out  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  Constitution, 
as  the  people  are  the  rightful  source  of  political  power,  I 
should  say  the  executive  would  have  the  right  to  invite  the 
people  to  have  a  convention  to  restore  government  to  the  peo 
ple.  .  .  .  We  find  in  the  constitution  of  this  state  that  you 
can  amend  the  constitution  by  the  legislature,  but  it  takes  six 
years  to  amend  it  in  that  way.  But  when  we  recur  to  the  bill 
of  rights,  which  is  a  paramount  part  of  our  state  constitution, 
we  find  that  the  sovereign  people  have  the  right  to  alter,  amend, 
or  abolish  their  form  of  government  whenever  they  think  proper, 
and  in  their  own  way.  This  is  perfectly  consonant  to  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  and  admits  tHe 'great  principle 
that  all  political  power  is  inherent  in  the  people.  ...  In  other 
words,  let  us  have  the  sovereign  present  in  the  shape  of  dele 
gates.  .  .  .  Some  that  have  been  nominally  Union  men,  and 
some  that  have  been  rebels  .  .  ,  turn  to  the  constitution  as 
it  now  stands  and  say,  let  us  get  the  legislature  back  here ; 
let  us  patch  up  things  and  have  no  fuss.  They  think  61  that 
little  clause  in  our  constitution  which  provides  that  the  legis 
lature  shall  not  emancipate  slaves  without  the  consent  of  their 
owners.  Don't  you  see?  Then  if  they  get  the  legislature  Back 
under  the  constitution  as  it  is,  they  think  they  can  hold  on  to 
the  little  remnant  of  negroes  that  is  left — the  disturbing  element 
that  has  produced  all  this  war.  .  .  .  Let  us  have  the  people 
here,  and  when  they  assemble  in  convention,  when  the  sovereign 
is  present,  he  can  do  all  that  the  legislature  can,  and  he  can 
do  a  great  deal  more.  .  .  .  Let  the  people  come  forward  and 
speak,  and  in  speaking  upon  the  negro  question,  my  honest 
convictions  are  that  they  will  settle  it,  and  settle  it  finally.  .  .  , 

"The  rebels  commenced  the  destruction  of  the  government 
for  the  preservation  of  slavery,  and  the  government  is  putting 
down  the  rebellion,  and  in  the  preservation  of  its  own  existence 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         117 

has  put  slavery  down,  justly  and  rightfully,  and  upon  correct 
principles.  .  .  .1  have  had  some  come  to  me  and  say,  'Governor 
Johnson,  are  you  in  favor  of  immediate  emancipation?'  I  tell 
them  yes.  'Do  you  want  to  turn  the  negroes  all  loose  upon 
the  country?  What  will  we  do  with  them?'  Why,  sir,  I  reply, 
as  far  as  emancipation  is  concerned,  that  has  already  taken 
place.  Where  are  your  negroes?  They  answer,  'They  are  run 
ning  about  somewhere/  I  ask,  what  do  you  call  that?  They 
seem  to  be  already  turned  loose.  The  institution  of  slavery 
is  turned  into  a  traveling  institution,  and  goes  just  where  it 
pleases.  It  is  said  that  the  negroes  are  not  qualified  to  be  free; 
because  they  have  been  slaves  so  long,  they  are  unfitted  to  be 
freemen,  and  shall  not  be  permitted  to  enjoy  the  privileges  of 
freemen;  but  by  way  of  making  them  competent,  it  is  proposed 
to  keep  them  in  slavery  nineteen  or  twenty  years  longer.  In 
the  first  place,  it  would  not  do  to  have  them  free,  because  they 
have  been  slaves,  and,  in  the  next  place,  they  should  be  kept  in 
slavery  to  qualify  them  for  freemen.  ...  In  fact,  negroes  are 
emancipated  in  Tennessee  to-day,  and  the  only  remaining  ques 
tion  for  us  to  settle,  as  prudent  and  wise  men,  is  in  assigning  the 
negro  his  new  relation.  Now,  what  will  that  be?  ...  The 
negro  will  be  thrown  upon  society,  governed  by  the  same  laws 
that  govern  communities,  and  be  compelled  to  fall  back  upon 
his  own  resources,  as  all  other  human  beings  are.  .  .  .  Political 
freedom  means  liberty  to  work,  and  at  the  same  time  enjoy 
the  product  of  one's  labor.  ...  If  he  can  rise  by  his  own 
energies,  in  the  name  of  God  let  him  rise.  In  saying  this,  I  do 
not  argue  that  the  negro  race  is  equal  to  the  Anglo-Saxon.  .  .  . 
If  the  negro  is  better  fitted  for  the  inferior  condition  of  society, 
the  laws  of  nature  will  assign  him  there.  ...  If  there  are  any 
here  who  have  lived  in  the  county  of  Davidson,  you  know 
many  men  have  been  afraid  and  alarmed  even  to  speak  upon 
the  negro  question  when  the  large  slave-holders  were  about. 
Some  of  you  Have  been  deprived  of  your  manhood  so  long 
upon  this  question,  that  when  you  begin  to  talk  about  it  now, 
you  look  around  to  see  if  you  are  not  overheard  by  some  of 
your  old  masters.  .  .  . 

"There  are  men  owning  slaves  themselves  that  will  be  emanci- 


n8  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

pa  ted  by  this  operation.  It  is  not  my  devotion  to  the  black 
man  alone,  but  a  greater  devotion  to  the  white  men  and  the 
amelioration  of  their  condition.  ...  If  you  cut  up  these  large 
cotton  farms  into  small-sized  farms,  each  man  with  his  little 
family  getting  hold  of  part  of  it,  on  good  land  will  raise  his 
own  hogs,  his  own  sheep,  beef-cattle,  his  own  grain,  and  a 
few  bales  of  cotton,  better  handled  and  a  much  better  article 
than  we  have  ever  had  heretofore.  With  a  greater  number  of 
individuals,  each  making  a  few  bales,  we  will  have  more  bales 
than  ever  were  made  before." 

The  meeting,  completely  in  the  hands  of  the  governor,  passed 
resolutions  in  full  accord  with  his  desires  and  requested  him  to 
call  a  constitutional  convention  whenever,  in  his  judgment,  the 
state  might  be  represented  from  all  its  parts.  Declaring  that  the 
rebellion  had  laid  waste  the  state,  prostrated  its  civil  institutions, 
and  brought  death,  anarchy,  crime,  and  ruin  upon  the  people, 
and  that  slavery  was  the  cause  of  all  this  evil,  "an  unmitigated 
evil  in  itself/'  and  already  "dead  by  the  acts  of  its  own  friends," 
it  pledged  itself  to  labor  for  the  election  of  delegates  to  the 
convention  who  favored  "immediate  and  universal  emancipation 
now  and  forever."15  Messages  from  other  parts  of  the  state 
reached  Johnson,  praising  his  speech  and  the  sentiment  of  the 
meeting  and  urging  him  to  act  promptly  in  accord  with  his 
opinions. 

Thus  encouraged,  the  governor  proceeded  to  inaugurate  the 
process  he  had  outlined.  On  the  26th  of  January,  he  issued  a 
proclamation16  for  an  election  on  the  'first  Saturday  in  March 
for  county  officers — justices  of  the  peace,  sheriffs,  constables, 
trustees,  circuit  and  county  court  clerks,  registers  and  tax- 
collectors.  Inasmuch  as  this  election  is  to  be  held  in  a  state 
of  the  Union  under  the  Federal  Constitution,  the  proclamation 
asserts,  "it  is  not  expected  that  the  enemies  of  the  United  States 
will  propose  to  vote,  nor  is  it  intended  that  they  be  permitted  to 
vote,  or  hold  office."17  Therefore,  to  be  entitled  to  the  franchise, 

13  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  viii,  doc.  358. 

1(5  Ibid.,  doc.  340;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxix,  8655. 

17  "Thus  to  invoke  the  Constitution  was  like  Satan  quoting  Scripture." 
Jefferson  Davis,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,  vol  ii, 
p.  287. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         119 

the  would-be  voter  must,  besides  satisfying  the  requirements  of 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  state  in  force  previous  to  the 
act  of  secession,  subscribe  to  the  following  stringent  oath: 
"I  solemnly  swear  that  I  will  henceforth  support  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States  and  defend  it  against  the  assaults 
of  all  its  enemies;  that  I  will  henceforth  be  and  conduct  my 
self  as  a  true  and  faithful  citizen  of  the  United  States,  freely 
and  voluntarily  claiming  to  be  subject  to  all  the  duties  and 
obligations,  and  entitled  to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
such  citizenship;  that  I  ardently  desire  the  suppression  of  the 
present  insurrection  and  rebellion  against  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  the  success  of  its  armies  and  the  defeat 
of  all  those  who  oppose  them,  and  that  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  and  all  laws  and  proclamations  made  in  pur 
suance  thereof,  may  be  speedily  and  permanently  established 
and  enforced  over  all  the  people,  states,  and  territories  thereof ; 
and  further,  that  I  will  hereafter  aid  and  assist  all  loyal  people 
in  the  accomplishment  of  all  these  results.  So  help  me  God."18 

All  judges  and  officers  holding  the  elections  were  to  take  still 
another  oath19  to  permit  none  to  vote  who  had  not  satisfied 
the  requirements  of  the  proclamation.  The  elections  were  to 
be  conducted  under  the  code  of  Tennessee,  which  provided 
that  the  inspectors  and  judges  of  elections  should  be  appointed 
by  the  county  court.  If  the  court  did  not  or  could  not  perform 
that  duty,  it  might  be  done  by  the  sheriff,  with  the  advice  of 
three  justices  of  the  peace;  or,  failing  them,  by  any  justice  of 
the  peace;  or,  failing  him,  by  any  three  freeholders.  Since, 
in  many  counties,  no  loyal  county  officers  existed,  the  governor 
affirmed  that  he  would  designate  citizens  to  appoint  the  inspectors 
and  judges  in  those  counties. 

The  exaction  of  such  an  oath  served  notice  on  the  former 
secessionists  that  only  by  a  complete  change  of  heart  or  by 
false  swearing  could  they  obtain  a  voice  in  the  counsels  of 
the  government.  Assurances  of  future  loyalty  and  acquiescence 
in,  the  accomplished  results  of  the  war — the  only  conditions  in 
Lincoln's  wise  and  generous  offer — were  now  by  no  means 

18  Moore,  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  viii,  doc.  .340;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxix,  8655. 
"  Ibid. 


120  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

enough.  The  restored  citizen  must  "ardently  desire"  and  ac 
tually  assist  in  the  suppression  of  his  former  secessionist  kins 
men  and  friends  and  the  reestablishment  over  them  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  laws  they  hated,  against  which  they  had  taken 
arms,  and  for  the  overthrow  of  which  they  were  still  contending. 
In  February,  Maynard,  the  attorney-general,  threw  another 
bomb  among  the  amnestied  disloyalists  by  deciding  that  since 
citizenship,  forfeited  by  rebellion,  could  be  regained  only  by 
subscribing  to  the  amnesty  oath,  and  the  state  constitution,  under 
which  the  election  was  to  be  held,  restricted  the  ballot  to  those 
who  had  been  citizens  for  six  months,  no  person  who  had 
ever  been  guilty  of  a  disloyal  act  could  vote  until  six  months 
after  taking  the  oath.20 

Subjected  to  these  tests,  the  ardor  for  reconstruction  cooled. 
To  many  judicious  Union  men  it  seemed  that  Johnson  was 
going  too  far  and,  by  unnecessary  severity,  was  defeating  his 
own  purpose.  The  president  was  besieged  with  protests  against 
the  new  oath,  but  his  confidence  in  Johnson's  ability  and  under 
standing  of  the  peculiar  conditions  to  be  dealt  with  in  Ten 
nessee  decided  him,  as  always,  to  allow  the  governor  loose 
rein.  He  must,  Lincoln  told  Maynard,  who  had  expressed  to 
him  apprehensions,  be  permitted  to  proceed  in  accordance  with 
his  own  judgment,  but  he  need  not  be  expected  to  deviate  to 
any  ruinous  extent  from  the  president's  plan,  and  a  hasty 
perusal  of  his  program  had  revealed  no  such  deviation.21 
Ruinous  the  deviation,  as  it  proved,  was  not;  but  that  it  was 
a  deviation  of  the  most  radical  character,  the  president  could 
hardly  have  pretended  to  deny.  Obviously,  however,  those  who 
had  hoped  that  a  mortifying  rebuke  and  the  overruling  of  his 
arbitrary  action  were  in  store  for  Johnson  were  to  be  disappointed. 
To  an  inquiry  as  to  whether  the  election  officers  could  dispense 
with  the  governor's  oath  and  administer  only  the  amnesty  oath 
to  voters,22  Lincoln  replied:  "In  county  elections  you  had  better 
stand  by  Governor  Johnson's  plan ;  otherwise  you  will  have 
conflict  and  confusion."23  In  a  later  and  more  detailed  commu- 

20  Nashville,  Dispatch,  February  12. 

21  Nicholay    and    Hay,    Life    of    Lincoln,    vol.    viii,    p.    /m. 

22  J.  P.,  vol.  xl,  8894;  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1864,  p.  763. 

23  J.  P.,  vol.  xl,  8893- 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         121 

nication  to  Secretary  East,  he  declared  that  no  conflict  existed 
between  the  two  oaths,  and  that  no  person  who  had  taken  one 
to  secure  a  pardon  should  object  to  taking  the  other  as  a  test 
of  loyalty.  "I  have  seen  and  examined  Governor  Johnson's 
proclamation/'  he  said,  "and  am  entirely  satisfied  with  his  plan; 
which  is  to  restore  the  state  government  and  place  it  under 
the  control  of  citizens  truly  loyal  to  the  government  of  the 
United  States."24 

If  Lincoln  was  not  disposed  to  place  obstacles  in  the  gov 
ernor's  way,  the  people  of  Tennessee  were.  His  overbearing 
egotism,  inability  to  conciliate,  and  determination  to  carry  out  his 
own  ideas  without  variation  or  concession  aroused  against  him 
a  powerful,  resolute  opposition,  which  drew  support  from  many 
sources.  Many  who  were  diplomatically  silent  in  public,  worked 
secretly  to  undermine  him  and  destroy  his  influence.  A  call 
was  circulated  in  Memphis  (February)  for  a  meeting  of  con 
servative  Unionists,  at  which  it  was  planned  formally  to  condemn 
the  oath  as  exceeding  the  governor's  authority  and  out  of  har 
mony  with  the  president's  policy,  but  the  Johnson  party  suspected 
its  purpose,  attended  in  a  body,  and  succeeded  in  substituting 
resolutions  indorsing  his  course.25  Others,  who  shrank  from 
actually  denouncing  the  oath,  busied  themselves  with  devices 
for  getting  around  it.  A  favorite  line  of  reasoning  was  that 
the  governor  had  no  right  to  prescribe  any  oath  to  the  people; 
therefore  the  whole  proceeding  was  void,  and  a  person  might 
take  the  oath,  which  had  no  legal  sanction,  without  actually 
swearing  at  all.  The  Nashville  Press,  which  had  once  warmly 
supported  Johnson,  but  had  become  disgusted  and  alienated  by 
his  arbitrary  methods,  advocated  this  subterfuge.  "If  this  course 
of  reasoning  should  be  generally  adopted  and  acted  out,"  it 
commented  cynically,  "we  don't  see  how  the  governor  can  manage 
to  checkmate  the  move.  He  may  construct  a  new  or  additional 
oath — he  may  even  require  folks  to  swear  that  they  love  him 
for  his  candor  and  humanity  and  disinterested  patriotism,  and 
'ardently  desire'  that  he  shall  be  perpetual  dictator  of  Ten 
nessee — they  can  still  take  it  in  the  same  sense  they  offer  to 

MIbid,  vol.  xli,  8956;  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  p.  141. 
2(1  J.  P.,  vol.  xl,  8847. 


122  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

the  other — the  sense  of  void  nothingless."26  Even  the  Confederate 
cavalry  leader,  Richardson,  advised  his  friends  to  "take  any 
oath  that  the  Federals  may  prescribe,  but  to  see  to  it  and 
control  the  election  at  all  hazards."27  That  these  suggestions 
were  largely  followed  was  the  conviction  of  the  Nashville  Union, 
which,  during  the  following  summer,  alleged  that  hundreds  who 
had  taken  both  oaths  were  clandestinely  corresponding  with  men 
in  the  Confederate  army  and  sending  them  information  and  sup 
plies.28  Similar  arguments  were  brought  to  bear  to  induce  the 
Union  soldiers  to  desert,  on  the  ground  that  their  enlistments 
were  no  longer  binding,  since  the  war  was  now  carried  on  not 
for  the  Union,  as  they  had  been  told,  but  for  the  emancipation 
of  the  slaves.29 

More  irregularities  followed  in  various  parts  of  the  state. 
In  fact,  the  sole  animating  purpose  of  the  administration  party 
seemed  to  be  to  prevent,  by  hook  or  crook,  the  election  scheduled 
for  the  5th  of  March  from  degenerating  into  a  humiliating  fiasco, 
For  example,  a  rally  was  held  in  Nashville  on  the  3d,  to  ratify 
nominations  for  county  officers  made  by  certain  "unconditional 
Union  men"  the  previous  evening.  This  done,  the  meeting,  by 
what  authority  does  not  appear,  appointed  a  committee  to  ascer 
tain  who  were  entitled  to  vote  at  the  coming  election  and  to 
"instruct  the  judges  accordingly."  The  committee  reported  that 
quartermasters  and  their  clerks  and  all  soldiers  and  government 
employees  who  had  been  residents  of  the  county  for  six  months 
were  voters  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  en 
tirely  ignoring  a  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  state 
which  construed  the  six  months  requirement  to  mean  a  fixed, 
permanent  residence  extending  over  that  period.  The  Union 
pertinently  asked:  "Did  ever 'a  vigilance  committee  assume  more 
authority  than  this  meeting?"30  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the 
situation  in  other  parts  of  the  state  was,  to  say  the  least,  no 
better  than  at  Nashville. 

*  Nashville  Press,  February  28,  1864. 

27  J.    P.,   vol.   xl,   8847. 

28  Nashville  Union,  August  14 
»  Ibid. 

*  Ibid.,  March  3. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         123 

Under  such  conditions,  the  election  of  the  5th  could  only  be 
"a  serious  farce."31  The  total  vote  was  perhaps  between  forty 
and  fifty  thousand.  Accuracy  is  impossible,  because  the  officers 
of  some  counties  simply  forwarded  certificates  of  election,  with 
out  giving  the  number  of  votes  cast.  The  omission  is  unim 
portant,  however,  for,  considering  the  character  of  the  electorate, 
precise  results  have  no  significance.  In  some  districts,  no  polls 
were  opened  at  all.32  Four  days  before  the  election,  Colonel 
J.  B.  Dorr  reported  that  he  could  not  find  a  citizen  of  Humphries 
county  with  manhood  enough  to  accept  an  appointment  to  hold 
an  election  there.33  In  Shelby  county,  the  scandal  was  so  great 
that  the  governor  felt  compelled  to  declare  the  election  void  for 
most  of  the  offices  and  order  another  on  the  i6th  of  June.34 
Many  Union  citizens  throughout  the  state  refused  to  vote,  on 
the  ground  that  the  proceedings  were  fully  as  irregular  as  those 
of  the  secessionists  in  1861,  and  that  they  would  not  "compliment 
the  devil  by  adopting  his  programme."35  The  ultra-loyalists  of 
East  Tennessee  withheld  their  support,  insisting  that  they  should 
not  be  required  to  take  any  kind  of  oath.  The  tendency  of 
the  soldiers  was  to  vote  in  cliques,  under  manipulation.  It  was 
estimated  that,  had  the  amnesty  oath  been  the  only  test,  the 
vote  would  have  been  nearly  doubled.36  The  practical  result  of 
the  election  was  to  provide  officers  for  about  two-thirds  of  the 
counties  of  the  state,  but  the  whole  affair  brought  no  credit  to 
its  instigators  and  placed  the  government  in  a  weak  and  equivocal 
position  before  the  people.87  Johnson  himself  suffered  particularly 
in  his  personal  prestige.  The  Memphis  Argus  asserted  that  the 
failure  of  reconstruction  in  Tennessee  was  chargeable  not  to  the 
people,  but  to  the  governor  and  his  radical  adherents,  who  de 
manded  an  exact  compliance  "with  their  own  ideas  and  isms." 
The  Argus  urged  the  people  to  disregard  Johnson  and  take  up 
the  work  themselves.  As  long  as  they  allowed  him  to  have 

31  Ibid. 

32  Ibid.,  March  8. 
38  Ibid.,  March  23. 

*J.  P.,  vol.  xli,  8986. 

36  Nashville    Union,   March    10. 

36  Ibid.,  March  8. 

37  Ibid.,  March   n,  March  23;   Knoxville   Whig,  March   12. 


124  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

his  own  way,  so  long  would  he  "thwart  every  effort  at  reorganiza 
tion  which  did  not  originate  with  him."38 

The  storm  of  abuse  to  which  he  was  subjected  only  steeled 
Johnson's  resolution.  His  dispatches  to  Lincoln  express  neither 
disappointment  nor  uncertainty;  on  the  contrary,  he  asserts  his 
determination  to  carry  on  the  work  of  restoration  exactly  in 
accordance  with  the  plan  already  outlined  by  him — forcing  a 
convention  and  immediate  emancipation,  if  necessary,  down  the 
very  throats  of  the  protesting  conservatives.  His  organ,  the 
Times,  denounced  his  opponents  who  were  pressing  for  speedy 
reconstruction  by  a  legislature  as  aiming,  while  posing  as  cham 
pions  of  constitutionality,  to  save  slavery  by  avoiding  a  con 
vention  of  the  people;  the  governor,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
intent  on  applying  directly  to  the  people  to  kill  and  bury  the 
institution,  which  he  maintained  they  would  surely  do.  "There 
is  but  one  rope  left  unsevered  which  fastens  Tennessee  to-day  to 
the  pirate-ship  of  rebellion.  That  rope  is  slavery,  and  it  must 
be  cut  instantly."39 

The  serious  discord  which  had  developed  in  East  Tennessee 
during  the  March  elections  impelled  Johnson  to  concentrate  his 
efforts  upon  that  stronghold  of  Union  sentiment,  for  the  purpose 
of  lining  up  a  solid  loyal  party  in  support  of  his  policy.  The 
district  was  again  in  the  extremities  of  distress.  The  armies 
of  Buckner,  Burnside,  Longstreet,  and  Sherman  had  lived  off 
it  during  the  preceding  fall  and  winter,  and  the  little  they  had 
left  had  been  gobbled  up  by  Morgan  and  Wheeler.  Considerably 
more  than  half  the  loyal  voting  population  had  either  fled  north 
or  was  in  the  Union  army.  It  was  estimated  that  less  than 
five  per  cent,  of  the  usual  breadth  of  wheat  could  be  sown  in 
the  spring  of  1864.  Fences  were  down,  barns  destroyed,  the  live 
stock  had  largely  disappeared.  Contributions  from  the  North 
were  inadequate  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  people.  Under 
stress  of  three  years  of  suffering  and  neighbor-warfare,  a  feeling 
of  fierce  hatred  had  sprung  up  between  loyalists  and  secessionists, 
which  had  no  counterpart  in  1861.  The  old  Union  leaders,  whose 
conciliatory  spirit  had  colored  the  resolutions  of  the  Greenville 

38  Quoted  by  Nashville  Union,  April  6. 

39  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  March  24,  April  26. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         125 

convention,  had  now  to  deal  with  a  party  of  relentlessly  vindictive 
young  men — Union  soldiers,  partisan  fighters,  and  refugees — who 
had  felt  the  mercilessness  of  the  war  in  their  persons,  their 
families,  and  their  property,  and  were  determined  that  their 
enemies  should  have  their  full  meed  of  retribution.  This  party 
naturally  attached  itself  to  Johnson  and  took  its  stand  upon  the 
principle — no  concessions  to  traitors. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Greenville  convention,  on 
its  adjournment  in  May,  1861,  had  authorized  its  president  to 
reassemble  it  whenever  conditions  required  further  action.  John 
son  had  thus  a  machine  ready  at  hand  to  inaugurate  his  project 
and  affording  him  the  opportunity — grateful,  doubtless,  in  view 
of  the  hostility  which  his  recent  measures  had  engendered — 
to  remain  at  first  in  the  background,  to  watch  its  workings, 
and  to  intrude  himself  only  in  case  friction  developed.  Accord 
ingly,  at  his  suggestion,40  the  president,  T.  A.  R.  Nelson,  assembled 
the  convention  at  Knoxville  on  the  I2th  of  April. 

Hardly  had  its  deliberations  begun,  when  it  gave  unmistakable 
evidences  that  it  was  no  suitable  vehicle  for  the  governor's 
purposes.  Its  old  leaders  still  adhered  to  the  conservative  prin 
ciples  which  had  always  animated  them,  and,  since  they  were 
the  convention  officers,  they  were  able  to  constitute  com 
mittees  in  sympathy  with  themselves.  The  radical  interest  was, 
however,  strong  among  the  members,  despite  the  fact  that  many 
former  delegates  who  favored  that  party  were  absent  on  service 
with  the  army.  The  committee  on  resolutions,  made  up  with  a 
conservative  majority,  could  not  agree  upon  a  report,  and  finally 
presented  two,  the  majority  favoring  compromise  with  the  South 
along  the  lines  of  the  Crittenden  proposition,  the  minority  sup 
porting  Johnson's  plan,  including  emancipation.  Neither  of  these 
carried  the  convention.  A  movement  to  detach  East  Tennessee 
as  a  separate  state  showed  some  vitality  for  a  time,  but  suddenly 
collapsed  before  the  determined  opposition  of  the  governor  him 
self.  The  debate  became  acrimonious  and,  as  no  accommodation 
could  be  reached  and  every  hour  increased  the  bitterness  of  the 
contestants,  an  adjournment  without  further  action  was  agreed 
to  on  the  I5th,  to  preserve  any  remaining  shreds  of  harmony. 

*°  Temple,  Notable  Men  of  Tennessee,  p.  408. 


126  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

That  the  motion  to  adjourn  obtained  almost  a  two-thirds  vote  and 
was  the  only  important  proposition  that  did  not  arouse  hostility 
is  proof  enough  that  the  conservatives  were  anxious  only-  to 
avoid  committing  themselves  to  anything.41 

But  the  Johnson  party,  disappointed  in  their  hope  that  the 
convention  would  surrender  to  their  views,  had  no  notion  of 
contenting  themselves  with  a  drawn  battle.  The  day  after  the 
adjournment,  they  held  a  mass  meeting  of  their  own,42  on  the 
pretence  that  the  officers  of  the  convention  had  prevented  a  fair 
expression  of  opinion  by  manipulating  the  committees.  Oliver 
P.  Temple,  an  active  participant  in  the  proceedings  of  this 
meeting,  gives  a  highly  interesting  account43  of  the  secret  in 
fluences  which  really  determined  its  action.  Resolutions  un 
qualifiedly  indorsing  the  program  and  principles  of  the  governor, 
as  embodied  in  his  speech  and  the  resolutions  of  the  2ist  of 
January,  were  drawn  up  in  advance  by  Johnson  himself,  and 
Brownlow  was  requested  to  offer  them  as  his  own.  The  latter, 
though  willing  to  do  so,  was  incapacitated  from  reading  them 
to  the  meeting  by  the  partial  loss  of  his  voice,  and  he  suggested 
Temple  for  that  office.  Johnson  at  once  grasped  at  this  proposal. 
By  connecting  the  names  of  two  Whig  leaders  with  his  plan, 
he  would,  he  said,  gain  the  friends  of  both,  who  together  con 
stituted  a  majority  of  the  loyalists.  Temple  accordingly  pre 
sented  the  resolutions  as  Brownlow's,  and  Johnson  referred  to 
them  approvingly  in  his  subsequent  speech,  as  if  he  had  never 
before  heard  of  them  and  was  highly  gratified  by  an  unsought 
and  unexpected  tribute  to  himself.  As  such,  they  passed  the 
meeting.  Johnson  had  emerged  with  the  least  possible  discredit 
from  a  very  bad  situation. 

Another  illusive  hope  was  held  out  to  the  tottering  Unionists 
by  the  approach  of  the  National  Union  convention  at  Baltimore 
for  the  nomination  of  a  presidential  candidate.  The  participation 
of  the  Tennessee  delegates  in  the  proceedings  would  impart  a 
certain  dignity  to  the  party  in  the  state,  which  would  thus  be 
recognized  as  readmitted,  for  party  purposes  at  least,  to  its  ante- 

41  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  April  16  ;Nashville    Union,  April  17,  19,  30. 

43  Nashville   Times  and   Union,  April  27. 

43  Temple,  Notable  Men  of  Tennessee,  p.  408. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         127 

bellum  privileges.  With  this  aim,  the  permanent  executive  com 
mittee  published,  on  the  3d  of  May,  a  call  to  unconditional 
Union  men  to  meet  in  the  respective  divisions  of  the  state  on 
the  3Oth,  to  elect  the  delegates.  Expressing  their  confidence  that, 
by  the  time  of  the  November  election,  the  people  would  be  able 
to  vote  in  peace  and  security,  they  explained  the  interest  of 
Tennessee  in  the  Baltimore  convention  and  asserted  her  right 
to  be  represented.  Tennessee  being  entitled  to  ten  delegates, 
they  suggested  that  East  Tennessee  send  four,  and  the  other 
two  divisions  three  each.44 

Regularity  in  choosing  the  delegates  was  clearly  not  to  be 
expected.  Even  with  the  best  of  intentions,  the  authorities  could 
do  little,  and  they  were  disinclined  to  go  to  any  unnecessary 
trouble.  The  easiest  way  was  best,  when  any  way  was  illegal. 
An  unsigned  notice,  dated  May  26,  published  in  the  Nashville 
papers,  convoked  the  loyal  citizens  of  Middle  Tennessee  on  the 
2/th  "to  consult  as  to  who  shall  represent  them  in  the 
Baltimore  convention."  This  meeting,  harking  back,  doubtless, 
to  the  convenient  generality  of  popular  sovereignty,  voted  that  the 
citizens  of  the  state,  in  mass  convention  at  the  state-house  on 
the  3Oth,  should  elect  delegates  for  the  state  at  large,  and,  on 
the  same  day,  the  citizens  of  Middle  Tennessee,  at  the  same 
place,  should  appoint  the  delegates  for  that  section.45 

The  newspaper  accounts  of  the  proceedings  on  the  3Oth46  are 
so  confused  that  it  is  impossible  to  get  at  exactly  what  was  done. 
The  meeting  at  Nashville,  which  was  attended  by  delegates 
chosen  by  gatherings  of  "unconditional  Union  men"  from  other 
counties  of  the  district,  as  well  as  by  citizens  of  Nashville,  elected 
two  delegates  at  large — one  from  East  and  one  from  Middle 
Tennessee — and  the  three  delegates  of  Middle  Tennessee.  It 
also  drew  up  resolutions  similar  to  those  of  January  21  and 
April  12,  declaring  for  a  constitutional  convention  to  be  called 
by  Governor  Johnson,  when  the  state  could  be  fully  represented, 
favoring  immediate  emancipation,  and  asserting  that  "the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  and  the  governments  of  the  states 

44  Nashville  Union,  May  3 ;  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  May  26. 

48  Nashville  Union,  May  29. 

46  Ibid.,   June    i ;    Nashville    Times  and   Union,   May  31. 


128  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

erected  under  the  Constitution  thereof  are  the  governments  of 
the  free  white  man,  to  be  controlled  and  administered  by  him, 
and  the  negro  must  assume  that  status  to  which  the  laws  of  an 
enlightened,  moral  and  high-toned  civilization  shall  assign  him." 
The  administration  and  war  policy  of  the  president  were  en 
dorsed  and  his  renomination  recommended.  Governor  Johnson, 
who,  "by  his  unflinching  courage  and  patriotism"  had  "endeared 
himself  to  all  American  patriots,  and  by  his  long  public  services, 
especially  by  the  administration  of  affairs"  during  his  term  as 
military  governor,  had  "gained  the  entire  confidence  of  all  the 
loyal  people  of  Tennessee/'  was  named  for  the  vice-presidency, 
In  East  Tennessee,  two  separate  meetings  seem  to  have  been  held, 
one  at  Chattanooga  and  one  at  Knoxville,  at  each  of  which  two 
of  the  four  delegates  alloted  to  that  section  were  chosen.47  The 
West  Tennessee  convention  was  called  together  by  the  executive 
committee  of  that  section  and  the  delegates  of  four  counties, 
chosen  at  mass  meetings,  were  admitted  to  seats.  Shelby  county 
was  allowed  ten  votes  and  the  other  three  counties  five  each, 
and  the  three  delegates  to  the  Baltimore  convention  were  elected 
on  that  basis.48  Both  the  East  and  West  Tennessee  meetings 
declared  for  Lincoln  and  Johnson  as  the  party  nominees. 

The  hopes  of  the  Unionists  were  realized  when  the  Baltimore 
convention  admitted  the  Tennesseeans.  To  do  so  was  to  indorse 
the  Johnson  doctrine  that  the  state  had  not,  because  of  the 
action  of  a  majority  of  her  people,  lost  her  place  in  the  Union, 
but  all  the  old  rights  and  privileges  still  appertained  to  her 
loyal  citizens,  who  now  constituted  the  state.  This  view  was 
put  forcibly  before  the  convention  by  "Parson"  Brownlow.  His 
picturesque  personality  and  romantic  history  had  won  him  an 
enthusiastic  invitation  to  address  the  meeting,  and  he  took  ad 
vantage  of  this  opportunity  to  protest  against  the  rejection  of 
the  Tennessee  delegates.  "I  hope  you  will  pause,  gentlemen," 
he  said,  "before  you  commit  so  rash  an  act  as  that,  and  thereby 
recognize  secession.  We  don't  recognize  it  in  Tennessee.  We 
deny  that  we  are  out.  We  deny  that  we  ever  have  been  out. 
We  maintain  the  minority  first  voted  us  out,  and  then  a  majority 

47  Nashville   Union,  June  4. 

48  Memphis  Bulletin,  May  31. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         129 

whipped  the  minority  out  of  the  state  with  bayonets  and  drove 
over  a  portion  of  our  men  to  their  ranks."49  The  principle  was 
affirmed  beyond  doubt  or  question  when  the  convention  nominated 
Governor  Johnson  for  the  vice-presidency.  Only  a  citizen  of 
a  state  could  hold  that  office,  and  the  selection  of  Johnson 
placed  the  party  stamp  of  disapproval  on  the  contention  of 
Sumner  that  "a  state  pretending  to  secede  from  the  Union" 
must  be  regarded  as  a  rebel  state  subject  to  military  occupation 
until  readmitted  to  the  Union  by  the  vote  of  both  houses  of 
Congress.50 

The  summer  months  of  1864  provide  a  hiatus  in  the  history 
of  reconstruction  in  Tennessee.  The  results  of  the  efforts  in 
that  direction  had  tended  to  discourage  Union  men  and  shake 
their  confidence  in  their  ability  to  carry  the  state  with  them. 
While  some  blamed  the  narrow  policy  of  Johnson,  others  insisted 
that  rigor  was  the  only  possible  remedy  for  the  situation;  that 
the  fact  was,  the  bulk  of  the  people  were  hostile  to  the  Union 
and  determined  to  remain  so,  despite  threats  or  blandishments. 
The  amnesty  proclamation,  it  was  felt,  had  done  little  good.  Its 
principles  were  admitted  to  be  excellent,  but  correct  principles 
were  naturally  not  comprehensible  to  rebels.  By  many  it  was 
regarded  as  an  indication  of  timidity  on  the  part  of  the  presi 
dent,  a  disposition  to  trim  to  the  wind.  The  Nashville  Press 
declared  that  Lincoln  knew  when  he  issued  it  that  the  Supreme 
Court  was  bound  to  nullify  the  laws  and  proclamations  to  which 
it  referred,  and  that  therefore,  in  offering  secessionists  amnesty 
upon  conditions  which  had  no  legal  validity,  he  was,  in  fact, 
proposing  to  receive  them  back  unconditionally.  On  this  ground, 
it  urged  everybody  to  take  and  abide  by  the  oath,  which  bound 
them  to  nothing  to  which  they  could  possibly  object;  then  "the 
Johnsonians"  would  "have  no  means  of  ultimately  preventing 
the  recognition  of  the  state  upon  a  constitutional  basis  except 
that  of  direct  and  open  military  coercion.51  So  generally  was 
this  advice  adopted  that,  the  Times  alleged,  the  session  of  the 

"Ibid.,  June  n. 

60  Ibid. 

61  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  May  26. 


130  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Federal  court  in  Nashville  was  made  a  mockery  by  former 
leaders  of  the  rebellion,  who  presented  themselves  and  obtained 
free  pardons  by  taking  the  oath.  "Till  the  rebellion  shall  be 
fully  put  down,  its  armies  effectually  destroyed,  and  its  leaders 
tried  and  punished  for  treason,  the  policy  of  making  citizens 
out  of  rebels  will  be  pernicious  to  the  government."52  Aggravated 
by  repeated  evidences  of  the  persistent  and  contemptuous  dis 
loyalty  of  men  who  complied  with  the  formalities  prescribed  by 
the  government  in  order  to  receive  trading  privileges,  protection, 
and  other  advantages  at  its  hands,  while  taking  no  part  in  any 
open  Union  movement,  remaining  away  from  the  polls,  and 
continuing  unregenerate  at  heart,  the  unconditional  Unionists, 
both  within  and  without  the  state,  used  every  means  to  force  the 
administration  to  abandon  lenity  for  coercion.  A  petition  of 
"Many  Many  very  Many  voters  of  Upper  Tennessee"  de 
manded  that  the  regiments  engaged  in  protecting  rebel  property  in 
Middle  Tennessee  be  sent  back  to  restore  order  and  security  at 
home.  If  this  was  not  done,  they  said,  Johnson's  vote  in  No 
vember  would  suffer,  and  the  fact  that  he  had  deserted  his  old 
neighbors  in  their  distress  would  be  published  to  the  country.53 
J.  B.  Bingham  wrote  from  Memphis  that  no  more  elections 
should  be  held  in  the  state  until  military  commanders  could  be 
had  who  would  not  show  more  favor  to  rebels  than  to  uncon 
ditional  Union  men.54  From  distant  New  York,  Eli  Thayer 
importuned  Johnson  to  confiscate  the  lands  of  rebels  and  fill 
them  with  loyal  settlers,  thus  enabling  the  state  to  dispense 
with  a  standing  army  after  the  war.  He  believed  that  Lincoln, 
by  opposing  confiscation,  had  prolonged  the  war  eighteen  months 
and  cost  the  country  a  million  men  and  many  millions  of  dollars. 
A  blow  at  the  landed  property  of  the  rebels  would  kill  slavery, 
the  root  of  the  rebellion,  and,  if  the  plantations  were  divided 
among  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Confederate  army,  they  would 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  have  a  permanent  incentive  to 
keep  it  in  good  faith.  "It  is  not  enough  to  offer  them  starva 
tion,  as  Lincoln  does  in  his  miserable  amnesty  proclamation," 

60  Ibid. 

83  J.  P.,  vol  xliv,  9532. 

w  Ibid.,  vol  xlii,  9249. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         131 

he  said.  "They  went  into  the  rebel  service  to  escape  that,  and  it  is 
folly  to  expect  they  will  come  out  to  secure  it."55  Johnson  him 
self  wrote  to  Lincoln  in  May  that  he  was  satisfied  the  amnesty 
would  be  seriously  detrimental  in  reorganizing  the  state  govern 
ment,  and  asked  that  Tennessee  be  excepted  from  it.  All  possible 
benefit  to  be  derived  from  it,  so  far  as  the  army  was  concerned, 
had  been  already  gained.  It  would  be  far  better  if,  for  the 
future,  each  Tennesseean  desiring  pardon  should  be  required  to 
apply  directly  to  the  president.  He  would  thus  be  impressed 
with  his  personal  obligation  to  the  government.  "As  it  now 
operates,  its  main  tendency  is  to  keep  alive  the  rebel  spirit, 
in  fact  reconciling  none.  This  is  the  opinion  of  every  real  Union 
man  here."56 

While  the  movement  for  a  convention  was  permitted,  for  the 
time,  to  hang  fire,  the  governor  busied  himself  with  the  long 
delayed  task  of  restoring  the  courts.  In  May,  Judge  Trigg 
opened  the  United  States  circuit  court  for  the  district  of  East 
Tennessee  at  Knoxville.57  A  chancellor,  judge,  and  attorney- 
general  for  the  fourth  judicial  district  of  the  state  were  appointed 
in  June;58  and,  the  same  month,  Judge  Brien  issued  notice  that 
the  circuit  court  of  the  9th  district  would  sit  in  Williamson 
county  in  July  and  in  Davidson  county  in  September.59  The 
county  court  of  Marion  county  was  organized  early  in  July, 
though  Johnson  was  warned  that  its  chairman  and  another  mem 
ber  were  rebel  sympathizers,  elected  by  rebels  in  expectation 
of  protection  and  favors  in  return,  and  that  not  a  single  lawyer 
practicing  in  the  court  was  certainly  a  loyal  man.60  In  July, 
the  chancellors,  judges,  and  district  attorneys  for  the  3d,  4th, 
6th,  and  9th  districts  received  their  commissions.61 

Particularly  interesting  was  the  condition  of  the  judiciary 
at  Memphis.  That  city  had  been  virtually  under  military  rule 
since  its  capture  in  June,  1862,  although  the  city  government, 

56  Ibid.,   vol  xliii,  9438,  9440. 

69  Ibid.,  9372. 

87  Nashville  Union,  May  26. 

68  Nas'hville  Times  and   Union,  June  27. 

69  Nashville  Union,  June  30. 
"J.  P.,  vol.  xlv,  9968. 

61  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  July  28. 


132  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

including  the  police  court,  was  allowed  to  exist  by  suffrance 
of  the  commanding  general.  This  officer  regulated  the  trade 
and  communication  with  the  surrounding  country  and  controlled 
the  rental  of  real  estate  belonging  to  secessionists.  By  his 
orders,  provost-marshals,  with  their  guard,  maintained  order 
and  supervised  the  city  police  force.62  In  October,  a  military 
commission  was  constituted  to  deal  with  offences  against  the 
laws  of  war  not  cognizable  by  court-martial,63  and  in  January, 
1863,  another  commission  was  organized  to  try  all  criminal 
cases  laid  before  it  by  department,  district,  or  post  commanders, 
the  provost-marshal  general,  or  district  provost-marshals,  and 
empowered  to  punish  by  fine,  imprisonment,  or  transportation 
beyond  the  lines.  Its  decisions  were  subject  to  review  by  the 
department  commander.6*  Similar  provisions  for  the  handling 
of  civil  cases  were  not  introduced  at  that  time,  perhaps  on 
account  of  the  argument  frequently  advanced  that  there  was  a 
manifest  hardship  in  allowing  a  loyalist  in  New  York  to  collect 
his  debt  from  a  loyalist  in  Memphis,  while  the  latter  was  estopped 
by  force  of  circumstances  from  recovering  from  a  loyalist  in 
Mississippi.65 

In  April,  1863,  however,  General  Veatch,  commander  of  the 
post,  appointed  a  civil  commission  of  three  citizens,  "to  hear 
and  determine  all  complaints  and  suits  instituted  by  loyal  citizens 
of  the  United  States  for  the  collection  of  debts,  the  enforce 
ment  of  contracts,  the  prevention  of  frauds,  the  recovery  of  the 
possession  of  property,  real  or  personal,  and  generally  to  perform 
such  duties  and  exercise  such  powers  as  can  be  done  by  a 
court  deriving  its  powers  from  military  authority.'"'66  This 
commission  continued  throughout  the  war  and  offered  to  the 
citizens  of  Memphis  their  sole  opportunity  to  enjoy  the  ad 
vantages  of  the  civil  law.  It  became  the  object  of  violent 
attack  and  equally  ardent  defence  by  the  opposing  factions.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  was  contended  that  two  of  the  three  com- 

**  Birkhimer,  Military   Government  and  Martial  Law,  pp.    143-147. 
63  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xvii,  part  ii,  p.  294. 
**Ibid.,  vol.  xxiv,  part  iii,  p.  1067. 
*  J.  P.,  vol.  xxix,  6459. 
*"  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7447. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         133 

missioners  were  not  residents  of  the  state  and  directed  their 
attention  to  perquisites  and  personal  advancement,  regardless 
of  the  interests  of  the  citizens;  that  the  assessment  of  costs 
was  exorbitant  and  the  people  were  systematically  robbed.  J.  M. 
Tomeny,  a  prominent  radical  Unionist,  stated  that  in  one  typical 
case,  involving  $38,  the  costs  amounted  to  $40,  and  the  net 
profits  of  the  commissioners  from  the  fees  collected  during  the 
first  three  months  of  the  session  totalled  $4500.  The  decisions 
were  said  to  be  so  vacillating,  so  inconsistent  with  established 
precedents,  that  the  commission  had  fallen  into  contempt  with  the 
ablest  members  of  the  bar.  No  appeals  were  allowed  and  no 
plea  to  the  jurisdiction,  and  the  stay  laws  of  the  state  were 
not  regarded.  Personal  property  was  levied  upon  and  sold  in 
three  days  after  execution  issued.  Though  the  commission  had 
no  authority  to  sell  real  estate,  rents  and  profits  were  subject 
to  sequestration  at  its  order.87  J.  B.  Bingham  charged  that  one 
of  the  commissioners  was  courting  rebel  sympathizers  with  a 
view  to  settling  in  Memphis  as  a  "copperhead  lawyer"  and  had 
nearly  driven  every  Union  lawyer  out  of  court.  As  a  remedy, 
the  commission  was  declared  to  be  worse  than  the  disease  it  was 
intended  to  cure.68 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  alleged  that  the  commission 
answered  all  the  requirements  of  the  people  and  possessed  their 
confidence,  that  a  change  was  inadvisable  under  existing  con 
ditions  and  was  advocated  only  by  office  seekers  and  interested 
politicians.69  There  seems  to  have  been  something  in  this  claim ; 
but  a  body  of  this  sort  was  naturally  not  under  the  same  salu 
tary  restraints  as  a  regular  court,  and  its  champions  entirely 
overshot  the  mark  when  they  went  on  to  say  that  Governor 
Johnson  had  no  authority  to  establish  courts  in  Tennessee  at 
all,  since  the  constitution  and  laws  of  neither  the  United  States 
nor  the  state  conferred  such  power  on  the  governor,  and  it 
could  exist  only  as  a  war  power,  to  be  exercised  by  the  officer 
having  the  paramount  military  command  in  the  city.70  The 

91  Ibid. 

"Ibid.,  vol.  xlv,  9833. 

«Mbid.,  9908;  Memphis  Argus  quoted  by  Nashville  Times  and  Union, 
July  21. 

7*J.  P.,  vol.  xlv,  9908. 


i34  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

obvious  reply  was  that  any  war  power  belonging  to  the  presi-; 
dent  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  could  be 
delegated  by  him  to  any  agent  he  might  select ;  and  that  Johnson 
was  not  a  civil  governor  at  all,  but  Lincoln's  military  agent, 
of  military  rank  and  detailed  expressly  to  perform,  among 
other  tasks,  the  special  work  of  restoring  the  courts. 

This  work,  not  only  for  Memphis,  but  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
state,  could,  however,  proceed  but  slowly.  As  the  autumn  of  1864 
came  on,  the  disorder  increased.  The  Confederate  cavalry  took 
advantage  of  Sherman's  descent  upon  Georgia  to  spread  havoc 
in  his  rear  and  to  harrass  almost  to  distraction  the  Union  forces 
remaining  in  Tennessee.  On  the  24th  of  August,  Forrest  made 
his  famous  dash  into  Memphis,  nearly  capturing  Generals 
Hurlbut  and  Washburn.  Wheeler  terrorized  East  and  Middle 
Tennessee,  penetrated  almost  to  Nashville,  and  cut  the  railroad 
between  that  city  and  Murfreesboro.  The  brilliant  and  rapid 
strokes  of  the  partisan  leaders  utterly  bewildered  the  Federal 
commanders  and,  when  they  failed  to  check  the  raiders,  judges 
and  sheriffs  had  little  prospect  of  enforcing  the  law.  Mean 
while  Thomas,  from  Sherman's  army,  did  not  cease  to  press 
Johnson  to  get  the  courts  speedily  into  full  operation  throughout 
the  state.  This,  he  explained,  would  enable  him  to  dissolve  the 
military  commission  which  assessed  damages  upon  rebel  sym 
pathizers  for  the  acts  of  the  guerillas  in  their  neighborhood, 
and  would  offer  the  loyal  citizens  a  legal  remedy  through  the 
regular  tribunals.71  The  unintentional  irony  of  such  a  suggestion 
must  have  struck  the  governor,  but  he  answered  in  excellent 
spirit,  recognizing  the  desirability  of  carrying  out  Thomas' 
recommendation,  assuring  him  that  the  work  was  being  pushed 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  indicating  the  difficulties  in  the  way.72 
West  Tennessee  regained  its  equilibrium  more  quickly  than 
the  rest  of  the  state.  Forrest  was  compelled  to  draw  off  east 
ward,  and,  in  October,  the  civil  commission  finally  went  out 
of  business  and  the  criminal,  common  law  and  chancery  courts 
convened.73  But  the  bickerings  were  not  quieted.  The  pro- 

n  Ibid.,  vol.  xlix, — 701. 

72  ibid.,— 738. 

"  Miller's  Manual  of  Tennessee,  pp.  179-187. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         135 

ceedings  of  the  courts  promptly  fell  foul  of  General  Dana's 
orders  regarding  the  militia.  The  judges  complained  to  John 
son  that  the  business  of  the  court  took  all  the  time  of  the  court 
officers,  but  the  general  had  commanded  that  all,  not  exempt 
from  militia  service,  who  failed  to  perform  it,  be  arrested,  fined 
and  imprisoned,  and  had  told  them  that  if  militia  duty  conflicted 
with  civil  duty,  the  courts  must  "bust  up."74  This,  they  assumed, 
applied  not  only  to  judges,  clerks,  and  other  court  officers,  but 
also  to  jurymen  and  witnesses.  Judge  Smith,  of  the  common 
law  and  chancery  court,  wrote  in  December  that  no  quarterly 
term  could  be  held  in  January,  because  Dana  refused  to  grant 
passes  to  the  justices  outside  the  lines  to  come  in,  on  the 
ground  that  he  did  not  believe  loyal  justices  could  live  outside 
the  lines.75  Dana's  reply  to  Johnson's  protest  gives  the  whole 
affair  the  aspect  of  a  tempest  in  a  tea-pot.  His  only  purpose, 
he  said,  was  to  have  the  enrollment  of  the  militia  complete  and 
every  man  assigned  to  his  place  in  case  of  attack.  After  this 
was  done,  the  judge  and  other  indispensable  officers  of  the  court 
would  be  excused  from  active  duty.  "No  effort  will  be  spared 
on  my  part,"  he  assured  Johnson,  "to  cooperate  with  you  in 
your  work  of  reorganizing  the  loyal  element."76  Warm  letters 
in  defence  of  Dana  asserted  that  he  was  laboring  "with  an  eye 
single  to  the  promotion  of  his  country's  cause"  and  that,  be 
cause  he  dared  to  "face  the  corruptions  of  the  commercial 
combinations"  in  Memphis,  he  was  denounced  by  men  inspired 
by  motives  "less  patriotic  than  mercenary."77  Bingham  and  his 
friends,  who  were  acting  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the  governor 
and  dispensing  political  favors  in  Memphis,  had,  it  was  declared, 
neither  the  respect  nor  the  confidence  of  the  community,  and 
Johnson  was  making  a  mistake  in  allying  himself  with  them.78 
At  the  other  extremity  of  the  state,  dissatisfaction  was  equally 
great.  Brownlow  wrote,  in  November,  that  the  Federal  court 
at  Knoxville  was  "a  complete  farce,"  the  worst  rebels  and 

7*J.  P.,  vol.  Hv,— 1670. 

TO  Ibid.,— 1710. 

w  Ibid.,— 1816. 

^Ibid.,    vol.    Ivi, — 2106. 

"Ibid.,  vol.   li, — 1021;   vol.   Ivi, — 2106. 


136  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

traitors  against  whom  indictments  were  found  escaping  with 
only  the  payment  of  costs  on  taking  the  amnesty  oath.79  Con 
sidering,  however,  the  obstacles  he  had  had  to  surmount,  John 
son  had  reason  to  be  gratified  at  the  progress  made.  By  the 
end  of  1864,  the  circuit  courts  were  open  in  the  4th,  6th, 
8th,  9th,  and  I5th  circuits,  besides  the  criminal  courts 
of  Davidson  and  Shelby  counties.  The  1st  and  2d  circuits 
followed  in  January,  1865,  an<^  tne  others  were  not  far  behind.80 

In  tracing  the  restoration  of  the  courts  to  a  conclusion,  it  has 
been  necessary  to  defer  the  account  of  a  serious  reverse  sus 
tained  by  the  administration  in  July,  1864,  in  the  subversion 
of  the  city  government  of  Memphis.81  From  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  the  metropolis  of  West  Tennessee  had  been  the  dis 
affected  core  of  the  most  disaffected  region  of  the  state.  Its 
importance  as  a  commercial  entrepot — particularly  for  the  cotton 
trade — and  its  strategic  situation  on  the  Mississippi  river  and 
the  great  railroad  arteries  of  the  Confederacy  had  made  it  the 
constant  centre  of  military  operations  and  had  caused  it  to  be  con 
trolled  primarily  in  the  interests  of  the  army.  The  details  of 
local  administration,  however,  were  left  in  the  hands  of  an  elected 
government.  Throughout  the  war,  John  Park  had  served  unin 
terruptedly  as  mayor.  During  the  agitation  in  1861,  he  had 
embraced  the  extreme  secession  view  and  vehemently  denounced 
the  Union ;  but  he  had  acquiesced  in  the  occupation  of  Memphis 
by  the  Federal  army,  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  had 
been  allowed  to  hold  his  office.  The  unconditional  Unionists 
never  ceased  to  shower  denunciation  on  him  and  his  board  of 
aldermen  as  traitors  at  heart,  ready  to  betray  the  government 
at  the  first  opportunity.  It  was  charged  that  they  had  obtained 
their  places  by  fraud  at  the  last  election,  when  six  hundred 
votes  were  polled  in  wards  containing  only  three  hundred  voters 
and  men  openly  admitted  having  voted  four  times  in  each  ward 
in  the  city;  that  they  used  their  right  of  appointing  the  judges 
of  election  to  name  those  who  would  look  after  their  interests ; 
that  they  represented  the  result  as  an  anti-administration 

Ibid.,    vol.    liii, — 1463. 


79  Ibid.,    vol.    liii, — 1463. 

80  Miller's  Manual  of  Tennessee,  pp.  182-184. 
81 J.   P.,  vol.  xxxvi,  7897;  vol.  xlii.  9249. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         137 

triumph,  although  they  had  made  no  such  issue  in  the  cam 
paign.  Bingham  averred  that  General  Hurlbut  had  resolved  to 
set  the  election  aside  altogether,  but  finally  agreed  with  the 
Union  leaders  that  such  a  proceeding  would  appear  to  be  a 
backward  step  in  the  attempted  progress  toward  civil  govern 
ment,  and  would  be  misrepresented  at  Washington. 

While  the  strictures  of  the  radical  malcontents  must  be  taken 
with  grave  suspicion,  it  is  certain  that  the  Memphis  government 
was  not  according  an  enthusiastic  support  to  the  Union  cause,  and 
was  particularly  at  odds  with  the  emancipation  policy.  In 
October,  1863,  the  aldermen  passed  and  the  mayor  approved  a 
set  of  ordinances  for  the  regulation  of  the  negroes  in  the  city, 
which  contained  certain  rigorous  provisions,  including  punish 
ment  by  whipping.  These  "black  laws,"  so  called,  became  the 
most  formidable  weapon  of  attack  upon  their  f ramers.  Also,  the 
cry  of  fraud  was  kept  up,  and  that  of  corruption  in  office  was 
added.  The  Park  party  was  said  to  control  the  entire  Irish 
element  and  to  entertain  high  hopes  of  success  at  the  ensuing 
June  elections.  In  apprehension  of  this,  Bingham  urged  Johnson 
to  prevent  the  election  and  fill  the  offices  by  appointment. 

If  the  undeniably  loyal  administration  men  had  been  able  to 
act  in  harmony,  they  would  have  had  a  fighting  chance  of  suc 
cess,  but,  as  usual,  dissensions  shattered  their  organization. 
Park  himself  had  no  idea  of  appearing  before  the  public  as  a 
suspicious  character,  and  he  participated  in  the  National  Union 
convention  on  the  3Oth  of  May  and  asserted  his  complete  loyalty 
over  his  signature  in  the  press.  The  National  Unionists'  original 
candidate  for  mayor,  Samuel  T.  Morgan,  represented  the  con 
servative  element  of  the  party  and  might  possibly  have  held 
the  vote  opposed  to  Park,  had  not  some  of  the  nominees  on 
the  slate  with  him  committed  the  tactical  blunder  of  accepting 
also  nomination  on  the  Park  ticket.  The  radicals  seized  the 
pretext  thus  offered  to  throw  over  the  whole  Morgan  ticket  and 
present  one  of  their  own,  styled  ''unconditional  Union,"  with 
Dr.  G.  D.  Johnson  for  mayor.  At  least  two  other  minor  can 
didates  were  in  the  field. 

This  potpourri  practically  insured  the  victory  of  Park.  The 
only  cloud  on  his  horizon  was  a  persistent  rumor  that,  if  he 


138  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

should  be  elected,  General  Washburn  would  depose  him  and  take 
the  city  government  into  his  own  hands.  Park  accordingly 
wrote  to  the  general,  requesting  an  official  statement,  and  re 
ceived  a  chilling  confirmation  of  his  fears.  The  government,  said 
Washburn,  had  been  both  disloyal  and  inefficient  and  could  no 
longer  be  trusted  to  the  present  incumbents  of  office.82 

Despite  this  damaging  blow,  the  chaos  among  the  loyalists 
was  so  great  that  Park  carried  the  election  on  June  30  with 
ease;  and,  true  to  his  word,  Washburn  issued  an  order  on  the 
2d  of  July,  forbidding  any  of  the  elected  officers  to  qualify  and 
appointing  an  acting  mayor,  recorder,  treasurer,  comptroller, 
tax  collector,  tax-collector  on  privileges,  chief  of  police,  and 
wharfmaster,  who  together  were  to  form  a  board  for  the 
government  of  the  city,  their  resolutions  and  ordinances  being 
subject  to  revocation  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  district 
of  West  Tennessee  or  by  a  superior  military  authority.  In  justi 
fication  of  this  action,  it  was  alleged  that  the  municipal  govern 
ment  had  failed  utterly  during  the  past  two  years  to  discharge 
its  proper  functions,  and  had  shown  disloyalty  and  lack  of 
sympathy  with  the  government  of.  the  United  States  and  an 
indisposition  to  co-operate  with  the  military.  "They  have  grown 
from  bad  to  worse,  until  a  further  toleration  of  them  will  not 
comport  with  the  sense  of  duty  of  the  commanding  general."83 
A  second  order,  on  the  i6th,  supplanted  the  board  created 
on  the  2d  by  a  new  one  to  be  known  as  "the  provisional  mayor 
and  council  of  the  city  of  Memphis,"  with  all  the  powers  of  the 
old  board  of  mayor  and  aldermen.84  In  fact,  West  Tennessee 
remained  under  the  wing  of  the  army  until  the  close  of  the  war. 

82  Moore's  Rebellion  Record,  vol.  xi,  doc.  591 

83  Digest  of  the  Charters,  etc.  of  Memphis;  Standard  History  of  Mem 
phis  (J.  P.  Young,  editor),  p.  135. 

84 Standard  History  of  Memphis   (J.  P.  Young,  editor),  p.   136. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

As  the  time  for  the  presidential  election  approached,  the 
Union  men  of  Tennessee  had  to  face  the  necessity  of  taking 
positive  action.  After  securing  the  participation  of  Tennessee 
in  the  Baltimore  convention,  as  if  she  were  an  active  state  in  the 
Union,  and  aiding  in  the  nomination  of  one  of  their  own  num 
ber  as  vice-president,  they  could  not,  with  honor,  permit  the 
election  day  to  find  them  in  an  inglorious  paralysis,  content 
tamely  to  relinquish  the  right  for  which  they  had  so  loudly 
contended,  or  hesitating  to  support  their  leader  at  the  polls. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  prospect  of  an  election  at  this  time  gave 
them  pause.  In  no  part  of  the  state  could  a  pronounced  ad 
ministration  victory  be  promised.  From  West  Tennessee  came 
the  warning  that  an  overwhelming  defeat  was  more  than 
probable  in  that  section;  allegations  were  not  lacking  that  the 
vaunted  loyalty  of  East  Tennessee  had  undergone  corruption; 
and  Middle  Tennessee,  always  an  uncertain  factor,  was  cowed 
by  Confederate  cavalry  and  guerillas. 

Even  more  formidable  than  the  secessionist  sympathizers, 
whose  exclusion  from  the  polls  could  be  readily  justified,  was 
the  Union  peace  party,  powerful  throughout  the  state  and  es 
pecially  so  in  West  Tennessee,  and  drawing  numerous  recruits 
from  those  who  had  broken  with  the  government  on  the  eman 
cipation  issue.  These  men  stood  upon  their  loyalty  and  their 
rights  under  the  Constitution,  denounced  the  proclamations  and 
laws  regarding  slavery  as  unconstitutional,  attacked  the  president 
and  governor  for  continuing  the  war,  when  the  end  for  which 
it  was  inaugurated  could  now  be  obtained  by  giving  up  emanci 
pation,  declared  for  "the  Union  as  it  was  and  the  Constitution 
as  it  is,"  and  seemed  doubly  fortified  by  the  very  legality  of 
their  position. 

To  meet  this  crisis,  hold  an  election,  and  insure  an  administra 
tion  victory,  a  course  of  procedure  was  now  instituted  which, 

139 


i4o  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

while  direct  evidence  of  detailed  prearrangement  among  the 
president,  the  governor,  and  the  radical  leaders  is  lacking,  was 
carried  forward  so  smoothly  and  so  undeviatingly  to  a  successful 
conclusion,  that  all  the  participants  seemed  to  be  playing  parts 
especially  assigned  to  them  and  carefully  conned  from  the 
beginning. 

On  the  2d  of  August,  a  meeting  of  "the  citizens  of  Tennessee" 
at  Nashville  requested  the  state  executive  committee  to  call  a 
convention  of  loyal  men  to  discuss  the  various  problems  facing 
the  people.1  The  call,2  which  appeared  on  the  4th,  named  the 
first  Monday  in  September  as  the  date  for  the  convention,  and 
stated  the  questions  there  to  be  discussed  as  three: — the  general 
condition  of  the  country;  the  means  of  reorganizing  civil  gov 
ernment  and  restoring  law  and  order ;  and  the  expediency  of 
holding  a  presidential  election  in  the  state  in  November,  any 
necessary  preliminaries  for  which  the  convention  was  to  arrange. 

The  convention3  assembled  at  Nashville  on  the  5th  of  Sep 
tember.  Comment  was  aroused  by  the  scarcity  of  financial  and 
business  men  among  the  delegates.  More  than  forty  counties 
were  represented,  but  most  of  the  delegates  had  not  been  reg 
ularly  chosen — nor,  indeed,  chosen  at  all — but  came  on  their  own 
responsibility,  as  Union  men.4  Soldiers,  who  could  be  depended 
upon  to  support  radical  measures,  were  numerous  among  them. 
Wheeler's  activity  in  the  eastern  and  southern  parts  of  the 
state  kept  away  many  from  those  sections.5  Indeed,  the  dis 
turbances  throughout  Tennessee,  the  interruption  of  railroad 
communications,  and  the  wretched  condition  of  the  roads,  to 
gether  with  the  caution  or  indifference  of  the  Unionists,  resulted 
in  so  meagre  an  attendance  that  a  postponement  was  at  first 
talked  of.6 

The  complete  ascendency  of  the  radicals  and  their  determina 
tion  to  tolerate  no  interference  with  their  already  matured  plans 

1  Nashville  Union,  August  4;  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  August  n. 

2  Nashville  Union,  August  4. 

3  The  'best  account  of  the  convention  is  in  the  Nashville  Dispatch,  Sep 
tember  6-9. 

4  Nashville  Union  and  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  September  8-9. 

5  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1864,  p.  764. 
9  Nashville  Dispatch,  September  6. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         141 

were  immediately  apparent.  Samuel  R.  Milligan  was  chosen 
president  and  the  committees  on  credentials,  organization,  and 
business,  that  together  held  the  helm  of  the  convention  and 
determined  its  course,  were  made  up  with  radical  majorities.  On 
the  last  and  most  important,  composed  of  one  member  from 
each  congressional  district,  were  such  powerful  and  uncompromis 
ing  personalities  as  Horace  Maynard,  G.  W.  Bridges,  J.  S.  Fowler, 
J.  B.  Bingham,  and  L.  C.  Houk.  In  accordance  with  the  recom 
mendation  of  its  committee,  the  convention  voted  to  admit  to 
the  floor  not  only  "all  delegates  regularly  appointed  by  loyal 
primary  county  conventions,"  but  also  "all  unconditional  Union 
men"  of  the  state  "who  are  for  all  the  measures  of  the  govern 
ment  looking  to  put  down  the  rebellion."7 

By  this  time,  the  conservative  element  in  the  convention, 
lured  to  Nashville  by  the  broadly  worded  call  of  the  state  com 
mittee,  which  had  given  them  grounds  for  hope  that  all  shades 
of  loyal  opinion  would  be  reflected  in  a  liberal,  non-partisan 
arrangement  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  state,  had  been  rudely 
awakened  to  the  true  condition  of  affairs.  The  majority  were 
carrying  things  with  a  high  hand,  and  it  was  apparent  that 
they  were  bent  on  using  the  convention  to  push  through  a  far- 
reaching  plan,  sweep  aside  all  inconvenient  constitutional  im 
pediments,  and  deliver  Tennessee,  for  better  or  worse,  into  the 
hands  of  Johnson  and  his  party.  Outnumbered  and  outvoted  by 
the  administration  men,  and  placed,  if  they  remained  in  the 
convention,  in  an  intolerable  position  as  accessories  to  the  rigid 
policy  of  the  governor,  to  which  they  could  in  no  way  subscribe, 
the  conservatives  determined  on  the  only  possible  course  open 
to  them — a  dignified  protest  against  any  and  all  arbitrary  or 
extra-legal  measures  of  reconstruction;  which  failing,  it  only 
remained  for  them  to  withdraw. 

Accordingly,  on  the  first  day  of  the  session,  T.  B.  Thomas, 
of  McMinn  county,  offered  the  pointed  resolution  that,  as 
"written  constitutions  are  the  only  guarantee  of  stability  in 
elective  governments,  the  only  safeguards  which  the  public  have 
against  irresponsible  violence  on  the  one  hand  and  official  usur 
pation  on  the  other,"  and  as  "the  horrors  of  civil  war,  which  now 

7  Ibid. ;  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1864,  p.  764. 


142  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

surround  us,  were  introduced  chiefly  by  conventions  of  men 
claiming  authority  from  the  people,  yet  proceeding  in  plain 
violation  of  constitutions  which  the  people  had  established  for 
the  restraint  of  all  their  servants,"  the  convention  be  guided  and 
governed  by  the  constitutions  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 
state  of  Tennessee.8 

Instantaneously  a  fierce  storm  of  radical  abuse  broke  upon 
Thomas'  devoted  head.  Colonel  R.  C.  Crawford  exclaimed  that, 
in  every  convention  of  Unionists,  some  members  were  sure  to 
show  the  cloven  foot.  Men  like  Thomas,  he  intimated,  were 
secessionists  at  heart.  The  latter  replied  that  he  was  proposing 
a  peace-offering  to  his  fellow-citizens,  but  Colonel  Houk  de 
manded  that  the  resolution  be  laid  on  the  table,  or,  better  still, 
thrown  under  the  table.  To  the  accompaniment  of  "tremendous 
applause,  shouts,  and  whooping,"  he  declared  that  he  loved  and 
venerated  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  but  denounced 
the  constitution  of  Tennessee,  which  consigned  men  to  dungeons 
for  speaking  against  slavery.  It  was,  in  his  opinion,  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  a  league  with  that  institution.  "Show  me 
a  stickler  for  constitutions,"  he  concluded,  "and  I'll  show  you 
a  man  none  too  good  a  Union  man."9  A  delegate  inquired  if 
any  constitution-advocate  had  ever  been  seen  with  a  musket  on 
his  shoulder.  Amid  angry  demonstrations,  Thomas'  resolution 
was  buried  by  referring  it  to  the  business  committee. 

The  next  day  (September  6)  the  radical  onslaught  continued, 
with  Crawford  and  Houk  again  to  the  fore.  The  former  moved 
that  the  president,  through  the  governor,  be  requested  to  appoint 
a  provost-marshal  and  deputy  provost-marshals  to  enroll  the 
militia  and  to  make  a  list  of  all  voters  of  each  county  in  1861, 
and  ascertain  the  loyalty  of  each  voter  so  enrolled,  for  the 
purpose  of  putting  the  elections  into  the  hands  of  loyal  men.10 
Houk  urged  the  convention  to  declare  itself  unalterably  opposed 
to  disunion,  as  well  as  to  any  armistice  with  the  Confederates, 
as  "treason  of  the  darkest  character,"  the  sponsors  for  which 
were  "enemies  of  free  institutions  and  our  admirable  form  of 

8  Nashville  Dispatch,  September  6. 

'  Ibid. 

"Ibid.,  September  /. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         143 

government,  whose  appreciation  of  freedom  has  been  ruthlessly 
destroyed  by  thirst  for  office  and  political  power" ;  and  to  indorse 
the  National  Union  party  as  "the  only  party  having  the  patriotism 
and  determination  to  preserve  the  Union  by  whipping  the  rebels." 
Some  other  device  than  test  oaths  must  be  adopted,  he  insisted, 
if  disloyalists  were  to  be  kept  from  the  polls;  the  ballot-box 
was  too  important  to  them  at  this  time  for  oaths  and  conscientious 
scruples  to  influence  their  conduct.  He  believed  that,  even  if  all 
the  copperheads  and  traitors  were  to  take  an  oath  to  vote  for 
Lincoln  and  Johnson,  McClellan  would  still  beat  them.11 

Perhaps  to  secure  a  formal  expression  of  the  already  obvious 
temper  of  the  convention,  James  Ramsay,  a  Bedford  county 
conservative,  and  Colonel  Houk  now  offered  their  resignations 
from  the  business  committee.  Ramsay's  was  promptly  accepted 
and  Houk's  refused.  Resolutions  condemnatory  of  the  platform 
and  attitude  of  the  Democrats  followed  one  another  in  rapid 
succession,  one  asserting  that  "this  howl  of  violated  constitutions 
comes  with  a  bad  grace  from  those  who,  by  peace  communications 
and  resolutions,  are  affording  substantial  aid  and  comfort  to 
the  rebels."12 

When  the  tempest  of  violence  and  recrimination  had  some 
what  abated,  Thomas,  who  seems  to  have  kept  his  head  and  his 
temper  throughout  the  melee,  calmly  and  emphatically  presented 
the  conservative  ultimatum  in  two  resolutions13  which  crystallized 
his  party's  demands : 

"That  the  convention  has  met  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
state  government,  and  not  as  a  meeting  for  the  ratification  of 
presidential  candidates. 

"That,  relying  upon  a  just  cause  and  the  guidance  of  a  good 
Providence,  we  are  all  willing  to  submit  the  presidential  vote  to 
the  wisdom  of  the  people,  giving  all  truly  loyal  men  an  oppor 
tunity  to  vote  as  they  may  see  proper." 

This  was  a  sharp  home-thrust  at  the  program  of  the  admin- 
istrationists,  and  their  fury  exceeded  all  bounds  of  parliamentary 
courtesy  or  decorum.  Thomas  was  even  refused  permission  to 

11  Ibid. 

12  Ibid. 

13  Ibid. 


144  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

explain  his  resolutions.  In  vain  did  he  assert  with  dignity  that 
he  and  his  friends  had  only  come  as  loyal  men,  at  the  call  of 
the  state  committee,  to  aid  in  restoring  the  civil  government, 
not  to  attend  a  ratification  meeting;  that,  if  they  were  mistaken 
as  to  the  purpose  of  the  convention,  they  were  ready  and  begged 
leave  to  retire.  Copperheads,  said  Captain  Driver,  should  be 
invited  out,  not  granted  leave  to  go.  "Kick  them  out!"  shouted 
Colonel  Byrd ;  "point  them  out,  and,  by  God,  I'll  lead  the  charge !" 
The  conservatives  withdrew  amid  maledictions  and  the  parting 
shot  from  Byrd  that  there  could  be  but  two  parties  in  the  Country, 
those  of  Abe  Lincoln  and  Jeff  Davis.  Thomas'  resolutions  were 
laid  on  the  table.14 

The  convention  was  now  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  Johnson 
party.  Even  a  suggestion  by  Colonel  R.  M.  Edwards  of  Bradley 
county  that  the  electors  of  the  state  legislature  comprise  "the 
genuine  Union  men  of  the  state,  in  connection  with  those  qualified 
to  vote  under  amnesty  proclamation  of  President  Lincoln"15 
was  so  violently  denounced  as  aiming  to  send  friends  of  slavery 
to  Congress  and  to  "choke  off  the  poor  man"  that  its  author 
asked  permission  to  withdraw  it. 

All  was  now  in  readiness  for  the  resolutions  of  the  business 
committee,16  which  were  adopted  unanimously  on  the  7th.  An 
election  for  president  and  vice-president  was  to  be  held  in 
Tennessee  in  November  by  those  "who  are  now  and  have  been 
attached  to  the  National  Union."  To  qualify  as  an  elector,  a 
man  must  meet  the  requirements  of  the  state  constitution  for 
that  privilege,  and,  in  addition,  must  either  have  voluntarily 
borne  arms  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  during  the  war 
(such  service  being  still  continued,  or  terminated  by  an  honorable 
discharge),  or  must  be  a  known  active  friend  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States.  He  must  also  register  with  an  election 
agent  at  least  fifteen  days  before  the  election,  the  registration 
being  open  to  public  inspection,  and  the  election  officers  being 
empowered  to  examine  applicants  on  oath  touching  matters  of 
fact  and  to  reject  anyone  on  proof  of  disloyalty.  As  a  -final 

14  Ibid. 

15  Ibid.,  September  8. 

™  Annual  Cyclopedia,   1864,  p.   765. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         145 

test,  he  must,  before  depositing  his  vote,  subscribe  to  the  following 
oath,  which  merits  careful  comparison  with  the  one  required 
of  county  electors  the  preceding  March : 

"I  solemnly  swear  that  I  will  henceforth  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  defend  it  against  the 
assaults  of  all  its  enemies;  that  I  am  an  active  friend  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States;  that  I  sincerely  rejoice 
in  the  triumph  of  its  armies  and  navies  and  in  the  defeat 
and  overthrow  of  the  armies,  navies,  and  all  armed  combina 
tions  in  the  interest  of  the  so-called  Confederate  States; 
that  I  will  cordially  oppose  all  armistices  or  negotiations 
for  peace  with  rebels  in  arms,  until  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  all  laws  and  proclamations  made  in  pur 
suance  thereof  shall  be  established  over  all  the  people  of 
every  state  and  territory  embraced  within  the  National 
Union ;  and  that  I  will  heartily  aid  and  assist  the  loyal  people 
in  whatever  measures  may  be  adopted  for  the  attainment 
of  these  ends;  and  further,  that  I  take  this  oath  freely  and 
voluntarily  and  without  mental  reservation.  So  help  me 
God."17 

Even  this  oath  was  to  be  but  prima  facie  evidence  of  loyalty, 
subject  to  disproof. 

Continuing,  the  resolutions  provided  for  the  opening  of  polls 
at  the  county  seat  or  some  other  suitable  place  in  each  county, 
and  also,  for  the  convenience  of  the  soldiers,  at  places  accessible 
to  them  and  guarded  so  as  to  secure  a  free  and  fair  election. 
Only  unfaltering  Union  men  could  hold  office,  and  all  doubt 
ful  incumbents  were  to  be  removed.  Lincoln  and  Johnson 
electors  were  nominated  and  an  executive  committee,  consist 
ing  of  five  from  each  division  of  the  state,  was  appointed,  with 
authority  to  fill  vacancies  occurring  in  the  ticket.  The  candi 
dates  and  action  of  the  Baltimore  convention  were  endorsed, 
the  course  of  Johnson  as  governor  in  Tennessee  approved,  and 
the  immediate  abolition  of  slavery  and  "its  prohibition  in  the 
future  by  all  suitable  and  proper  amendments"  demanded. 
Governor  Johnson  was  requested  to  execute  the  resolutions  "in 

17  Ibid. 


146  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

such  manner  as  he  may  think  will  best  subserve  the  interests 
of  the  government." 

The  convention  purported  to  speak  for  the  loyal  sovereign 
people  of  Tennessee.  The  powerful  support  of  the  military 
government  was  pledged  in  a  significant  proclamation18  issued 
opportunely  on  the  7th,  while  the  convention  was  yet  in  session. 
The  governor  begins  with  his  familiar  statement  of  the  reasons 
for  his  appointment  and  the  constitutional  basis  of  his  authority, 
and  enumerates  the  powers  conferred  upon  him.  By  virtue 
of  these  powers,  civil  government  will  be  reestablished  in  parts 
of  the  state,  wherever  and  whenever  the  people  evince  a  wish 
for  it  and  a  disposition  to  sustain  the  officers  appointed;  and 
appointments  will  be  superseded  by  elections  in  accordance  with 
the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  state  previous  to  the  rebellion 
or  with  new  regulations  prescribed  by  a  popular  convention, 
when  elections  are  desired.  All  officers  will  follow,  as  the 
rule  of  their  action,  the  old  laws  familiar  to  the  people,  when 
these  are  applicable,  and  will  take  the  oath  prescribed  in  the 
proclamation  of  January  26.  "All  cases,  civil  and  criminal, 
coming  before  the  judicial  tribunals  of  this  state,  involving  the 
rights  of  colored  persons,  shall  be  adjudicated,  and  be  disposed 
of  as  free  persons  of  color."  The  strong  arm  of  the  govern 
ment  will  (be  employed  to  protect  loyal  men  and  their  property 
in  unregenerate  districts. 

In  conclusion,  the  governor  makes  it  clear  that  the  days  of 
grace  for  obstinate  recalcitrants  are  about  to  end,  and  that  no 
mercy  will  be  shown  in  future.  "I  will  once  more  make  an 
appeal  to  the  whole  people  of  Tennessee  to  come  forward 
promptly  and  willingly  and  aid  me  in  the  important  work  of 
restoring  the  government.  Ample  time  has  transpired  for  re 
flection,  return  of  loyalty  and  reason.  Amnesty  (has  been?) 
kindly  offered  for  your  protection,  and  surely  bitter  experi 
ence  has  demonstrated  the  folly  of  longer  persisting  in  wanton 
opposition  to  the  power  and  authority  of  the  national  govern 
ment.  I  invoke  you,  therefore,  again  to  return  to  your  alle 
giance,  and  aid  in  the  protection  of  yourselves  against  lawless 
bands  of  marauding  pirates  and  robbers,  and  thereby  save  your 

18  J.  P.  vol.  xlviii, — 459;  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  September  13. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         147 

property,  persons  and  firesides  from  outrages  hitherto  unknown  to 
civilization.  Longer  resistance  to  law  and  order  will  not  be 
tolerated.  There  must  be  an  end  to  the  criminal  opposition 
so  long  and  wickedly  waged  against  the  laws  and  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  those  who  still  continue  to  adhere 
to  traitors  and  treason  can  no  longer  expect  the  protection 
of  the  government  they  daily  revile  and  seek  to  destroy.  They 
must  yield  their  opposition  (male  and  female)  or  they  will  be 
removed  beyond  the  reach  of  harm  to  the  government  and 
authority  of  the  United  States." 

On  the  3Oth,  Johnson,  in  a  second  proclamation,19  professing 
his  desire  to  cooperate  with  the  "laudable  efforts"  of  the  con 
vention  of  "a  respectable  portion  of  the  loyal  people  of  Ten 
nessee,  representing  a  large  number  of  the  counties  of  the 
state,  and  supposed  to  reflect  the  will  of  the  Union  men  in  their 
respective  counties,"  ordered  an  election  on  the  8th  of  Novem 
ber  for  president  and  vice-president  under  the  convention's 
plan.  Voters  must  take  the  oath  exactly  as  worded  in  the  reso 
lutions.  The  governor  would  designate  superintendents  and 
registers  of  elections,  and,  in  cases  where  no  inspectors,  judges, 
or  sheriffs  were  regularly  appointed,  the  registering  agents  were 
to  act  in  their  stead.  Officers  of  the  army  and  surgeons  in 
charge  of  hospitals  were  to  hold  elections  for  the  soldiers.  Ow 
ing  to  the  short  time  remaining  before  the  election,  persons  of 
"known  and  established  loyalty"  might  vote,  though  they  had 
not  registered. 

That  the  convention  should  have  ventured  to  prescribe  the 
governor's  course  for  him  and  that  he  should  have  acquiesced 
without  remark  in  its  instructions  and  embodied  them  verbatim 
in  his  proclamation  makes  it  all  but  certain  that  he  either  drew 
up  the  resolutions  himself  or  approved  them  before  they  were 
voted  upon.  From  the  work  of  the  convention  he  derived  the 
advantage  of  appearing  not  to  insist  on  any  settled  plan  of 
his  own,  but  simply  to  carry  out  the  expressed  will  of  the  sov 
ereign  people.  This  pose,  however,  actually  deceived  nobody. 
The  proclamation  was  a  transparent  attempt  to  save  some 

19  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  October  3 ;  Edward  McPherson,  Politi 
cal  History  of  the  UnitecT  States  during  the  Great  Rebellion,  p.  436. 


148  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

remnants  of  Johnson's  popularity,  if  any  there  were,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  present  an  ostensibly  united  front  of  Unionists 
for  the  new  policy,  by  distributing  the  responsibility  for  it  as 
widely  as  possible.  Indeed,  the  radicals  needed  all  the  strength 
to  be  derived  from  common  action,  for,  as  the  full  purport 
of  the  cunningly  contrived  oath  came  to  be  grasped,  a  storm 
of  protest  and  denunciation  burst  upon  them,  and  especially 
upon  Johnson  himself,  whose  dominating  influence  everyone 
recognized. 

The  first  clauses  of  the  oath  clearly  disfranchised  Confederate 
sympathizers.  This  was,  of  course,  necessary  and  occasioned 
no  comment.  But  more  lay  behind.  The  national  Democratic 
convention,  which  had  met  at  Chicago  in  August,  while  pro 
nouncing  unequivocally  for  the  Union,  had  bitterly  deplored 
the  war  and  demanded  immediate  efforts  for  a  cessation  of 
hostilities  and  the  restoration  of  peace  on  the  simple  basis  of 
the  Union ;  and  its  presidential  candidate,  McClellan,  had  an 
nounced  his  conviction  that,  whenever  it  appeared  probable  that 
the  Confederates  would  consent  to  these  terms,  "all  the  re 
sources  of  statesmanship  practised  by  civilized  nations  and 
taught  by  the  traditions  of  the  American  people,  consistent  with 
the  honor  and  interests  of  the  country",  should  be  enlisted  to 
secure  an  agreement.  The  adherents  of  this  party  in  Tennessee 
decided  to  contest  the  election  with  the  "unconditional,"  and, 
in  September,  placed  an  electoral  ticket  in  the  field.  It  was  this 
manoeuvre  which  the  Johnsonians  had  anticipated  and  fortified 
against  by  the  clause  of  their  oath  pledging  the  voter  to  "oppose 
all  armistices  or  negotiations  for  peace  with  rebels  in  arms," 
until  the  restoration  of  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  and  proc 
lamations  made  in  pursuance  of  them  over  all  the  states  and 
territories.  This  clause  and  the  succeeding  one,  committing 
the  voter  to  "whatever  measures  may  be  adopted  for  the  attain 
ment  of  these  ends,"  were  a  mortal  blow  at  the  pro-slavery 
Unionists  and  a  guarantee  that  every  man  who  cast  his  ballot 
in  November  would  be  either  an  "unconditional"  or  a  perjurer. 

The  outraged  feelings  of  the  peace  Democrats  crystallized 
in  a  deputation  of  the  McClellan  electors  to  Washington  to 
present  to  the  president  their  vehement  protest  against  the  ar- 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         149 

bitrary  proceedings  of  the  radicals.  The  signatures  appended 
to  this  comprehensive  and  able  document,20  including  those  of 
Thomas  A.  R.  Nelson,  the  president  of  the  old  Knoxville-Green- 
ville  convention,  William  B.  Campbell,  ex-governor  of  the  state 
and  a  general  in  the  Union  army,  Emerson  Etheridge,  one  of 
the  foremost  champions  of  the  Union  in  1861,  and  John 
Lellyert,  formerly  postmaster  of  Nashville  and  a  man  of  sterling 
character,  show  how  conditions  had  changed  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war  and  how  impossible  it  was  for  many  devoted,  high- 
minded  loyalists  to  keep  up  with  the  course  of  the  military 
governor.  That  such  men  combined  to  condemn  the  narrow 
ness  and  intolerance  of  Johnson's  policy  is  a  heavy  indictment, 
which  can  be  met  only  by  the  contention  that,  in  this  turbulent, 
disaffected  state,  the  most  extreme  precautions  were  necessary 
to  weather  the  crisis. 

Alluding  but  briefly  to  the  departures  made  by  the  proclama 
tion  from  the  constitutional  requirements  for  elections,  the 
protestants  concentrate  their  attack  upon  the  oath.  The  obliga 
tion  to  support  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
they  are,  they  declare,  ready  to  renew  daily,  but  they  revolt 
from  the  required  expression  of  gratification  at  "scenes  of 
blood  and  wounds,  of  anguish  and  death."  They  are  committed 
to  the  prolongation  of  the  war  by  no  considerations  of  pleasure, 
profit,  or  honor,  while  their  feelings  "as  Christians,  as  patriots, 
and  as  civilized  men,"  as  well  as  the  oaths  they  have  taken, 
impel  them  to  peace.  They  cannot  consent  "to  swear  at  the 
ballot  a  war  of  extermination  against  their  countrymen  and 
kindred,  or  to  prolong  by  their  opposition  for  a  single  day 
after  it  can  be  brought  to  an  honorable  and  lawful  conclusion, 
a  contest  the  most  sanguinary  and  ruinous  that  has  scourged 
mankind."  The  president  himself,  in  his  famous  note  to  Horace 
Greeley  at  the  time  of  the  Niagara  Falls  conference  in  July, 
had  proposed  to  treat  with  rebels  in  arms.  "Are  we  now  to 
understand,"  they  inquire,  "by  this  proclamation  of  one  acting 
under  your  authority,  and  himself  a  candidate  with  you  for  the 
second  office,  that  even  the  above  proposition  is  withdrawn, — 

30  Edward  McRherson,  Political  History  of  the   United  States  during 
the  Great  Rebellion,  p.  438. 


ISO  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

that  you  will  henceforth  have  no  negotiations  upon  any  terms 
but  unrelenting  war  to  the  bitter  end?  Or  are  we  to  under 
stand  that  while  you  hold  this  proposition  open,  or  yourself 
free  to  act  as  your  judgment  may  dictate,  we,  the  citizens  of 
Tennessee,  shall  swear  to  oppose  your  negotiations?" 

A  climax  of  indignation  is  reached  in  discussing  the  pledge 
to  support  whatever  measures  may  be  adopted  by  the  govern 
ment  in  attaining  its  ends.  "We  cannot  comment  upon  the 
absurdity  of  the  obligation  here  imposed  without  danger  of 
departing  from  the  respectable  propriety  of  language  which 
we  desire  to  observe  in  addressing  the  chief  magistrate  of  the 
American  people." 

The  memorialists  epitomize  their  argument  by  a  direct  denial 
of  the  authority  of  the  governor  or  president  to  alter  or  annul 
any  law  of  Tennessee.  They  continue:  "We  demand  that  Ten 
nessee  be  allowed  to  appoint  her  electors  as  expressly  provided 
by  the  Federal  Constitution  which  you  (Lincoln)  have  sworn 
to  support,  protect,  and  defend,  in  the  manner  which  the  legis 
lature  thereof  has  prescribed.  And  to  that  end  we  respectfully 
demand  of  you,  as  the  principal  under  whose  authority  this 
order  has  been  issued,  that  the  same  shall  be  revoked.  We 
ask  that  all  military  interference  shall  be  withdrawn  so  far  as 
to  allow  the  loyal  men  of  Tennessee  a  full  and  free  election. 
By  the  loyal  men  of  Tennessee  we  mean  those  who  have  not 
participated  in  the  rebellion,  or  given  it  aid  and  comfort;  or 
who  may  have  compiled  with  such  terms  of  amnesty  as  have 
been  offered  them  under  your  authority."  Should  the  presi 
dent,  however,  believe  that  the  critical  military  situation  re 
quires  additional  precautions,  the  petitioners,  while  denying  his 
legal  right  to  exact  it,  will  feel  no  hardship  in  taking  a  simple 
oath  of  loyalty ;  but  they  insist  that  Johnson's  oath  be  disallowed 
as  "irrelevant,  unreasonable,  and  not  in  any  sense  a  test  of 
loyalty"  and  as  "calculated  to  keep  legal  and  rightful  voters 
from  the  polls."  The  paper  concludes  by  denominating  the 
September  convention  "a  mere  partisan  meeting,  having  no 
authority,  and  not  representing  the  loyal  men  of  Tennessee  in 
any  sense,"  and  intimating  that,  in  the  disturbed  condition  of 
the  country,  the  Democratic  ticket  would  not  have  been  put 
in  the  field  at  all,  but  for  the  action  of  the  radicals. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         151 

The  Democratic  delegation  saw  the  president  on  the  I5th  of 
October  and  Lellyett  read  the  protest  to  him.  "May  I  inquire," 
asked  Lincoln,  "how  long  it  took  you  and  the  New  York  poli 
ticians  to  concoct  that  paper?"  When  Lellyett  said  that  none 
but  Tennesseeans  had  had  a  hand  in  it,  the  president  retorted: 
"I  expect  to  let  the  friends  of  George  B.  McClellan  manage 
their  side  of  this  contest  in  their  own  way,  and  I  will  manage 
my  side  of  it  in  my  way";  and  closed  the  interview  abruptly 
with  an  intimation  that  he  might  make  some  further  answer 
in  writing.21  This  he  did  on  the  22d.22  He  denied  having  had 
any  communication  with  Johnson  regarding  the  subjects  treated 
in  the  protest.  The  movement  in  Tennessee/he  said,  did  not 
emanate  from  him,  and  could  properly  be  considered  only  "as  an 
independent  movement  of  at  least  a  portion  of  the  loyal  people 
of  Tennessee."  He  proposed  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  it, 
either  to  sustain  it  or  to  modify  it.  He  had  no  power  under  the 
Constitution  and  laws  to  interfere  in  a  presidential  election  in  a 
state,  except,  by  virtue  of  his  military  authority,  to  give  protec 
tion  against  violence;  and  for  this  he  saw  no  necessity.  "Gover 
nor  Johnson,  like  any  other  loyal  citizen  of  Tennessee,"  the 
president  observes,  "has  the  right  to  favor  any  political  plan  he 
chooses ;  and,  as  military  governor,  it  is  his  duty  to  keep  the  peace 
among  and  for  the  loyal  people  of  the  state.  I  cannot  discern 
that  by  this  plan  he  proposes  any  more.  But  you  object  to  the 
plan.  Leaving  it  alone  will  be  your  perfect  security  against  it. 
It  is  not  proposed  to  force  you  into  it.  Do  as  you  please,  on 
your  own  account,  peaceably  and  loyally,  and  Governor  Johnson 
will  not  molest  you,  but  will  protect  you  against  violence  as  far 
as  in  his  power."  Presumably  an  election  strictly  under  the  old 
system  is  not  now  possible.  In  any  event,  the  validity  of  the 
vote  will  be  determined  neither  by  the  president  nor  by  the  gover 
nor,  but  by  Congress. 

The  incident  was  closed  by  the  rejoinder  of  three  of  the  dele 
gates,  Campbell,  Lellyett,  and  Bailie  Peyton,  on  the  29th.23  "The 
idea  that  the  president  himself  can  make,  or  repeal,  or  modify  a 

21  Ibid.,  p.  439;  Savage,  The  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Andrew  John 
son,  p.  313. 

22  McPherson,  p.  425 ;  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1864,  p.  766. 
36  McPherson,  p.  440. 


152  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

law  of  the  land,  state  or  national,  constitutional  or  statutory, 
though  freely  practiced  upon  by  yourself,  is,"  they  say,  "a  doc 
trine  of  despotism  in  'irrepressible  conflict'  with  the  principles  of 
public  liberty.  And  when  these  things  are  done  by  subordinates, 
the  evil  becomes  intolerably  oppressive,  and  calls  for  the  firmest 
and  most  active  lawful  resistance  which  a  people  deserving  to  be 
free  can  offer."  The  plan  of  Governor  Johnson,  an  agent,  does, 
in  reality,  emanate  from  the  president  as  principal,  who,  unless 
he  disavows  it,  becomes  responsible  for  it.  The  present  "inde 
pendent  movement"  in  Tennessee,  contrary  to  all  lawful  author 
ity,  finds  its  parallel  in  the  independent  movement  of  the  seces 
sionists  in  1861,  and  the  government  is  bound  to  oppose  both. 
Then  "there  was  no  menace  of  coercion  or  violence  toward  any 
who  should  consent  to  see  the  Constitution  violated  and  the  'po 
litical  plan'  carried  out  without  opposition.  But  the  bayonet  was 
kept  in  view,  as  it  is  in  this  case.  Public  meetings  were  menaced, 
and  perhaps  broken  up  by  armed  force.  And  so  it  is  now.  Those 
opposed  to  the  'independent  movement'  were  denounced  as 
traitors,  and  so  they  are  now.  We  had  vigilance  committees  and 
mob  violence  then.  We  have  now  secret  leagues,  and  are  liable 
at  any  time  to  arbitrary  arrest,  as  well  as  to  mob  violence  which 
is  now  used  in  our  midst.  .  .  .  'Governor  Johnson/  you  say,  'like 
any  other  loyal  citizen,  has  a  right  to  favor  any  political  plan  he 
chooses.'  We  do  not  so  read  the  duty  of  a  citizen.  Some  of  the 
political  plans  of  our  day  are  devised  to  overturn  the  Constitu 
tion  and  government  of  the  United  States — and  this  is  one  of 
them.  The  Southern  rebellion  is  another.  Neither  the  citizen 
nor  Governor  Johnson  has  a  right  to  favor  such  plans,  unless  it 
be  upon  the  principle  advanced  by  you  as  a  member  of  Congress, 
that  'any  people,  anywhere,  being  inclined  and  having  the  power, 
have  the  right'  to  revolutionize  their  government;  that  'this  is 
a  most  valuable,  a  most  sacred  right.'  We  shall  despair  of  the 
republic  if  these  principles  of  anarchy,  as  embodied  in  you,  shall 
be  adopted  by  the  people  in  your  reelection."  Any  assurance  of 
protection  for  persons  holding  a  separate  election  in  Tennessee 
at  variance  with  Governor  Johnson's  plan  is  but  a  cruel  mockery ; 
to  attempt  such  an  election  would  be  to  jeopardize  the  lives  of 
the  voters,  as  anti-administration  citizens  already  know  too  well 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         153 

from  experience.  Therefore,  since  the  military  power  is  in  the 
ascendant,  the  laws  disregarded,  and  the  president  deaf  to  ap 
peals  for  justice,  the  McClellan  ticket  is  withdrawn.  "There  will 
be  no  election  for  president  in  Tennessee  in  1864.  You  and 
Governor  Johnson  may  'manage  your  side  of  it  in  your  own 
way' ;  but  it  will  be  no  election." 

Examination  of  the  oath  which  engendered  so  much  passion 
and  excitement  points  to  the  conclusion  that,  considering  the 
supreme  importance  of  the  election,  the  peculiar  situation  of 
Tennessee,  the  passive  disloyalty  of  the  great  majority  of  the 
people,  and  the  impossibility,  under  the  circumstances,  of  con 
ducting  an  election  in  strictly  legal  fashion,  the  obligation  im 
posed  on  voters  was  none  too  strict,  if  we  except  the  clauses 
aimed  at  the  loyal  Democrats.  It  was  of  the  utmost  importance, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  government,  to  place  the  restoration 
of  the  state  in  the  hands  of  those  who  could  be  depended  upon 
as  whole-hearted  for  the  Union,  and  any  so  disposed  could  hardly 
object  to  "the  suppression  of  the  rebellion"  or  the  triumph  of 
the  armies  and  navies  of  the  United  States.  Former  citizens, 
who  had  sought  to  sever  their  connection  with  the  Union,  could 
not  expect  to  be  received  back  without  earnests  of  complete  al 
legiance  on  their  part.  If,  as  was  generally  admitted,  the  am 
nesty  oath  was  a  failure  in  Tennessee,  and  bushwhackers  and 
marauders  were  frequently  captured  with  certificates  of  amnesty 
in  their  pockets,24  a  more  stringent  test  was  imperatively  required. 

On  the  other  hand,  without  going  into  the  question  of  whether 
the  peace  Democrats  throughout  the  Union  were  justified  in  their 
policy  of  attacking  and  opposing  the  government,  it  is  fair  to  ob 
serve  that  the  practical  considerations  which  allowed  them  to 
vote  in  the  other  states  should  have  secured  them  the  same  privi 
lege  in  Tennessee,  if  Tennessee  was  permitted  to  vote  at  all. 
There  was  a  manifest  inconsistency  in  assuming  that  Tennessee 
retained  all  her  rights  and  privileges  in  the  Union,  while  denying 
the  franchise  to  loyal  men  who  would  have  been  allowed  to 
exercise  it  in  other  states.  If,  notwithstanding  her  continued 
membership  in  the  Union,  she  was,  by  force  of  circumstances, 
prevented  from  acting  with  the  same  freedom  as  her  sisters,  she 

24  Nashville  Union,  September  22. 


154  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

should  not  have  been  forced  into  a  compromising  position  as  a 
prop  of  the  National  Union  party,  at  the  expense  of  the  unques 
tioned  rights  of  loyal  citizens;  action  should  have  been  deferred 
for  a  few  weeks  and  then  all  Union  men  united  in  the  labor  of 
reorganization,  without  reference  to  the  national  issues  which 
divided  them.  Finally,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  that  the  clause  pledg 
ing  the  voter  to  assist  in  "whatever  measures  may  be  adopted" 
for  the  reestablishment  of  the  Union  was,  as  the  Democratic 
delegates  declared,  absurd — an  insult  to  the  intelligence  of  the 
citizens. 

The  petitioners,  in  their  rejoinder  to  the  president,  referred  to 
the  breaking  up  by  an  armed  force  of  a  McClellan  meeting  on 
the  2 ist  of  October.  They  insisted  that  they  were  proceeding 
peaceably  and  legally  and  that  provost-guards  were  present  at 
their  request  to  insure  order,  when  the  soldiers  of  a  Tennessee 
regiment  suddenly  rushed  into  the  hall  with  guns  and  pistols, 
extinguished  the  lights,  ordered  the  "rebels  and  traitors"  to  dis 
perse,  and  drove  them  out.  These  soldiers  later  published  over 
their  signatures  a  card  in  the  Nashville  Times,25  affirming  that 
they  acted  entirely  on  their  own  initiative  and  that  neither  Gov 
ernor  Johnson  nor  anyone  else,  not  an  active  participant,  knew 
anything  of  their  intentions. 

Lincoln  and  Johnson  meetings  were  hardly  less  exciting.  The 
night  of  October  24  was  a  wild  one  in  Nashville.  A  negro  torch 
light  procession  was  held  and  "shots  were  freely  fired."  John 
son  addressed  the  crowd  at  the  capitol  in  a  speech  of  which  we 
have  several  highly  colored  and  garbled  reports,  the  most  favor 
able  of  which  does  him  no  credit  as  a  statesman.  He  seems, 
rather,  to  have  resorted  to  the  devices  of  the  demagogue  to  sway 
the  ignorant  and  excited  blacks,  and  his  extravagances  of  ex 
pression  suggest  his  too  constant  friend,  the  whiskey  bottle,  as 
the  inspiration  of  his  unfortunate  diatribe. 

It  is  impossible  to  get  at  exactly  what  Johnson  said.  The 
principal  loyal  paper  in  Nashville,  the  Union,  does  not  report 
his  address  at  all.  The  most  complete  record  is  an  apocryphal 
one  from  a  more  than  questionable  source,  and  attributes  to  the 
governor  words  which  it  seems  impossible  he  could  have  used; 

25  McBherson,  p.  440. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         155 

but,  as  the  speech  created  too  much  of  a  stir  to  be  disregarded 
altogether,  recourse  may  be  had  to  this  account  as  the  only  de 
tailed  one  available,  due  allowance  being  made  for  its  manifest 
inaccuracy.26 

The  estates  of  the  aristocracy,  Johnson  declared,  should  be 
divided  among  free  farmers.  The  great  planters  sneer  at  negro 
equality,  while,  about  their  dwellings,  one  may  see  mulatto  chil 
dren  bearing  unmistakable  resemblance  to  their  masters,  the 
product  of  "a  concubinage,  compared  to  which  polygamy  is  a 
virtue."  Tennessee's  destiny  must  be  controlled  by  loyal  men 
and  "rebels  must  be  dumb."  "Let  them  gather  their  treasonable 
conclaves  elsewhere — among  their  friends  in  the  Confederacy." 

The  climax  is  reached  in  an  outburst  of  absurdity  which  al 
most  destroys  faith  in  even  the  approximate  accuracy  of  the  nar 
rative.  The  governor  had,  he  said,  a  proclamation  of  his  own 
to  make.  Without  reference  to  the  president  or  any  other  person, 
he  proclaimed  full,  broad,  and  unconditional  freedom  to  every 
man  in  Tennessee.  Looking  upon  the  persecuted  and  despised 
people  before  him,  he  was  almost  induced  to  wish  that,  as  of 
old,  a  Moses  might  arise,  to  lead  them  from  the  land  of  bondage 
to  the  promised  land  of  freedom.  "You  are  our  Moses  !"  shouted 
the  crowd.  "Well,  then,"  Johnson  assented,  "humble  and  un 
worthy  as  I  am,  if  no  better  shall  be  found,  I  will  indeed  be 
your  Moses,  and  lead  you  through  the  Red  Sea  of  war  and 
bondage  to  a  fairer  future  of  liberty  and  peace."  If  these  were 
indeed  the  governor's  words,  they  brought  him  only  personal  dis 
credit  as  an  unscrupulous  agitator:  politically  they  were  of  little 
significance,  and  legally  of  none  at  all. 

The  election  on  the  8th  of  November  was,  for  Tennessee,  a 
mere  form,  with  the  outcome  predetermined.  The  only  question 
was  as  to  the  size  of  the  vote,  and  in  this  respect  the  result  was 
disappointing.  It  had  become  apparent  that  the  Confederates 
would  take  advantage  of  Sherman's  absence  in  Georgia  to  make 
one  more  desperate  attempt  for  Tennessee,  and,  while  their 
forces  were  gathering,  nobody  who  had  not  already  committed 
himself  irrevocably  was  disposed  to  take  a  stand  on  either  side. 
Already  the  advance  of  Breckenridge  into  East  Tennessee  had 

29  Moore,  Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  xxxv,  quoting  a  corres 
pondent  of  the  Cincinnati  Gazette. 


156  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

caused  consternation  there.  Partisan  cavalry  swarmed  in  the 
state,  south  and  west,  in  anticipation  of  Hood's  movement  against 
Nashville.  In  West  Tennessee,  a  Colonel  Yansil  had  been  de 
clared  provisional  governor  of  the  state  by  the  Confederates  and, 
with  the  cooperation  of  Forrest,  had  ordered  an  organization  of 
the  militia,  to  include  all  citizens  between  sixteen  and  eighteen 
and  between  forty-five  and  fifty,  the  remainder  being  subject  to 
conscription.27  Requisitions  for  pork  and  grain  were  made  on  the 
people  and  any  pro-Union  activity  was  forbidden  under  penalty 
of  death.  In  many  counties,  and  generally  in  the  rural  districts, 
voting  was  impossible. 

The  returns  are  untrustworthy.28  Only  a  few  scattering  votes 
went  for  McClellan  and  Pendleton.  Nashville  gave  them  25 
out  of  1342.  Shelby  county,  including  Memphis,  went  for  Lin 
coln  and  Johnson,  1579  to  24,  but,  on  an  "unconditional  Union" 
estimate  of  3500  to  4500  possible  voters  and  2400  enrolled  militia 
men,  the  showing  was  poor.29  Bingham  wrote  from  Memphis 
that  the  poor  laborers  and  small  dealers  showed  their  loyalty  by 
coming  to  the  polls,  but  the  wealthy  and  influential  citizens 
worked  actively  to  keep  down  the  vote.30  The  Tennessee  soldiers 
in  the  regiments  and  hospitals  swelled  the  Lincoln  majority  by 
over  85oo.31 

Congress,  by  joint  resolution,  rejected  the  electoral  vote  of 
Tennessee  on  the  ground  that  the  state  had  "rebelled  against  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  and  was  in  such  condition  on 
the  8th  day  of  November,,  1864,  that  no  valid  election  for  electors 
of  president  and  vice-president  of  the  United  States,  according  to 
the  Constitution  and  laws  thereof,  was  held  on  said  day"  ;32  and 
the  president  acquiesced  in  this  decision. 

27  J.  P.,  vol.  xlix,— • 665. 

28  Ibid.,  vol.  Hi, — 1172;  also  the  Nashville  newspapers. 

29  J.  P.,  vol.  Hi,— 1189. 

30  Ibid. 

*  I  bid.,— 1172. 

50  Congressional  Globe,  38th  Congress,  2d  session,  pp.  522,  533,  534,  548, 
574,  590,  608,  711. 


CHAPTER   IX 

REORGANIZATION  ACCOMPLISHED 

As  soon  as  the  national  election  was  out  of  the  way,  it  was 
designed  to  push  forward  the  work  of  state  reconstruction  in 
accordance  with  the  governor's  proclamation.  This  time  the 
initiative  came  from  the  East  Tennessee  Union  executive  com 
mittee.  They  prefix  their  call,1  dated  the  I2th  of  November, 
1864,  by  the  naive  assertion  that  the  heavy  vote  cast  in  Tennessee 
shows  the  disposition  of  the  people  to  put  down  the  rebellion  and 
restore  the  state;  therefore,  a  preliminary  state  convention  will 
be  held  at  Nashville  on  the  igth  of  December,  "to  form  a  ticket 
to  be  run  for  a  constitutional  convention"  by  the  loyal  men  of 
the  state.  (The  wording  of  this  call  subsequently  becomes  of 
high  importance.)  The  pro-Union  citizens  of  East  Tennessee 
are  summoned  to  Knoxville  on  the  6th  of  December,  to  appoint 
their  delegates  to  this  nominating  convention. 

By  the  irony  of  fate,  this  call,  which  seemed  to  promise  the 
speedy  realization  of  the  long  deferred  hopes  of  the  Unionists, 
was  but  the  harbinger  of  a  period  of  distress  and  anxiety  for 
them,  which,  though  brief,  was  fully  as  acute  as  any  to  which 
they  had  been  subjected  during  the  war.  On  the  I3th  of  No 
vember,  Breckenridge  surprised  General  Gillem's  force  of  the 
"governor's  guard"  in  East  Tennessee  and  drove  it  in  confusion 
to  Knoxville,  followed  by  a  terror-stricken  stampede  of  loyalists, 
who  abandoned  their  property  to  the  vengeance  of  the  enemy 
and  fled  for  their  lives.  The  Chattanooga  Gazette  reported  that, 
during  the  week  following  Gillem's  defeat,  3401  refugees  (596 
men,  1115  women,  and  1690  children)  arrived  at  Chattanooga 
without  food,  in  the  most  terrible  weather,  with  the  mud  knee- 
deep.  Those  who  could  not  be  sent  on  to  Nashville  were  gather 
ed  into  a  camp  around  the  already  overcrowded  refugee  house.2 

1  Nashville  Union,  November  18,  1864;  House  of  Representatives,  Mis 
cellaneous  Documents,  39th  Congress,  ist  session,  no.  55,  p.  5. 

2  Nashville  Union,  November  25. 


158  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

"It  is  sickening  to  the  heart,"  Brownlow  wrote  from  Knoxville, 
"to  stand  here  and  look  at  one  thousand  men,  women,  and  chil 
dren  coming  in  through  the  mud  and  rain,  leading  their  stock, 
...  to  save  what  they  can.  ...  I  have  no  houses,  no  shanties, 
no  anything  to  give  them  shelter.  The  picture  is  worse  than 
I  make  it."3 

Notwithstanding  these  discouragements,  the  preparations  for 
the  convention  went  on.  Since  a  fairly  proportioned  representa 
tion  of  all  parts  of  the  state  by  regularly  chosen  delegates  was 
impossible,  the  Union  leaders  determined  to  make  the  meeting 
a  sort  of  informal  assembly  of  Tennessee  loyalists,  who  could 
take  at  least  the  preliminary  steps  in  reorganization  and  bring  the 
work  up  to  the  point  where  its  consummation  could  be  speedily 
effected  when  a  more  auspicious  occasion  offered.  To  this  end, 
it  was  decided  to  open  the  doors  as  widely  as  possible  and  to 
encourage  all  who  were  for  the  Union  to  come  and  join  the 
movement;  in  other  words,  to  make  the  convention  a  meeting 
not  of  representatives,  but  of  Unionists.  Thus,  the  call  of  the 
executive  committee  of  Middle  Tennessee,  issued  on  the  2Qth  of 
November,  while  suggesting  the  election  of  delegates,  declared: 
"The  people  meet  to  take  such  steps  as  wisdom  may  direct  to 
restore  the  state  of  Tennessee  to  its  once  honored  status  in  the 
great  National  Union.  ...  If  you  cannot  meet  in  your  counties, 
come  upon  your  own  personal  responsibility.  It  is  the  assembling 
of  Union  men  for  the  restoration  of  their  own  commonwealth  to 
life  and  a  career  of  success."4  Commenting  on  this  call,  the 
Nashville  Union  of  the  3Oth  said:  "Every  loyal  man,  who  feels 
any  interest  in  the  reorganization  of  the  state  and  a  change  in 
our  organic  law,  so  as  to  conform  it  to  the  exigencies  of  the  times, 
has  a  right  to  attend  and  be  heard." 

Meanwhile,  Hood  advanced  from  Georgia  into  Middle  Ten 
nessee,  for  the  purpose  of  striking  the  lines  of  communication  of 
Sherman's  army  in  Georgia  and  compelling  it  to  retire  from  that 
state.  General  George  H.  Thomas  had  been  detached  by  Sher 
man  to  watch  and  deal  with  Hood,  and  he  now  fell  back  before 
him  to  draw  him  into  a  battle  with  the  concentrated  Union  army, 

3J.  P.,  vol.  Hi— 1357- 

*  House  Miscellaneous  Documents,  39th  Congress,  ist  session,  no.  55. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         159 

as  far  as  possible  from  his  base.  The  strategic  significance  of 
Thomas'  retreat  was  lost  on  the  mass  of  the  people,  who  saw 
only  a  retrograde  movement,  spelling  disaster  to  the  Federals; 
and  everywhere  throughout  the  state  the  secession  sympathizers 
raised  their  heads. 

On  the  3Oth  of  November,  Schofield,  with  a  part  of  Thomas' 
army,  checked  Hood  at  Franklin  on  the  Harpeth  river,  but  the 
Confederates  pressed  on  again  until  confronted  by  Thomas  him 
self,  with  his  whole  force,  at  bay  three  miles  from  Nashville. 
The  capital  was  in  an  uproar.  Swarms  of  citizens  and  laborers 
were  enlisted  for  defence.  The  suspense  was  prolonged  by  a 
period  of  terrible  weather,  with  storms  of  sleet  and  ice,  making 
military  operations  impossible,  during  which  the  two  armies 
watched  each  other.  The  apprehension  extended  to  Washington 
and  to  Grant's  headquarters  at  City  Point.  The  war  department 
did  not  fully  comprehend  the  difficulties  that  embarrassed 
Thomas.  What  it  did  appreciate  was  that  another  Confederate 
army,  apparently  caught  at  a  disadvantage,  seemed  likely  to  make 
good  its  escape,  as  others  had  done  before,  from  another  over 
cautious  Federal  general.  Grant  goaded  and  scolded  Thomas, 
but  the  latter  was  determined  not  to  move  until  conditions  were 
more  favorable.  Finally  the  commander-in-chief  set  out  for 
Nashville  to  supplant  Thomas  by  Logan;  but  on  the  I5th  of  De 
cember,  before  he  arrived,  the  weather  changed.  Thomas  at  once 
made  the  long  delayed  attack  and,  on  the  I5th  and  i6th,  utterly 
crushed  Hood's  army  and  drove  the  scattered  fragments  into 
Alabama.  The  Confederate  force  in  Tennessee,  as  an  effective 
instrument  of  invasion,  was  destroyed.  Here,  at  last,  was  the 
decisive  victory  for  which  the  Union  men  had  yearned  and 
prayed.  The  last  hope  of  the  secessionists  that  the  state  might 
yet  be  won  for  the  Confederacy  was  gone,  and,  for  the  first  time, 
Southern  sympathizers  were  compelled  to  realize  that  the  only 
course  open  to  them  was  to  make  the  best  possible  terms  for 
their  submission. 

The  Confederate  invasion  had,  of  course,  made  it  impossible  to 
hold  the  Union  convention  on  the  iQth  of  December,  as  origi 
nally  announced.  On  that  day,  the  executive  committee  of  Mid 
dle  Tennessee  published  a  card5  postponing  it  until  the  8th  of 

8Nashville  newspapers,  December  19. 


160  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

January,  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  and  call 
ing  upon  the  eastern  and  western  committees  to  cooperate  in 
their  sections.  There  was  now  no  excuse  for  further  delay,  for 
the  battle  of  Nashville  had  taken  the  heart  out  of  the  secession 
ists  and  silenced  the  peace  Democrats,  while  the  chaotic  condition 
of  the  state  called  for  immediate  remedy.  In  West  Tennessee, 
business  was  almost  at  a  standstill  on  account  of  the  disorder  and 
the  prohibitive  trade  regulations.  The  army  officials  were  un 
popular  and  friction  between  them  and  the  civilian  leaders  was 
constant.  They  were  charged  with  susceptibility  to  bribes  and 
with  bestowing  favors  regardless  of  the  records  and  merits  of 
claimants.6  The  boards  of  claims,  acting  under  military  author 
ity,  were  denounced  as  capricious  and  not  above  political  proselyt 
ing  in  making  their  awards.7  The  state  was  still  infested  with 
marauders,  who  were  fast  reducing  it  to  utter  desolation  and 
whom  the  army,  directing  all  its  energies  to  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  main  forces,  had  neither  time  nor  men  to  suppress. 
The  advantages  to  the  citizens  of  taking  their  government  into 
their  own  hands  became  more  and  more  apparent.  General 
Thomas,  too,  for  military  reasons,  desired  them  to  do  so,  that 
he  might  withdraw  his  garrisons  for  service  at  the  front.  He 
urged  this  consideration  on  Johnson  in  a  dispatch8  of  the  3Oth 
of  December,  and  received  the  latter's  assurances  that  no  effort 
to  that  end  would  be  spared  on  his  part.9 

No  further  military  vicissitudes  interfered  with  the  great  final 
act  toward  which  all  loyal  energies  were  now  directed.  The 
convention10  met  at  Nashville  on  the  9th  of  January — the  8th, 
the  day  named  in  the  call,  falling  on  a  Sunday.  The  same  ir 
regularities  which  had  characterized  previous  conventions  ap 
peared  again  in  this  one.  With  delegates  chosen  by  mass  meet 
ings,  more  or  less  representative,  mingled  citizens  who  repre 
sented  their  friends  or  only  themselves,  and  soldiers  sent  by 
their  regiments.  The  opinion  seems  to  have  prevailed  at  first  that 
the  meeting  was  but  a  preliminary  one,  to  take  steps  for  assem- 

•  J.  P.,  vol.  Hi,— 1303. 

7  Ibid. ;  vol.  liii, — 1463  ;   vol.  liv, — 1654. 

8  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xlv,  part  ii,  p.  421. 
'Ibid.,  p.  471. 

10  The  best  account  of  the  convention  is  in  the  Nashville  Dispatch,  Jan 
uary  10-16,  1865. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         161 

bling  a  more  regular  convention,  and  consequently  that  it  was 
hardly  worth  while  to  insist  upon  annoying  formalities.  This 
view  was  certainly  justified  by  the  wording  of  the  original  call 
and  was  assumed  by  Colonel  S.  R.  Rodgers,  the  president  of  the 
convention,  in  his  opening  speech.11 

The  only  difficulty,  therefore,  concerning  the  admission  of 
delegates,  turned  on  the  degree  of  loyalty  to  be  required.  The 
original  report12  of  the  committee  on  credentials  recommended 
that  all  "who  give  an  active  support  to  the  Union  cause  and  who 
have  never  voluntarily  borne  arms  against  the  government"  be 
seated,  but  the  majority  were  uncompromising  in  their  determi 
nation  to  exclude  the  non-belligerent  secessionists  whose  secret 
cooperation  had  wrought  so  much  damage  in  the  state  and  em 
barrassed  the  Federal  armies;  and,  on  motion  of  Colonel  Houk 
of  East  Tennessee — the  same  who  loomed  large  in  the  September 
convention — another  clause  was  added,  barring  those  who  had 
ever  "voluntarily  given  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy."13  The 
delegates  of  each  county  were  directed  to  select  a  chairman  who 
should  furnish  the  secretary  of  the  convention  with  the  list  of 
eligibles  present  from  his  county  and  distribute  tickets  of  ad 
mission  to  them.  All  soldiers  who  came  as  delegates  were 
admitted.14 

The  next  question  was  on  the  basis  of  voting  in  the  convention. 
A  resolution,15  offered  by  R.  R.  Butler  of  Johnson  county,  to  give 
each  county  at  least  one  vote,  with  one  additional  for  every  hun 
dred  votes  cast  by  it  against  "separation  and  representation"  in 
1861,  was  at  first  adopted,  but  encountered  the  fierce  opposition 
of  the  Middle  and  West  Tennesseeans,  who  claimed  that  the  elec 
tions  in  their  sections  had  been  interfered  with  by  force  and 
fraud  and  did  not  fairly  show  their  Union  strength,  and  threat 
ened  to  withdraw  from  the  convention  unless  their  delegates 
were  accorded  individual  recognition.16  To  preserve  harmony, 
Mr.  Butler's  resolutions  were  reconsidered  and  withdrawn17  and 

11  Nashville  Dispatch,  January  10. 

12  Ibid. 

13  Ibid. 

14  Ibid. 

15  Ibid.,  January  n. 
"  Ibid. 

"Ibid.,  January  12. 


1 62  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

the  "one  man,  one  vote"  method  substituted,18  but  not  before  the 
charges  and  counter-charges  of  disloyalty  had  led  the  debate  away 
from  the  subject  immediately  under  consideration  and  revealed 
the  divergent  views  of  the  delegates  as  to  the  proper  policy  of 
reconstruction.  Colonel  Houk,  speaking  for  East  Tennessee,  ad 
vocated  the  exclusion  of  every  former  citizen  who  had  voted  for 
"separation  and  representation"  in  1861  or  had  afterwards  volun 
tarily  aided- the  rebellion  from  voting  in  state  elections,  testi 
fying  in  court  against  loyal  men,  practicing  law  in  the  state,  or 
serving  on  a  jury  for  five  years  after  the  declaration  of  peace, 
and  then  only  on  filing  a  petition  in  the  Federal  court  of  the 
circuit  or  district  where  he  resided,  with  the  allegation,  supported 
by  the  sworn  evidence  of  two  citizens,  whose  unbroken  loyalty 
antedated  the  war,  that  he  had  been  actively  loyal  during  the 
five  years  of  probation.19  A.  J.  Clements,  of  Macon  county, 
wished  to  divide  all  former  citizens  into  three  classes: — first, 
qualified  voters,  who  must  take  oath,  backed  by  the  oaths  of  two 
loyal  persons,  either  that  they  had  voted  against  separation  in 
1861  and  had  never  willingly  aided  the  rebellion  nor  wished  it 
success,  but  had  warmly  desired  the  triumph  of  the  Federal  gov 
ernment  ;  or  that  they  had  acted  loyally  during  the  twelve  months 
last  past,  hoped  for  the  defeat  of  the  Confederacy,  and  would  do 
all  they  could  to  accomplish  it;  second,  passive  non-combatant 
subjects — comprising  those  who  would  agree  to  do  nothing  in 
support  of  the  rebellion — entitled  to  protection,  but  excluded 
from  voting  and  holding  office;  and,  third,  all  others,  who  were 
not  to  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  laws  or  the  right  of  action  in 
the  courts,  whose  oath  would  not  be  taken  against  either  of  the 
other  classes,  and  who  were  subject  to  expulsion  on  three  months' 
notice.20  D.  P.  Gass  of  Sevier  county  proposed  the  disfranchise- 
ment  for  ninety-nine  years  of  all  who  had  voted  for  separation 
or  had  voluntarily  born  arms  against  the  Union  and  was  for 
.precluding  the  legislature  from  reinstating  any  for  at  least  ten 
years  after  the  war.  Mr.  Carper,  a  narrow-minded,  keen-witted, 
implacable  delegate  from  Davidson  county,  declared,  in  a  rous- 

18  Ibid.    The  newspaper  accounts  are  not  clear  on  this  point,  but,  on  all 
subsequent  ballots,  each  delegate  apparently  cast  an  independent  vote. 

19  Nashville  Dispatch,  January   12. 
29  Ibid. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         163 

ing  speech,  that  the  rebels  had  not  repented,  but  had  held  out  as 
long  as  possible  in  their  efforts  to  destroy  the  government,  and 
were  now  coming  back  to  get  office.  "The  only  right  they  have," 
he  said,  "is  to  be  hung.  You  cannot  make  a  good  citizen  of  a 
rebel.  You  may  paint  a  crow  white  or  red,  but  that  won't  pre 
vent  him  from  stealing  your  corn.  If  the  rebels  are  allowed  to 
come  back,  the  few  Union  men  of  Tennessee  will  have  to  leave 
the  state."21  The  applause  with  which  Mr.  Carper's  remarks 
were  greeted  showed  that  many  in  the  convention  were  of  the 
same  opinion. 

From  the  first  day  of  the  session,  it  was  apparent  that  the 
radical  delegates,  who  were  probably  the  most  numerous  and 
certainly  the  most  determined  and  united  party,  and  who  had 
gained  control  of  the  business  committee,  consisting  of  three 
members  from  each  section  of  the  state,  which  was  to  frame  the 
resolutions  for  discussion,  had  become,  after  the  example  of  their 
friends  of  the  September  convention,  disciples  of  irregularity. 
They  were  now  bent  upon  disregarding  the  plain  meaning  of  the 
call  of  the  I2th  of  November,  dispensing  altogether  with  a  second 
convention,  and  themselves  drawing  up  immediately  constitu 
tional  amendments  and  other  regulations  embodying  their  plan 
for  reconstruction,  to  be  submitted  directly  to  the  people  for  their 
approval.  The  conservatives,  on  the  contrary,  were  opposed  to 
any  doubtful  measures  which  would  admit  of  pertinent  compari 
sons  with  the  much  denounced  acts  of  the  secessionists  in 
1 86 1,  and  were  insistent  that  expedition  be  sacrificed  to  regular 
ity  and  to  as  close  an  approximation  to  absolute  legality  as  was 
possible  under  the  circumstances. 

Their  program  was  outlined  in  resolutions22  offered  by  Judge 
Trewett  of  Hamilton  county,  which  the  radicals  succeeded  in 
referring  to  the  business  committee  without  debate.  They  sub 
mitted  "that  this  convention,  being  a  primary  assemblage  of  the 
people,  has  no  constitutional  powers  to  resolve  itself  into  a  con 
vention  of  delegates,  and  in  that  capacity  revise  or  amend  our 
state  constitution;  that  the  true  policy  which  should  govern  this 
convention  is  to  set  forth  a  declaration  of  principles  for  the  con 
sideration  of  the  people,  and  prepare  a  general  ticket  for  dele- 


"Ibid. 

22  Ibid.,  January  n. 


1 64  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

gates,  who  shall  be  appointed  and  elected  according  to  the  Union 
strength  in  the  three  grand  divisions  of  the  state;  that  the  best 
interests  of  the  state  demand  that  we  yet  continue  a  military 
government  until  the  rebellion  shall  cease  to  have  an  army  in  the 
field ;  that  an  election  be  holden  for  delegates  to  a  state  convention 
on  the  first  day  of  February,  1865,  in  the  same  way  and  manner 
that  members  to  the  general  assembly  were  elected  immediately 
preceding  the  rebellion,  who  shall  meet  at  Nashville  on  the  5th 
of  February,  1865,  revise  the  state  constitution,  and  submit  the 
ratification  of  the  same  to  the  people  of  Tennessee  on  the  4th 
of  March,  1865 ;  and  at  the  same  time  members  to  the  legislature 
of  the  state  and  to  Congress  shall  be  elected,  in  such  mode  and 
manner  as  the  revised  or  amended  constitution  may  prescribe 
.  .  .  ;  that  the  convention  of  delegates,  in  the  amended  consti 
tution,  should,  upon  the  basis  of  the  Union  vote,  fix  the  number 
of  representatives  in  Congress,  and  in  each  branch  of  the  state 
legislature,  to  which  the  people  of  the  state  shall  be  entitled  in 
the  first  session,  and  redistrict  the  state  accordingly."  It  was 
further  proposed  that  the  coming  convention  declare  for  the  un 
conditional  abolition  of  slavery,  and  that  none  who  voluntarily 
sided  with  the  rebellion  be  eligible  as  delegate  to  the  convention 
or  as  voter  in  the  elections. 

The  radicals  fell  back  upon  the  fundamental  right  of  the  sover 
eign  people,  for  their  own  salvation  in  a  crisis  of  their  fate,  to 
transcend  the  bounds  set  by  themselves  to  their  normal  action. 
The  report23  of  the  majority  of  the  business  committee,  read  to 
the  convention  on  the  nth,  proposed  this  preamble  to  their 
resolutions:  "The  first  article  and  the  first  section  of  the  decla 
ration  of  rights  in  the  constitution  of  the  state  of  Tennessee  de 
clares  :  'That  all  power  is  inherent  in  the  people,  and  all  govern 
ments  are  founded  on  their  authority,  and  instituted  for  their 
peace,  safety,  and  happiness;  and  for  the  advancement  of  these 
ends  they  have  at  all  times  an  inalienable  and  indefeasible  right 
to  alter,  reform,  or  abolish  the  government  in  such  manner  as 
they  may  think  proper.'  Therefore  a  portion  of  the  citizens  of 
the  state  of  Tennessee  and  of  the  United  States  of  America,  in 
convention  assembled,  do  propound  the  following  alterations  and 

23  Ibid.,  January  12. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         165 

amendments  to  the  constitution,  which,  when  ratified  by  the 
sovereign  loyal  people,  shall  be  and  constitute  a  part  of  the  per 
manent  constitution  of  the  state  of  Tennessee." 

The  amendments  to  be  submitted  were  four  in  number.  The 
first  abolished  slavery  and  involuntary  servitude  in  the  words  of 
the  thirteenth  amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  then  pend 
ing  before  the  country;  the  second  forbade  the  legislature  to 
make  any  law  "recognizing  the  right  of  property  in  man'';  the 
third  substituted  for  popular  election  of  the  judges  of  the  state 
supreme  court,  attorney-general,  and  reporter,  appointment  by 
the  governor,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  senate;  the 
fourth  admitted  to  the  suffrage  all  citizens  of  Tennessee  who  had 
voluntarily  borne  arms  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  (thus 
giving  the  vote  to  the  negro  soldiers),  declared  that  color  should 
not  disfranchise  any  person  who,  by  state  law,  should  be  a 
competent  witness  in  the  courts  against  a  white  man,  and  per 
manently  denied  the  ballot  to  holders  of  civil,  judicial,  and  other 
offices  in  the  state  who  had  given  aid  and  comfort  to  the  Con 
federates,  unless  they  could  establish  their  loyalty  beyond  a 
doubt,  and  also  to  all  officers  in  the  Confederate  army  above  the 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  leaving  to  the  legislature,  however,  the 
power  to  reenfranchise  such  persons,  well  disposed  toward  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  as,  in  their  judgment,  merited 
the  privilege.  Appended  was  a  schedule  invalidating  the  acts  of 
the  secession  government  and  elaborating  the  details  for  state 
reconstruction. 

The  first  two  amendments  were  certain  to  command  the  almost 
unanimous  support  of  the  convention,  for  the  pro-slavery  loyal 
ists  had  been  alienated  from  the  "unconditional"  by  the  quar 
rels  of  the  past  autumn.  The  third  and  fourth  embodied  the 
views  of  the  radicals,  with  modifications  calculated  to  render 
them  palatable  to  delegates  inclined  to  leniency.  Thus  a  loophole 
through  which  to  escape  permanent  disfranchisement  was  pro 
vided  in  the  discretion  accorded  to  the  legislature.  Delegates 
were  not  lacking  who  urged  the  granting  of  the  suffrage  to  all 
loyal  negroes,  and  a  petition24  from  the  "colored  citizens"  of 
Nashville  was  read  in  the  convention,  asking  this  boon  and  the 

*  Ibid. 


i66  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

still  more  precious  one  of  admission  of  negro  testimony  on  oath 
in  court  in  cases  where  white  persons  were  concerned.  The 
majority  were  not  disposed  to  go  so  far,  but  they  proposed  to 
enfranchise  the  negro  soldiers,  and  conceded,  as  regards  the  rest 
of  the  blacks,  that,  whenever  the  legislature  chose  to  extend  the 
right  to  testify  in  the  courts,  the  vote  should  go  with  it. 

J.  R.  Hood  of  Hamilton  county,  the  editor  of  the  Chattanooga 
Gazette,  made  a  minority  report,25  vigorously  denying  the  author 
ity  of  the  convention  to  offer  amendments  to  the  people.  The 
call  under  which  it  had  assembled,  he  observed,  specifically  stated 
its  object  to  be  to  take  council  and  to  plan  for  a  second  "duly 
elected  and  qualified  body  of  delegates,  clothed  with  full  power 
to  make  all  necessary  amendments."  Many  of  the  present  "dele 
gates,"  on  their  own  testimony,  possessed  no  representative  char 
acter  at  all,  but  came  as  individual  members  of  the  Union  party 
of  the  state.  There  was  danger  in  following,  "even  by  implica 
tion,"  in  the  footsteps  of  the  secessionists,  whose  revolutionary, 
lawless  acts  had  been  so  freely  condemned.  Hood's  proposition 
was  that  the  convention  request  the  military  governor  to  issue 
writs  for  an  election  by  general  ticket  on  the  22d  of  February 
of  one  hundred  delegates,  who  should  meet  at  Nashville  on  the 
4th  of  March,  "to  take  into  consideration  such  measures  as  will 
make  the  organic  law  of  the  state  homogeneous  with  the  liberal 
policy  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,"  and  that  the 
people  vote  on  the  measures  recommended  on  the  2Oth  of  April. 

Not  only  the  assumed  authority  of  the  convention  to  propose 
amendments  at  all,  but  also  specific  points  in  the  majority  plan — 
and  particularly  the  third  and  fourth  amendments — came  in  for 
severe  strictures.  Speakers  inveighed  against  the  extension  of 
the  franchise  to  the  negro  soldiers,  the  proposal  to  discontinue 
popular  election  of  judges,  the  strict  disfranchising  clauses. 
Lincoln's  amnesty  proclamation  was  an  inducement  to  the  rebels 
to  return  home  and  receive  all  their  old  rights,  argued  Judge 
Gaunt  of  Bradley  county,  and  the  convention  could  not  depart 
from  the  president's  policy.  A  man  could  not  be  deprived  of  his 
rights  and,  nevertheless,  be  made  a  good  citizen.26  Colonel  Byrd, 
of  Roane  county,  revived  an  old  ghost,  once  laid  by  Governor 

25  Ibid. 

36  Ibid.,  January  13. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         167 

Johnson,  when  he  urged  that  the  convention  plan  be  discarded 
and  a  legislature  elected  to  propose  amendments  in  a  constitu 
tional  way.27 

Gradually,  however,  realizing  the  necessity  of  cooperation,  if 
they  were  to  make  any  headway  against  the  determined  radicals, 
the  moderates  rallied  around  Hood  and  his  hundred-delegate 
idea.  Hood  himself  led  the  attack  in  a  blunt,  defiant  speech28  on 
the  1 2th,  in  which  he  directly  impunged  the  motives  of  the  radical 
leaders  and  accused  them  of  attempting  to  browbeat  their  oppo 
nents  by  questioning  their  loyalty.  The  action  advocated  by 
the  majority,  he  contended,  would  be  a  fraud  on  the  people. 
"The  disinterested  masses  can  trace  the  ruin  of  the  country  to  the 
insolent  demands  of  party  tacticians.  What  accounts  for  the 
surprising  phase  affairs  have  presented  in  this  convention?  .  .  . 
It  is  the  party  lash.  I  tell  gentlemen  to  beware.  They  cannot 
whip  the  loyalists  of  Tennessee  into  the  traces.  They  have  been 
fighting  arrogance  and  insolence  too  long  to  succumb  to  the  en 
croachments  of  those  who  may  have  personal  ends  to  accom 
plish."  The  "would-be  managers  of  the  people"  are  trying  to 
trick  them  by  combining  good  and  bad  measures  in  one  propo 
sition  and  thus  leading  them  to  commit  themselves  to  the  bad — 
"to  sanction  the  act  of  this  mob" — for  the  sake  of  securing  the 
good.  One  admirable  measure  they  propose  is  the  enfranchise 
ment  of  the  negro  soldiers.  "Loyal  black  soldiers  are  better  than 
white  rebels." 

Hood  and  the  moderates  might  have  saved  their  breath.  The 
radicals  were  holding  in  reserve  their  final  thunderbolt,  waiting 
for  the  decisive  moment  to  launch  it.  Governor  Johnson  had 
thus  far  taken  no  active  part  in  the  proceedings,  but  the  intensity 
with  which  he  followed  every  move  in  this  final  act  of  the  drama, 
in  which  his  was  the  principal  part,  may  be  imagined.  Now  it 
was  proposed  and  voted  that  he  be  invited  to  address  the  con 
vention  on  the  evening  of  the  I2th.  This  brought  him  forward 
just  after  Hood's  telling  speech.  The  stage  was  set  for  him, 
and  before  he  had  finished,  he  seemed  to  be  the  only  actor  upon  it. 

With  solid  practical  argument  and  trenchant  directness,  he 
struck  straight  at  the  foundation  of  the"  moderate  position. 

37  Ibid. 

28  Ibid.,  January  15. 


i68  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

"Suppose  you  do  violate  law,"  he  said;  "if  by  so  doing  you  restore 
the  law  and  the  constitution,  your  consciences  will  approve  your 
course,  and  all  the  people  will  say,  amen !  You  are  without  law 
and  without  a  constitution,  and  it  is  your  duty  to  get  it  back  for 
the  people.  ...  If  you  do  boldly  what  the  hour  demands, 
you  .  .  .  may  hold  up  your  hands  when  the  struggle  is 
ended  and  swear  that  you  have  saved  your  state  and  the  repub 
lic.  .  .  .  This  is  the  most  favorable  opportunity  that  has  pre 
sented  itself.  .  .  .  Why  not  agree  upon  two  or  three  simple 
propositions,  and  get  back  your  state  government?"  Were  the 
matter  in  his  hands,  he  declared,  he  would  simply  propose  to  the 
people  that  slavery  be  abolished  and  its  resurrection  forever  pro 
hibited.  This  great  monopoly,  essentially  "contrary  to  the  gen 
ius  of  a  free  state,"  is  the  foe  now  engaged  in  a  war  to  the  death 
with  the  government.  Crush  it  in  Tennessee,  and  its  death- 
knell  will  be  sounded  throughout  the  land.  It  matters  not  how 
the  movement  is  started,  so  long  as  the  sovereign  people  finally 
acquiesce  in  it.  "Any  man  can  draw  up  a  few  'whereases,'  sub 
mit  them  to  his  friends,  and  they  recommend  them  to  the  people 
of  the  state;  and  if  the  people  ratify  them,  the  subject-matter  be 
comes  law, — it  is  constitutional,  and  the  procedure  consonant 
with  the  spirit  of  popular  government.  If  you  call  a  convention, 
involving  expense,  delay,  and  vexation,  their  action  must,  after 
all,  go  to  the  people  to  be  sanctioned  by  them  before  it  can  become 
a  part  of  the  constitution."  Then  let  the  people  act.  The  im 
portant  thing  is  to  restore  the  civil  government  at  once, 
free  from  the  encumbrances  that  brought  on  the  rebellion.  Ac 
cordingly,  it  is  unwise  to  waste  time  now  over  minor  defects 
that  can  be  attended  to  as  well  later — for  example,  the  matters 
treated  in  the  proposed  third  and  fourth  amendments.  As  for 
the  elective  franchise,  get  a  legislature  first  and  let  it  attend  to 
that.  Make  no  more  amendments  than  are  necessary  to  insure 
a  free  government.29 

•  It  would  be  hardly  an  overstatement  to  say  that  never  did  a 
political  speech  bring  more  decisive  results.  Before  it,  the  op 
position  that,  the  same  afternoon,  had  seemed  so  powerful,  im 
mediately  dissolved  and  disappeared  and  the  radical  plan,  with 
the  modifications  suggested  by  the  governor,  was  put  through 
"Ibid.,  January  14. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         169 

with  little  further  deliberation.  As  a  partial  explanation  of  this 
remarkable  occurrence,  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  was  not 
all  shades  of  loyal  opinion  in  the  state  that  Johnson  succeeded 
so  signally  in  blending  into  a  harmonious  background  for  his 
policy.  The  convention  consisted  only  of  "unconditionals," 
ostensibly  administration  men;  all  others  had  been  eliminated 
from  participation  in  the  work  of  reorganization  by  a  gradual 
process  culminating  in  the  iron-clad  oath  of  September,  1864, 
and  the  rigid  requirements  for  delegates  which  the  convention 
itself  prescribed.  All  the  members  were  in  reality  radical,  in  the 
sense  that  they  were  the  foes  of  slavery  and  of  the  old  system  of 
government  in  the  state.  With  hardly  an  exception,  all  were  in 
favor  of  restoration  by  the  convention  method.  The  agitation 
for  committing  the  task  to  a  legislature,  so  vigorous  in  the  pre 
ceding  summer,  had  dwindled  to  a  few  voices,  to  whom  little 
heed  w!as  now  given.  No  irreconcilable  differences  existed 
among  the  delegates  as  to  the  form  the  new  government  should 
take.  Indeed,  the  Hood  party  might  more  properly  be  called 
legalists  or  constitutionalists  than  moderates.  Their  only  de 
termined  attack  was  made  upon  the  representative  character  and 
constitutional  status  of  the  convention,  and  to  meet  this  John 
son  directed  all  his  powers  of  persuasion.  To  make  it  the  single 
issue,  he  cleverly  avoided  disputes  on  vexed  questions,  not  im 
mediately  essential,  proposed  in  the  third  and  fourth  amend 
ments,  by  suggesting  their  postponement.  For  the  legality  of 
the  convention's  action  he  practically  assumed  personal  respon 
sibility  by  his  speech,  thus  lifting  a  load  from  the  shoulders  of 
scrupulous  delegates ;  and  by  emphasizing  his  favorite  doctrine 
of  paramount  popular  sovereignty,  exercised  to  restore  rather 
than  to  destroy  the  government,  he  sought  to  contradistinguish 
this  action  from  that  of  the  secessionists  in  1861. 

After  this  speech,  the  result  was  certain.  Many  delegates  de 
parted  for  their  homes,  realizing  that  the  remaining  proceedings 
would  be  merely  perfunctory.  The  next  day,  the  business  com 
mittee  withdrew  its  report  and  returned  it  with  the  third  and 
fourth  amendments  stricken  out.30  The  last  attempt  of  the 
moderates  to  gain  recognition  for  their  views — a  resolution31  by 

30  Ibid.,  January  15. 

31  Ibid. 


170  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Colonel  Butler  that  the  convention  would  exceed  its  powers  by 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  report — failed  by  a  vote  of  113 
to  161,  all  that  remained  of  the  original  five  hundred  odd  dele 
gates.  The  report  was  then  adopted.32 

Two  constitutional  amendments,  therefore,  were  to  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  people,  providing  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  and 
prohibiting  the  legislature  from  reviving  it.  The  radical 
schedule,33  also  approved,  abrogated  a  section  of  the  state  consti 
tution  in  conflict  with  the  new  amendments,  declared  unconsti 
tutional  and  void  the  declaration  of  independence  and  ordinance 
of  separation  of  May  6  and  the  convention  and  military  league 
with  the  Confederacy  of  May  7,  1861,  as  well  as  all  laws  of  the 
secessionist  legislature  and  acts  done  in  pursuance  of  them,  in 
cluding  the  issue  of  state  bonds,  notes  of  the  Bank  of  Tennessee 
and  its  branches,  and  all  debts  created  in  the  name  of  the  state 
by  their  authority ;  forbade  any  subsequent  legislature  to  author 
ize  the  payment  of  such  debts  or  the  redemption  of  such  notes ; 
suspended  the  statute  of  limitations  from  May  6,  1861,  until 
the  legislature  should  restore  it ;  authorized  attachments  of  prop 
erty  and  collection  of  judgments  in  suits  for  torts  or  upon  con 
tracts,  without  personal  service  of  process  upon  the  defendant, 
until  the  legislature  should  make  other  regulations;  ratified  all 
civil  and  military  appointments  of  Governor  Johnson  and  pro 
vided  for  their  continuance  until  the  election  or  appointment  of 
their  successors  under  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  state  and 
of  the  United  States.  "The  people"  were  to  be  summoned  to 
vote  on  both  the  amendments  and  the  schedule  on  the  ensuing 
22d  of  February  and,  if  they  approved  them,  an  election  for 
governor  and  members  of  the  legislature  was  to  follow  on  the 
4th  of  March,  the  legislature  to  be  voted  for  by  general  ticket 
upon  practically  the  old  basis  of  representation.  The  officers 
thus  chosen  were  to  serve  until  legally  supplanted  at  the  regular 
biennial  election  in  1867.  Changes  in  the  laws  regulating  the 
qualifications  for  voters  and  other  modifications  of  the  elective 
franchise,  at  first  proposed  for  incorporation  in  the  constitution, 
were  left  to  the  general  assembly. 

32  Ibid. 

33  Ibid. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         171 

It  remained  to  provide  the  machinery  for  launching  the  new 
system.  This  was  done  in  a  series  of  resolutions34  passed  by 
the  convention.  The  defences  which  had  safeguarded  the  admin 
istration  party  in  November  were  again  erected  around  the  ballot- 
box  for  both  the  vote  on  the  amendments  and  the  first  election 
in  March.  The  voters  in  each  case,  except  those  known  to  the 
judges  of  the  election  as  unconditional  Union  men,  were  required 
to  take  the  governor's  iron-clad  oath.  The  name  of  each  voter 
must  be  written  on  the  back  of  his  ticket,  and  the  tickets  filed 
with  the  clerks  of  the  county  courts  for  future  reference.  Thus, 
any  man  who  ventured  to  oppose  the  dominant  party  must  count 
on  being  known  and  reaping  the  consequences  of  implied  dis 
loyalty.  Qualified  voters  might  cast  their  ballots  in  any  county 
of  the  state,  or,  if  in  the  military  service,  wherever  they  might 
happen  to  be  on  election  day ;  and,  for  the  soldiers,  military  com 
manders  and  superintendents  of  hospitals  were  empowered  to 
hold  elections.  Returns  were  to  be  made  to  the  secretary  of 
state  and  the  result  declared  by  proclamation  of  the  governor. 

The  convention  then  voted  to  nominate  a  candidate  for  gov 
ernor  and  to  commit  the  naming  of  candidates  for  the  legislature 
and  officers  of  elections  to  the  delegates,  for  their  respective  dis 
tricts.  If,  however,  the  "Union  people"  of  any  district  preferred 
another  candidate,  they  were  to  be  free  to  substitute  him  for 
the  one  selected  by  the  delegates.  The  state  executive  committee 
was  authorized  to  fill  all  vacancies  in  the  list  of  nominees.35 

The  nomination  of  the  gubernatorial  candidate  was  the  last 
exciting  episode  of  a  dramatic  event.  For  months  the  administra 
tion  and  its  supporting  newspapers  had  made  no  secret  of  their 
preference  -for  Brownlow,  "the  fighting  parson,"  a  popular  hero 
and,  even  more  than  Johnson,  the  most  striking  individual  figure 
in  the  state.  Of  qualifications  for  the  office  he  had  almost  none, 
save  his  intense,  unswerving,  self-sacrificing  loyalty  to  the  Union. 
As  editor  of  the  Knoxville  Whig,  the  organ  of  ultra-anti-secession 
radicalism,  he  had  brought  down  upon  himself  and  his  family 
the  vengeance  of  the  Confederates.  Something  of  the  sanctified 
celebrity  of  the  martyr  clung  about  him  and  glows  with  a  shade 

34  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  January  16. 
85  Ibid. 


172  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

too  vivid  of  complacency  in  the  pages  of  " Parson  Brownlow's 
Book,"  in  which  he  recounts  his  sufferings  and  draws  a  highly 
colored  picture  of  Confederate  atrocities.  Intense,  bitter,  utterly 
narrow-minded  as  he  was,  extravagance  in  action  and  expression 
was  a  necessary  outlet  for  his  fierce  passions,  and  his  picturesque 
personality  and  violent  diatribes  were  the  most  effective  drawing- 
cards  at  all  Union  meetings  in  Tennessee.  He  never  failed  to 
excite  and  to  amuse;  in  him  the  arts  of  the  demagogue  were 
astonishingly  mingled  with  the  purest,  sincerest,  most  intolerable 
fanaticism. 

No  opposition  to  Brownlow  appeared,  and  he  was  chosen  by 
acclamation.  In  his  brief  speech  of  acceptance38  he  promised 
an  administration  of  "deeds  and  acts,"  and  concluded:  "God 
being  my  helper,  if  you  will  send  up  a  legislature  to  reorganize 
the  militia  and  pass  other  necessary  laws,  I  will  put  an  end  to 
this  infernal  system  of  guerilla  fighting  in  the  state,  in  East,  Mid 
dle  and  Western  Tennessee,  if  we  have  to  shoot  and  hang  every 
man  concerned."  The  convention  then  wound  up  its  business 
with  resolutions37  requesting  the  president  to  appoint  Brownlow 
a  brigadier-general  and  assign  him  to  duty  as  military  governor 
for  the  period  between  Governor  Johnson's  retirement  and  the 
March  election,  urging  the  governor  and  the  department  com 
manders  to  send  Tennessee  troops  to  guard  the  ballot-box  during 
the  approaching  canvass  and  election  and  protect  the  loyal  people 
after  the  election,  and  providing  for  the  appointment  by  the  presi 
dent  of  the  convention  of  a  committee  of  three  from  the  three 
divisions  of  the  state  to  proclaim  Tennessee  no  longer  in  insur 
rection  against  the  national  government. 

"Thank  God  that  the  tyrant's  rod  has  been  broken,"  exclaimed 
Johnson,  in  his  dispatch  of  the  I3th,  announcing  the  result  to 
Lincoln.  "Without  some  reverse  of  arms,  the  state  will  be  re 
deemed  and  the  foul  blot  of  slavery  erased  from  her  escutcheon. 
I  hope  that  Tennessee  will  not  be  included  in  the  bill  now  before 
Congress  and  be  made  an  exception  if  the  bill  passes.  All  is 
now  working  well,  and  if  Tennessee  is  now  left  alone,  (she) 

36  Proceedings  of  the  Liberty  and  Union  Convention  in  Nashville,  Ten 
nessee,  on  the  9th  of  January,  1865  (pamphlet,  'Library  of  Congress). 
91  Nashville  Dispatch,  January  15. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         173 

will  soon  resume  all  the  functions  of  a  state  according  to  the 
genius  and  theory  of  the  government."38 

The  result  of  the  popular  vote,  under  the  elaborate  restrictions 
imposed,  was  insured  from  the  beginning.  On  the  22d  of  Feb 
ruary,  the  amendments  and  schedule  proposed  by  the  convention 
were  ratified  by  a  vote  of  25,293  to  48.39  More  than  3,000  votes 
were  by  soldiers.  Only  twenty-seven  counties  in  the  state  sent  in 
returns,  and  Shelby  county  was  the  sole  participant  from  West 
Tennessee.  The  feeling  in  that  section  was  influenced  unfavor 
ably  by  the  friction  which  had  attended  the  enrollment  of  the 
militia  and  probably  also  by  the  enforcement  of  General  Canby's 
order  for  a  draft  of  one  man  in  seven  on  the  i5th.40  An  unsuc 
cessful  effort  had  been  made  by  those  apprehensive  of  the  effect 
of  the  draft  to  have  it  postponed  until  after  the  election.  A 
meeting  called  at  Memphis  to  ratify  the  proceedings  of  the  con 
stitutional  convention  had,  to  the  consternation  of  its  sponsors, 
fallen  under  the  domination  of  the  "copperheads,"  who  carried 
resolution's  denouncing  the  convention's  proceedings  and  setting 
aside  its  nominations, — requiring  a  subsequent  radical  meeting 
to  undo  its  work.41  The  guerillas  were  still  showing  intermittent 
activity  in  East  Tennessee  and  frightened  many  citizens  into  re 
maining  away  from  the  polls. 

Although  the  result  was  far  from  an  unqualified  success,  the 
president's  ten  per  cent,  requirement  was  more  than  complied 
with.  At  last,  after  three  years  of  incessant  effort,  Johnson's 
work  in  Tennessee  was  done.  In  a  few  days  he  was  to  leave  the 
state  to  take  up  his  new  duties  in  Washington,  and  his  procla 
mation42  of  the  25th,  announcing  the  people's  verdict  on  his 
plan — for  his  it  essentially  was — and  declaring  the  amendments 
a  part  of  the  constitution,  is  of  the  nature  of  a  valedictory. 

"For  nearly  three  years,"  he  said,  "in  the  midst  of  dangers  and 
difficulties  the  most  complicated  and  perplexing,  I  have  earnestly 
labored  to  restore  the  state  to  its  former  proud  position  in  the 

88  O.    R.,    series    iii,    vol.    iv,    p.    1050. 
138 Annual   Cyclopedia,    1864,   p.    769. 

40  J.  P.,  vol.  Ivi, — 2167,— 2193;  Ivii, — 2302;  Nashville  Times  and  Union, 
February  16. 

*»J.    P.,    vol.    Ivii,— 2302. 

^Nashville  Times  and  Union,  February   17. 


174  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

Union.  My  constant  effort  has  been  to  save  it,  not  to  destroy  it ; 
but  the  rebellious  sentiment  of  the  people  often  interposed  ob 
stacles  which  had  to  be  overcome  by  military  power.  The  task 
was  painful,  but  the  duty  has  been  performed,  and  the  result 
has  passed  into  history.  Time,  I  am  happy  to  say,  has  greatly 
calmed  the  passions  of  the  people,  and  experience  restored  them 
to  reason.  The  folly  of  destroying  their  government  and  sacri 
ficing  their  sons  to  gratify  the  mad  ambition  of  political  leaders 
needs  no  longer  to  be  told  to  the  laboring  masses.  The  wasted 
estates,  ruined  and  dilapidated  farms,  vacant  seats  around  the 
hearthstone,  prostrate  business,  and  even  life  itself,  everywhere 
proclaim  it  in  language  not  to  be  misunderstood. 

"But  all  is  not  lost.  A  new  era  dawns  upon  the  people  of 
Tennessee.  They  enter  upon  a  career  guided  by  reason,  law, 
order,  and  reverence.  The  reign  of  brute  force  and  personal 
violence  has  passed  away  forever.  By  their  own  solemn  act  at 
the  iballot-box,  the  shackles  have  been  formally  stricken  from  the 
limbs  of  more  than  275,000  slaves  in  the  state.  The  unjust  dis 
tinctions  in  society,  fostered  by  an  arrogant  aristocracy,  based 
upon  human  bondage,  have  been  overthrown,  and  our  whole 
social  system  reconstructed  on  the  basis  of  honest  industry  and 
personal  worth.  Labor  shall  now  receive  its  merited  reward,  and 
honesty,  energy,  and  enterprise  their  just  appreciation.  Capital, 
heretofore  timid  and  distrustful  of  success,  may  now  confidently 
seek  remunerative  and  profitable  investments  in  the  state.  Public 
schools  and  colleges  begin  anew  their  work  of  instruction  upon  a 
broader  and  more  enduring  basis.  The  foundations  of  society, 
under  the  change  in  the  constitution,  are  in  harmony  with  the 
principles  of  free  government  and  the  National  Union ;  and  if 
the  people  are  true  to  themselves,  true  to  the  state,  and  loyal  to 
the  Federal  government,  they  will  rapidly  overcome  the  calami 
ties  of  the  war,  and  raise  the  state  to  a  power  and  grandeur  not 
heretofore  even  anticipated.  Many  of  its  vast  resources  lie  un 
discovered,  and  it  requires  intelligent  enterprise  and  free  labor 
alone  to  develop  them  and  clothe  the  state  with  a  richness  and 
beauty  surpassed  by  none  of  her  sisters." 

The  state  election  followed  on  the  4th  of  March.  The  vote 
was  even  smaller  than  that  on  the  amendments,  Brownlow  and 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         175 

the  convention  ticket  receiving  23,352  against  35  scattering.43  On 
the  3d  of  April,  the  legislature  met  at  Nashville,  and,  on  the  5th, 
it  ratified  the  thirteenth  amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitution 
and  proceeded  to  reorganize  the  state  government  and  elect 
United  States  senators.44  But  these  events  and  the  subsequent 
troubled  history  of  Tennessee  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  ac 
count,  for  Governor  Johnson  had  already  resigned  his  office  and 
left  the  state.  The  president  had  not  bestowed  his  mantle  on 
Brownlow,  as  the  convention  had  requested,  but  permitted  Secre 
tary  of  State  East  to  perform  the  gubernatorial  functions  until 
the  new  civil  officers  were  qualified. 

43  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1864,  pp,  767-769. 
41  Ibid. 


CHAPTER   X 

A  GOVERNOR-OF-ALL-WORK 

A  connected  account  of  the  reconstruction  of  Tennessee — the 
work  for  which  Johnson's  office  was  originally  created  and  to 
which  all  his  diversified  activities  were  incidental — has  postponed 
until  now  the  treatment  of  several  subsidiary  matters  which  oc 
cupied  his  attention  in  the  meantime. 

Among  the  many  functions  of  the  governor  requiring  immedi 
ate  exercise,  the  military  were  by  far  the  most  important.  Real 
izing  this,  the  president  had  conferred  upon  him  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general,  authorized  him  to  call  upon  the  military  com 
manders  for  assistance  in  carrying  out  his  orders,  and  provided 
for  a  "governor's  guard"  to  be  under  his  own  immediate  and 
exclusive  command.1 

At  first,  as  has  already  been  observed,  the  respective  authority 
of  the  governor  and  the  generals  was  not  clearly  understood,  and 
led  to  serious  complications  under  Buell  and  Rosecrans.  That 

1  Johnson's  instructions,  accompanying  his  commission,  were  as  fol 
lows  :  "Sir :  The  commission  you  have  received  expresses  on  its  face 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  duties  and  power  devolved  on  you  by  the 
appointment  as  military  governor  of  Tennessee.  Instructions  have  been 

given  to  Major-General  to  aid  you  in  the  performance  of  your 

duty  and  the  extent  of  your  authority.  He  has  also  been  instructed  to 
detail  an  adequate  military  force  for  the  special  purpose  of  a  governor's 
guard  and  to  act  under  your  directions.  It  is  obvious  to  you  that  the 
great  purpose  of  your  appointment  is  to  reestablish  the  authority  of  the 
Federal  government  in  the  state  of  Tennessee  and  provide  the  means 
of  maintaining  peace  and  security  to  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  that  state 
until  they  shall  be  able  to  establish  a  civil  government.  Upon  your 
wisdom  and  energetic  action  much  will  depend  in  accomplishing  the 
result.  It  is  not  deemed  necessary  to  give  any  specific  instructions,  but 
rather  to  confide  in  your  sound  discretion  to  adopt  such  measures  as 
circumstances  may  demand.  Specific  instructions  will  be  given  when 
requested.  You  may  rely  upon  the  perfect  confidence  and  full  support 
of  the  department  in  the  performance  of  your  duties."  J.  P.,  vol.  xvi, 
3688;  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  ix,  p.  396;  ibid.,  series  iii,  vol.  ii,  p.  106. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         177 

there  was  less  trouble  afterwards  is  doubtless  to  be  explained 
not  so  much  by  the  absence  of  causes  of  dissension  as  by  the 
character  of  the  officers  appointed  and  the  lesson  they  had  drawn 
from  the  experience  of  their  predecessors,  that  the  governor  was 
a  power  to  be  reckoned  with  and  conciliated.  Thomas,  who  suc 
ceeded  Rosecrans,  had  promptly  won  Johnson's  enthusiastic  ad 
miration  and  confidence  by  his  ability,  pure  patriotism,  and 
single-minded  devotion  to  duty,  and  had  been  earnestly  recom 
mended  by  him  for  the  command  to  which  he  was  finally  as 
signed.  He,  like  Johnson,  was  a  Southern  loyalist;  his  views  on 
reconstruction  were  much  the  same;  and  his  equable  temper  and 
indisposition  to  quarrel  or  trespass  on  another's  province  stood 
him  in  good  stead  in  Tennessee.  The  post  commanders  at  Nash 
ville  also  took  on  wisdom.  As  for  the  subordinate  military  offi 
cers,  the  principal  source  of  friction  was  removed  when  John 
son  was  authorized  to  dictate  the  appointment  of  the  provost- 
marshal  at  Nashville,  and  those  who  rememibered  the  fate  of 
Matthews,  Greene  and  Truesdail  trod  warily  under  the  gover 
nor's  eye.  Whatever  embarrassments  he  experienced  in  the  late 
years  of  the  war  came  from  distant  sections,  like  Memphis,  where 
the  civil  government  existed  only  sporadically,  under  military 
regulations  of  the  general;  and  such  incidents  were  few  and 
comparatively  unimportant  and  were  speedily  remedied  or  ex 
plained  away  when  he  complained  of  them. 

Another  important  duty  imposed  upon  Johnson  was  the  raising 
of  Tennessee  troops  for  the  Federal  army2  and  for  the  defence 

2  Under  the  act  of  July  22,  1861,  authorizing  the  governors  of  states 
furnishing  volunteers  to  "commission  the  field  staff  and  company  officers 
requisite  for  said  volunteers"  Where,  in  Southern  states,  the  proper 
authorities  "fail  or  refuse"  to  commission  the  officers,  the  president  is 
authorized  to  do  so.  More  detailed  regulations  were  provided  in  the 
form  of  general  orders  from  the  war  department,  viz. : 

General  Order  No.  18,  1862 :  Breaking  up  all  independent  organizations 
and  ordering  their  members  to  report  to  the  governors  of  their  states 
for  commissions. 

General  Order  No.  75,  1862:  Providing  that  all  volunteer  regiments 
shall  be  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  governors  of  their  states  until 
their  muster  rolls  are  complete,  when  they  shall  be  mustered  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States. 

General  Order  No.  48,  1863:     Providing  that  no  volunteer  officer  shall 


178  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

of  the  state.  The  supporters  of  the  Union  in  Tennessee  were 
comparatively  few,  but  among  them  the  task  was  rendered  easy 
by  the  fact  that,  in  the  existing  condition  of  the  country,  Union 
men  were  actually  safer  in  the  army  than  at  home,  where  those 
not  caught  in  the  wide-flung  Confederate  conscription  net  fell 
to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  guerillas. 

The  governor  brought  with  him  authority  from  Stanton  to 
draw  on  the  treasury  to  the  amount  of  $10,000  for  funds  to  or 
ganize  a  "home  guard"  for  service  in  Tennessee,3  and,  by  the 
23d  of  April,  he  could  report  two  regiments  complete  and  four 
others  nearly  so.4  Volunteers  were  plentiful  enough,  but  many 
insisted  on  organizing  as  cavalry,  to  clear  the  state  of  guerillas 
and  protect  their  homes  and  families — a  business  for  which  in 
fantry  was  practically  worthless.  The  infantry  regiments,  conse 
quently,  did  not  fill  rapidly.  This  would  have  been  well  enough, 
but  for  the  great  difficulty  of  getting  horses.  The  Confederates 
had  taken  almost  every  animal  of  value  for  military  purposes. 
Johnson  finally  resorted  to  pressing  horses  from  secession  sympa 
thizers,  but  the  supply  never  came  near  equalling  the  demand, 
and  some  troops  attempted  for  a  time  to  use  mares,  an  experi 
ment  which  worked  badly  and  was  abandoned.5  The  regiment, 
originally  infantry,  commanded  by  the  governor's  son,  Robert, 
was  transferred  to  the  cavalry  service,  and  Colonel  Robert's  cor 
respondence  with  his  father  is  the  history  of  a  long  struggle  to 
secure  proper  horses  and  equipment. 

On  the  28th  of  June,  1862,  Johnson  subscribed  the  invitation 
of  the  loyal  governors  to  the  president  to  call  upon  their  states 
for  all  the  men  necessary  to  fill  up  the  ranks  of  the  army  in  the 
field,  provide  garrisons  for  captured  posts,  and  speedily  crush 
the  rebellion,6  and  proceeded  promptly  to  raise  the  two  regiments 
asked  for  as  part  of  Tennessee's  quota.  By  the  first  of  July,  the 
unrestrained  career  of  Forrest  and  Morgan  and  the  cutting  of 

be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  until  he  shall  exhibit  a 
commission  from  the  governor  of  the  state  to  which  the  organization 
into  which  he  desires  to  be  mustered  belongs.  J.  P.,  vol.  xxx,  6764. 

JJ.   P.,  vol.  xvi,  3967. 

*O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  x,  part  ii,  p.   in. 

aj.    P.,    vol.    xxiv,    5268. 

a  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  ii,  pp.   180,   187,  208. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         179 

the  railroad  communications  threatened  Nashville  with  complete 
isolation.  Johnson  was  thoroughly  alarmed,  and  set  himself  with 
characteristic  energy  to  help  organize  the  defence.  On  the  I4th, 
the  rumor  gained  currency  that  the  Confederates  were  marching 
on  the  city.  A  Union  meeting  was  hurriedly  announced  and 
Johnson  delivered  a  stirring  speech,  calling  on  the  citizens  to 
enroll  and  promising  them  arms,  while  those  who  should  serve  a 
month  were  to  receive  regular  pay.  In  similar  crises  throughout 
the  year,  it  was  the  governor  who  spurred  the  flagging  zeal  of 
others  with  his  restless  energy. 

Meanwhile,  Halleck  in  the  west  and  Morgan  in  East  Tennessee 
were  begging  for  cavalry.  Johnson's  response  was  prompt.  His 
demands  on  Washington  brought  him,  on  the  1st  of  August, 
full  authority  to  raise  any  amount  of  cavalry  and  infantry  needed 
for  service  in  Tennessee.7  The  appointment  of  the  officers,  too, 
was  practically  in  his  hands.  Operations  within  the  state,  he 
constantly  urged,  should  be,  as  far  as  possible,  in  charge  of 
Tennessee  officers ;  and  he  did  not  hesitate  to  request  the  substi 
tution  of  ex-Governor  Campbell  for  General  Buell  as  commander 
of  the  relief  expedition  into  East  Tennessee.8 

In  military  matters,  as  in  every  other  respect,  the  tendency  of 
the  president  was  to  avail  himself  more  and  more  of  Johnson's 
proved  energy  and  efficiency.  On  the  28th  of  March,  1863,  he 
was  empowered  to  raise  and  muster  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  for  three  years  or  during  the  war,  ten  regiments 
of  infantry,  ten  of  cavalry,  and  ten  batteries  of  artillery,  the 
officers  to  be  appointed  by  him  and  commissioned  by  the  war 
department.  Quartermasters  and  commissaries  were  instructed 
to  issue  supplies  to  these  troops  upon  the  governor's  requisition.9 
The  same  order  contained  also  the  specific  authority  for  raising 
the  governor's  guard  which  had  been  promised  a  year  before, 
for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  his  authority  and  performing 
service  around  Nashville.  This  force,  which  might  not  exceed 
a  brigade,  was  placed  under  his  exclusive  command  and  could 
not  be  employed  without  his  consent.  On  April  22d,  a  regiment 

7  Annual  Cyclopedia  1862,  p.  598;  Nashville  Union,  July  15,  1862;  O.  R., 
series  iii,  vol.  ii,  p.  208. 

8  O.   R.,  series   iii,  vol.  ii,  p.  290. 
'Ibid.,  series  i,  vol.  xvi,  part  ii,  p.  118. 


i8o  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

of  Tennessee  infantry  was  detached  from  the  regular  army, 
against  the  protest  of  General  Rosecrans,  to  form  a  nucleus  for 
the  guard.10  Henceforth,  it  was  apparent,  the  governor  need 
not  depend  upon  others  for  carrying  out  his  behests. 

Though  laboring  faithfully  to  obtain  recruits  for  Rosecrans, 
Johnson's  more  immediate  concern  was  for  the  succor  of  the 
loyal  people  of  Tennessee,  exposed  to  the  vengeance  of  the  enemy, 
who  were  sweeping  the  country  in  the  rear  of  the  Union  army. 
To  this  end  he  wearied  the  government  with  complaints  and 
prayers  for  aid  and  finally  (April)  won  the  consent  of  the  war 
department — recruits  from  Tennessee  now  coming  in  but  slowly 
— to  enlist  men  from  other  states  to  complete  the  number  he 
required.11  The  work  was  begun  at  once,  but  led  to  serious 
complications  and  friction  between  recruiting  officers  and  gover 
nors,  and  the  order  permitting  it  was  revoked  in  June.12 

In  the  autumn  of  1863,  the  need  for  more  soldiers  became 
acute.  Rosecrans  was  concentrating  every  available  man  at  the 
front  for  the  projected  winter  campaign  against  Bragg.  Even 
prisoners  were  released  on  condition  of  taking  service  in  the 
army.  The  Confederate  cavalry  and  guerillas  were  everywhere 
and  a  large  force  for  guard  and  garrison  duty  was  essential. 
The  places  of  the  veterans  withdrawn  from  this  service  had 
promptly  to  be  filled  by  new  troops,  and  in  this  work  the  co 
operation  of  the  governor  was  highly  important.  Lincoln  tele 
graphed  him  on  the  8th  of  September:  "Let  me  urge  that  you 
do  your  utmost  to  get  every  man  you  can,  black  and  white,  under 
arms  at  the  very  earliest  moment,  to  guard  roads,  bridges,  and 
trains,  allowing  all  the  better  trained  soldiers  to  go  forward  to 
Rosecrans.  Of  course  I  mean  for  you  to  act  in  cooperation  with, 
and  not  independently  of,  the  military  authorities."13  Authority 
was  sent  him  to  raise  both  troops  for  the  regular  army  and 
companies  of  "Union  guards"  to  be  organized  under  Tennessee 
law  for  twelve  months'  service  in  the  state  only,  and  controlled 
directly  by  the  governor.14  A  similar  organization  had  already 

30  J.   P.,  vol.  xxx,  6756. 

11  Ibid.,  vol.  xliii,  9412;   O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxiii,  part  ii,  p.  308. 

12  J.  P.,  vol.  xxix,  6348 ;  vol.  xxxi,  6754. 

13  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  823. 
UJ.   P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7598. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         181 

been  effected  by  General  Hurlbut  in  West  Tennessee.15  By  the 
middle  of  October,  Johnson  was  able  to  report  good  success  in 
his  undertaking.  The  men  obtained,  he  said,  were  well  adapted 
for  service  against  the  guerillas,  as  they  came  from  the  country 
where  they  were  numerous  and  knew  how  to  meet  them.16  Still, 
the  scheme  was  not  without  its  imperfections.  Officers  engaged 
in  recruiting  regular  three-year  regiments  complained  that  the 
opportunity  offered  for  shorter  service  drew  many  men  away 
from  them.  It  was  contended  that  the  "home  guards,"  though 
possibly  suited  to  warfare  with  small  bands  of  Indians,  were 
useless  against  the  strong  and  capably  led  forces  of  Forrest  and 
Morgan.  Arms  furnished  them  would  only  be  captured  and  sent 
South,  and  their  feeble  efforts  would  bring  a  worse  vengeance 
upon  the  country.  They  themselves  were  insubordinate  and  dis 
posed  to  commit  outrages  on  the  people  they  were  supposed  to 
defend,  and,  in  general,  might  be  expected  to  do  far  more  harm 
than  good.17  Much  of  this  criticism  was  just,  but  the  protection 
furnished  by  the  "home  guards"  was  all  that  could  be  afforded 
the  citizens  during  the  critical  winter  of  1863-64,  and  doubtless 
saved  them  from  a  worse  fate  than  actually  befell  them.  And 
much  more  important  and  valuable  were  their  services  in  guard 
ing  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  army. 

In  his  telegram  of  the  8th  of  September,18  Lincoln  had  urged 
the  arming  of  black  as  well  as  white  soldiers.  This  suggestion, 
of  course,  was  only  in  consonance  with  his  general  plan  of  utiliz 
ing  the  slaves  to  increase  the  resources  of  the  North,  but,  in 
Tennessee  and  the  other  border  states,  this  policy  was  attended 
by  peculiar  difficulties.  The  same  considerations  which  sug 
gested  the  exemption  of  Tennessee  from  the  emancipation  proc 
lamation  counselled  a  tender  regard  for  the  feelings  and  property 
of  loyal  and  qua'si-loyal  slave-owners  in  the  state.  The  military 
crisis,  however,  was  decisive  in  the  matter,  and  determined  the 
president  to  organize  the  blacks,  with  proper  safeguards  for 
Union  men.  As  early  as  the  26th  of  March,  he  had  written  to 
Johnson :  "I  am  told  that  you  have  at  least  thought  of  raising 

15  Nashville   Union,  September  26. 

M  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxx,  part  iv,  p.  308. 

17  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7582 ;  vol.  li,  -1074. 

18  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  823. 


182  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

a  negro  military  force.  In  my  opinion  the  country  now  needs 
no  specific  thing  so  much  as  some  man  of  your  ability  and  posi 
tion  to  go  to  this  work.  When  I  speak  of  your  position,  I  mean 
that  of  an  eminent  citizen  of  a  slave  state  and  himself  a  slave 
holder.  The  colored  population  is  the  great  available,  and  yet 
unavailed  of,  force  for  restoring  the  Union.  The  bare  sight  of 
50,000  armed  and  drilled  black  soldiers  upon  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi  would  end  the  rebellion  at  once.  And  who  doubts 
that  we  can  present  that  sight  if  we  but  take  hold  in  earnest? 
If  you  have  been  thinking  of  it,  please  do  not  dismiss  the 
thought."19 

To  facilitate  this  work,  the  war  department,  in  September, 
commissioned  Major  George  L.  Stearns  assistant  adjutant-general 
and  sent  him  to  Tennessee  to  report  to  Rosecrans  and  Johnson 
and  take  charge  of  the  organization  of  colored  troops.  He  was 
empowered  to  enlist  all  free  negroes  and  slaves  of  disloyal 
masters.  Slaves  of  loyal  citizens  might  be  taken  with  their 
masters'  consent,  in  which  case  the  owners  were  to  be  given 
descriptive  lists  of  their  negroes  enlisted,  entitling  them  to  com 
pensation  "not  to  exceed  the  sum  authorized  by  law  as  bounties 
for  volunteer  service/'  All  negroes  entering  the  army  were  to 
be  free  at  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  enlistment.20 

No  sooner  had  Major  Stearns  reached  Nashville,  than  he  ex 
cited  the  hostility  of  both  Johnson  and  other  "influential  loyal 
Tennesseeans"  opposed  to  making  soldiers  of  the  negroes.  The 
governor's  animosity  apparently  arose  from  a  mistaken  notion 
of  Stearns'  mission,  which  he  assumed  was  to  take  the  control 
of  the  enlistments  out  of  his  hands.  He  remonstrated  to  Stanton 
that  the  major's  plans  seriously  interfered  with  his  own.  He 
had  proposed  first  to  employ  the  newly  organized  negroes  on  the 
government  works,  "indispensable  to  sustain  the  rear  of  General 
Rosecrans'  army,"  and  later  to  convert  them  into  soldiers,  while 
Stearns  wished  to  place  them  at  once  in  military  camps.  "All 
the  negroes,"  he  observed,  "will  quit  work  when  they  can  go 
into  camp  and  do  nothing."  Persons  from  other  states  were 
anxious  to  raise  colored  regiments  simply  for  the  sake  of  getting 

"  Ibid,  p.  103. 
w  Ibid.,  p.  816. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         183 

commands  in  them :  they  neither  knew  nor  cared  anything  about 
the  condition  of  the  negro  or  the  effect  their  action  would  have 
on  public  opinion  and  the  restoration  of  the  Union  in  Tennessee. 
"It  is  exceedingly  important,"  he  concluded,  "for  this  question 
to  be  handled  in  such  a  way  as  will  do  the  least  injury  in  forming 
a  correct  public  judgment  at  this  time.  We  hope,  therefore,  that 
the  organization  of  negro  regiments  in  Tennessee  will  be  left 
to  the  general  commanding  the  department  and  the  military 
governor."21 

Stanton  was  prompt  with  reassurances.  Major  Stearns  came 
to  Tennessee,  he  said,  as  the  subordinate  of  Rosecrans  and 
Johnson,  to  aid  them  and  to  act  under  their  directions,  and 
might  be  relieved  of  his  office  by  them  at  any  time.  "Upon  your 
judgment  in  matters  relating  to  the  state  of  which  you  are  gover 
nor,"  he  assured  Johnson,  "the  department  relies  in  respect  to 
whatever  relates  to  the  people,  whether  white  or  black,  bond  or 
free."  No  officers  of  colored  troops  would  be  appointed  except 
in  accordance  with  the  governor's  views.22  Stearns  was  instructed 
to  leave  Nashville  rather  than  become  involved  in  dissension  with 
Johnson  ;23  but  he  was  a  tactful  and  efficient  officer,  and  succeeded 
in  dispelling  misunderstandings,  gained  the  latter's  confidence, 
and  cooperated  harmoniously  with  him  thereafter. 

Military  commanders  who  presumed  to  trench  on  the  gover 
nor's  preserves  got  nothing  but  censure  from  Washington.  To 
a  complaint  from  Captain  Dickson,  the  assistant  adjutant-general 
at  Nashville,  the  reply  came :  "It  is  not  perceived  what  right  the 
military  authorities  have  to  interfere  with  those  questions  which 
properly  belong  to  the  jurisdiction  of  General  Johnson,"  and  the 
secretary  of  war  "directs  you  and  all  others  in  the  military  service 
to  abstain  from  interfering  with  these  questions  without  specific 
authority  from  this  department,  and  to  leave  them  entirely  to  the 
adjudication  of  Governor  Johnson,  whose  authority  to  dispose 
of  them  is  ample,  and  in  whose  discretion  and  judgment  the  de 
partment  has  full  confidence."24 

The  recruiting  of  the  colored  regiments  went  forward  with 

21  Ibid.,  p.  819;  J.   P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7475. 

22  O,  IR.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  822;  J.  P.,  vql.  xxxiv,  7481. 
28  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  823;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7486. 
84  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxx,  part  iii,  p.  701. 


184  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

decided  success.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  condition 
of  the  negroes  in  Tennessee  had  been  anything  but  an  enviable 
one.25  The  devastation  of  the  plantations  and  the  flight  of  their 
masters  had  turned  great  numbers  of  them  loose  with  little  re 
straint  and  less  prospect  of  supporting  themselves  by  labor,  and 
they  became  gradually  more  destitute  and  miserable.  Many  had 
been  rounded  up  by  the  government  to  labor  on  the  fortifications 
and  other  public  works,  but  such  employment  was  irregular  and 
open  to  abuses.  Officers,  with  no  authority  to  do  so,  impressed 
them  for  military  and  other  service,  kept  them  under  strict  sur 
veillance  to  prevent  desertion,  often  treated  them  harshly,  and 
paid  them  nothing.  The  opportunity  to  change  to  a  regular  or 
ganization,  affording  them  protection,  consideration,  pay  and 
sustenance  could  not  but  appeal  to  them.  Agents,  white  and 
colored,  were  sent  through  the  state  to  work  upon  them  through 
public  meetings  and  personal  interviews.  To  overcome  the  op 
position  of  loyal  slave  owners,  Johnson  urged  on  the  president 
(September  23)  that  they  be  given  $300.  in  addition  to  the 
bounty  for  each  slave  enlisted,  the  slave  to  receive  all  other  pay. 
"If  a  white  man  pays  his  $300.  for  a  substitute,"  he  said,  "he  need 
not  care  whether  he  is  white  or  black."26 

Complete  rules  covering  negro  enlistments  in  Maryland,  Mis 
souri,  and  Tennessee  were  promulgated  as  general  orders  by  the 
war  department  on  the  3d  of  October.27  Slaves  were  to  be 
classified  and  treated  according  to  the  loyalty  of  their  owners,  as 
in  Major  Stearns'  original  instructions.  For  every  slave  enlisted 
with  the  consent  of  his  owner,  the  latter  received  a  certificate 
entitling  him  to  compensation,  not  exceeding  $300.,  for  the  slave's 
services,  upon  proving  his  title  and  filing  a  valid  deed  of  manu 
mission  and  release.  Any  loyal  owner  who  claimed  upon  oath 
that  his  slave  had  been  enlisted  without  his  consent  could  inspect 
the  enlisted  men  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  his  property, 
and,  if  necessity  required  the  retention  of  the  slave,  the  owner 
was  to  receive  compensation.  For  Tennessee,  Johnson  was  em 
powered  to  modify  these  orders  "by  such  regulations  as  he  may 
establish  to  promote  enlistments,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 

23  Stearns'   report  to   Stan-ton,   O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.   iii,  p.  840. 

2(5  Ibid.,  p.  837;   J.   P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7524. 

*  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  860.    For  Lincoln's  views  see  ibid.,  p.  856. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         185 

war  department."28  These  orders  had  a  good  effect.  Many 
slave-owners,  it  was  officially  stated,  came  to  Stearns'  office  and 
declared  themselves  in  favor  of  emancipation.29  Colonel  R.  D. 
Mussey,  in  his  report  to  the  war  department  in  October,  1864, 
declared  that  a  revolution  in  public  opinion  had  taken  place  and 
he  then  knew  of  no  prominent  loyal  Tennesseean  who  opposed 
the  enlistment  of  negroes.30 

On  the  2 ist  of  October,  Johnson  and  Stearns  were  authorized 
to  appoint  any  persons  they  deemed  suitable  for  "raising,  organ 
izing,  and  commanding  colored  troops"  in  Tennessee,  whether 
they  had  complied  with  the  regular  formalities  or  not.31  Such 
appointments  had  previously  required  the  sanction  of  Rosecrans, 
but  the  confusion,  the  interruption  of  communications,  and  the 
pressing  demands  on  the  general,  following  the  defeat  at  Chick- 
amauga,  prevented  him  from  attending  promptly  to  business  of 
this  sort.32 

The  result  of  Stearns'  labors  was  six  regular  negro  regiments 
and  two  garrison  and  hospital  regiments.33  "The  general  senti 
ments  of  the  people  and  those  of  the  army  with  whom  these 
regiments  have  been  brought  in  contact  is  favorable  to  them," 
reports  Colonel  Mussey,  the  chief  superintendent  of  contrabands. 
"The  material  has  been  found  plastic  to  a  degree,  the  men  all 
appear  eager  to  learn  and  willing  to  do  their  duty,  and,  as  a 
rule,  the  officers  have  been  good.  .  .  .  My  experience  in  this 
work  convinces  me  that  these  regiments  can  be  made  for  many 
duties  superior  to  white  regiments.  As  guards  they  are  remark 
ably  faithful.  ,  .  .  For  raiders  in  the  enemy's  country  these 
colored  troops  will  prove  superior.  They  are  good  riders,  have 
quicker  eyes  at  night  than  white,  and  know  all  the  byways."34 
This  was  undoubtedly  the  general  opinion,  at  least  among  Union 
men.  The  good  conduct  and  efficiency  of  the  negro  soldiers 
rapidly  moderated  the  prejudice  against  them.  The  Union  con- 

28  Ibid.,  p.  896;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxiv,  7617. 

29  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  pp.  762-774. 

30  Ibid. 

31  Ibid.,   vol.   iii,   p.   908. 

32  Ibid.,  vol.  iv,  p.  764;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxv,  7766. 
83  O.   R.,  series,  iii,  vol.  iv,  pp.  762-774. 

31  Ibid. 


1 86  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

vention  of  September,  1864,  called  black  as  well  as  white  militia 
to  the  defence  of  the  state. 

During  the  summer  of  1864,  East  Tennessee  demanded  John 
son's  particular  attention.  After  Longstreet's  retreat  into  Vir 
ginia  in  the  spring,  the  bands  of  Wheeler  and  Morgan  continued 
to  operate  there.  From  Knoxville  a  strong  appeal,35  signed  by 
Brownlow  and  other  citizens,  reached  Johnson  in  July.  The 
rebels,  they  said,  were  rapidly  repairing  the  railroad,  preparing 
to  carry  South  all  the  grain  and  live-stock,  and  murdering  the 
Union  men.  A  force  must  be  sent  at  once  to  save  them.  "If 
this  is  not  done  before  the  rebels  have  run  off  their  supplies,  then 
we  ask,  in  mercy  to  the  citizens,  that  no  troops  of  ours  come 
afterwards,  to  eat  out  what  little  may  be  left." 

This  was  a  project  with  which  Johnson  was  in  full  sympathy. 
Having  shared  the  early  sufferings  of  his  neighbors,  he  had  since 
experienced  scarcely  less  anguish  from  his  inability  to  avert 
their  later  disasters.  Now  he  determined  to  dispatch  the  "gover 
nor's  guard"  to  their  relief.  That  body  had  developed  into  a 
considerable  force  under  the  command  of  General  Alvin  C. 
Gillem,  Johnson's  protege  and  trusted  friend.  On  the  first  of 
August,  he  received  orders36  to  kill  or  drive  out  all  marauders  in 
East  Tennessee,  pursuing  them,  if  necessary,  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  state,  and  then  to  direct  his  efforts  to  aiding  the  civil  authori 
ties  in  restoring  law  and  order,  according  to  instructions  from 
the  governor's  office.  He  was  given  command  also  of  all  the 
organized  regiments  being  raised  in  East  Tennessee  to  serve  a 
year  or  longer,  and  empowered  to  raise  others  if  he  needed  them. 

Although  Johnson's  motives  in  undertaking  such  a  movement 
were  unexceptionable,  his  judgment  deserved  criticism.  A  com 
paratively  small  expedition,  operating  in  an  exposed  position 
and  from  a  distant  base,  required  for  its  success  at  least  the 
prompt  and  hearty  support  of  the  regular  army  in  East  Ten 
nessee  and,  indeed,  should  have  been  under  the  same  command 
as  that  army  and  working  to  the  same  purpose.  Johnson  himself 
was  not  wholly  blind  to  so  evident  a  fact.  Though  unwilling  to 
waive  a  project,  of  the  utility  of  which  he  was  convinced,  to 
suit  the  plans  of  another,  he  did  appreciate  the  necessity  of  mutual 

*J.  P.,  vol  xlv,  -4. 

36  W.  A.  Goodspeed,  History  of  Tennessee,  p.  494. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         187 

understanding  and  harmony,  and,  to  this  end,  he  urged  on  the 
war  department  (August  27)  the  transfer  of  East  Tennessee, 
then  a  part  of  the  department  of  the  Ohio  under  Schofield,  to  the 
department  of  the  Cumberland  under  Thomas,  with  whom  his 
relations  had  been  especially  congenial  and  for  whose  ability  he 
had  a  profound  respect.37  The  change  was  not  made,  because,  as 
General  Sherman  explained,  both  Thomas  and  Schofield  were 
then  actively  campaigning  and  had  no  time  to  attend  to  the 
details.38 

At  first,  Gillem  met  with  considerable  success,  penetrating 
northward  to  Bull's  Gap,  scattering  the  Confederate  bands,  and 
taking  many  prisoners.  His  most  notable  achievement  was  on 
the  4th  of  September,  when  the  force  of  the  famous  John 
Morgan — than  whom  only  Forrest  inspired  more  terror  in  the 
state — was  surprised  and  routed,  Morgan  himself  being  among 
the  slain. 

By  the  middle  of  October,  however,  it  was  apparent  that  this 
career  'of  easy  victories  was  soon  to  end.  The  plan  of  the  Con 
federates  for  their  last  attempt  to  overrun  the  state  contemplated 
the  invasion  of  East  Tennessee  by  Breckenridge.  Schofield,  who 
was  with  Thomas,  watching  Hood  in  the  south,  expected  this  and 
saw  the  danger  of  divided  councils.  To  avert  it,  he  directed 
General  Ammen,  who  commanded  the  regular  troops  at  Knox- 
ville,  to  assume  command  of  Gillem's  force.  He  sought  to  win 
Johnson's  assent  to  this  arrangement  by  urging  that  the  present 
emergency  demanded  concerted  action,  and  that  an  order  from 
the  governor,  withdrawing  his  guard  from  Ammen,  would  be 
respected  at  any  time.39  Johnson  would  have  none  of  such  an 
explanation  and  the  guard  was  again  detached.  Schofield  com 
plained  to  Thomas  that  he  could  learn  nothing  of  the  governor's 
intentions  and  was  perplexed  about  assigning  troops  to  East 
Tennessee,  because  he  did  not  know  how  long  it  was  proposed 
to  leave  Gillem  there.40 

The  result  was  obvious.  Ammen  was  probably  irritated  by 
the  conflicting  orders  and  affronted  by  Gillem's  refusal  to  serve 

87  O.  .R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxix,  part  ii,  p.  307. 

88  Ibid.,  vol.   xxxviii,  part  ii,   p.   717. 
39  J.  P.,  vol.  Ii,  -958. 

"O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xlv,  part  i,  p.  884;  J.  P.,  vol.  Hi,  -1235. 


1 88  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

under  him,  and,  from  that  time,  showed  him  but  scant  consider 
ation.  Recrimination  broke  out  between  them,  and  continued 
after  Breckenridge  entered  the  state.  Reluctant  to  surrender  the 
advantages  he  had  gained  and  trusting  to  reinforcements,  Gillem 
delayed  too  long  in  the  face  of  a  vastly  superior  force.  When  he 
finally  realized  that  the  enemy  was  gaining  his  rear,  he  began  a 
rapid  retreat  on  Knoxville,  meanwhile  sending  frantic  appeals  to 
Ammen  for  assistance;  but,  for  whatever  reason,  assistance  did 
not  come.  On  the  I3th  of  November,  his  brigade  ran  into  the 
Confederate  ambush  that  was  set  for  it  between  Russellville  and 
Morristown  and  was  utterly  routed  and  driven  in  confusion  to 
Knoxville.41  As  Thomas  observed,  another  disaster  was  to  be 
attributed  to  want  of  cooperation.42  Gillem  reorganized  his 
guard,  but  it  accomplished  nothing  of  particular  importance 
thereafter. 

Sherman's  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea  was  the  signal  for  a 
renewed  outbreak  of  cavalry  and  guerilla  activity  in  Tennessee, 
calculated  to  impede  and  embarrass  him  and,  at  the  best,  cut  his 
communications  and  compel  him  to  retreat.  Deprived  of  almost 
all  the  regular  troops,  who  were  needed  at  the  front,  the  governor 
and  the  military  commanders  remaining  in  Tennessee  were  com 
pelled  to  develop  other  instruments  of  defence.  For  this  pur 
pose  it  was  determined  to  enroll  the  state  militia.  The  idea  was 
not  a  new  one.  In  the  preceding  November,  at  Memphis,  Sher 
man,  then  commanding  the  department  of  the  Tennessee,  had  di 
rected  the  impressment  of  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  fill  the 
existing  regiments  and  batteries  to  their  maximum,  such  men  to 
receive  regular  pay  if  they  enlisted  for  three  years  or  the  war; 
otherwise,  to  be  provided  simply  with  food  and  rations  and  a  cer 
tificate  of  service  entitling  them  to  a  compensation  to  be  de 
termined  later,  when  the  need  for  them  was  past.43  On  various 
occasions,  the  citizens  of  Nashville  and  other  places  had  been 
summoned  to  defend  their  homes  when  an  attack  seemed  im 
minent.  As  early  as  July,  Bingham,  of  Memphis,  had  urged  the 
enrollment  of  the  militia  throughout  the  state.44  Johnson  him- 

41 J.  P.,  vol.  Hi,  ^1254,  1260,  -1210. 

42  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxix,  part  ii,  p.  886. 

43  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxi,  part  iii,  p.   160. 
MJ.   P.,  vol.  xlv,  9833- 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         189 

self  appreciated  the  advantages  of  such  a  plan  and,  in  August, 
had  drawn  up  a  proclamation  putting  it  in  effect,  but  apparently 
preferred  not  to  publish  it  without  some  previous  popular  sanc 
tion.45  The  September  convention  at  Nashville,  which  served 
as  the  vehicle  for  his  will  in  other  respects,  gratified  him  in  this 
also.  A  resolution,46  adopted  on  the  7th,  declared  for  the  en 
rollment  and  drill  of  the  militia  "to  protect  the  citizens  from  law 
less  violence,  pillage  and  bloodshed."  The  proclamation47 
followed  the  next  day.  "Whereas  the  militia  of  the  state  con 
stitutes  the  military  power,  which  must,  when  necessary,  sustain 
the  civil  in  the  suppression  of  crime  and  punishment  of  evil 
doers,"  all  able-bodied  males,  white  and  colored,  between  eighteen 
and  fifty  years  of  age,  except  those  afterwards  exempted,  are  to 
be  enrolled.  The  magistrates  in  the  rural  districts  and  wards  are 
to  act  as  commissioners  for  this  purpose.  Any  justice  of  the 
peace  who  refuses  or  fails  to  perform  this  duty  and  offers  no 
satisfactory  excuse  for  his  delinquency  is  to  be  sent  out  of  the 
state. 

The  announcement  of  the  new  policy  aroused  immense  excite 
ment.  It  was  realized  at  once  that  its  effect  would  be  to  force 
the  thousands  of  non-combatants,  who  had  heretofore  remained 
in  non-committal  security  and  inaction,  to  declare  themselves 
openly  for  one  side  or  the  other.  Even  the  punishment  which 
the  proclamation  held  over  the  heads  of  reluctant  magistrates 
proved  insufficient  to  drive  them  to  face  the  general  resentment. 
Everywhere  threats  were  made  that  whoever  attempted  to  ex 
ecute  the  proclamation  would  be  killed.  Many  justices  of  the 
peace  declared  that  they  preferred  deportation  to  death.48  Peti 
tioners  from  Macon  county  begged  Johnson  to  appoint  an  army 
officer  for  the  work,  as  he  would  be  known  already  as  an  enemy 
by  the  guerillas,  and  so  would  incur  no  additional  risk.49  General 
Milroy  wrote  from  Tullahoma  that  he  was  experiencing  the  ut 
most  difficulty  in  ten  counties.  In  districts  where  there  were  no 

45  Ibid.,  vol.  xlvii,  -307 ;  vol.  xlviii,  -475,-477. 

48  Nashville  Dispatch,  September  8. 

47  Nashville  Union,  September  8;  Nashville  Times  and  Union,  Septem 
ber  13. 

48 J.  P.,  vol.  1,  -840  et  passim.;  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxi,  part  iii, 
p.  508. 

49  J.    P.,  vol.   1,   -923- 


icjo  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

enrolling  officers,  he  had  ordered  the  county  clerks  to  appoint 
the  most  active  secessionists,  who  were  thus  left  to  choose  be 
tween  risking  the  vengeance  of  the  guerillas  and  being  sent  in  irons 
to  Johnson.50  The  difficulties  were  enhanced  by  the  mistaken  im 
pression  which  prevailed  that  the  enrollment  was  really  a  conscrip 
tion  or  draft  to  secure  men  for  the  regular  Union  army,  and  the 
secessionists  bestirred  themselves  to  foster  this  idea.  The  people 
were  told  that  it  had  now  come  to  a  choice  of  serving  with  the 
Confederates  or  with  the  "Yanks/'51  Many  recruits  were  thus 
gained  for  Forrest  and  Wheeler,  but,  as  General  Thomas  ob 
served,  the  system  had  the  positive  merit  of  distinguishing  friends 
from  enemies.52  Meanwhile,  the  Federal  officers  were  striving 
to  convince  the  people  that  the  proclamation  was  but  a  necessary 
measure  for  protection  and  order. 

The  total  number  of  militia  enrolled  to  the  middle  of  Janu 
ary,  1865,  according  to  the  report  of  the  assistant  adjutant- 
general  of  the  state,  was  18,625  (14,888  white  and  3,737  col 
ored).53  As  the  only  available  resource  of  the  government 
against  the  guerillas  and  partisan  cavalry,  their  embodiment  was 
a  necessary  measure,  but,  compelled  into  the  service  as  they  were, 
their  loyalty  was,  of  course,  open  to  grave  suspicion,  and  little 
reliance  could  be  placed  on  them.  Certainly  their  devotion  to 
Johnson  and  reconstruction  was  slight,  if  the  election  of  Novem 
ber,  1864,  at  Memphis  may  be  taken  as  a  criterion.  With  an 
enrollment  of  2400,  the  total  vote  was  less  than  i6oo.54  Hints 
were  common,  especially  in  West  Tennessee,  that  the  system  was 
not  fairly  administered  by  the  officers  in  charge,  who  sometimes 
exempted  rich  anti-Union  men  from  service,  but  pressed  hard 
upon  poor  loyal  laborers.55  As  the  war  in  Tennessee  was  so  soon 
ended,  the  militia  received  no  serious  test.  From  a  Northern 
standpoint,  this  was  doubtless  fortunate. 

Besides  these  important  military  matters  with  which  Johnson 
had  to  deal,  his  responsibility  for  the  raising,  organization,  and 

50  Ibid.,  vol.  li,  -1085. 

81  Ibid. 

MO.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxix,  part  ii,  p.  382. 

86  Nashville  Times,  January  16. 

MJ.  P.,  vol.  Hi, -i  189. 

"E.g.,   J.    P.,   vol.   liii,   -1409;    vol.   liv,   -1654. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         191 

general  oversight  of  the  Tennessee  troops  involved  him  in  count 
less  problems  of  a  more  petty,  but  equally  perplexing  nature. 
Complaints  of  officers  against  the  government  and  against  one 
another,  and  of  soldiers  against  their  officers  were  constant. 
Generals  and  colonels  presented  their  grievances,  demanded  in 
creased  rank  or  additions  to  their  commands,  requested  special 
authority,  or  assumed  it  in  advance  and  applied  to  Johnson  to 
validate  it.  From  the  Union  armies  east,  west,  and  south  came 
appeals  for  reinforcements  and  for  cavalry  to  check  the  guerillas. 
Horses  and  arms  for  Tennessee  cavalry  were  lacking,  and  the 
governor  was  looked  to  to  supply  them.  Soldiers  whose  pay 
was  in  arrears  expected  him  to  prod  the  paymaster-general  at 
Washington.  The  East  Tennessee  troops  with  Sherman  in 
Georgia  complained  that  they  were  under  Northern  officers  who 
cared  nothing  for  them  and  were  sacrificing  them  in  every  en 
gagement,  and  begged  to  be  allowed  to  return  and  protect  their 
homes.56  The  post  commander  at  Nashville  asked  for  instruc 
tions  as  to  the  treatment  of  destitute  wives  of  soldiers.  The 
executive  office  was  flooded  with  protests  against  the  insubordi 
nation  and  the  outrages  committed  by  the  "governor's  guard."57 
And  every  act  of  authority  by  the  governor,  however  justifiable, 
was  regarded  'by  the  military  commanders  with  a  critical  and 
jealous  eye. 

As  a  general  in  the  volunteer  service,  Johnson  was  required  to 
make  monthly  returns  to  the  adjutant-general's  office  and  account 
for  all  supplies  and  equipment  to  the  quartermaster-general  at 
Washington.  All  vouchers  given  by  his  subordinates  had  to  be 
indorsed  by  him.58  To  expedite  the  securing  of  supplies  for 
the  Tennessee  regiments,  he  was  authorized  in  October,  1863,  to 
make  all  requisitions  directly  on  the  ordinance  officers  and  quar 
termasters  at  Nashville,59  but  this  led  to  perplexities  and  conflicts 
with  the  orders  of  General  Grant  and,  the  following  January,  he 
was  directed  to  apply  to  the  ordinance  department  at  Washing 
ton.60  This,  too,  proved  to  be  inconvenient,  and  a  second  modi- 

M,Ibid.,  vol.  xlv,  9758. 

07  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxix,  part  ii,  pp.  438  et  passim. 

58  J.  P.,  vol.  1,  passim. 

69  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxv,  7658. 

68  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxix,  8507. 


192  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

fication,  in  February,  permitted  the  officers  of  companies,  bat 
talions  and  regiments,  with  the  governor's  approval,  to  draw  on 
the  Nashville  depot,  on  presenting  a  certificate  that  the  number 
of  men  for  whom  stores  were  required  had  been  mustered  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States.  "The  point  which  the  depart 
ment  wishes  to  urge,"  it  was  explained,  "is  that  you  will  use  every 
effort  to  avoid  the  issue  of  stores  to  state  officers  or  troops  that 
have  not  been  duly  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  and  at  the  same  time  afford  every  facility  in  equipping  the 
new  organizations."61  Throughout  the  war,  Johnson  had  to  en 
counter  the  greatest  reluctance  of  the  ordinance  authorities  to 
fill  his  requisitions  for  the  Tennessee  troops.  It  was  freely  as 
serted  that  his  regiments  were  worthless  and  that  supplies  issued 
to  them  were  thrown  away.  Worse  than  this,  it  was  said,  their 
disorderly,  plundering  habits  made  arming  them  contrary  to  the 
dictates  of  humanity. 

According  to  the  official  records,  Tennessee  furnished  to  the 
Union  army  on  her  quota  during  the  war,  31,092  white  soldiers. 
To  these  must  be  added  20,133  colored  troops  not  credited  upon 
the  quota,  but  recruited  under  direct  authority  from  the  general 
government.  Prdba'bly  7,000  Tennesseeans  enlisted  in  Kentucky 
regiments  and  were  credited  to  that  state.  Tennessee's  contribu 
tion  to  the  Confederate  army  is  estimated  at  nearly  100,000. 
When  it  is  reflected  that  140,000  was  regarded  as  a  good  vote  in 
the  state  just  previous  to  the  war,  these  figures  speak  volumes 
for  the  devoted  heroism  of  her  sons.  A  large  proportion  of  the 
white  Union  soldiers  came  from  a  division  of  the  state  with  a 
male  population,  between  twenty  and  fifty  years  of  age  of  only 
45,000.  The  Union  recruits  were  organized  into  eight  regiments 
of  infantry,  eight  of  mounted  infantry,  twelve  of  cavalry,  and 
five  battalions  of  light  artillery.62 

Partly  military,  partly  civil  in  its  nature,  and  particularly  im 
portant  in  its  bearing  upon  his  reconstruction  policy,  was  John 
son's  authority  to  control  the  disposal  of  Tennessee  prisoners. 

61  Ibid.,    vol.    xli,   8918-8923. 

*"  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  pp.  73,  1270;  Goodspeed,  History  of 
Tennessee,  pp.  477,  497. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         193 

The  Confederate  conscript  law  had  borne  with  great  severity  on 
Tennessee.  Many  who  preferred  the  Union  were  compelled  to 
join  the  Southern  army  against  their  will,  and  not  a  few  deserted 
and  found  their  way  within  the  Federal  lines.  Others  enlisted 
to  avoid  persecution  at  home,  but  were  lukewarm  or  indifferent  in 
the  service  and,  when  convinced  that  Tennessee  was  lost  to  the 
Confederacy,  were  anxious  to  return  to  their  families  and  their 
old  allegiance.  These  men  would  be  of  value  in  restoring  the 
state,  and  it  was  obviously  to  the  advantage  of  the  government 
to  deal  leniently  with  them.  The  difficulty  lay,  of  course,  in  dis 
tinguishing  sincere  penitents  from  those  who  simply  desired  to 
escape  the  hardships  of  prison  life,  while  remaining  disloyal  at 
heart;  but  many  even  of  these  might  eventually  be  won  by  con 
siderate  treatment. 

From  the  outset,  Johnson's  mail  was  filled  with  petitions  from 
prisoners,  confined  mostly  at  Camp  Chase,  Ohio,  Camp  Douglas, 
Illinois,  and  Camp  Morton,  Indiana,  and  from  their  relatives  and 
friends,  asking  either  for  permission  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance 
and  return  home  or  for  release  on  parole.  Increasingly,  as  the 
war  progressed  and  the  lot  of  the  Confederate  soldier  became 
harder,  the  petitioners  begged  not  to  be  exchanged  and  sent  South, 
but  to  be  retained  in  confinement  until  the  government  prescribed 
terms  of  pardon  for  them.  A  letter  from  several  hundred  pris 
oners  at  Camp  Morton  is  characteristic.63  They  realize,  they  say, 
that  the  war  is  now  for  the  independence  of  the  cotton  states,  not 
for  Tennessee,  which  the  Confederacy  has  no  chance  of  recover 
ing.  They  had  entered  the  struggle  under  the  false  impression, 
inspired  by  their  leaders,  that  the  North,  possessed  by  "a  mad 
fanaticism,"  was  bent  on  destroying  the  "peculiar  institution" 
which  belonged  to  Tennessee  and  the  cotton  states  alike  and 
united  them  in  a  common  interest.  They  are  now  convinced, 
however,  from  conversations  with  Northern  citizens  and  soldiers 
and  from  reading  Northern  newspapers,  that  a  large  portion  of 
the  Northern  people  are  conservative,  and  never  really  intended 
to  interfere  with  their  institutions  at  all.  And,  as  loyal  Tennes- 
seeans,  they  wish  to  follow  their  state  back  into  the  Union.  "We 
believe,"  they  conclude,  "it  is  our  duty  to  return  to  our  allegiance 

40  J.  P.,  vol.  xxi,  4830;  vol.  xvii,  3826,  3837  et  passim. 


194  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

to  the  Federal  government,  and  be  contented  to  go  home  and 
remain  peaceable  citizens,  and  aid  in  restoring  peace  and  quiet 
to  our  distracted  state  once  more,  and  in  removing,  as  far  as  we 
can,  the  false  views  of  our  fellow  citizens  we  left  behind  us." 

Late  in  March,  1862,  Johnson  sent  C.  F.  Trigg  to  Camp  Chase 
to  confer  with  the  prisoners,  as  a  preliminary  to  interceding  with 
the  government  for  them.  Trigg  found  many  anxious  to  take 
the  oath,  though  the  majority  held  that  their  honor  was  involved 
in  a  previous  oath  to  the  Confederacy  and  asked  to  be  paroled, 
pending  a  possible  exchange.  These  latter,  Trigg  thought,  had 
-best  remain  harmless  in  prison,  since  they  had  experienced  no 
change  of  heart.64 

Johnson's  active  interest  in  the  matter  led  Lincoln  (June  4) 
to  ask  him  directly  whether  he  wished  to  control  the  whole  busi 
ness  of  releasing  Tennessee  prisoners.65  The  governor  responded 
promptly  in  the  affirmative.  I  believe,  he  said,  that  "we  can 
prescribe  such  terms  of  release  and  so  dispose  of  the  question  as 
to  exert  a  powerful  influence  throughout  the  state  in  our  favor 
and  to  a  great  extent  make  secessionists  dependent  upon  Union 
influence."66  The  desired  control  was  not  immediately  granted, 
because,  as  Stanton  explained,  conditions  were  not  yet  ripe  for 
the  exercise  of  clemency;  but,  on  the  4th  of  August,  the  gover 
nor  was  empowered  to  appoint  commissioners  to  examine  the 
prisoners  to  determine  the  merits  of  each  case  and  the  terms  on 
which  releases  ought  to  be  granted.67  Those  who  expressed  an 
anxious  desire  to  return  to  their  allegiance,  took  the  oath,  and 
gave  bond  for  its  faithful  observance  might  be  set  free.68  John 
son  named  General  (ex-Governor)  W.  B.  Campbell  as  commis 
sioner,  and  many  releases  were  arranged  for. 

On  the  'ioth  of  July,  1863,  the  secretary  of  war  directed  that 
Confederate  prisoners  who  had  been  impressed  into  the  service 
and  desired  to  join  the  Union  army  in  good  faith  might  be  per 
mitted  to  do  so,  on  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance.69  At  first  each 

**  Ibid.,  vol.  xvii,  3883. 

65  Lincoln's  Complete  Works,  vol.  vii,  p.  212. 

68  J.  P.,  vol.  xx,  4607. 

Tbid.,  4638;  vol.  xxiv,  5330. 

"Nashville  Union,  August  10. 

99  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  482 ;  J.  P.,  vol.    xxxii,  7148. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         195 

case  was  referred  separately  to  Washington,  but,  on  the  repre 
sentation  of  Rosecrans  that  this  elaborate  process  interfered  with 
the  enlistments,  particularly  of  the  prisoners  taken  at  Vicksburg, 
that  formality  was  dispensed  with,  and  the  work  confided  to  the 
discretion  of  Rosecrans  and  Johnson,  with  the  simple  require 
ments  that  care  be  taken  so  to  distribute  such  recruits  as  to  keep 
them  under  "Union  forces  and  sentiment"  and  that  descriptive 
lists  of  them  be  filed  at  Rosecrans'  headquarters.70 

From  the  summer  of  1863  until  almost  the  end  of  the  war, 
exchange  of  prisoners  was,  with  few  exceptions,  discontinued. 
Johnson  was  thereby  somewhat  relieved  from  a  heavy  responsi 
bility,  though  he  still  made  recommendations  for  discharges, 
which  were  placed  on  file,  pending  a  possible  change  of  policy. 

The  unexpected  prolongation  and  hardships  of  the  war  and 
the  ill  success  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Tennessee  brought  an 
increasing  number  of  desertions  from  their  ranks  to  the  Union 
army.  Rosecrans  and  Johnson,  on  authority  from  Stanton, 
adopted  the  practice  of  enlisting  deserters  in  the  Tennessee  regi 
ments.  Thomas,  who  succeeded  to  the  command  in  October, 
1863,  reversed  this  policy.  His  opinion,  confirmed  by  representa 
tions  from  his  subordinates,  was  that  such  men  were  not  depend 
able  and  that  the  enemy  were  taking  advantage  of  this  easy 
means  of  slipping  spies  into  his  army.  By  his  direction,  all 
deserters  were  thereafter  to  be  sent  north  of  the  Ohio  river,  to 
remain  during  the  war.71 

This  order  caused  serious  hardship.  In  January,  1864,  the 
provost-marshal  at  Jeffersonville,  Indiana,  wrote  to  Johnson72  that 
hundreds  of  Tennesseeans  had  been  driven  to  that  place,  with  no 
money  and  no  prospect  of  getting  work.  Their  condition  he  de 
scribed  as  "truly  forlorn  and  pitiable."  At  other  points  north  of 
the  Ohio  it  was  as  bad.  Many  of  these  men  deserved  the  deepest 
sympathy  as  sincere  loyalists  forced  into  the  enemy's  ranks  wholly 
against  their  will.  The  situation  became  acute  when  Hood  in 
vaded  the  state  in  November,  conscripting  all  men  available  as 
soldiers.  Large  numbers  of  them  deserted  at  the  first  oppor 
tunity  and  were  captured  in  the  very  act  of  doing  so.  Johnson's 

70  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  p.  735;  series  i,  vol.  xxx,  part  in,  p.  230. 
71 J.  P.,  vol.  xxxvi,  7998. 

71  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxviii,  8434. 


196  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

interest  was  enlisted  in  their  favor,  and  he  succeeded  in  secur 
ing  Thomas'  consent  to  the  -release  of  those  known  to  be  heartily 
loyal  and  aiding  the  enemy  only  under  compulsion.73  Finally, 
on  the  5th  of  January,  1865,  after  the  rout  of  Hood  had  removed 
all  apprehension  in  his  department,  Thomas  revoked  his  onerous 
order.  Confederate  deserters,  residents  of  Kentucky  and  Ten 
nessee,  who  could  furnish  satisfactory  evidence  of  their  intention 
to  'become  peaceable  citizens,  were  permitted  to  go  to  their  homes, 
after  reporting  to  the  provost-marshal  general  at  Nashville  and 
taking  the  amnesty  oath.74 

Not  only  Confederate,  but  also  Union  deserters,  had  reason  to 
be  grateful  for  the  governor's  good  offices.  During  the  summer 
of  1864,  refugees  from  East  Tennessee,  enlisted  in  regiments  as 
signed  to  service  elsewhere,  hearing  of  the  depredations  of  the 
guerillas  in  the  neighborhood  of  their  houses  and  in  despair  for 
the  safety  of  their  families  and  property,  escaped  and  returned 
to  protect  them.  For  them,  too,  Johnson  appealed  to  Thomas.75 
They  had  not  realized  the  magnitude  of  their  offence,  he  said,  and 
had  intended  to  go  back  to  duty,  but  fear  of  being  court-martialed 
now  kept  them  away.  In  deference  to  his  request,  Thomas  con 
sented  to  receive  back  the  offenders  without  trial  or  punishment, 
if  they  reported  within  twenty  days.76 

The  operations  of  the  Union  army,  particularly  in  the  early 
years  of  the  war,  were  seriously  impeded  by  the  lack  of  any 
adequate  transportation  facilities  in  the  state.  In  1862,  the  only 
railroads  in  running  order  which  could  be  utilized  to  advantage 
were  the  Memphis,  Clarksville,  and  Louisville  and  the  Louisville, 
Nashville,  and  Chattanooga.  The  former  was  in  serious  financial 
difficulties  and,  after  it  had  failed  twice  in  the  payment  of  the 
interest  on  its  bonds,  the  governor  took  it  over  in  the  name  of  the 
state.77  The  Louisville-Nashville  road  was  of  far  more  impor 
tance,  as  the  channel  of  communication  with  the  North  for  the 
Federal  armies  operating  against  Georgia  and  with  the  South  for 

'**O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xlv,  part  ii,  pp.  308,  319. 

7*  Nashville  Dispatch,  January  12,  1865. 

TOJ.   P.,  vol.  xlvii,  -240. 

™ Ibid,  -283. 

77  Ibid.,  vol.  xxi,  4822. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         197 

the  Confederate  armies  operating  against  Kentucky.  On  it  the 
forces  and  supplies  of  Buell  and  Rosecrans,  Albert  Sidney  John 
son  and  Bragg  were  transported.  It  was,  however,  utterly  inade 
quate  for  the  demands  upon  it.  Its  length  made  it  extremely  dif 
ficult  to  defend,  and  the  large  number  of  trestles,  bridges  and 
tunnels,  which  could  be  destroyed  easily  in  a  short  time,  enabled 
cavalry  to  keep  it  almost  constantly  crippled.  Thus,  without 
warning,  a  Union  army,  far  from  its  base,  might,  at  any  time,  be 
placed  in  a  dangerous  predicament. 

This  difficulty  demanded  a  prompt  solution.  The  most  feasible 
one  lay  in  the  completion  of  the  already  projected  Nashville  and 
Northwestern  road,  designed  to  connect  the  capital  with  Hick- 
man,  Kentucky,  on  the  Mississippi  river,  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  distant,  and  to  strike  the  Tennessee  river  at  Reynoldsburg. 
It  was  proposed  to  complete  this  line  as  far  as  Reynoldsburg,  a 
distance  of  seventy-five  miles,  all  but  eight  miles  of  which  were 
already  graded.78  Being  little  more  than  a  third  as  long  as  the 
Louisville  road,  it  would  greatly  expedite  communication  and  the 
task  of  guarding  it  would  be  comparatively  simple.  But  five  short 
bridges  would  be  necessary,  no  accident  to  which  could  long 
delay  traffic.  The  road  intersected  the  Memphis,  Clarksville, 
and  Louisville  line,  thus  opening  up  connections  west  and  north, 
and,  at  its  terminus  at  Reynoldsburg,  the  river  was  of  sufficient 
depth  to  afford  easy  navigation  for  freight-boats  and  gunboats, 
which  could  be  utilized  to  land  supplies  at  that  point. 

From  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Johnson  had  urged  this  project 
upon  the  war  department  and  the  generals.  The  successes  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry  in  1863  brought  its  desirability  sharply  home 
to  Rosecrans.  On  the  27th  of  August,  he  replied  to  the  gover 
nor's  solicitations  with  ,a  proposal79  to  place  the  work  in  his  hands. 
One  responsibility  more  added  to  the  many  which  already  weighed 
upon  him  was  no  deterrent  to  Johnson ;  he  accepted  with  alacrity. 
The  requisite  authority  came  from  Stanton  on  the  22d  of  Oc 
tober.80  The  governor  was  given  full  power  to  secure  the  neces 
sary  material,  employ  engineers  and  other  officers  and  laborers, 
the  contracts  being  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  quartermaster- 

78  Nashville  Union,  September  20,  1863. 

79  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxx,  part  iii,  p.  184.     See  also  pp.  67,  74. 

80  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxi,  part  iii,  p.  14;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxxv,  7769. 


198  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

general.  Certificates  for  rations  and  supplies  from  the  quarter 
master's  department,  indorsed  by  the  governor  and  the  engineer 
in  charge,  were  to  be  honored.  The  road  was  to  remain  under 
Johnson's  control  until  its  completion,  then  to  be  turned  over  to 
the  general  manager  of  government  railroads. 

General  Grant  was  directed  to  supply  a  force  to  protect  the 
work,81  but  he  was  too  much  occupied  with  other  matters  to  give 
adequate  attention  to  this,  and  the  task  of  maintaining  the  guard 
fell  largely  on  Johnson.  New  companies  were  raised  for  this 
purpose  and  placed  under  the  command  of  General  Gillem.  Later 
the  place  of  the  white  guards  was  taken  by  negroes. 

From  the  persistent  cavalry  raids,  the  Louisville-Nashville  road 
was  more  and  more  ruined,  its  rolling-stock  deteriorated,  and  it 
became  practically  useless.  For  the  operations  in  the  southern 
part  of  the  state  in  1864,  the  new  line  was  of  the  utmost  im 
portance  and  the  war  department  had  reason  to  be  grateful  to 
Johnson  for  his  foresight.  Gillem  wrote  to  him  in  March  :  "Gen 
erals  Grant  and  Thomas  look  upon  it  as  an  absolute  necessity  — 
in  fact  it  would  be  impossible  to  subsist  both  Thomas'  and  Scho- 
field's  armies  .without  the  aid  of  this  road.  At  last  the  com 
mander  of  the  department  sees  what  you  saw  two  years  since."82 

Pushed  forward  with  Johnson's  characteristic  energy,  the  road 
was  sufficiently  advanced  in  May,  1864,  for  cars  to  run  regularly 
to  the  Tennessee  river.  General  Webster,  Sherman's  chief  of 
staff  at  Nashville,  thereupon  directed  Anderson,  the  general  su 
perintendent,  to  take  it  over  for  the  army.83  Johnson  was  not 
consulted  in  the  matter,  and  he  lost  no  time  in  bringing  the  over 
sight  to  Webster's  attention.84  The  road  could  be  used  to  its 
full  capacity  for  military  purposes,  he  wrote,  but  until  it  was 
completed  and  turned  over  by  him  to  the  war  department,  he  ex 
pected  to  retain  the  control  given  him  by  his  instructions. 

On  the  I3th  of  June,  Sherman  requested  Johnson  to  relinquish 
the  management  of  the  road  to  Anderson  and  the  guarding  of  it 
to  General  Rosecrans,  "to  simplify  matters  and  insure  the  respon 
sibility  of  agents,"85  but  the  formal  transfer  did  not  take  place 


81  Ibid. 

83  J.  P.,  vol.  xli,  9062. 


83  Ibid.,  vol.  xliii,  9376,  9469. 

94  Ibid. 

86  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxviii,  part  iv,  p.  466. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         199 

until  the  6th  of  August,  by  an  order86  from  Stanton  based  on 
Sherman's  representation  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  success 
of  his  operations.  For  all  purposes  of  transportation,  it  had  al 
ready  been  under  his  management  since  June,  though  Johnson 
still  directed  the  work  of  construction.87  The  latter  keenly  re 
sented  the  haste  to  be  rid  of  his  authority  and  he  intimated  to 
Sherman  that  it  did  not  spring  from  wholly  disinterested  motives. 
"This  state  is  largely  interested  in  this  road,"  he  wrote,  "inno 
cent  persons  beyond  its  limits  holding  the  bonds  issued  for  its 
construction.  An  effort  was  made  by  certain  parties  some  time 
since  to  take  charge  of  the  road  before  it  was  even  in  running 
order.  It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  state  that  there  might  be 
parties  interested  in  various  ways  in  having  the  immediate  and 
direct  supervision  of  the  road  a  little  farther  removed  for  other 
than  military  purposes."  The  government  would  do  well,  he  sug 
gested  to  take  over  the  Louisville-Nashville  road  also.  Large 
sums  paid  for  its  use  had  gone  into  the  pockets  of  traitors.88 

The  Northwestern  road  continued  to  be  an  important  resource 
of  Sherman  and  Thomas  throughout  the  war.  Though  tempo 
rarily  wrecked  during  Hood's  advance  on  Nashville,  it  was 
promptly  repaired.  To  Johnson  is  due  the  largest  share  of  the 
credit  for  the  advantages  it  brought  to  the  Federal  armies. 

An  obvious  result  of  the  victorious  Union  advance  into  Ten 
nessee  in  the  spring  of  1862  was  utter  chaos  in  the  state  finances. 
The  state  government,  fleeing  first  from  Nashville  and  then  from 
Memphis,  took  with  it  for  the  use  of  the  Confederacy  every 
portable  asset  on  which  It  could  lay  its  hands.  When  Johnson 
assumed  his  office  at  the  capitol,  specie  had  practically  disap 
peared,  the  banks  were  in  distress,  -business  was  at  a  standstill, 
and  the  state  in  a  condition  of  panic-fear  which  augured  ill  for 
the  immediate  future.  The  situation  was  further  complicated  by 
the  fact  that  the  great  bulk  of  the  population,  especially  the 
wealthier  classes,  were  ardently  for  the  Confederacy  and  pre 
pared  to  endure  unnecessary,  hardships  and  even  want  if  by  so 
doing  they  could  embarrass  and  weaken  the  military  government. 

86  Ibid.,   part  v,   pp.   367,  391 ;    J.    P.,   vol.   xlv,   -126. 

87  O.  R.,  series  i,  xxxviii,  part  iv,  p.  411;  J.  P.,  vol.  xlv,  -134. 
"  Ibid. 


200  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

General  Sherman,  in  command  at  Memphis,  promptly  grasped 
the  essential  factors  of  the  problem  there.  It  was  true,  he  wrote 
to  Johnson  in  August,  1862,  that  the  Memphis  bankers  had  lost 
their  specie,  but  their  notes  were  secured  by  property  in  Tennes 
see  which  could  be  proceeded  against.  Furthermore,  the  Con 
federates  who  took  away  the  bank  funds  possessed  assets  in  the 
state,  subject  to  confiscation  for  the  unlawful  acts  of  the  owners- 
The  most  substantial  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  just  settlement 
were  the  disloyal  proclivities  of  the  bankers  themselves  or  timid 
reluctance  to  commit  themselves  one  way  or  the  other,  so  long  as 
the  issue  of  the  war  remained  in  doubt.  "They  must  be  true  to 
their  trust,  declare  boldly  and  openly  against  the  parties  who 
robbed  them  and  at  once  begin  to  realize  on  assets,"  he  declared, 
"  .  .  .  else  I  have  no  alternative  but  to  conclude  that  they  are  in 
complicity  with  our  enemies,  and  treat  them  as  such.  .  .  .  This 
by-play  is  more  dangerous  than  open,  bold  rebellion."89 

Similar  conditions,  of  course,  obtained  throughout  the  state. 
In  localities  where  any  funds  remained  in  the  banks,  the  military 
government  was  called  upon  to  bestir  itself  to  secure  them  against 
disloyal  bank  officials  and  Confederate  cavalry.  As  early  as 
April,  for  example,  Johnson  had  instructed  General  Negley  at 
Columbia  to  assume  custody  of  the  bank  and  its  contents  when 
ever  his  judgment  prompted  such  a  course.90  To  Colonel  Mason 
at  Clarksville  he  wrote  (June)  that  whoever  pleaded  garnishment 
by  the  Confederacy  as  an  excuse  for  non-payment  of  debts  would 
be  promptly  arrested  and  held  in  custody  until  he  satisfied  the 
authorities  in  respect  to  the  debt  and  took  the  oath  of  allegiance.91 

The  fiscal  problem  in  Nashville92  was  particularly  acute,  and 
reached  a  crisis  in  the  summer  of  1863,  when,  as  a  result  of  the 
leaguer  of  1862,  the  vicissitudes  of  Buell's  army,  the  general 
ruin  of  the  surrounding  country,  and  the  regulations  of  the  Fed 
eral  government,  trade  was  in  a  state  of  almost  utter  paralysis, 
while  prices  soared  exorbitantly.  As  regards  the  staple,  cotton, 
the  right  to  purchase  was  limited  to  agents  of  the  government 

89  J.  P.,  vol.  xxiv,  5369. 
99  Ibid.,  vol.  xxi,  4993. 
91  Ibid.,  4745. 

ea  Nashville  Dispatch,  October  15,  1863;  Nashville  Union,  October  17, 
18,  21,  22,  1863. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         201 

and  payment  could  be  made  only  in  Federal  treasury  notes.  The 
consequence  was  the  immediate  decline  of  state  paper  money. 

Other  more  potent  causes  contributed  to  the  same  end.  Specie 
had  vanished  by  the  same  processes  as  in  Memphis,  and  the  banks, 
with  no  assets  immediately  available,  were  tottering.  By  the  state 
bank  code  of  1857-58,  bank  notes  "current  and  passing  at  par" 
in  Tennessee  were  receivable  in  payment  of  taxes  and  other  debts 
to  the  state.  The  Harris  government,  by  an  act  passed  on  July 
I,  1861,  had  modified  this  provision  by  legalizing  the  acceptance 
for  such  dues  of  ''the  circulation  of  the  banks  of  this  state  which 
conform  to  the  bank  code  of  Tennessee  and  the  acts  amen 
datory  thereof."93  By  this  provision,  depreciated  notes,  of  what 
ever  value  in  general  circulation,  could  be  thrust  upon  the  gov 
ernment  at  par. 

The  resulting  embarrassments  were  great.  The  bank  paper, 
notwithstanding  all  attempts  to  bolster  it  up,  declined  at  an  alarm 
ing  rate  and  the  income  of  the  government  was  correspondingly 
diminished.  Concern  was  expressed  lest  a  new  and  burdensome 
tax  would  have  to  be  imposed  to  make  up  the  loss.  Protests 
poured  in  upon  Johnson  and  the  newspapers  of  Nashville  began 
a  violent  controversy  among  themselves  on  the  issues.  The 
Press  assigned,  as  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  the  decline  of 
the  paper,  the  policy  of  the  Federal  government  "to  absorb  the 
entire  credit  of  the  country  and  by  the  introduction  of  treasury 
notes  to  exclude  the  local  currency."  Tennessee  merchants,  it 
observed,  were  forced  to  convert  Tennessee  money  into  United 
States  money  in  order  to  buy  goods ;  and,  to  avoid,  as  far  as 
possible,  loss  in  exchange,  they  were  naturally  indisposed  to  re 
ceive  the  former  from  their  customers.  This,  said  the  Press,  had 
produced  a  run  on  the  brokers  for  greenbacks  which  had  shaken 
confidence  in  the  Tennessee  banks  and  depreciated  the  local 
notes.94 

The  remedy  for  this  state  of  affairs,  which  the  Press  insisted 
was  purely  artificial  and  unwarranted  by  actual  conditions,  lay, 
in  its  opinion,  in  a  resolute  determination  on  the  part  of  the  people 
to  resist  all  impulses  to  panic  and  to  force  their  currency  back  to 

*  Acts  33d  Tenn.  General  Assembly,  2d  extra  session,   1861    (July   i). 
**  Nashville  Press,  August  17,  1863. 


202  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

its  intrinsic  value,  which,  it  maintained,  was  equal  to  or  greater 
than  that  of  the  Federal  greenbacks.  The  latter  represented  no 
gold  actually  deposited  to  protect  them  and  carried  no  guarantee 
of  their  redemption;  whereas  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  Ten 
nessee  pledged  the  credit  of  the  state  for  the  redemption  of  its 
notes,  the  issues  of  the  Union  and  Planters'  banks  were  amply 
secured,  and,  in  the  case  of  all  the  banks,  the  property  of  their 
officers  was  available  for  the  purpose  of  reimbursing  depositors 
whose  money  had  been  carried  off  by  the  Confederates.  "Let 
every  man  resolve,"  urged  the  Press,  "that  he  will  not  sell  his 
Tennessee  money  unless  he  is  obliged  to.  This  will  diminish  the 
demand  for  greenbacks  to  an  extent  that  will  cause  an  instant 
rise  in  Tennessee  money.  .  .  .  Again,  let  the  people  buy  nothing 
but  what  they  are  compelled  to  have,  and  the  merchants,  rather 
than  sacrifice  their  own  currency,  sell  what  surplus  produce  and 
stock  they  have,  and  with  the  proceeds  of  such  sales  make  their 
necessary  purchases,  and  if  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  exceed  their 
immediate  wants,  lend  to  their  neighbors.  ...  If  any  man  thinks 
his  debt  at  all  doubtful,  he  will  certainly  be  willing  to  receive 
Tennessee  money ;  and  the  ,banks  are  compelled  to  receive  it.  ... 
As  soon  as  the  restrictions  upon  trade  are  removed,  Tennessee 
money  will  rise  not  only  to  par,  but  will  advance  to  a  premium."95 

Other  suggestions  were  forthcoming  in  the  greatest  variety. 
A  proposal  that  the  Union  and  Planters'  banks  restore  confidence 
in  their  notes  by  redeeming  them  in  greenbacks  was  punctured 
by  the  objection  that  the  state  bank  was  prohibited  by  law  from 
doing  likewise  and  that,  therefore,  the  fall  in  the  value  of  its 
issues  under  such  an  arrangement  would  more  than  offset  the 
advantages  gained  by  the  rise  in  those  of  its  rivals.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  redemption  in  gold  was  attempted,  and  if  the  initial 
problem  of  getting  the  gold  could  be  surmounted,  there  was  the 
difficulty  that  the  bulk  of  the  notes  were  in  the  hands  of  brokers, 
who  would  promptly  cash  them,  and,  in  many  cases,  would  carry 
the  specie  again  out  of  the  state.96 

The  real  root  of  the  imbroglio  was,  of  course,  far  too  deep  to 
be  reached  by  any  such  superficial  measures  as  these.  The  trouble 


96  Ibid.,  August  21. 
"Ibid.,  August  17. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        203 

was  in  the  instability  and  doubtful  status  of  the  state  itself  and 
all  institutions  existing  under  both  the  old  laws  and  the  new  mili 
tary  regulations.  No  one  could  tell  how  long  either  would  be  valid. 
There  was  neither  a  regular  state  government  nor  any  immediate 
prospect  of  one  to  set  credit  on  its  feet  and  make  either  banks 
or  private  debtors  meet  their  obligations;  and  nobody  who  had 
property  in  or  wished  to  remain  a  citizen  of  Tennessee  and  con 
ceived  the  remotest  possibility  of  the  eventual  restoration  of 
Confederate  rule  would  dream  of  calling  upon  the  military  gov 
ernment  to  support  him  in  proceeding  against  securities  whose 
misfortunes  were  the  result  of  their  loyalty  to  the  Southern 
cause.  Every  man  who  looked  beyond  the  immediate  future  saw 
nothing  but  impenetrable  haze,  and,  in  such  an  atmosphere,  the 
wary  appreciated  the  wisdom  of  doing  nothing  and  avoiding  risks. 

Failing  the  specie  requisite  to  bolster  up  the  local  paper,  the 
state  was  also  almost  destitute  of  the  only  other  resource  which 
could  have  availed  it  in  the  crisis — stable  products,  especially 
cotton.  The  demand  for  this  commodity  was  great  both  at  home 
and  abroad  and  it  brought  very  high  prices  in  the  market,  but,  of 
all  parts  of  the  country,  Tennessee  was  least  in  condition  to 
take  advantage  of  such  opportunities.  Her  plantations  were  in 
ruins;  the  negro  laborers  had  abandoned  them  and  departed  in 
all  directions,  many  of  them  making  their  way  to  the  cities  to 
become  a  burden  on  the  community;  and  a  good  proportion  of 
the  cotton  which,  notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  was  baled, 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederate  bands  that  constantly 
scoured  the  country.  The  remainder  depended  for  a  market  on 
the  military  authorities,  who  too  often,  as  in  the  case  of  Truesdail, 
showed  scant  sympathy  for  the  planters  and  diverted  the  lion's 
share  of  the  profits  to  their  own  pockets.  Cotton,  as  a  medium  of 
exchange,  was  negligible,  and  hardly  enough  of  other  products 
was  available  to  meet  the  bare  necessities  of  the  people. 

The  governor  was  therefore  called  upon  to  deal  with  the  prob 
lem  of  a  paper  currency  practically  unsecured  and  worth,  in 
October,  1863,  but  half  its  face  value,  but,  according  to  the  law 
of  1861,  receivable  at  par  for  all  obligations  to  the  government, 
and  to  confront  the  probability  of  a  still  further  decline  which 
would  bring  the  receipts  so  far  below  the  current  expenses  as  to 


204  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

necessitate  new  impositions  upon  the  people  which  they  were 
in  <no  condition  to  bear  and  the  means,  short  of  actual  confisca 
tion,  available  for  which  were  not  apparent.  His  decision  was 
announced  (October)  in  an  order97  to  the  clerk  of  the  county 
court  and  the  tax  collectors  of  Davidson  county,  which  included 
Nashville,  to  receive,  besides  specie,  only  the  legal  tender  notes 
of  the  United  States  in  payment  of  moneys  due  the  state.  So 
radical  an  inference  with  the  relations  of  creditors  and  debtors 
exposed  him  at  once  to  the  most  bitter  attacks,  but  his  obvious 
and  sufficient  defence  was  that  the  order  was  compelled  by 
actualities;  and  pleas  of  subversion  of  legal  rights  had  little 
weight  with  Johnson,  when  those  rights  had  been  freshly  created 
by  a  secessionist  legislature  in  the  interest  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  governor's  order,  his  friends  pointed  out,  was  but  a  rever 
sion  to  the  law  of  1857-58,  which  was  in  fact  the  only  valid 
one.  They  took  pains  to  insist  that  his  policy  was  in  no  sense 
a  denial  or  avoidance  of  the  ultimate  obligation  of  the  state  to 
redeem  the  notes  of  the  state  bank,  but  simply  a  measure  de 
signed  to  meet  a  temporary  emergency  in  the  affairs  of  the 
government. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  governor  was  urged  to  use  the  military 
power  to  assist  the  banks  to  collect  their  debts  and  to  force  them 
to  redeem  their  paper,  and  some  voices  loudly  charged  him  to 
solve  the  entire  problem  by  a  confiscation  of  Confederate  prop 
erty,98  but  this  he  steadfastly  refused  to  do.  Under  the  circum 
stances,  his  course  was  eminently  wise.  Whatever  moral  justi 
fication  there  might  have  been  in  seizing  the  possessions  of  the 
converters  of  the  specie  to  relieve  the  distress  of  their  victims, 
the  spoil  available  could  not  have  come  near  remedying  the  evil 
done  and  the  political  effect  of  such  a  policy  would  have  been 
disastrous.  Nothing  could  permanently  revive  the  decrepit  local 
paper  except  the  determination  of  the  war  and  the  restoration 
of  confidence.  It  was  only  as  the  scene  of  military  operations 
shifted  to  the  southward  and  the  collapse  of  the  Confederacy 
became  assured  that  the  state  finances  began  to  approach  stability. 

."  Nashville  Dispatch,  October  15. 
98  E.g.,  Nashville  Union,  October  18. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        205 

By  the  winter  of  1862-63,  the  immediate  pressure  of  the 
Confederate  army  on  Nashville  was  sufficiently  relieved  to  enable 
Johnson  to  turn  his  attention  from  the  military  problems  which 
had  almost  monopolized  it  to  the  business  of  civil  administration. 
Hitherto,  he  had  found  time  only  to  suppress  open  disloyalty. 

The  scope  of  his  civil  authority,  with  directions  for  its  exer 
cise,  was  prescribed  in  two  sets  of  instructions"  issued  from  the 
war  department  in  April,  1863.  The  governor  was  to  impose 
taxes  for  the  support  of  the  poor,  for  police  purposes,  and,  in 
general,  for  the  maintenance  of  his  government.  He  might  levy 
exactions  upon  disloyal  persons — especially  upon  any  who  had 
contributed  money,  property,  or  slaves  to  the  enemy — for  the 
subsistence  of  the  wives  and  children  of  refugees  and  Confed 
erate  soldiers,  or  for  other  purposes,  and  take  possession  of  the 
property  and  collect  the  rents  for  lands,  buildings,  and  slaves  of 
persons  within  the  Confederate  lines.  Public  buildings  belong 
ing  to  the  state  of  Tennessee  and  all  other  public  property  in 
Nashville  were  to  be  taken  over  and  assigned,  so  far  as  required, 
to  the  purposes  of  the  civil  government,  all  under  the  control  of 
the  governor,  subject  only  to  military  occupation  as  the  order  of 
the  commanding  general.  Vacant  or  abandoned  property  belong 
ing  to  Confederates  was  also  at  his  disposal.  Lands  and  planta 
tions  so  acquired  were  to  be  leased  for  cultivation  on  terms  fixed 
by  him,  and  records  of  the  transactions  sent  to  the  war  depart 
ment.  Upon  him  also  was  placed  the  responsibility  of  providing 
for  the  employment  and  subsistence  of  the  slaves  of  Confeder 
ates,  under  the  regulations  of  Congress.  Lists  and  descriptions 
of  them  were  to  be  compiled  for  the  war  department.  The  able- 
bodied  men  might  be  employed  on  the  public  works,  the  others  at 
tasks  for  which  they  were  suited.  Their  payment  was  in  John 
son's  hands.  He  had  also  to  provide  medical  attendance  for  the 
sick  and  food  and  clothing  for  the  poor  and  destitute  and  to  keep 
careful  accounts  of  all  expenditures  for  these  purposes. 

All  these  functions  and  many  more  be  actively  exercised. 
The  destitution  of  the  people,  caused  by  the  war,  was  perhaps 
his  most  important  immediate  concern.  As  early  as  August, 
1862,  he  had  taken  steps  for  their  relief  by  dispatching  letters100 

99  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iii,  pp.  122,  115;  J.  P.,  vol.  xxx,  6758. 

100  Nashville   Union,  August  20,   1862. 


206  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

to  a  number  of  the  most  wealthy  avowed  secessionists  of  Nash 
ville,  requiring  them  to  contribute  a  stated  sum  for  the  support 
of  women  and  children  deprived  of  means  of  subsistence  by  the 
absence  of  their  husbands  and  fathers  with  the  Confederate 
army,  and  whose  necessities,  as  he  said,  "have  become  so  mani 
fest  and  their  demands  for  the  necessaries  of  life  so  urgent,  that 
the  laws  of  justice  and  humanity  would  be  violated  unless  some 
thing  was  done  to  relieve  their  suffering  and  destitute  condition." 
A  second  tax  for  the  same  purpose  was  imposed  in  December,101 
causing  "high-toned  grief/'  it  was  said,  among  distinguished 
citizens.102 

Not  only  distressed  families  of  Confederates,  but  hordes  of 
loyal  refugees  flocked  to  'Nashville,  as  to  every  other  Union 
stronghold  in  the  state.  The  supplies  in  the  capital,  scant  even 
for  the  citizens,  threatened  to  give  out  entirely  before  such  an 
influx  of  hungry  human  beings,  and  even  the  troops  had  to  be 
put  on  half  rations  in  the  fall  of  i862.103  No  adequate  shelter 
was  available.  Another  crisis  was  faced  in  the  hard  winter  of 
1663-64.  Fuel,  especially,  was  in  great  demand.  Johnson  gave 
free  transportation  over  the  Northwestern  railroad  for  wood  pro 
cured  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen  to  relieve  this  want.104  During 
the  summer  of  1864 — so  General  Miller  reported — the  refugee 
house  at  Nashville  could  not  accommodate  half  the  applicants 
for  shelter.  Vacant  houses  in  the  city  and  surrounding  towns 
were  assigned  to  them  and  Johnson's  quartermaster  provided 
tents  for  the  remainder.105  Union  relief  associations  were  formed 
to  expend  to  the  best  advantage  the  money  raised  for  the  poor. 

The  pressure  upon  the  civil  authorities  was  increased  by  the 
practice  adopted  by  the  military  commanders  of  sending  disaf 
fected  citizens  to  the  rear  as  the  army  advanced  southward.  A 
great  part  of  the  remaining  population  of  the  state  was  thus 
threatening  to  engulf  Nashville  and  the  country  north  of  it,  re 
quiring  to  be  lodged  and  fed,  though  by  what  means  was  not 

101  Moore,  Speeches  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  xxviii ;   Savage,  Life  and 
Public  Services  of  Andrew  Johnson,  p.  274. 

102  New  York  Tribune,  December  15,  1862. 

103  Annual  Cyclopedia,  1862,  p.  598. 
**  J.   P.,  vol.  xxxi,  7800. 
""Ibid.,  vol.  xlv,  -52. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        207 

apparent.  Instead  of  this,  Johnson  wrote  to  Thomas  in  July, 
1864,  they  should  be  pressed  back  upon  the  enemy,  to  devour  his 
resources.  Let  the  Southerners  "hear  the  cries  of  suffering  and 
supply  their  stomachs  and  backs  with  food  and  raiment.  .  .  . 
By  sending  them  here  they  add  to  the  rebel  or  copperhead  senti 
ment  and  increase  opposition  to  the  government.  .  .  .  They 
would  rather  go  anywhere  else  than  South,  and  it  would  create 
more  terror  than  sending  them  North."108  Thomas  replied  that 
General  Sherman  concurred  in  Johnson's  view  and  intended  to 
adopt  it  after  the  campaign  was  over;  but  to  do  so  while  the 
army  was  advancing  would  involve  the  troublesome  process  of 
passing  large  numbers  through  the  lines  under  flag  of  truce.107 

The  interposition  of  the  governor  was  also  required  to  save  the 
people  from  wrong  at  the  hands  of  harsh  or  careless  military 
officials.  Often  even  the  property  of  loyal  citizens  was  con 
fiscated,  horses  seized,  and  negroes  carried  off  upon  insufficient 
pretexts  and  without  adequate  compensation,  sometimes  with  no 
apparent  authority.  Houses  were  occupied  for  military  purposes 
and  the  families  turned  into  the  streets  with  no  provision  for 
their  accommodation.  Workmen  complained  of  ill-treatment  or 
violation  of  the  contracts  made  with  them.  Outrages  were  com 
mitted  under  pretext  of  foraging.  "If  it  had  not  been  for  the 
incessant  exertions  of  Governor  Johnson,  who  has  never  failed 
to  bring  these  petty  military  usurpations,  depredations,  and 
swindling  before  the  commander  of  the  post,  an  appalling  amount 
of  villainy  and  robbery  would  have  been  witnessed  here,"  com 
mented  the  Nashville  Union  in  November,  1862. 

A  considerable  part  of  Stanton's  instructions  to  Johnson  for 
the  civil  administration  of  the  state  had  to  do  with  the  manage 
ment  of  the  negro  "contrabands"  who  were  not  available  for 
military  service  or  labor  on  the  public  works.  In  elaboration  of 
this  subject,  Stanton  wrote:  "They  had  better  be  set  to  digging 
their  subsistence  out  of  the  ground.  If  there  are  plantations  near 
you  on  either  side  of  the  river,  which  are  abandoned  by  their 
owners,  first  put  as  many  contrabands  on  such  as  they  will  hold, 
that  is,  as  can  draw  subsistence  from  them.  If  some  still  remain, 

"•  Ibid.,  -16. 
m  Ibid.,  -32. 


208  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

get  loyal  men  of  character  to  take  them  temporarily  on  wages  to 
be  paid  to  the  contrabands  themselves — such  men  obliging  them 
selves  to  not  let  the  contrabands  be  kidnapped  or  forcibly  carried 
away.  Of  course  if  any  contrabands  voluntarily  make  arrange 
ments  to  work  for  their  living  you  will  not  hinder  them.  It  is 
thought  best  to  leave  details  to  your  discretion  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  acts  of  Congress  and  the  orders  of  the  war 
department."108 

The  problem  of  dealing  with  this  incoherent  mass  of  humanity 
which,  by  the  summer  of  1863,  had  flooded  Nashville,  was  in 
deed  one  oif  the  most  perplexing  which  the  governor  was  called 
upon  to  face.  Released  from  their  accustomed  bonds  and  filled 
with  a  pleasing,  if  vague,  sense  of  uncontrolled  freedom,  they 
flocked  to  the  cities,  with  little  hope  of  obtaining  remunerative 
work  and  little  inclination  to  avail  themselves  of  it  if  it  came. 
Wagon-loads  of  them  were  brought  in  from  the  country  by  the 
soldiers  and  dumped  down  to  shift  for  themselves.  As  was  to  be 
expected,  they  became,  before  long,  a  distressing  burden  on  the 
citizens.  The  food  and  fuel  available  for  them  was  in  no  pro 
portion  to  their  want.  Hunger  and  cold  came,  and  with  them 
suffering  and  crime.  Huddled  together  in  ruined  old  buildings, 
sheds,  and  cellars,  they  presented  a  picture  of  abject  wretched 
ness.  Many  of  the  young  women  formed  illicit  relations  with  the 
soldiers,  "to  the  literal  demoralization  of  both  and  the  military 
demoralization  of  the  latter."  Filth  and  disease  prevailed.109 

In  the  country,  the  negroes  'wandered  about  unrestrained. 
Many  had  arms  obtained  from  the  soldiers;  some  were  bent  on 
mischief.  The  white  families,  particularly  those  of  Southern 
sympathizers,  who  had  been  generally  disarmed,  were  in  constant 
alarm.  Many  laborers  belonging  to  loyal  masters  definitely  as 
serted  their  right  to  work  for  themselves,  while  drawing  on  their 
owners  for  food  and  lodging.  One  general  sought  to  remedy  this 
by  hiring  slaves  to  their  masters  by  printed  contracts.  The 
negroes  drove  off  horses  and  mules  from  the  farms  and  commit 
ted  waste  with  impunity. 

The  efforts  of  both  the  governor  and  the  military  authorities 

108  Ibid.,  vol.  xxx,  6762. 

109  Ibid.,  vol.  xxxvi,  7891;   O.   R.,   series  i,  vol.  xxxii,  part  ii,  p.  267. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        209 

to  deal  with  this  situation  during  1863  were  only  partially  suc 
cessful.  The  task  was  far,  too  great  for  officials  already  over 
whelmed  with  other  duties ;  a  separate  and  special  organization 
to  execute  it  was  clearly  demanded.  This  was  finally  supplied 
by  an  order110  of  the  war  department,  dated  February  4,  1864. 
A  contraband  camp  was  established  at  Nashville,  under  command 
of  an  officer  detailed  for  the  purpose.  The  quartermaster's  de 
partment  furnished  the  supplies.  From  this  camp  any  loyal 
civilian  might  hire  negroes  for  labor  at  fixed  wages.  Land  oh 
which  to  work  them  could  be  leased  from  the  district  commander. 
Any  negroes  not  so  hired  were  to  be  set  to  work  for  wages  on 
abandoned  plantations.  Those  who  were  able  to  do  so  were  to 
pay  for  the  supplies  furnished  them,  thus  making  the  camp  as 
nearly  self-supporting  as  possible. 

Beginning  in  1863,  steps  were  taken  unofficially  to  provide  edu 
cation  for  the  negro  children  of  the  state.  In  February,  1865, 
Colonel  Mussey,  the  chief  superintendent  of  contrabands  for  East 
and  Middle  Tennessee,  reported  four  negro  schools  at  Nashville 
and  one  each  at  Murfreesboro,  Stevenson,  Huntsville,  Gallatin, 
Clarksville,  Edgefield,  Knoxville,  and  Chattanooga,  with  about 
two  thousand  pupils,  sustained  largely  by  benevolent  societies,  be 
sides  a  number  of  small  pay-schools  conducted  by  the  negroes 
themselves,  and  a  school  in  each  colored  regiment  in  charge  of 
the  chaplain.111' 

110  Nashville  Union,  February  n,  1864. 
111 J.  P.,  vol.  Ivii,  -2315. 


CHAPTER  XI 
CONCLUSION 

Having  followed,  step  by  step,  the  progress  of  reorganization 
in  Tennessee,  it  remains  to  condemn  or  to  justify  the  means  by 
which  the  desired  end  was  attained.  And  the  conclusion  reached 
will  ;be  also  a  condemnation  or  justification  of  Johnson's  career 
as  governor ;  for  one  cannot  read  the  records  of  these  three  criti 
cal  years  without  realizing  that  the  essential  features  of  the  work 
were  peculiarly  his  own.  Contemporaries  fully  appreciated  this ; 
it  was  at  the  governor  personally  that  their  attacks  were  directed. 
Only  recently,  a  distinguished  participant  in  those  stirring  events, 
Mr.  Oliver  P.  Temple,  in  an  unsparing  criticism,  has  thrust  upon 
his  shoulders  a  heavy  'burden  of  blame  and  reproach.1 

The  first  serious  charge  laid  at  Johnson's  door  is  that  he  pur 
posely  delayed  reconstruction.  This  accusation  was  freely  circu 
lated  at  the  time.  Mr.  Temple  says :  "The  work  of  reorganizing 
the  state  and  of  revising  the  constitution  might  have  been  and 
should  have  been  accomplished  in  a  regular,  decent  way  one  year, 
and  possibly  two,  earlier  than  it  was,  and  the  state  admitted  back 
into  the  U,ttion.  The  last  of  the  Confederate  armies  was  driven 
out  of  Middle  and  Western  Tennessee  in  the  summer  of  1863,  and 
out  of  the  greater  part  of  East  Tennessee  in  September  of  the 
same  year." 

Only  with  the  greatest  diffidence  may  the  conclusions  of  one  so 
intimately  identified  as  Mr.  Temple  with  the  episodes  of  which 
he  treats  be  called  in  question;  but  my  study  of  the  records, 
without  the  advantage  of  the  personal  viewpoint  of  Mr.  Temple 
and  others  who  have  expressed  opinions  similar  to  his,  has 
forced  me  to  (believe  that  they  have  been  hardly  just  to  Johnson. 
If  my  account  of  the  war  in  Tennessee  establishes  anything,  it 
is  that  at  no  time  previous  to  the  end  of  December,  1864,  was  a 
fair,  dignified,  and  representative  election  possible. 

1  Oliver  P.  Temple,  Notable  M,?n  of  Tennessee,  pp.  416  et  seq. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         211 

It  is  true  that  the  successes  of  June  and  July,  1863,  placed  most 
of  the  state  temporarily  in  the  control  of  the  government.  John 
son  promptly  pronounced  for  an  election  in  October,  if  condi 
tions  continued  favorable.  But  nothing  really  decisive  had  oc 
curred  ;  neither  of  the  Confederate  armies  in  Tennessee  had  been 
beaten  in  a  pitched  'battle ;  Rosecrans'  advance  was  attended  with 
serious  difficulties  and  might  be  checked  at  any  time.  The  Union 
army  had  been  just  as  favorably  situated  a  year  previously,  only 
to  be  manoeuvred  out  of  all  its  advantages,  and  those  who  had 
ventured  to  celebrate  its  triumphs  had  reason  to  regret  their  pre 
mature  enthusiasm.  The  people  were  not  disposed  again  to  rally 
around  the  administration,  until  they  received  substantial  assur 
ances  that  the  Union  domination  was  permanent.  From  every 
point  of  view,  it  was  desirable  that  a  victory  over  Bragg  should 
stimulate  popular  confidence,  and  there  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  Johnson  only  awaited  this  to  clear  the  way  for  the  restoration 
of  a  civil  government  with  the  prestige  of  victory  behind  it. 

All  such  hopes  were  dispelled  by  the  disaster  at  Chickamauga 
(September  20).  Now,  more  than  ever  before,  before  even  a 
beginning  in  reorganization  could  foe  made,  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  army  recover  its  shattered  prestige.  The  fall 
and  early  winter  had  passed  before  this  was  done.  More  im 
portant  still,  East  Tennessee,  the  citadel  of  Unionism,  was  in 
the  grip  of  Longstreet,  whose  army  hung  on  desperately  in  the 
northeast,  even  after  the  siege  of  Knoxville  was  raised. 

Until  January,  then,  there  was  no  reasonable  pretext  for  an 
appeal  to  the  distracted  people.  On  the  contrary,  many  Union 
men  begged  Johnson  to  spare  himself  and  them  the  mortification 
of  certain  failure  in  an  impossible  task.  Nevertheless,  before  the 
end  of  the  month,  he  had  returned  to  the  work,  provided  the 
public  with  a  comp1ete  program  for  restoring  the  state,  and  ar 
ranged  for  county  elections  in  March,  allowing  for  the  "decent" 
interval  which  Mr.  Temple  says  was  desirable.  That  reconstruc 
tion  in  the  counties  should  precede  the  action  of  the  state  as  a 
whole  was  a  wise  and  provident  decision.  It  would  supply  the 
judicial  and  other  machinery  most  essential  for  immediate  local 
needs,  and,  at  the  same  time,  would  furnish  a  criterion  of  the 
popular  attitude  toward  the  government  in  the  various  sections, 


212  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

by  which  the  result  of  a  general  election  could  be  accurately 
foretold. 

The  outcome  of  the  March  elections  was  eminently  discourag 
ing.  They  were  commonly  designated  as  farcical,  and  Johnson's 
most  trusted  supporters  advised  against  again  inviting  so  pain 
ful  a  humiliation.  In  fact,  whether  the  Unionists  or  the  Con 
federates  happened  to  be  at  any  time  temporarily  dominant  in 
the  state  was  beside  the  point.  Nothing  worth  while  could  be 
done  while  the  army  of  the  Cumberland  had  a  resolute,  efficient 
enemy  in  its  front  and  cavalry  and  guerillas  operating  in  its  rear. 
This  situation  appertained  throughout  the  summer  and  fall  of 
1864.  The  people  of  Tennessee  awaited  the  certainty  of  the  per 
manent  control  of  their  state  by  one  side  or  the  other.  While  the 
issue  was  doubtful,  their  only  hope  of  security  lay  in  judicious 
inaction;  so  much,  experience  had  soundly  taught  them. 

During  all  this  period,  Johnson  appears  ready  and  willing  to 
take  forward  steps  in  reconstruction  upon  even  slight  encourage 
ment,  while  it  is  the  bulk  of  the  Union  party  who  hang  back.  The 
East  Tennessee  convention  displays  the  most  extreme  anxiety  to 
adjourn  without  action.  The  May  convention  at  Nashville  de 
clares  for  an  election  only  when  the  state  can  be  represented  from 
all  its  parts.  Johnson's  correspondence  teems  with  letters  urging 
waiting  and  watching.  From  West  Tennessee  comes  the  assur 
ance  that  no  vote  can  be  taken  there.  In  July,  the  municipal 
government  of  Memphis  is  suspended.  In  August,  Forrest  enters 
Memphis.  In  September,  Gillem  is  routed  in  East  Tennessee. 
Everywhere  guerillas  abound  and  refugees  flee  before  them. 

One  is  constrained  to  believe  that  Johnson  was  dealing  only 
with  unimpeachable  facts  when  he  declared  that,  under  such  con 
ditions,  an  election  was  impossible.2  Nevertheless,  he  never 
ceased  to  assert  that,  whenever  a  considerable  number  of  citizens 
manifested  their  desire  to  reconstruct  the  government,  he  was 
ready  actively  to  cooperate  with  them.  Indeed,  he  seems  to  have 
driven  rather  than  followed  the  convention  of  the  5th  of  Septem- 

2  However,  General  Thomas  and  General  S.  P.  Carter,  the  provost- 
marshal  general  at  Nashville,  declared  in  January,  1864,  that  civil  author 
ity  could  and  should  be  restored  then.  O.  R.,  series  i,  vol.  xxxii,  part 
ii,  p.  64;  Nashville  Union,  Febraury  16,  1864. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE         213 

her;  all  its  recommendations  were  promptly  embodied  in  his 
proclamations,  and  every  assistance  given  to  forward  its  de 
signs.  Never  do  we  find  the  governor  opposing  a  restoration 
movement  by  the  people;  on  the  contrary,  his  energies  are  al 
ways  devoted  to  encouraging  them.  The  election  of  November, 
held  under  his  auspices,  was  another  fiasco;  but  he  lent  his  sanc 
tion  to  the  call  for  a  convention  in  December.  The  work  would 
have  been  accomplished  then,  but  the  invasion  of  Hood  and 
Breckenridge  intervened  and  the  convention  could  not  assemble. 
At  last,  on  the  i6th  of  December,  the  battle  of  Nashville  created 
the  situation  for  which  he  had  yearned  so  long.  The  Confederate 
army  was  not  only  beaten,  but  crushed.  Tennessee  was  positively 
won  for  the  Union.  Never  before  could  this  have  been  said. 
For  the  first  time,  the  administration  could  hope  for  an  unre 
strained  expression  of  whatever  Union  feeling  existed  in  the 
state.  The  governor  acted  with  the  utmost  possible  energy.  The 
reconstruction  convention  met  on  the  gth  of  January,  and  he  was 
its  guiding  spirit.  The  whole  weight  of  his  influence  was  exerted 
in  favor  of  immediate,  decisive  measures.  Obstructionists  were 
overruled,  slow  methods  of  procedure  were  discountenanced,  and 
in  two  months  the  work  was  done. 

Mr.  Temple  asks :  was  not  this  long  delay  in  calling  a  conven 
tion  due  to  Johnson's  desire  to  hold  his  position  of  military  gov 
ernor  until  he  could  step  into  a  higher  place  in  March?  "His 
ambition  was  to  carry  to  Washington  his  own  state  as  a  recon 
structed  member  of  the  Union,  and  present  it  as  a  rich  jewel  to 
the  nation.  It  would  give  him  new  prestige  and  eclat.  Hence 
his  sudden  haste  just  at  the  close  of  his  service  as  military 
governor." 

In  response,  it  may  be  inquired  what  advantage  could  possibly 
come  to  Johnson  from  reconstruction  in  March,  1865,  which 
would  not  have  been  greatly  enhanced  by  reconstruction  in  June, 
1864,  when  he  was  a  candidate  for  national  preferment  and  men 
tioned  by  many  for  the  first  place  on  the  ticket ;  or  by  reconstruc 
tion  in  November,  1864,  when  he  was  seeking  the  vote  of  the 
people.  In  either  case,  his  advancement  would  have  been  helped 
immeasurably,  and  the  prestige  thus  gained  would  surely  have 
lasted  until  March.  But  neither  in  June  nor  in  November  was 


214  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

reconstruction  practicable.  As  it  was,  he  was  compelled,  much 
against  his  will,  to  leave  the  work  unfinished  and  come  to  Wash 
ington  without  the  perfect  "jewel"  with  which  he  might  have 
courted  favors  for  himself. 

If  we  absolve  Johnson  from  blame  for  unnecessary  delay  in  the 
performance  of  his  duty,  there  remains  the  charge  that  the 
method  he  adopted  was  arbitrary,  unconstitutional,  and  perma 
nently  injurious  in  its  results.  Two  other  feasible  plans  were 
suggested.  A  legislature  might  be  chosen  by  popular  vote  and 
might  inaugurate  the  desired  amendments  in  the  manner  pre 
scribed  by  the  constitution  itself;  or  the  people  might  be  called 
upon  to  elect  a  second  convention  for  the  express  purpose  of 
changing  the  fundamental  law.  The  first  alternative,  however, 
was  open  to  the  objection  that  a  strict  compliance  with  the  con 
stitutional  provision  for  amendment  would  require  a  period  of 
several  years,  which,  in  such  a  crisis,  was  not  to  be  thought  of. 
Another  practical  argument  against  committing  reconstruction  to 
a  legislature  was  that,  in  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  country, 
no  legislature  could  be  chosen  to  represent  all  the  counties  of  the 
state,  except  on  a  general  ticket,  and  such  representation  was 
manifestly  imperfect,  not  at  all  the  sort  contemplated  by  the 
constitution. 

The  second  suggestion  was  at  once  weaker  and  stronger  than 
the  first.  Its  weakness  was  that  it  was  no  more  constitutional 
than  Johnson's  plan.  To  this,  however,  it  was  replied  that  none 
of  the  three  plans  was,  in  reality,  constitutional.  No  legislature 
was  in  existence,  nor  the  machinery  prescribed  by  the  constitu 
tion  for  electing  one.  From  a  Union  viewpoint,  the  revolutionary 
acts  of  the  secessionists  had  thrown  the  constitution  out  of  gear 
and  there  was  no  regular  way  of  putting  it  again  in  operation. 
This  was  generally  admitted  by  all  Union  men,  but  the  most  con 
servative  pressed  for  the  nearest  possible  approximation  to  con 
stitutional  forms,  while  others  ridiculed  the  idea  of  sacrificing 
every  practical  consideration  to  a  pretended  legality  which  was,  in 
truth,  no  legality  at  all. 

If  reconstruction  by  means  of  the  legislature  should  be  aban 
doned  on  practical  grounds,  the  question  remained,  should  the  ori 
ginal  convention  complete  the  work  or  a  second  one  be  elected 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        215 

especially  for  that  purpose,  The  advocates  of  the  latter  view  took 
the  position  that  the  existing  body  was  in  no  just  sense  representa 
tive.  Few,  if  any,  of  the  delegates  had  been  chosen  in  a  regular 
manner,  and  the  wording  of  the  call  was  positive  proof  that  the 
people  could  have  had  no  idea  that  they  were  creating  a  body  to 
formulate  constitutional  amendments.  Here  again,  however,  the 
objections  had  more  apparent  than  real  weight.  If  the  amend 
ments  were  not  to  be  proposed  in  the  manner  provided  for  in  the 
constitution,  it  mattered  little  in  what  manner  they  were  pro 
posed.  They  could  not  become  law  until  accepted  by  the  sover 
eign  people,  and  the  same  people  would  vote  on  them  in  either 
case.  There  could  be  little  doubt  that  an  election  for  a  second 
convention  would  bring  together  almost  precisely  the  same  indi 
viduals  as  were  already  deliberating;  and,  if  the  people  disap 
proved  of  the  actions  of  these  "self-constituted"  leaders,  their 
dbvious  course  was  to  refuse  them  their  sanction  at  the  polls  and 
thus  make  a  second  convention  necessary.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  favored  the  amendments,  time  and  money  would  be  saved 
and  nothing  important  lost.  In  support  of  this  view,  there  was 
the  impressive  precedent  of  the  irregular  proceedings  resorted  to 
in  framing  and  adopting  the  Federal  Constitution  of  1789.  As 
Johnson  himself  clearly  pointed  out,  the  convention  method  de 
liberately  disregarded  prescribed  forms  and  depended  for  its 
justification  upon  the  inherent  sovereignty  of  the  people.  What 
they  established  received  thereby  the  highest  possible  sanction. 
The  only  necessity,  then,  was  to  get  the  expression  of  the  will 
of  the  sovereign;  and,  whether  the  first  or  a  second  convention 
submitted  proposals,  the  decisive  expression  would  come  from 
the  votes  of  the  same  persons  at  the  polls. 

The  chief  advantage  of  the  one-convention  plan  was  in  the 
saving  of  time.  Was  there  any  occasion  for  haste,  aside  from 
the  gratification  of  Johnson's  desire  for  "eclat,"  which  justified 
the  sacrificing  of  dignity  to  speed?  As  has  been  shown,  the  call 
for  the  convention,  issued  in  November,  1864,  contemplated  leav 
ing  the  work  of  revision  to  a  second  body,  more  formally  chosen, 
and  to  this  arrangement  Johnson  had  offered  no  objection.  But, 
in  the  fall  and  winter,  the  administration  party  in  Congress  had 
struck  rough  ground  in  developing  its  reconstruction  projects. 


2i6  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

An  especially  strong  opposition  developed  to  the  proposed  thir 
teenth  amendment.  For  some  time  its  success  seemed  doubtful, 
for  all  the  formidable  "copperhead"  strength  was  arrayed  un 
compromisingly  against  it.  Under  date  of  January  14,  1865, 
there  is,  in  the  Johnson  correspondence,  a  letter3  from  one  W. 
Bilbo,  a  prominent  Tennessee  banker,  then  in  Washington,  in 
forming  the  governor  that  the  amendment  is  held  up  for  lack  of 
two  more  votes  in  its  support.  The  writer  continues:  "Can't 
you  come  to  our  assistance  with  the  ten  congressional  votes  of 
Tennessee  ?  Let  the  convention  at  once  repeal  the  secession  ordi 
nance,  emancipate  the  slaves,  appoint  a  day  within  the  next  four 
teen  to  elect  members  of  Congress,  elect  them,  send  them  on  here 
so  they  can  help  us  pass  the  amendment  ?"  It  is  at  least  a  plausi 
ble  surmise  that  other  messages  of  similar  purport  came  to  John 
son.  Devoted  as  he  was  to  the  principle  of  the  amendment  and, 
now  prominently  identified  with  the  administration,  he  would 
recognize  the  importance  of  avoiding  a  reverse  on  this  cardinal 
point  of  its  program  and  of  coming  promptly  to  its  aid  with  every 
available  resource.  The  congressional  vote  of  Tennessee,  he  was 
told,  would  be  decisive  of  the  result.  He  was  about  to  leave  the 
state,  but  if,  during  the  few  weeks  that  remained  to  him  as  gov 
ernor  and  while  his  hand  still  held  the  helm,  Tennessee  could  be 
launched  on  her  course  and  her  congressional  candidates  placed 
before  the  people,  his  influence  was  powerful  enough  to  direct 
her  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  the  administration.  Once  he 
was  distant  in  Washington,  however,  events  in  his  state  would  be 
beyond  his  control,  and  the  dissensions  among  the  Unionists,  all 
too  strongly  evinced  on  many  previous  occasions,  made  him  ap 
prehensive  of  the  outcome.  May  not  this  be  the  explanation  of 
his  impatience  to  accomplish  everything  possible  in  the  short 
time  available  between  the  defeat  of  Hood  in  December  and  his 
departure  in  February? 

Another  charge  against  Johnson  remains  to  be  treated:  that, 
by  the  unnecessarily  rigid  requirements  of  his  "iron-clad"  oath, 
he  excluded  many  unquestionably  loyal  men  from  participation  in 
reconstruction,  thus  destroying  their  interest  in  the  work,  humil 
iating  and  aggrieving  them,  and  losing  their  counsel,  influence, 
and  cooperation,  beside  depriving  the  new  constitution  and  gov- 

•J.  P.,  vol.  LV,  -1878. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        217 

ernment  of  a  substantial,  impressive  indorsement  at  the  polls,  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  forcing  his  own  views  and  his  own  men  upon 
the  state. 

It  will,  no  doubt,  be  generally  agreed  that  the  only  parties  shut 
out  by  the  oath  who  had  any  just  claim  to  be  admitted  were  the 
pro-slavery  loyalists  and  the  "peace  Democrats."  I  have  already 
expressed  my  opinion  that,  whatever  censure  they  may  have  de 
served  for  their  violent  strictures  upon  the  government  in  a  crisis 
of  the  nation's  fate,  they  should  not  have  been  discriminated 
against  in  Tennessee,  while  their  counterparts  in  the  Northern 
states  received  toleration.  All  were  equally  to  be  justified  or 
condemned.  On  this  ground,  as  it  seems  to  me,  Johnson's  policy 
may  be  fairly  censured.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remem 
bered  that  the  conditions  in  Tennessee  were  peculiar.  The  various 
loyal  factions  were  of  uncertain  and  shifting  strength.  The 
state  had  been  excepted  from  the  emancipation  proclamation  for 
the  express  purpose  of  bringing  prestige  and  impulse  to  the 
progam  of  the  national  administration  by  herself  taking  the 
initiative  in  freeing  her  own  slaves.  With  whatever  advantages 
the  government  expected  from  this  action,  the  discredit  of  a 
defeat  would  be  commensurate.  Finally,  Lincoln,  with  his  sensi 
tive  finger  upon  the  nation's  pulse,  approved  Johnson's  course. 
Usually  magnanimous  and  generous  almost  to  a  fault,  he  gave 
way,  as  regards  Tennessee,  to  the  latter's  representations;  and 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  he  did  so  only  after  thoroughly  diagnosing 
the  situation  and  satisfying  himself  that  no  more  lenient  policy 
was  feasible.  Tennessee  seemed  always  on  the  point  of  breaking 
away  from  his  control,  and  he  could  not  afford  to  relax  the  reins 
on  so  intractable  a  steed.  The  Union  cause  required  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  active,  determined  men,  who,  however  they  might  blun 
der,  would  not  falter.  To  such  Johnson  committed  it.  His  three 
years  in  office  had  been  one  long  struggle  with  timidity  and  irreso 
lution.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  he  embraced  the  brief 
opportunity  offered  him  to  finish  the  battle  himself  with  few,  but 
dependable  and  single-hearted  fighters  at  his  back. 

Biographers  of  most  men  who  have  attained  national  promi 
nence  are  able  to  lighten  their  narrative  with  many  personal  anec 
dotes,  interesting  in  themselves  and  helpful  in  explaining  the 


2i8  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

characters  and  careers  of  their  subjects.  Such  advantages  must 
be  largely  foregone  by  one  who  writes  of  Johnson,  at  least  for 
the  period  of  the  war,  when  his  activities  were  confined  to 
Tennessee.  This  is  to  be  explained  partly  by  Johnson's  own 
personality,  partly  by  the  impossible  circumstances  in  which  he 
was  placed.  During  these  three  years,  he  occupied  a  position 
which  would  have  been  insupportable  by  any  man  less  self-suffi 
cient,  grim,  impervious — one  is  tempted  to  say,  less  fanatical — 
than  he.  Never  popular  with  the  leaders  in  his  state,  his  return 
among  his  fellow-citizens  as  the  voluntary  instrument  of  the 
Federal  government  for  their  repression  aroused  against  him  a 
hatred  that  expressed  itself  on  every  possible  occasion  and  in 
every  possible  form  of  vituperation  and  insult.  And  surely  no 
man  ever  was  less  qualified  than  Johnson  to  overcome  prejudice 
by  virtue  of  his  personality.  Neither  graciousness  of  address, 
charm  of  manner,  nor  suavity  of  disposition  won  or  mollified  his 
enemies.  He  possessed  none  of  the  appealing  gentleness,  broad 
sympathy,  and  deep  understanding  of  and  love  for  humanity, 
none  of  the  saving  humor  which  made  up  so  much  of  the  great 
ness  and  power  of  Lincoln.  His  mind  was  narrow,  bigoted,  un 
compromising,  suspicious;  his  nature  solitary  and  reticent;  his 
demeanor  coldly  repellant  or  violently  combative.  Fessenden's 
remark  of  him  as  president,  that  he  had  no  friends,  applied  to 
him  equally  as  governor.  His  harsh,  domineering  intolerance 
drove  from  him  those  who  admired  his  impeccable  honesty  and 
patriotism  and  his  brilliant  abilities,  or,  at  least,  held  them  only 
by  bonds  of  esteem  rather  than  devotion.  He  remained  always 
a  solitary  man,  yielding  his  full  confidence  to  none. 

Of  personal  letters,  to  which  the  biographer  looks  for  the  softer 
tones  of  a  portrait,  Johnson  received  comparatively  few  and 
wrote  fewer.  He  was  never  able  to  supply  the  lack  of  a  good 
elementary  education.  His  pen  was  not  his  friend;  his  spelling 
and  grammar  were  always  faulty.  He  complains  to  his  wife  that 
the  difficulty  he  experiences  in  writing  often  impels  him  to  put 
the  letter  aside  unfinished. 

The  studied  contempt  with  which  the  pro-Southern  citizens  of 
Nashville  treated  him  stung  his  pride,  caused  him  to  draw  further 
back  within  himself,  and  made  him  still  more  resentful.  Deputed 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        219 

to  extend  the  protecting  aegis  of  law  and  orderly  government  over 
the  state,  his  utter  lack  of  finesse  made  him  appear  to  be  brandish 
ing  a  club  to  frighten  the  people  into  subjection,  and  their  ani 
mosity  centred  upon  him.  The  hostility  to  the  Federal  govern 
ment  and  troops,  wrote  General  Nelson  to  Buell  in  July,  1862, 
"seems  settled  into  a  fierce  hatred  to  Governor  Johnson,  to  him 
personally  more  than  officially,  for  in  questioning  many  people 
they  cannot  point  to  an  act  that  he  has  not  been  warranted  in 
doing  by  their  own  showing ;  but  still,  either  in  manner  of  doing 
it,  or  that  it  should  be  done  by  him,  or  from  some  indefinable  cause 
touching  him  their  resentment  is  fierce  and  vindictive,  and  this 
country,  from  being  neutral  at  least,  as  you  left  it,  is  now  hostile 
and  in  arms."4 

Johnson  returned  hatred  'with  all  the  violent  intensity  of  his 
nature.  As  the  storm  of  abuse  beat  upon  him,  he  became  more 
and  more  bitter.  With  him,  an  affront  took  on  something  of  the 
character  of  the  feud,  familiar,  one  may  imagine,  to  his  not  too 
remote  forbears ;  the  debt  must  be  repaid  in  full.  He  developed 
an  almost  savage  determination  to  humiliate  the  "aristocrats," 
the  scorners  of  free  labor,  and  to  make  them  pay  the  price  of  the 
ruin  of  the  war.  More  than  any  other  idea,  this  permeates  his 
public  and  private  utterances.  It  was  by  the  constantly  reiterated 
expression,  "Treason  must  be  made  odious,  traitors  punished 
and  impoverished,"  that  he  became  most  widely  known  through 
out  the  country. 

The  habit  of  indulging  in  intoxicants,  afterwards  reputed  as 
Johnson's  most  conspicuous  personal  failing  as  president,  had,  of 
course,  been  formed  long  before.  There  is  no  evidence  that  it 
interfered  seriously  with  the  performance  of  his  duties,  but  it 
occasionally  betrayed  him  into  extravagances  of  action  and  ex 
pression  which  did  him  no  credit.  Charles  A.  Dana,  who,  as 
assistant  secretary  of  war,  paid  him  an  official  visit  in  Nashville 
in  1863,  reports  that  the  governor  opened  their  first  interview  by 
producing  a  whiskey-bottle,  and,  in  his  opinion,  was  addicted  to 
taking  "more  than  most  gentlemen  would  have  done."5 

Carl  Schurz  gives  one  of  the  few  interesting  personal  impres- 

*O.  R.,  series  r,  vol.  xvi,  part  i,  p.  816. 

'Charles   A.  Dana,  Recollections   of   the  Civil   War,  p.   106. 


220  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

sions  of  Johnson,6  as  he  saw  him  in  1863.  "His  appearance,"  he 
says,  "was  not  prepossessing,  at  least  not  to  me.  His  countenance 
was  of  a  distinctly  plebeian  cast,  somewhat  like  that  of  the  late 
Senator  Douglas,  but  it  had  nothing  of  Douglas'  force  and 
vivacity  in  it.  There  was  no  genial  sunlight  in  it;  rather  some 
thing  sullen,  something  betokening  a  strong  will  inspired  by  bit 
ter  feelings.  I  could  well  imagine  him  leading  with  vindictive 
energy  an  uprising  of  a  lower  order  of  society  against  an  aristoc 
racy  from  whose  lordly  self-assertion  he  had  suffered,  and  whose 
pride  he  was  bent  upon  humiliating.  .  .  .  Judging  from  his  con 
versation,  his  mind  moved  in  a  narrow  circle  of  ideas  as  well  as 
of  phrases.  ...  I  could  not  rid  myself  of  the  impression  that 
beneath  his  staid  and  sober  exterior  there  were  still  some  wild 
fires  burning  which  occasionally  might  burst  to  the  surface. 
This  impression  was  strengthened  by  a  singular  experience.  It 
happened  twice  or  three  times  that,  when  I  called  upon  him,  I 
was  told  by  the  attendant  that  the  governor  was  sick  and  could 
not  see  anybody;  then,  after  the  lapse  of  four  or  five  days,  he 
would  send  for  me,  and  I  would  find  him  uncommonly  natty 
in  his  attire  and  generally  groomed  with  especial  care.  He  would 
also  wave  off  any  inquiry  about  his  health.  When  I  mentioned 
this  circumstance  to  one  of  the  most  prominent  Union  men  of 
Nashville,  he  smiled,  and  said  that  the  governor  had  'his  infirmi 
ties/  but  was  'all  right'  on  the  whole. 

"My  conversation  with  him  always  turned  upon  political  sub 
jects.  He  was  a  demonstratively  fierce  Union  man — not  upon 
anti-slavery  grounds,  but  from  constitutional  reasons,  and  from 
hatred  of  the  slave-holding  aristocracy,  the  oppressors  and  mis- 
leaders  of  the  common  people,  who  had  resolved  to  destroy  the 
Republic  if  they  were  not  permitted  to  rule  it.  The  constant 
burden  of  his  speech  was  that  this  rebellion  against  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Union  was  treason,  and  that  treason  was  a  crime  that 
must  be  made  odious  by  visiting  condign  punishment  upon  the 
traitors.  To  hear  him  expatiate  upon  this,  his  favorite  theme, 
one  would  have  thought  that  if  this  man  ever  came  into  power, 
the  face  of  the  country  would  soon  bristle  with  gibbets,  and 
foreign  lands  swarm  with  fugitives  from  the  avenging  sword  of 

"Carl  Schurz,  Reminiscences,  vol.  Hi,  p.  95. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        221 

the  Republic.  And  such  sentiments  he  uttered  not  in  a  tone 
betraying  the  slightest  excitement,  but  with  the  calmness  of  long 
standing  and  unquestionable  conviction." 

John  M.  Palmer,  in  his  Personal  Recollections,  thus  estimates 
Johnson:  "He  possessed  great  natural  capacity,  but  his  knowl 
edge  of  the  science  of  government  was  superficial.  He  was  sin 
cere  and  earnest  in  his  opinions,  but  his  prejudices  were  violent 
and  often  unjust.  His  personal  dislikes  were  never  concealed. 
Bailie  Peyton  said  of  him  that  'he  hated  a  gentleman  by  instinct.' 
After  listening  to  him  one  day,  I  said:  'Governor,  the  anti- 
slavery  men  of  the  North  oppose  slavery  because  it  is  unjust,  and 
hope  by  abolishing  it  to  make  free  citizens  of  those  human  chat 
tels.'  He  answered:  'D — n  the  negroes;  I  am  righting  these 
traitorous  aristocrats,  their  masters !'  "7 

Almost  all  the  defects  of  Johnson's  character  noted  by  his  con 
temporaries  may  be  explained  by  the  hardships,  limitations,  and 
narrowness  of  his  early  environment  and  by  the  prejudices  en 
gendered  in  a  man  conscious  of  natural  superiority,  but  held  down 
by  institutions  and  conventions.  The  lack  of  broad,  comprehen 
sive  interests  had,  however,  a  compensating  element, — it  enabled 
him  to  concentrate  all  the  strength  of  his  extraordinarily  forceful 
nature  upon  the  few  essentials  which  he  clearly  comprehended, 
and  to  move  to  them  with  overwhelming  energy.  He  had  three 
invaluable  assets  for  the  work  to  which  he  was  called — singleness 
of  mind,  tenacity  of  purpose,  indomitable  persistency.  In  the 
darkest  days  for  the  Union,  in  the  spring  of  1863,  he  wrote  to 
his  wife :  "I  feel  sometimes  like  giving  all  up  in  dispare ;  but  this 
will  not  do  we  must  hold  out  to  the  end,  this  rebelion  is  wrong 
and  must  be  put  down  let  cost  what  it  may  in  the  life  and  treasure. 
I  intend  to  appropriate  the  remainder  of  my  life  to  the  redemp 
tion  of  my  adopted  home  East  Tennessee  and  you  and  Mary8 
must  not  be  weary,  it  is  our  fate  and  we  should  be  willing  to 
bear  it  cheerfully.  Impatience  and  dissatisfaction  will  not  better 
it  or  shorten  the  time  of  our  suffering."9  The  whole  letter  reveals 
a  tortured  mind  and  an  exhausted  body,  sustained  by  an  unflag 
ging  spirit.  With  his  property  confiscated,  his  family  for  a  time 

7  John  M.   Palmer,  Personal  Recollections,  p.   127. 

8  Johnson's  daughter. 
•J.  P.,  vol.  xxx,  6689. 


222  ANDREW  JOHNSON 

in  danger  and  distress,  hated  and  insulted  by  his  neighbors, 
maligned  by  rivals  and  enemies,  often  defeated,  mortified,  and 
seemingly  almost  discredited  in  his  labors  to  reorganize  his  state, 
his  devotion  and  patriotism  never  faltered,  but  soared  higher  and 
surer  with  every  reverse  of  fortune.  When  the  loyalists  of  Ten 
nessee  were  perplexed  and  almost  demoralized,  he  stood  firmly 
and  saw  clearly,  and  by  these  merits  won  the  confidence  of  Lin 
coln  and  Stanton  and  was  thus  able  to  hold  the  leadership,  over 
come  all  opposition,  and  command  the  course  of  events. 

Johnson's  weaknesses  were  those  of  temperament  and  training. 
His  claims  to  honor  are  based  upon  loyalty,  self-sacrifice,  and 
a  steadfast  devotion  to  the  cause  he  believed  to  be  right,  which, 
considering  all  that  he  had  at  stake,  can  only  be  described  as 
heroic.  The  issue  joined,  he  stepped  unhesitatingly  forward  into 
the  front  rank  for  service,  regardless  of  his  own  comfort  and 
safety,  and  gave  himself  unsparingly  to  saving  the  state.  He 
worked,  says  a  perhaps  too  fulsome  panegyrist,  "with  an  industry 
and  energy  that  never  grew  weary  or  asked  repose."10  His  re 
ward  came  in  the  esteem  of  those  who  could  best  comprehend 
the  value  of  his  services  and  in  elevation  to  a  high  post  of  national 
distinction.  His  record  as  governor  is  epitomized  in  Stanton's 
letter,11  accepting  his  resignation  of  the  office,  in  March,  1865. 
The  secretary  of  war  concludes :  "Permit  me  on  this  occasion  to 
render  to  you  the  thanks  of  this  department  for  your  patriotic 
and  a'ble  services  during  the  eventful  period  through  which  you 
have  exercised  the  high  trusts  committed  to  your  charge.  In  one 
of  the  darkest  hours  of  the  great  struggle  for  national  existence 
against  rebellious  foes  the  government  called  you  from  the  Senate 
and  from  the  comparatively  safe  and  easy  duties  of  civil  life 
to  place  you  in  the  front  of  the  enemy  and  in  a  position  of  per 
sonal  toil  and  danger,  perhaps  more  hazardous  than  was  en 
countered  by  any  other  citizen  or  military  officer  of  the  United 
States.  With  patriotic  promptness  you  assumed  the  post,  and 
maintained  it  under  circumstances  of  unparalleled  trials,  until 
recent  events  have  brought  safety  and  deliverance  to  your  state, 
and  to  the  integrity  of  that  constitutional  Union  for  which  you 

10  Nashville    Times,    January    7,     1865,    quoting    Atdhinson     (Kansas) 
Champion. 
"  O.  R.,  series  iii,  vol.  iv,  p.  1221 ;  J.  P.,  vol.  Ivii,  -2426. 


MILITARY  GOVERNOR  OF  TENNESSEE        223 

so  long  and  so  gallantly  periled  all  that  is  dear  to  man  on  earth. 
That  you  may  be  spared  to  enjoy  the  new  honors  and  perform  the 
high  duties  to  which  you  have  been  called  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  is  the  sincere  wish  of  one  who  in  every  official  and 
personal  relation  has  found  you  worthy  of  the  confidence  of  the 
government  and  the  honor  and  esteem  of  your  fellow-citizens." 


INDEX 


Ammen,  Gen.  Jacob,  Governor's 
guard  assigned  to  command  of, 
187;  then  withdrawn  from,  187; 
fails  to  support  Gillem,  188 

Amnesty,  See  oath 

Anderson,  Adna,  Government  super 
intendent  of  railroads,  198 

Banks  in  Tennessee,  200-204. 

Bell,  John,  Presidential  candidate,  i ; 
signs  Whig  appeal  to  people  of 
Tennessee,  6;  declares  for  South,  7 

Benjamin,  Judah,  P.,  Orders  repres 
sion  of  Tenn.  Unionists,  16;  men 
tioned,  27 

Bingham  J.  B.,  Urges  appointment 
of  Johnson  as  provisional  govern 
or,  96;  member  of  Union  executive 
committee,  98;  complains  of  treat 
ment  of  Union  men,  130;  denounces 
Memphis  civil  commission,  133 ;  de 
nounced,  135;  urges  enrollment  of 
militia,  188;  mentioned,  141,  156 

Boyle,  Gen.  Jeremiah  T.,  Begs  John 
son  for  cavalry,  57 

Bragg,  Gen.  Braxton,  Sanctions  plan 
to  kidnap  Johnson,  38;  occupies 
Chattanooga,  54;  invades  Kentucky, 
59,  60  and  notes ;  defeated  at  Stone 
River,  91 ;  abandons  Tullahoma, 
99 ;  retreats  into  Georgia,  101 ;  vic 
tor  at  Chickamauga,  108;  driven 
from  Tenn.,  108;  mentioned,  44,  61, 
98 

Brayman,  Gen.  Mason,  Report  of,  to 
Johnson,  90 

Brecken ridge,  Gen.  John  C.,  Esti 
mates  Buell's  conciliatory  policy, 
72  note;  invades  East  Tenn.,  155, 
187;  routs  Gillem's  guard,  157,  188; 
mentioned,  25,  213 

Brien,  M.  M.,  Mentioned,  98,  131. 

Bridges,  George  W.,  Elected  to  Con 
gress,  13;  arrested  by  Confeder 
ates,  13;  escapes,  13;  mentioned, 
141 

Brownlow,  William  G.,  Imprisoned, 
17;  denounces  the  administration, 
58;  opposes  lenient  treatment  of 
Tenn.  secessionists,  72;  member  of 


Union  executive  committee,  98;  at 
Knoxville  convention,  126 ;  speech 
of,  at  Baltimore  convention,  128; 
denounces  Federal  court  at  Knox 
ville,  135 ;  on  condition  of  refugees, 
158;  nominated  for  governor  of 
Tenn.,  171;  states  his  policy,  172; 
elected,  174 ;  appeals  for  protection 
for  East  Tenn.,  186;  mentioned,  I, 
14,  16,  18,  96,  175 

Buchanan,  James,  Mentioned,  23. 

Buckner,  Gen.  Simon  B.,  Retreats  in 
East  Tenn.,  101 ;  mentioned,  94 

Buell,  Gen.  Don  Carlos,  Appointed  to 
command,  17;  policy  of,  regarding 
Tenn.,  17;  rebuked  by  Lincoln  and 
McClellan,  17;  wisdom  of  plan  of, 
18  and  note ;  occupies  Nashville, 
19;  opposes  provincial  government 
for  Tenn.,  34;  advises  Johnson  of 
popular  temper  in  Nashville,  38; 
reinforces  Grant  at  Shiloh,  50;  on 
the  defence  of  Nashville,  51,  53, 
62,  63 ;  friction  beteen  Johnson  and, 
53;  advances  on  Chattanooga,  54; 
checked  by  Bragg,  54;  removal  of, 
urged,  58;  campaign  of,  against 
Bragg,  59,  60,  65 ;  rupture  between 
Johnson  and,  60  et  seq.;  Johnson 
complains  of,  to  Lincoln,  61 ;  court 
of  inquiry  into  conduct  of,  63 ;  dis 
satisfaction  with,  65 ;  intolerable 
position  of,  65-67;  succeeded  by 
Rosecrans,  67 ;  estimates  of,  65 
note;  conciliatory  policy  of,  71,  72 
note;  complains  of  disloyalty  of 
Tenn.,  74;  mentioned,  52,  55,  69, 
70,  76,  86,  176,  179 

Burnside  Gen.  Ambrose  E.,  Invades 
East  Tenn.,  99;  occupies  Knoxville, 
ipi ;  retreats  and  defends  Knox 
ville,  108;  mentioned,  106,  109 

Butler,  R.  R.,  .Resolutions  of,  161, 
170 

Byrd,  Col.,  Mentioned,  144,  166. 

Campbell,  John  A.,  Member  of  Union 
executive  committee,  98 

Campbell,  William  B.,  Suggested  as 
military  governor  of  Tenn.,  31 


225 


226 


INDEX 


note;  chairman  of  Unionist  mass 
meeting,  47;  speech  of,  48;  con 
servative  Unionist  candidate  for 
governor,  100;  signs  protest  against 
Johnson's  policy,  149;  proposed  by 
Johnson  as  commander  of  relief 
expedition  to  East  Tenn.,  179; 
commissioner  for  release  of  prison 
ers,  194;  mentioned,  i,  151 

Canby,  Gem.  Edward  R.S.,  Orders 
draft,  173 

Carper,  John,  Speech  of,  in  recon 
struction  convention,  162 

Carter,  Gen.  Samuel  P.,  Urges  dis 
tinction  between  degrees  of  loyalty, 
11.3 ;  mentioned,  212  note 

Caruthers,  Robert  L.,  Nominated  for 
governor  of  Tenn.,  95;  declared 
elected,  99;  mentioned,  I 

Catron,  Judge,  Charge  of,  to. grand 
jury,  45 

Cavalry,  Confederate,  50,  See  also 
Forrest,  John  H.  Morgan,  Wheeler. 

Chattanooga,  Buell  advances  on,  54; 
Bragg  retreats  to,  99;  Bragg  aban 
dons  101 ;  delegates  to  National 
Union  convention  elected  at,  128; 
Union  refugees  at,  157;  mentioned, 
59 

Cheatham,  Richard  B.,  Mayor  of 
Nashville,  removed  from  office  and 
imprisoned,  42,  43 

Chickamauga,  Battle  of,  108;  men 
tioned,  211 

Churchwell,  Col.  W.  M.,  Confederate 
provost-marshal;  orders  of,  con 
cerning  Union  refugees,  18 

Citizens  of  Tenn.,  Relation  of,  to 
military  government,  33;  consti 
tutional  meaning  of  citizenship,  34; 
Johnson's  proclamation  for  protec 
tion  of  loyal,  72;  Halleck's  orders 
concerning  treatment  of,  84;  ar 
rest  of  secessionist,  85 ;  defined  by 
Attorney-General  Maynard,  120 ; 
propositions  to  discriminate  be 
tween  classes  of,  on  basis  of 
loyalty,  162 

Clements,  Andrew  J.,  Elected  to 
Congress,  13;  suggestions  of,  for 
reconstruction,  162 

Clergy,  Anti-Unionist,  of  Nashville, 
suppressed  by  Johnson,  43 

Commissions  in  Tenn.,  See  courts 

Convention,  Gov.  Harris  suggests 
submitting  question  of  secession 


to,  2;  Tenn.  legislature  provides 
for  popular  vote  on,  3;  Tenn.  de- 
cares  against,  5;  Knoxville-Green- 
ville  Union,  12;  Confederate  nomi 
nating,  June,  1863,  95;  Union, 
July,  1863,  96-98 ;  second  Knoxville, 
125  et  seq.;  Union,  to  elect  dele 
gates  to  National  Union  conven 
tion,  127;  National  Union,  at  Bal 
timore,  128;  call  for,  to  discuss 
state  problems,  140;  Union,  Sept. 
1864,  140-147,  189  (membership, 
140;  radical  domination,  140;  con 
servative  position,  141 ;  conserva 
tive  resolutions,  141,  143;  conser 
vatives  forced  out,  144;  resolutions 
adopted,  144;  relation  of  Johnson 
to,  147)  ;  call  for  preliminary  re 
construction,  157;  reconstruction, 
Jan.,  1865,  158-172  (call  for,  158; 
informal  nature  of,  158;  delayed 
by  Hood's  invasion,  159;  meets, 
160;  admission  of  delegates,  161 ; 
basis  of  voting,  161 ;  radical  policy, 
163;  conservative  policy,  163; 
amendments  to  state  constitution 
proposed  by  radicals,  165;  author 
ity  of,  to  amend  constitution  denied, 
166;  radical  amendments  opposed, 
166;  Johnson's  speech,  167;  results 
achieved,  170;  provisions  for  state 
elections  and  nomination  of  can 
didates,  171)  ;  discussion  of,  system 
of  reconstruction,  214 

Cooper,  Edmund,  Appointed  John 
son's  private  secretary  and  confi 
dential  agent,  42 

Corinth,  Halleck  advances  on,  52; 
abandoned  by  Confederates,  54 

Courts  in  Tenn.,  Reopened  in  parts 
of  state,  45 ;  friction  between  civil 
and  military,  45;  war  department's 
rules  regarding,  45;  judicial  com 
missions  in  Memphis,  46;  provost, 
in  Nashville,  78;  requested  for 
Knoxville,  112;  reopened,  131; 
civil  and  military,  at  Memphis,  131- 
133;  in  West  Tenn.,  134;  in  Knox 
ville  denounced  135;  opened,  136; 
rights  of  colored  persons  in,  146 

Crawford,  Col.  R.  C,  Mentioned,  142 

Crittenden,  John  J.,  Johnson's  speech 
on  compromise  proposition  of,  27; 
protests  against  removal  of  Buell, 
67;  mentioned,  24,  125 

Currency  in  Tenn.,   199-204 


INDEX 


227 


Dana,  Charles  A.,  Interviews  John 
son,  105,  219 

Dana,  Gen.  Napoleon  J.  T.,  Friction 
between,  and  judges,  etc.  in  West 
Tenn.,  135 

Davis,  Charles,  Federal  commissioner 
to  administer  Confederate  prop 
erty,  86 

Davis,  Jefferson,  Proclaims  martial 
law  in  East  Tenn.,  18;  Johnson's 
retort  to,  22;  strictures  of,  on  mili 
tary  government  in  Tenn.,  35 ;  re 
mark  of,  on  Johnson's  proclama 
tion,  118  note;  mentioned,  9,  14 
note,  16,  43,  44 

Deserters,  Confederate,  enlisted  by 
Rosecrans  and  Johnson,  195;  en 
listment  of  Confederate,  forbidden 
by  Thomas,  195;  Confederate,  sent 
north  of  Ohio  river,  195 ;  loyal, 
from  Confederate  army,  195; 
Union,  196 

Dickson  Capt.  J.  Bates,  Rebuked  for 
interfering  with  Johnson,  183 

Dorr,  Col.  Joseph  B.,  Reports  con 
ditions  in  Humphries  county,  123 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  vote  for,  in 
Tenn.,  1860,  i  note;  reasons  for 
Johnson's  failure  to  support,  24; 
Johnson  compared  to,  220 

Driver,  Capt.,  Mentioned,   144 

Dumont,  Gen.  Ebenezer,  Approves 
reinforcements  for  Nashville,  51 

East,  Edward  H.,  Appointed  secre 
tary  of  state,  42;  governor  pro 
tern.,  175 

East  Tennessee,  Conditions  and  sen 
timent  in,  before  war,  4;  votes 
against  convention,  5 ;  votes  against 
secession,  10;  Union  convention  in, 
12 ;  congressional  election  in,  13 ; 
importance  of,  14;  Confederates 
overrun,  14;  Confederate  policy  in, 
14-17;  loyalty  of,  16;  Buell  fails 
to  succor,  17;  persecution  of  loy 
alists  in,  18;  Burnside  invades,  99, 
101 ;  conditions  in  (1864),  124,  186; 
Knoxville  convention  in  125  et  seq.; 
proposition  to  make  separate  state 
of,  125;  Union  nominating  conven 
tions  in,  128;  Gillem's  operations 
in,  186-188;  complaints  of,  troops, 
191 ;  mentioned,  7,  44,  46,  56,  58, 
67,  73,  91,  99,  104,  131,  139,  211 

Edwards,  Col.  Richard  M.,  Sugges 
tion  of,  regarding  electors,  144 


Elections  in  Tenn.,  Congressional, 
Aug.,  1861, 13 ;  municipal,  in  Mem 
phis,  June,  1862,  87;  congressional, 
attempted,  Dec.,  1862,  89-90;  Con 
federate,  Aug.,  1863,  99J  conser 
vative  Union,  Aug.,  1863,  99-100; 
Johnson  proclaims  county,  Jan., 
1864,  118;  irregularities  preceding 
county,  122;  county  Mar.,  1864,  123; 
attempted,  Dec.,  1862,  89-90;  Con 
vention,  May,  1864,  127;  presiden 
tial,  1864  (provided  for,  144;  or 
dered  by  Johnson,  147;  held,  156; 
declared  invalid  by  Congress,  156)  ; 
state,  Mar.,  1865  (provided  for,  170, 
machinery  for,  171 ;  nomination  of 
Union  candidates  for,  171 ;  held, 

174) 

Emancipation,  See  Johnson,  Lincoln, 
slavery,  Tennessee 

Etheridge,  Emerson,  Heads  conserva 
tive  Union  party,  09;  urges  recog 
nition  of  Campbell  as  governor, 
100;  signs  protest  against  Johnson's 
policy,  149;  mentioned,  7 

Ewing,  E.  H.,  Mentioned,  6 

Finances  of  Tenn.,  199-204  (condi 
tion  of  banks,  200;  decline  of  bank 
paper,  201 ;  remedies  proposed,  201 ; 
instability  of  state  institutions,  203 ; 
industrial  chaos,  203;  Johnson's 
policy,  204) 

Forrest,  Gen.  Nathan  B.,  Captures 
Murf  reesboro,  54 ;  approaches 
Nashville,  57,  62;  prevents  Union 
elections,  90;  enters  Memphis,  134; 
cooperates  in  organizing  Confed 
erate  militia,  156;  mentioned,  50, 
51,  58,  74,  190,  212 

Foster,  Turner  S.,  Elected  circuit 
judge,  48;  imprisoned  by  Johnson, 
48 

Fowler,  Joseph  S.,  Appointed  comp 
troller  of  Tenn.,  42;  mentioned, 
141 

Franklin,   Battle  of,   159 

Gass,  D.  P.,  Proposes  disfranchise- 
ment  of  secessionists,  162 

Gaunt,  Judge,  Views  of.  on  amnesty, 
166 

Gentry,  Meredith  P.,  Johnson  de 
feats,  for  governor  of  Tenn.,  i#55, 
21 

Gillem,  Gen.  Alvin  C.,  Commands 
governor's  guard,  186;  expedition  to 
East  Tenn.,  187-188;  guards  Nash- 


228 


INDEX 


ville-tNorthwestern    irailroad,    198  ; 
mentioned,  157,  211 

Governor's  guard,  Provision  for,  42 ; 
ist  Term,  regiment  transferred  to, 
83;  authority  for,  176  note,  179; 
operations  of,  in  East  Tenn.,  186- 
188;  friction  between  Johnson  and 
army  officers  over,  187 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.,  Captures 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  19; 
proclaims  martial  law  in  West 
Tenn.,  19;  victor  at  Shiloh,  46; 
commands  departments  of  Cumber 
land,  Tennessee,  and  Ohio,  108; 
drives  Bragg  from  Tenn.,  109;  dis 
satisfied  with  Thomas,  159;  direct 
ed  to  guard  Nashville-Northwest 
ern  railroad,  198;  mentioned,  no, 
191 

Greeley,   Horace,   Mentioned,   149 

Greene,  Capt.  Oliver  D.,  Johnson's 
quarrels  with,  57,  69,  70;  men 
tioned,  177 

Greenville,  Union  convention  at,  12, 
13 ;  mentioned,  20 

Guerillas,  15,  44,  50,  52  et  passim 

Halleck,  Gen.  Henry  W.,  Directed  to 
provide  troops  for  Johnson,  42; 
instructions  of,  regarding  relation 
of  military  and  civil  courts,  45 ; 
ordered  to  protect  Nashville,  51; 
advances  on  Corinth,  52;  explains 
failure  to  send  troops  to  Nashville, 
53;  plan  of,  to  clear  East  Tenn., 
54;  asked  to  suggest  successor  to 
Buell,  58;  orders  Buell  to  occupy 
East  Tenn.,  67;  explains  relation 
of  civil  to  military  government, 
8p;  rebukes  Rosecrans,  81 ;  instruc 
tions  by,  regarding  treatment  of 
inhabitants,  84;  mentioned,  46,  55, 
179 

Harris,  Isham  G.,  Convenes  Tenn. 
legislature,  2 ;  message  of,  2 ;  re 
fuses  Lincoln's  demand  for  troops, 
5 ;  urges  secession  and  union  with 
Confederacy,  7;  motives  of,  8; 
authorized  to  raise  and  direct 
Tenn.  troops,  etc.,  8;  proclaims 
congressional  elections,  13;  flees  to 
Miss.,  19;  remark  of,  concerning 
Johnson,  22;  proclaims  Confeder 
ate  nominating  convention,  95 ;  ad 
ministration  of,  indorsed,  95 ;  men 
tioned,  6,  9,  10,  62,  TOO,  106 

Harrison,  Horace  H.,  Member  of 
Union  executive  committee,  98 


Henry,  Gustavus  A.,  Johnson  defeats, 
for  governor  of  Tenn.,  21 

Hilliard,  Henry  W.,  Reports  to 
Toombs  on  conditions  in  Tenn.,  8; 
addresses  Tenn.  legislature,  9 

Holloway,  Lieut.  Junius  B.,  On 
Buell's  conciliatory  policy,  72  note 

Homestead  bill,  Championed  by  John 
son,  22;  vetoed  by  Buchanan,  23 

Hood,  James  R.,  Moderate  leader  in 
reconstruction  convention ;  minor 
ity  report  of,  166 ;  attacks  the  radi 
cals,  167 ;  mentioned,  169 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B.,  Invades  Tenn., 
158;  checked  at  Franklin,  159; 
routed  before  Nashville,  159;  men 
tioned,  44,  no,  199,  213 

Houk,  Col.  L.  C.,  Activities  of,  in 
reconstruction  conventions,  141, 
142,  143,  161,  162 

Houston,  Russell,  Mentioned,  6 

Hurlbut,  Gen.  Stephen  A.,  Declares 
Tennessee  ready  for  reconstruction, 
104;  misgivings  of,  regarding 
Memphis  election,  137;  mentioned, 

134 

Johnson,  Andrew,  Begs  aid  for  Tenn. 
Unionists,  14,  17;  sends  muskets 
to  East  Tenn.,  14  note ;  appointed 
military  governor,  19;  youth  of, 
20;  early  political  career  of,  21; 
political  principles  of,  22 ;  views  of, 
on  slavery,  secession,  coercion,  23 ; 
relations  of,  with  Douglas,  24;  sup 
ports  Breckenridge,  25;  reasons  for 
devotion  of,  to  Union,  25;  com 
promise  proposal  of,  25;  attacked, 
27 ;  speeches  of,  for  Union,  27 ; 
member  of  joint  committee  on 
conduct  of  war,  30;  objections 
to  appointment  of,  30  note;  com 
mission  of,  32 ;  instructions  to, 
32,  176  note;  problems  of,  32- 
38;  plots  and  threats  against,  37; 
address  of,  to  the  people,  38 ;  states 
purpose  of  military  government, 
39;  conciliatory  attitude  of,  39;  re 
lation  of,  to  army,  42 ;  vacates  and 
refills  offices  in  Nashville,  42;  sup 
presses  anti-Union  press,  43 ;  and 
clergy,  43;  facilitates  reopening  of 
courts,  45 ;  at  Union  mass  meeting, 
48;  dealings  of,  with  Turner  S. 
Foster,  48;  asks  reinforcements  for 
.Nashville  51-53;  criticizes  Buell, 
53;  quarrels  with  Federal  officers, 
55;  complains  of  lack  of  support, 


INDEX 


229 


56;  authorized  to  raise  cavalry,  56; 
quarrels  with  Capt.  Greene,  57,  69; 
plan  of,  for  defence  of  Nashville, 
59;  rupture  between  Buell  and,  60 
et  seq.;  deposition  of,  at  trial  of 
Buell,  63 ;  gains  credit  for  saving 
Nashville,  64;  demands  removal  of 
Negley,  64;  Lincoln's  story  of,  64; 
embarrassing  position  of,  67;  Lin 
coln's  confidence  in,  68 ;  quarrels 
with  military  authorities  in  Nash 
ville,  69 ;  secures  authority  to  ap 
point  provost-marshal,  70;  friction 
between  John  Lellyett  and,  70; 
policy  of,  for  protection  of  Tenn. 
Unionists,  72,  73;  mulcts  Pulaski, 
72;  banishes  disloyalists,  73;  adopts 
repressive  policy,  74;  appoints  com 
missioners  to  administer  oath  of 
allegiance,  etc.,  76;  authority  of, 
eclipsed  by  military,  77 ;  controver 
sy  between  Rosecrans  and,  over 
Truesdail  and  cotton  scandals,  79- 
83;  forbids  payments  of  rents,  etc. 
to  secessionists,  85 ;  controls  admin 
istration  of  Confederate  property, 
86;  proclaims  congressional  elec 
tion,  89;  secures  exception  of  Tenn. 
from  emancipation  proclamation, 
91 ;  speech  of,  on  slavery  in  Tenn., 
92;  speech  of,  at  Nashville  93; 
administration  of,  indorsed,  98; 
accused  of  delaying  reconstruction, 
99,  100;  implacable  toward  seces 
sionist  leaders,  102;  policy  of  re 
construction  of,  103;  on  conditions 
in  Tenn.,  105;  submits  plan  of 
reconstruction  to  Lincoln,  106;  re 
ceives  authority  for  reconstruction 
of  Tenn.,  107 ;  speech  of,  on 
reconstruction,  107;  attitude  of,  re 
garding  amnesty  oath,  113;  speech 
of,  on  reconstruction,  114-117; 
proclaims  county  elections,  118;  im 
poses  stringent  oath,  119;  support 
ed  by  Lincoln,  120 ;  blamed  for 
failure  of  county  elections,  123 ;  for 
immediate  emancipation,  124;  at 
Knoxville  convention,  126;  nom 
inated  for  vice-presidency  by  Tenn. 
Union  convention,  128;  and  by  Na 
tional  Union  convention,  129;  re 
quests  exception  of  Tenn.  from 
amnesty  proclamation,  131 ;  power 
of,  to  establish  courts  denied,  133 ; 
Union  convention  indorses  admin 


istration  of,  145;  proclamation  of, 
regarding  reconstruction,  146;  ap 
peals  for  aid  and  threatens  dis 
loyalists,  146;  orders  presidential 
election  in  Tenn.,  147;  explana 
tion  of  course,  in  convention, 
J47  '•>  policy  of,  condemned  by 
peace  Democrats,  148-153;  campaign 
speech  of,  to  negroes,  154;  speech 
of,  in  reconstruction  convention, 
167;  policy  of,  triumphant,  168; 
valedictory  of,  173;  Stanton's  in 
structions  to,  176  note;  relations 
between  Thomas  and,  177;  orders 
governor's  guard  to  East  Tenn., 
186;  friction  between  Schofield  and, 
187;  scope  of  civil  authority  of, 
205;  relief  of  destitute  adminis 
tered  by,  205,  206;  urges  that  dis 
loyal  citizens  be  sent  south,  207; 
protects  citizens  from  military 
officials,  207;  reconstruction  policy 
of,  criticized  and  defended,  210- 
217;  personal  estimate  of,  217-223. 
See  also  deserters,  finances,  mili 
tary  government,  militia,  negro, 
prisoners,  railroads,  reconstruction, 
troops 

Johnson,  Mrs.  Andrew,  Treatment 
of,  by  Confederates,  18 

Johnson,  Dr.  G.  D.,  Candidate  for 
mayor  of  Memphis,  137 

Johnson,  Gen.  Richard  W.,  Captured 
by  Morgan,  55 

Johnson,  Col.  Robert,  Mentioned, 
178 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E.,  Abandons 
Nashville,  19;  mentioned,  98,  99 

Jones,  William  P.,  Member  of  Union 
executive  committee,  98 

Kentucky,  Tenn.  refugees  in,  16; 
Bragg's  raid  into,  59-60 

Knoxville,  Union  conventions  at,  12, 
125;  ocupied  by  Burnside,  101 ; 
siege  of,  108,  109;  Federal  court 
for,  urged,  112;  election  at,  for 
delegates  to  National  Union  con 
vention,  128;  refugees  at,  157,  158; 
mentioned,  16,  18,  27,  157 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  Mentioned,  99 

Leftrick,  J.,  Member  of  Union  execu 
tive  committee,  98 

Legislature  of  Tenn.,  Convened  by 
Harris,  2;  passes  resolutions 
against  coercion,  3 ;  submits  ques 
tion  of  convention  to  people,  3; 


23° 


INDEX 


approves  league  with  Confederacy, 
9;  provides  for  popular  vote  on 
secession  and  union  with  Confed 
eracy,  9;  adjourns  sine  die,  19; 
meets  for  reconstruction,  175 

Lellyett,  John,  Friction  between  John 
son  and,  70;  spokesman  for  Mc- 
Clellan  supporters'  protest  to  Lin 
coln  against  Johnson's  policy,  151 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  Rebukes  Buell, 
17;  appoints  Johnson  military  gov 
ernor,  19;  placates  Johnson,  57; 
story  of  Johnson  by,  64;  confidence 
of,  in  Johnson,  68;  anxious  for 
reconstruction  of  border  states,  88; 
isends  agents  to  promote  recon 
struction,  88;  emancipation  procla 
mation  of,  88,  91 ;  suggestions  of, 
regarding  reconstruction  of  Tenn., 
106;  empowers  Johnson  to  recon 
struct  Tenn.,  107;  proclamation  of 
amnesty  and  reconstruction  by, 
no;  sends  agent  to  Tenn.,  112; 
position  of,  regarding  amnesty 
oath,  113;  supports  Johnson's  plan 
of  reconstruction,  120,  217;  nomi 
nated  by  Tenn.  Union  conventions, 
128;  amnesty  proclamation  of,  de 
nounced  and  derided  in  Tenn.,  129, 
130 ;  administration  of,  indorsed  by 
Tenn.  Union  convention,  145;  con 
troversy  between,  and  McClellan 
supporters  in  Tenn.,  148-153;  wins 
Tenn.  election,  156;  urges  Johnson 
to  raise  troops,  180 ;  urges  raising 
of  colored  troops,  181 ;  mentioned, 
i  note,  2,  5,  7,  17,  18  and  note, 
25,  53,  54,  61,  119,  222 

Logan,    Gen.    John    A.,    Mentioned, 

159 

Longstreet,  Gen.  James,  Reinforces 
Bragg,  108;  operates  against  JBurn- 
side,  108,  109;  mentioned,  211 

Lookout  Mountain,  Battle  of,  109 

McClellan,  Gen.  George  B.,  Assigns 
Buell  to  command,  17;  policy  of, 
regarding  East  Tenn.,  17;  censures 
Buell,  17;  views  of,  as  presidential 
candidate,  148;  supporters  of,  pro 
test  to  Lincoln  against  administra 
tion  policy  in  Tenn.,  148-153;  ticket 
withdrawn  in  Tenn.,  153;  vote  for, 
in  Tenn.,  156;  mentioned,  18  note, 
34,  143 

Matthews,  Col.  Stanley,  Johnson's 
animosity  toward,  69;  mentioned, 
177 


Maynard,  Horace,  Elected  to  Con 
gress,  13 ;  begs  government  for 
arms  for  East  Tenn.,  14,  17;  at 
torney-general  of  Tenn.,  42 ;  mem 
ber  of  Union  executive  committee, 
98;  decision  of,  regarding  status 
of  amnestied  citizens,  120;  men 
tioned,  i,  4,  1 6,  18,  96,  141 

Meigs,  R.  J.,  Suggestions  of,  to 
Johnson,  regarding  policy  as  mili 
tary  governor,  38  note;  urges  con 
fiscation  of  slaves  of  Confederates, 
92;  mentioned,  6 

Memphis,  Confederate  state  govern 
ment  in,  19;  captured  by  Federals, 
44;  legal  commissions  in,  46;  muni 
cipal  election  in,  87;  mass  meet 
ing  in,  urges  reconstruction,  112; 
meeting  of  conservative  Unionists 
in,  121 ;  courts  and  commissions 
at,  131-133;  Forrest  enters,  134; 
municipal  affairs  in,  136-138;  gov 
ernment  of,  subverted,  138;  presi 
dential  vote  in,  1864,  156,  190;  cop 
perhead  activity  in,  173 ;  mentioned, 
27,  52,  55,  89,  212 

Mercer,  S.  C,  Founds  Nashville 
Daily  Union,  43 

Middle  Tennessee,  Votes  against 
convention,  5;  for  secession,  10; 
military  operations  in,  1862,  52; 
Buell  explains  disposition  of  troops 
in,  53 ;  Union  nominating  conven 
tion  in,  127;  mentioned,  12,  13,  44, 
5o,  51,  130,  139.  See  also  Nash 
ville. 

Military  government,  Problems  con 
nected  with,  32;  relation  of,  to 
citizens,  33;  constitutional  status 
of,  34-37;  Jefferson  Davis  on,  35; 
purpose  of,  stated  by  Johnson,  38- 
40;  relation  of,  to  army,  42,  176, 
183;  and  courts,  45-46;  repressive 
measures  of,  under  Johnson  and 
Rosecrans,  72  et  seq.;  confusion  of 
civil  and  military  authority  under, 
76;  scope  of  civil  authority  of, 
205  ;  miscellaneous  functions  of : — 
raising  troops  (home  guards,  178; 
cavalry,  56,  178;  infantry,  cavalry, 
artillery,  179;  governor's  guard, 
179,  186-188;  recruits  from  other 
states,  180;  colored  troops,  180- 
185 ;  militia,  188-190 ;  supplies,  191 ; 
summary,  192)  ;  investigation,  dis 
charge,  and  recruiting  of  prisoners, 
192-195;  deserters,  195;  construe- 


INDEX 


231 


tion  and  guarding  of  railroads,  196- 
199;  regulation  of  finances,  199- 
204;  relief  of  destitute,  205-207; 
protection  of  citizens,  207;  over 
sight  of  negroes,  207-209 
Military  operations  in  Tenn.,  Corinth 
campaign,  52;  campaign  to  clear 
East  Tenn.,  1862,  54;  Bragg's  in 
vasion  of  Ky.,  59  et  seq.,  Federal 
plans  for  1863,  91 ;  Rosecrans' 
campaign,  1863,  91,  98,  99,  101,  107, 
108;  Grant's  campaign  against 
Bragg,  108;  Hood's  invasion,  158, 

159 

Militia  of  Tenn.,  Enrollment  of  (in 
West  Tenn,  135;  urged,  188;  Nash 
ville  convention  declares  for,  189; 
Johnson's  proclamation  for,  189; 
difficulties  in,  189)  ;  summary  of, 
190;  minor  problems  connected 
with,  191 

Milligan,  Samuel  R.,  President  of 
Union  convention,  141 

Milroy,  Gen.  Robert  H.,  Difficulties 
of,  in  enrolling  militia,  189 

Missionary  Ridge,  Battle  of,   109 

Mitchel,  Gen.  Ormsby  M.,  Advances 
to  Tuscumbia,  52;  Confederate 
pressure  on,  52;  retreats,  53 

Mitchell,  Gen.  Robert  B.,  Enforces 
confiscation  act,  85;  orders  seizure 
of  goods  of  delinquents,  85 ;  exacts 
oath  of  allegiance,  86 

Morgan,  Gen.  George  H.,  At  Cum 
berland  Gap,  54;  outflanked  iby 
Kirby  Smith,  60;  mentioned,  61, 
179 

Morgan,  Gen.  John  H.,  Menaces 
Nashville,  54;  captures  Gallatin, 
55 ;  closes  in  on  Nashville,  62 ;  en 
ters  Pulaski,  73;  death  of,  187; 
mentioned,  50,  51,  58,  72,  186 

Morgan,  Samuel  T.,  Candidate  for 
mayor  of  Memphis,  137 

Mundy,  Col.  Marc,  Urges  advantages 
of  conciliatory  policy,  41 ;  reluctant 
to  try  civilians  in  military  courts, 
43;  mentioned,  73 

Murfreesboro,  Captured  by  Forrest, 
54;  battle  of  (or  Stone  River),  91 ; 
mentioned,  57 

Mussey,  Col.  Reuben  D.,  Estimate 
of  negro  troops  by,  185;  reports 
on  negro  schools,  209 

Nashville,  Offered  as  Confederate 
capitol,  9;  Buell  plans  to  strike  at, 
17;  abandoned  by  Confederates, 


19 ;  occupied  by  Buell,  19 ;  municipal 
officers  of,  deposed  by  Johnson, 
42;  disloyal  press  and  clergy  of, 
suppressed,  43;  courts  reopened  at, 
45 ',  Union  mass  meeting  at,  May, 
1862,  47;  in  danger,  51;  Buell's 
plans  regarding,  52,  62,  63;  be 
sieged,  55-63;  Johnson  the  soul  of 
defence  of,  64,  179;  Rosecrans  re 
lieves,  67 ;  complaints  against  John 
son  in,  72;  jumble  of  offices  at,  76; 
confiscation  act  in,  86;  Union  sen 
timent  in,  89;  Johnson's  speech 
against  slavery  at,  93;  Union  con 
vention  at,  July,  1863,  96;  loyalty 
of  municipal  officers  of,  impugned, 
in;  Union  mass  meeting  at,  Jan., 
1864,  114;  Union  rally  at,  Mar., 
1864,  122;  election  at,  for  delegates 
to  National  Union  convention,  127 ; 
Union  meeting  at,  Aug.,  1864,  pro 
poses  convention,  140;  Union  con 
vention  at,  Sept.,  1864,  140  et  seq.; 
presidential  campaign  in,  154; 
presidential  vote  of,  156;  battle 
of,  159;  reconstruction  convention, 
Jan.,  1865,  at,  160  et  seq.,  legisla 
ture  meets  at,  175 ;  fiscal  difficulties 
at,  200;  refugees  in,  206;  negroes 
in,  208;  mentioned,  7,  17,  18,  27, 
34,  44,  46,  47,  48,  49,  53,  54, 
59,  65,  69,  70,  74,  75,  78,  79,  81, 
83,  85,  92,  101,  134,  157,  177,  179, 
182,  183,  188,  189,  191,  192,  196, 
197,  198,  199,  201,  205,  209,  212, 
213,  218,  219 

Nashville  Union  Club,  Declaration 
of  principles  of,  93 

Negley,  Gen.  James  S.,  Johnson  de 
mands  removal  of,  64,  69;  instruct 
ed  to  compensate  Unionists  out  of 
property  of  disloyalists,  74;  in 
structed  to  assume  custody  of  bank 
at  Columbia,  200;  mentioned,  70 

Negro,  Population  (Stanton's  instruc 
tions  regarding,  207 ;  wretched  con 
dition  of,  208;  relief  measures  for, 
209 ;  education  of,  209) ;  troops 
(Lincoln  urges  enlistment  of,  180, 
181 ;  enlistment  of,  182 ;  compensa 
tion  to  former  loyal  owners  of, 
184;  conditions  of  enlistment  of, 
184 ;  efficiency  of,  185 ;  public  senti 
ment  regarding,  185) 

Nelson,  Thomas,  A.  R.,  Elected  to 
Congress,  13;  imprisoned  by  Con 
federates,  13;  takes  oath  of  neu- 


232 


INDEX 


trality,  13;  calls  second  Knoxville 
convention,  125 ;  signs  protest 
against  Johnson's  policy,  149; 
mentioned,  i,  4 

Nelson,  Gen.  William,  Defends 
Nashville,  58;  Johnson  secures 
removal  of,  69 

Newspaper  press,  Nashville,  sup 
pressed  by  Johnson,  43 

Oath,  Of  allegiance  (amnesty  offered 
in  return  for,  40;  Nashville  offi 
cials,  clergy,  etc.  required  to  take, 
42;  penalties  for  refusal  to  take, 
73;  commissioners  to  administer, 
appointed,  76;  exacted  by  Gen. 
Mitchell,  86);  amnesty  (no;  Lin 
coln's  plan  for  reconstruction  based 
on,  in;  suggestions  regarding, 
112;  difficulties  regarding,  112-113; 
Johnson  opposes,  as  qualification 
for  franchise,  114;  derided,  129; 
abuses  under,  130;  mentioned, 
120) ;  Union  test  (advocated  by 
Johnson,  115;  text  of,  119;  signifi 
cance  of,  119;  condemnation  of, 
120-122;  Lincoln  supports,  120); 
"unconditional"  or  "iron-clad" 
(text  of,  145;  required  of  voters, 
147;  reasons  for,  148;  objected  to 
by  peace  Democrats,  149;  injustice 
of,  217) 

Olin,  Abraham  B.,  Views  on  status 
of  seceded  states  and  constitutional 
basis  of  military  government,  35 

Palmer,  Gen.  John  M.,  Commands 
Nashville  garrison,  62;  estimate  of 
Johnson  by,  221 

Park,  John,  Elected  mayor  of  Mem 
phis,  87;  denounced  as  disloyal 
136;  asserts  his  loyalty,  137;  re- 
elected,  138;  deposed  by  Washburn, 
138 

Parole,  Non-combatant,  Required  of 
citizens  of  Nashville,  86 

Peace  Democrats,  Platform  of,  148; 
contest  elections  in  Tenn.,  148;  pol 
icy  of  "unconditionals"  in  opposi 
tion  to,  148;  controversy  of  Tenn., 
with  Lincoln,  148-153;  ticket  of, 
withdrawn,  152;  discrimination 
against,  in  Tenn.  censurable,  153. 

Peyton,  Bailie,  Mentioned,  151,  221 

Pillow,  Gen.  Gideon  J.,  Report  of, 
on  conditions  in  Tenn.,  7 

Police,  In  Nashville,  78 ;  army  de 
tective  police,  78 

Prisoners,  Release  of  Tenn.,  sought 


toy  Union  mass  meeting,  48;  at 
titude  of  Confederate,  193;  peti 
tions  from  Confederate,  193;  C  F. 
Trigg  investigates,  194;  authority 
of  Johnson  regarding,  194;  W.  B. 
Campbell  commissioner  for  release 
of,  194;  Confederate,  permitted  to 
join  Union  army,  194;  authority 
to  recruit,  assigned  to  Rosecrans 
and  Johnson,  195 ;  discharge  of,  dis 
continued,  195 

Pulaski,  Mulcted  by  Johnson,  72 
Railroads,  Louisville,  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  (cut  by  Bragg,  59; 
importance  of,  197;  difficulty  in 
defending,  197)  ;  Memphis,  Clarks- 
ville  and  Louisville  (threatened, 
55;  Johnson  assumes  control  of, 
196)  ;  Nashville  and  Northwestern 
(importance  of  completing,  197; 
Johnson  urges  completion  of,  197; 
Johnson  authorized  to  complete, 
197;  guarding  of,  198;  turned  over 
to  war  department,  198;  controver 
sies  over,  198-199) 
Ramsay,  James,  Mentioned,  143 
Reconstruction  in  Tenn.,  Urged  by 
Union  mass  meeting,  May,  1862,  48; 
Lincoln  sends  agent  to  promote,  88 ; 
discussed  by  Union  convention, 
July,  186 3,  96-98;  Johnson  accused 
of  delaying,  99;  Johnson's  policy 
of,  103;  Johnson  submits  plan  for, 
to  Lincoln,  106 ;  Lincoln's  sugges 
tions  for,  106;  Johnson  receives 
full  authority  for,  107;  Lincoln's 
proclamation  regarding,  1 10 ; 
speedy,  deprecated  by  Union 
League,  LI  i ;  urged  by  Memphis 
meeting  and  by  Gen.  Thomas,  112; 
Johnson's  plan  for,  113  et  seq.; 
Johnson  urges  stringent  oath  for 
participants  in,  114-117;  test  oath 
required  of  voters  in,  118,  120; 
Johnson  blamed  for  failure  of,  123 ; 
Union  convention  of,  Sept.,  1864, 
takes  steps  toward,  140-145;  John 
son's  proclamation  regarding,  146; 
Johnson  appeals  for  aid  in,  146; 
call  for  preliminary  convention  for, 
I57j  final  convention  for,  160-171; 
accomplished,  173-175;  Johnson's 
policy  of,  criticized,  210;  and  de 
fended,  211-217;  possible  explana 
tion  of  Johnson's  haste  in,  215.  See 
also  convention,  elections,  Johnson, 
Lincoln,  military  government,  oath. 


INDEX 


233 


Rodgers,  S.  R.,  President  of  Tenn. 
reconstruction  convention;  speech 
of,  161 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  William  S.,  Instruc 
tions  to,  regarding  relation  of  mili 
tary  to  civil  courts,  45 ;  assigned  to 
command  department  of  Cumber 
land,  67;  adopts  repressive  policy, 
75;  controversy  between  Johnson 
and,  over  Truesdail,  79  et  seq.;  re 
buked  by  Halleck,  81 ;  accused  of 
complicity  in  cotton  scandals,  82; 
correspondence  of,  with  Johnson, 
82;  objects  to  transfer  of  regiment 
to  governor's  guard,  83 ;  repressive 
policy  of,  criticized,  83 ;  creates 
board  of  claims  for  Nashville,  85; 
directs  arrest  of  secessionists,  85; 
advances  against  Bragg,  91 ;  victor 
at  Stone  River,  91 ;  drives  Bragg 
from  Tullahoma,  99;  pursues 
Bragg  into  Georgia,  101 ;  defeated 
at  'Chickamauga,  108;  relieved  of 
command,  108;  authorized  to  re 
cruit  prisoners,  195 ;  enlists  Con 
federate  deserters,  195;  proposes 
that  Johnson  complete  Northwest 
ern  railroad,  197 

Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.,  'Checks 
Hood  at  Franklin,  159;  Johnson 
urges  substitution  of  Thomas  for, 
in  East  Tenn.,  187;  troubles  of, 
over  governor's  guard,  187 

Schurz,  Carl,  Recollections  of  John 
son  by,  219 

Scott,  Thomas  A.,  Report  of,  un 
favorable  to  appointment  of  John 
son,  30  note 

Secession  in  Tenn.,  See  convention, 
Harris,  legislature,  Tennessee 

Shackelford,  Gen.  James  M.,  Cap 
tures  Confederate  force  at  'Cum 
berland  Gap,  101 

Sherman,  Gen.  William  T.,  Burns 
Randolph,  55;  relieves  Knoxville, 
109;  secures  control  of  Nashville- 
Northwestern  railroad,  198,  199 ;  on 
financial  situation  in  West  Tenn., 
200 ;  approves  of  sending  secession 
ists  south,  207 ;  mentioned,  1 10, 
134,  155,  158,  187,  188,  191 

Shiloh,  Battle  of,  46 

Sidell,  Maj.  W.  H.,  Account  of 
Johnson's  plan  for  defence  of 
Nashville  by,  59 

Slavery  in  Tenn.,  Johnson's  views 
on,  23;  effect  of  emancipation 


proclamation  in  Tenn.,  88;  Tenn. 
excepted  from  emancipation  proc 
lamation,  91 ;  Johnson's  speech  on, 
92;  Nashville  Union  on,  92;  de 
nounced  by  Nashville  Union  Club, 
93;  Johnson  on,  105;  Lincoln 
presses  for  emancipation  clause  in 
Tenn.  constitution,  106;  Johnson 
on,  116-118;  condemned  by  Union 
meeting,  118;  Johnson  for  imme 
diate  emancipation,  124;  Johnson's 
opponent,  denounced  as  seeking  to 
save,  124;  abolition  of,  in  Tenn. 
demanded  by  Union  convention, 
145;  Johnson  declares  end  of,  155; 
emancipation  amendment  to  con 
stitution  proposed  in  reconstruction 
convention,  165;  proposed  amend 
ment  regarding  negro  suffrage,  165 ; 
abolition  urged  by  Johnson,  168; 
abolition  amendment  approved  by 
reconstruction  convention,  170; 
abolished,  173 

Smith,  Gen.  E.  Kirby,  Cooperates 
with  Bragg,  60  and  note 

Smith,  Hugh,  Mentioned,  78 

Smith,  Gen.  William  Sooy,  Complains 
of  lenient  policy  of  government,  74 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Orders  Halleck 
to  provide  troops  for  Johnson,  42; 
orders  Halleck  to  protect  Nashville, 
51 ;  Johnson  complains  to,  of  weak 
defence  of  Nashville,  52;  confidence 
of,  in  Johnson,  54,  68;  authorizes 
Johnson  to  raise  cavalry,  56;  in 
structions  of,  to  Johnson,  176 
note ;  authorizes  Johnson  to  raise 
funds  for  home  guard,  to  raise 
troops,  etc.,  178,  179,  180;  corre 
spondence  of,  with  Johnson  regard 
ing  organization  of  colored  troops, 
182,  183;  orders  of,  regarding  negro 
enlistments,  184,  185 ;  authorizes 
Johnson  to  examine  and  report  on 
prisoners  and  to  enlist  prisoners 
and  deserters,  198,  199;  transfers 
management  of  Nashville-North 
western  railroad  to  Anderson,  198; 
orders  of,  concerning  support  of 
negroes,  207;  enlogizes  Johnson, 
222;  mentioned,  74,  82 

Stearns,  Maj.  George  L.,  Authorized 
to  enlist  negroes,  182;  friction  be 
tween  Johnson  and,  182 

Stephens,  Alexander  H.,  Estimate  of 
Johnson's  speech  on  the  Crittenden 
compromise  by,  29 


234 


INDEX 


Stevens,  Thaddeus,  Views  on  status 
of  seceded  states  and  on  constitu 
tional  basis  of  military  government, 

34 

Stone  River,  Battle  of,  91 

Temple,  Oliver  P.,  Account  of  John 
son's  speech  for  Union  by,  27;  ac 
count  of  Knoxville  convention  by, 
126;  criticizes  Johnson's  reconstruc 
tion  policy,  210-213;  mentioned,  18 

Tennessee,  Conditions  in,  before  war, 
i;  legislature  of,  convened,  2;  se 
cession  agitation  in,  3;  sentiment 
in,  4;  repudiates  secession,  Feb., 
1861,  5 ;  forms  military  league  with 
Confederacy,  9;  secedes  and  joins 
•Confederacy,  10;  military  govern 
ment  established  in,  19;  economic 
conditions  in,  1862,  47;  conciliatory 
policy  of  Johnson  and  Buell  in, 
71 ;  disloyalty  of,  73 ;  reconstruc 
tion  of,  urged  by  Lincoln,  88;  ab 
sence  of  Union  enthusiasm  in,  90; 
excepted  from  emancipation  proc 
lamation,  91 ;  Confederate  dis 
couragement  over,  94;  economic 
conditions  in,  1863,  104;  political 
conditions  in,  1863,  105;  1864,  139; 
troops,  177-192;  finances,  199-204. 
See  also  East  Tenn.,  Middle  Tenn., 
West  Tenn.,  convention,  courts, 
elections,  legislature,  military  gov 
ernment,  military  operations,  mil 
itia,  railroads,  reconstruction,  slav 
ery 

Thayer,  Eli,  Urges  confiscation  of 
lands  of  Confederates,  130 

Thomas,  Gen.  George  H.,  Favors 
occupying  point  near  Cumberland 
Gap,  17;  proposed  as  successor  to 
Buell,  58;  speaks  in  Buell's  favor, 
66;  at  Chickamauga,  107;  assigned 
to  command  department  of  Cum 
berland,  107;  urges  speedy  recon 
struction,  112;  urges  reorganiza 
tion  of  courts,  134;  retreats  before 
Hood,  158;  war  department  and 
'Grant  dissatisfied  with,  159; 
crushes  Hood,  159;  urges  recon 
struction,  160;  Johnson  urges,  for 
command  in  East  Tenn.,  187;  or 
ders  of,  regarding  deserters,  195- 
196;  favors  sending  secessionists 
south,  207;  view  of,  regarding  re 
construction,  212  note ;  mentioned, 
62,  no,  188,  190,  198,  199 

Thomas,   T.   B.,   Delegate  to  Union 


convention;  resolutions  by,  141, 
143;  resolutions  of,  laid  on  table, 
144 

Tomeny,  J.  M.,  Member  of  Union 
executive  committee,  98;  testifies 
against  civil  commission  at  Mem 
phis,  133 

Toombs,  Robert,  Mentioned,  8 

Trewett,  Judge,  Resolutions  of,   163 

Trigg,  C.  F.,  Opens  circuit  court  at 
Knoxville,  131 ;  investigates  prison 
ers,  194 

Troops,  Tenn.,  See  military  govern 
ment 

Truesdail,  William,  Chief  of  army 
detective  police,  78;  alleged  cor 
ruption  of,  78  et  seq.;  Johnson 
complains  of,  ^79;  implicated  in 
cotton  scandals,  82;  administration 
of,  investigated,  83;  denounced  by 
Johnson,  83;  mentioned,  106,  177, 
203 

Union  League,  Deprecates  speedy 
reconstruction,  in 

Veatch,  Gen.  James  C.,  Appoints  civil 
commission  at  Memphis,  132 

Walker,  Leroy  P.,  Mentioned,  7 

Washburn,  Gen.  Cadwallader  C., 
Subverts  government  of  Memphis, 
138;  mentioned,  134 

Webster,  Gen.  Joseph  D.,  Mentioned, 
198 

West  Tennessee,  Votes  for  conven 
tion,  5;  votes  for  secession,  10; 
martial  law  in,  19;  military  opera 
tions  in,  52;  Union  sentiment  in, 
89,  105;  Union  nominating  con 
vention  in,  128;  courts  in,  134; 
enrollment  of  militia  in,  135;  ad 
ministration  defeat  in,  predicted, 
139;  Confederate  activity  in,  156; 
deplorable  conditions  in,  160; 
small  vote  for  reconstruction  in, 
173;  discontent  in,  190.  See  also 
Memphis 

Wheeler,  Gen.  Joseph,  Operations  of, 
134;  activity  of,  diminishes  Union 
vote,  140;  mentioned,  186,  190 

Whigs  in  Tenn.,  Strength  of,  before 
war,  i ;  vote  of,  1860,  i  note ;  ap 
peal  of,  to  people,  6;  disappearance 
of,  7 

Yansil,  Col.,  Confederate  provisional 
governor  of  Tenn.,  156 

Zollicoffer,  Gen.  Felix  K.,  Com 
mands  Confederates  in  East  Tenn., 
14;  mentioned,  15,  16 


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Andrew  Johnson,        H3 
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